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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is about the development and implementation of a Knowledge Management 
Strategy in a multi-cultural engineering design environment in the automotive industry. 
It aims to use knowledge management as a vehicle for organisational change by first, 
understanding the cultural interactions between partners on their models of learning and 
then to develop and trial a set of tools and frameworks to raise the capability and 
improve the efficiency of Nissan Technical Centre Europe.   
 
The main argument of this thesis is that national culture is so invasive and influential on 
organisational culture that it can become dysfunctional in a global organisation. The 
“way we do things around here” is a powerful mechanism by which people value 
themselves and build their identities. Through an action research approach to the design 
and implementation of a knowledge management strategy the thesis argues that, rather 
than try to homogenise cultures, global companies need to maximise the different 
cultural strengths and create agendas for dialogue. In the longer term this will help build 
relationships, understanding and empathy and ultimately enhance capability. 
Organisational cultures cannot be dictated but they can be shaped. Operationally, things 
may appear to be the same across borders but the cultural mechanisms to facilitate 
operations are inherently different; this difference needs to be understood and 
appreciated.  Organisational efficiency depends on being able to draw on nationalistic 
and organisational cultural strengths whilst accepting that these strengths need 
balancing to ensure they do not become self defeating.   
 
The conclusion of the thesis is that knowledge management at Nissan is a process of 
cultural change, shaped by those in positions of power at any given point in time and 
dependent on the interaction of structural, organisational, technological and procedural 
elements which cannot be treated separately and that efficiency, sustainability and the 
beginnings of a knowledge based learning culture can be realised by organising around 
knowledge and that knowledge management and organisational learning depend on 
developing a global mindset which allows for a variety of cultural contexts.   
 
John Temple      ii 
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 Chapter One 
 
Setting the Scene   
 
 
1. 0  Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the reader to global Nissan and sets the scene for the study 
which is about the development and implementation of a knowledge management 
strategy at Nissan Technical Centre Europe where the author works as the Manager of 
the Knowledge Management and Audit section. The intent of the strategy was to raise 
the capability of the company. The three year study began in January 2003 and 
culminated in a Methodology to Organise Around Knowledge. The study also begins 
to determine the scope and role of a knowledge manager and meaning of knowledge 
management within global Nissan. The chapter also introduces reader to the research 
philosophy and the keys bodies of literature used to substantiate the analysis and 
recommendations made in the thesis which include organisational culture, knowledge 
management and learning organisations and ends with a debate about the contribution 
to knowledge and the overall structure of the thesis 
 
1.1   Background  
 
Nissan’s core business is the sale and manufacture of automobiles but it also makes 
industrial machinery and marine equipment and employs 127, 625 people worldwide. 
In 2002, Nissan produced 2,761,375 vehicles, 1,317,061 of which were manufactured 
outside of Japan. The company manufactures vehicles in Japan, USA, Mexico, UK, 
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, South Africa, Indonesia and China and is 
supported by a global sales and distribution network (Nissan Fact File, 2003). The 
company has three main lead research and development (R&D) centres, its 
headquarters, Nissan Technical Centre, Japan (NTC), Nissan Technical Centre Europe 
(NTCE), which is in the UK and the Nissan Technical Centre North America 
(NTCNA), which is in Detroit, USA. It also has much smaller research and 
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development centres in Brussels (NTCB), Mexico (NMEX), South Africa (NSA), 
China (DNTC & NCIC)), Taiwan (YNTC) Vietnam (NSEA) and Brazil (NBA). 
(Appendix 1) 
 
NTCE, where the study takes place employs about a thousand people and has offices 
in Cranfield, Bedfordshire, England and in Barcelona, Spain. The company is 
dedicated to tailoring Nissan vehicles for the European market and services two 
manufacturing plants, Nissan Motor United Kingdom, (NMUK) in the North East of 
England and Nissan Motor Iberia, (NMISA) in Barcelona, Spain.  
 
The NTCE Knowledge Management Section is part of Product Development Support 
(PDS), which, as its name suggest focuses on managing the activities to support 
product design and development. The section had been in existence for about a year 
when the author took over as Manager. It had been set up by a Director who believed 
the company needed a computer based project management system, highlighting what 
sections needed to do and by when which was basically a computerised generic 
master schedule of events. In principle, it was a sound idea but the Director left the 
company and without a sponsor the section floundered. The incumbent knowledge 
manager was pleased to let the author take over the section, so he could “get on with 
the real business of making cars.”  The Knowledge Management Section was 
managed by senior who was an ex-trim engineer and comprised of an engineer, who 
looked after the apprentices, two administrators who concentrated on language 
services and a placement student who was who working at NTCE for one year as part 
of an engineering sandwich degree. (First line managers at NTCE are known as 
seniors). The senior had attempted to understand knowledge management, he had 
attended a couple of conferences and connected with other knowledge management 
groups in other organisations but nothing had been done in the way of strategy and 
implementation of initiatives. Later, the Director of Product Development Support 
stated that the section was to be disbanded within the year.  He said:  
 
“No one really knew what knowledge management was. It sounded like a good idea 
and something we should be doing. It meant different things to different people but no 
one actually did anything.”     
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Colleagues at the Nissan Technical Centre were equally baffled by knowledge 
management. What did it all mean? At one of the first global Knowledge 
Management meetings in Japan the author was shown the results of discussion 
between Senior Vice Presidents of the company on the meaning of knowledge 
management. Their opinions were divided and revolved around four main areas: 
 
• Recurrence Prevention: Finding ways to ensure problems are not repeated; 
• Subject Matter Experts – Transfer of Knowledge from the Expert to other 
staff members; 
• Company Intranets - The need for global and local networks of data 
bases/asset repositories; 
• Capturing Processes. 
 
The question remained: What is Knowledge Management? Buckman (2004) argues 
the term knowledge management is a misnomer much used by consultants to imply 
that organisational success can be simply achieved by managing explicit knowledge.  
Scarborough and Swann (2003) have argued that some organisations have introduced 
Knowledge Management as a panacea for the Business Process Re-engineering 
Programmes (BPR) of the early nineties. Hammer and Champy (1993), who 
pioneered BPR defined it as: 
 
“The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve 
dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as 
cost, quality, service and speed.” (Hammer and Champy, 1993:32) 
  
Whereas Total Quality Management (TQM) was concerned with continuous 
incremental improvements, BPR focused on radical restructuring change programmes 
to improve performance.  BPR, ignored history and the politics of organisational 
cultures and structures and undermined the traditional emphasis on task specialisation. 
It a process oriented approach, adopting a horizontal view of all the activities involved 
in the process or activities in the delivery of the product or service. BPR has been 
criticised as being obsessed with technology and a euphemism for downsizing (Brown 
and Duguid, 2000). Nevertheless, in its heyday, it gained an impressive following of 
organisations which were willing to be re-engineered, these included Ford, Hewlett-
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Packard, Xerox and IBM. The author will return to the subject of BPR and the link 
with IBM in Chapter Ten but it is interesting to note at this juncture that BPR 
initiatives have been given a failure rate of 50-70% and TQM one of 90% (Grey, 
2005). The reason for the failures are many and complex and far beyond the scope of 
this thesis but Grey (2005) makes an interesting and relevant point when discussing 
why change management fails: 
 
“Managers responsible for particular change programmes are likely, for career and 
identity reasons, to describe them as successful. Yet the everyday experience of 
people in organisations is that one change programme gives way to another in a 
perennially failing operation: nirvana is always just on its way.”  (Grey, 2005:97) 
 
Nissan also downsized in the early nineties, swathes of middle managers were made 
redundant or farmed out into its supplier base. This was compounded by a company 
policy, which stipulated that managers left the company when they reached the age of 
fifty five. It was short-sighted and ageist because often these were the people with the 
knowledge and one of the main criticisms of BPR is that it is people and not systems 
that deliver (Mullins, 1999).  Whilst it may be difficult to define knowledge 
management there seems to be an agreement, within Nissan at least, that the 
properties of knowledge are less contentious and fall into the categories as identified 
by Holden (2002).   
 
• Individuals create knowledge; 
• It is expandable, through interpretation and reflection; 
• It can be stored in human heads and in technical repositories like books, 
documents and databases; 
• It can be stored systematically to allow easy access; 
• It can be summarised and codified; 
• It can be shared; 
• It can be forgotten. 
Almeida et. al, (2003) regard knowledge as the basis of a firm’s growth and the key to 
sustainable competitive advantage. Taking the argument further, knowledge is 
accumulated only when the whole organisation gains a new understanding and the 
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deeper that knowledge base, the stronger its competitive advantage. A firm’s 
competitive advantage depends on the resource conversion and market positioning of 
knowledge. Resource conversion is the firm’s ability to create distinctive products 
from resources generally available to its competitors,  this can be through product or 
process innovation and is articulated by patents, copyrights and trade secrets whereas 
the market positioning of knowledge is the firm’s ability to spot opportunities and 
avoid threats posed by the environment (Chakravarthy et al., 2003).   
The ability of a company to absorb knowledge or its “absorptive capacity” has been 
defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as the ability to recognise and utilise the value 
of new external knowledge and apply it commercially to new ends and knowledge 
management is assumed to have a positive impact on performance (Scarbrough and 
Swan, 2003). McKern (1996) believes only those firms that develop their knowledge 
management capabilities will develop a clear cost and performance advantage over 
their competitors. Knowledge management, in this context is a resource-based view of 
the firm, focusing on the value of intellectual capital and the process of capturing and 
using knowledge to enhance organisational performance which suggests competitive 
advantage can be knowledge embodied internally, in a firm’s resource (Drew, 1996). 
Chakravarthy (1996) argues that sustainable profitable growth can only be achieved 
by knowledge management activities that protect, leverage and accumulate 
proprietary knowledge which is crucial to the success of the business.  
 
1.2  Broad Aims and Objectives: The Capability Challenge 
 
NTCE’s Managing Director (June 2001 – March 2006) and the main sponsor for this 
study had a similar view. He wanted to know how we used knowledge management to 
raise the technical capability of the company. The importance of the study, in trying to 
establish how the company learns, and manages knowledge – especially in respect of 
innovation and recurrence prevention – was the topic of discussion during the later 
part of 2002 because the company was about to undertake its first Case III project.   
 
In the past, NTCE has only concerned itself with Case II development projects, where 
vehicles are designed and developed by NTC and then handed over to NTCE to 
finalise the development and take the vehicle into production at one of Nissan’s 
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European manufacturing plants.  For Case III, the vehicle platform (chassis) and 
engine would be designed and developed by the Nissan Technical Centre in Japan but 
NTCE would be responsible for the design and development of the rest of the vehicle 
(Figure 1.1). The Managing Director was also interested in culture and asked how it 
impacted the way we managed different nationalities? He said: 
 
“I expect knowledge management to think about ways to help raise the technical 
capability of the company. They will make mistakes. They will go down the wrong 
road but I expect them to find practical ways of managing knowledge.” 
 
 
 
 
Case III 
Upper 
Body & Trim 
designed 
& developed 
by NTCE 
Platform & Engine designed and developed by NTC
 
Figure 1.1: Schematic Showing Design and Development Responsibilities 
 
It was a clear direction and an invitation to study with expected outcomes. It was also 
time based; his sponsorship lasted only as long as he remained with the company.  
The key word was “practical,” although not dismissive of academic study NTCE 
Directors and Managers soon tire of theoretical discussions which offer nothing 
concrete. Nissan wants to become a learning organisation which is concerned with the 
practicalities of discovering how an organisation “should” learn in order to be 
successful, rather than debating “how” an organisation learns. Senge (1990:1) has 
defined a learning organisation as  
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“a place where people continually expand their capacity for creating results they 
really want, where patterns of thinking are broadened and nurtured, where collective 
aspiration is free and where people are continually learning to learn.”  
Garvin’s (1993:80) simplified version reads:  
“an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at 
modifying its behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights”.  
The Managing Director wanted to know how to increase the capability of the 
company to manage shortened lead times and accommodate newly developed global 
systems. In 2003, at the start of this study NTCE was looking at a lead time, for Case 
III developments of 26 months from Model Cut Off, when the styling for the new 
model is finally agreed to Start of Production (SOP). This time also included a trail 
build (S-Lot) but had a new paperless design release system.  In 2007, NTCE’s lead 
time is expected to be 10 months, there will no trial builds and the company is 
expected to use a suite of new global processes (V3P Tools and Processes). (Figure 
1.2) 
 
C
apability
2007 
S-Lot  
Paper 
Dwgs 
 
26 Months
S-Lot  
Paperless 
Case II 
 
26 Months 
S-Lot  
 Case III 
 
26 Months 
S-Lot  
+ 
V3P Tools 
 Case III 
 
25 Months 
S-Lot  
+ 
V3P 
Process 
 
18 Months 
V3P 
Process 
 – No 
Prototype 
 
10 Months 
Increase in Capability 
2003 
Time  
 
Figure 1.2:  NTCE’s Capability Challenge for Case III Developments 
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The Managing Director also talked about the spiral up of technical knowledge and the 
need for continuous learning. Nissan Technical Centre Japan were developing ten to 
twelve cars a year, NTCNA (North America) were involved with four to six vehicle 
programmes a year. Both companies had the opportunity to learn from their 
experience when compared with NTCE (Europe), which had just begun its first Case 
III development. It was a tall order but he wanted to know how we closed the 
capability gap.  Figure 1.3: Spiral Up of Knowledge: Column A depicts the spiral up 
of knowledge. Column B shows the relative spiral up of knowledge, based on the 
number of vehicles the companies develop in any one year in NTC, NTCNA and 
NTCE. Column C shows an image of a graph indicating the capability gap between 
NTC and NTCE. 
 
 
 
    
                Column A                       Column B                        Column C 
Figure 1.3: Spiral Up of Knowledge 
 
Van der Spek et al. (2002:2) state “knowledge management is not rocket science; it is 
about smart ways of working and smart businesses.” The author has heard similar 
sentiments expressed by Nissan managers on numerous occasions but contends the 
implementation and sustainability of a knowledge management strategy is in all 
probability more complex than rocket science in that its success hinges on human 
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relationships. Knowledge is worthless unless people are willing to turn knowledge 
into action. The role of knowledge management is to provide people with culturally 
tuned methods and tools that build on their understanding of how knowledge 
underpins the business.  
 
The Managing Director had another challenge, whilst he accepted that any 
organisational culture is the interaction between the strategies driven from the top, 
with the working groups of the organisation at base level, he wanted to encourage 
more bottom up thinking. Cook and Yanow (1993) conceptualised organisational 
learning as a cultural process, for organisations to learn they must have the right 
culture, a learning culture. The Managing Director  said, that from his experience, 
NTCE employees were always waiting for direction from their management team. He 
wanted them to take the initiative and be more like NTC, where he said ideas came 
from “the bottom up.” (Figure 1.4) 
 
 
NTCE CULTURE NTC CULTURE 
Top Down 
Bottom 
Up 
Bottom 
Up 
Top  
Down 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Bottom Up Thinking 
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1. 3  Specific Aims and Objectives 
 
The specific aims and objectives of this thesis are to use knowledge management as a 
vehicle for organisational change by first, understanding the cultural interactions 
between partners on their models of learning and then to develop and trial a set of 
tools and frameworks to raise the capability and improve the efficiency of Nissan 
Technical Centre Europe. The problem,  given the cultural history of the company and 
the current global economic conditions is how knowledge is transferred that is 
simultaneously generic in process and content but culturally diverse in 
implementation and delivery.        
 
1. 4  Research Philosophy: Real World Enquiry 
 
This research is about finding something which is practical and works in “real life” 
situations. Trist (1976) claims that whilst the natural sciences use controlled 
laboratory experimentation to generate research findings, social scientists make 
theoretical progress by applied research.  It is not necessarily an easy task. Robson 
(2002:4) believes one of the challenges of real world enquiry is in saying “something 
sensible about a complex, relatively poorly controlled and generally ‘messy’ 
situation.” The employed methodologies and techniques are explained in Chapter 
Three are largely qualitative and in the form of discussions and semi structured 
interviews. The bodies of literature used to substantiate the analysis and the 
recommendations made in this thesis include organisational culture, knowledge 
management and learning organisations. These are described briefly in the next 
section and a more detailed literature survey is presented in subsequent chapters.  
 
1.4.1  Organisational Culture 
 
Organisational culture became popular as a management theory in the 1970s. Drennan 
(1992) defined it as:  
 
“How things are done around here. It is what is typical of the organisation, the habits, 
the prevailing attitudes, the grown up pattern of accepted behaviours.”  (Drennan, 
1992:3) 
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Organisational culture is less easy to understand than the formal elements, such as 
structure, management, strategy and technology. French and Bell (1990) famously 
used the metaphor of the organisational iceberg to pictorially express the idea of the 
formal and informal organisation. Above the water line is the formal organisation; 
below, is the informal organisation, which is shaped by culture, leadership styles, 
values, attitudes and beliefs. Presthus (1978) believes we live in organisational 
societies dominated by global organisations. Civilisation evolves around 
organisational routines, repeat activities and deference to management authority.  
Successful organisations need employees who behave and act similarly. To Ohmae 
(1991), a global organisation should be free from national allegiances. He supports the 
convergence view that argues the forces of industrialisation will align global 
strategies, structures and management philosophies regardless of organisational 
locations and wants to eradicate what he calls the “headquarters mentality.” Burack 
(1991) also believes that ingrained cultural values of an organisation result in uniform 
behavioural patterns and underlying values regardless of geographic, functional or 
business boundaries.   
 
1.4.2  Knowledge Management  
 
Prior to 1990, there was little academic interest in knowledge management (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles, 2003).  Knowledge is purported to be a key competitive asset which 
forms the basis of a firm’s growth (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995) and sustainable 
competitive advantage (Kogut, 1993).   To define this further, it is only proprietary 
knowledge, relative to the business that is of competitive advantage to the firm. 
Friedman et al. (1991) argue that two types of knowledge underpin a firm’s 
competitive advantage: resource conversion and market positioning. Resource 
conversion is the ability of a firm to use available knowledge to create distinctive 
products, through process or product innovation. Examples of the resource conversion 
of knowledge include the use of patents, copyrights and trade secrets. The market 
positioning of knowledge is the ability of a firm to spot, then use the knowledge it has 
to capitalise on opportunities in its environment. Thus, organisational knowledge can 
be defined as a study to:  
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“understand and conceptualise the nature of knowledge that is contained within 
organizations” and knowledge management as “a technical approach aimed at 
creating ways of dissemination and leveraging knowledge in order to enhance 
organizational performance.” (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003:3)    
 
1.4.3  Learning Organisations 
 
Whilst accepting that some writers make a distinction between learning organisations 
and organisational learning the author draws from the literatures of both for this study 
to support his argument. Organisational learning has been defined as the theoretical 
study and academic critique of organisational learning processes (Tsang, 1997). This 
approach is favoured by theoreticians who view organisations as “open systems” or 
single identities able to process information (Huber, 1991) and are able to scan, 
interpret and learn from the external environment in a constant manner (Daft & Weick, 
1984).   
 
The creation of a learning organisation is said to be about understanding how an 
organisation is able to prosper from effective learning (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 
2003) and came about with the emergence of communities of practice where it was 
proposed that learning was shaped by human factors (Brown and Duguid, 1991) and 
organisations were viewed as a collective culture (Cook & Yannow, 1993) where the 
knowledge needed to raise skill levels are formulated through the relationship of 
building and fostering of organisational identities and for the social constructionist, 
this is done at group level. Orr (1990) calls the knowledge commonly known to all 
members in the community as the “community memory.” The perspectives differ in 
that information processing concentrates on building structures but the social 
constructionist, whilst acknowledging context is important focuses on human factors 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991) however both consider the organisation as a unit of analysis 
and have the same aim of improving organisational learning.   
 
1. 5 The Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The issue of culture has been relatively neglected from the literature of organizational 
learning (Hong, 1999). The main argument of this thesis is that national culture is so 
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invasive and influential on organisational culture that it can become dysfunctional in a 
global organisation. The “way we do things around here” is a powerful mechanism by 
which people value themselves and build their identities. Rather than try to 
homogenise cultures, the aim is to create structures which maximise the different 
cultural strengths and create agendas for dialogue which, longer term will help build 
relationships, understanding and empathy and ultimately enhance capability and 
improve organisational efficiency.   
 
The author is pragmatic enough to realise he is not going to change cultural mindsets 
believing that the key to sustainability and implementation is in recognising and 
managing within the cultural restraints of the company. This means recognising and 
understanding the history, background and implications of the patterns of interaction 
operating within the company and designing frameworks which minimise 
misunderstandings and facilitate learning. He argues that these patterns of interaction 
are culturally ingrained to the point where they are difficult, if not impossible to 
change and any attempt to do so, at an organisational level is futile. Although 
individuals can be swayed by the logic of an argument it does not necessarily mean 
they will alter the way they behave because people, at different times in their lives, 
depending on their culture and experience are motivated by different things and in 
different ways.   
 
Nissan Global Culture is the amalgamation of cultures from multiple organisations, 
scattered across the globe which are unified by a common vision and harnessed by 
objectives. The question is how you shape culture to improve organisational 
efficiency. Cultural change is dynamic (ever changing) and cannot be controlled, 
however by studying culture we can understand the reasons for the differences and 
identify interventions which may assist in helping culture develop in a particular way, 
minimising the dysfunctional elements but making the most of the cultural strengths 
that each company brings to global Nissan. This is not the same as actively forcing 
change but by understanding the dynamics which cause those changes we can learn 
how to communicate change within a cultural context. The argument of this thesis is 
that enhanced capability, efficiency, sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge 
based learning culture can only be realised by organising around knowledge. The 
proposal is to align company and knowledge management strategies by identifying 
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and organising around the knowledge which is core to the business and the future 
direction of the company. The theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge  
are discussed in Chapter Eleven of this thesis.  
 
1.6  Thesis Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION ONE:  
Introduction, Context and 
Framework for the Study 
Chapter One: Setting the 
Scene. Outlines the Aims, 
Objectives and Structure of the 
Thesis. 
Chapter Two: The Study in 
Context  
Chapter Three: The Research 
Philosophy, Strategy and 
Methodological Framework 
Underpinning the Study 
SECTION TWO: 
Understanding the Impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four:  
Organisational Culture and 
the Management of Change 
Chapter Five: The Impact of 
Organisational Culture on 
Knowledge Management and 
Learning at Nissan 
 
SECTION THREE: Developing and 
implementing a Strategy to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Six: Putting a face to Knowledge 
Management at NTCE  
Chapter Seven:  The proposal to Organise 
Around Knowledge 
Chapter Eight: Phase One: Pilot to Organise 
Around Knowledge. 
Chapter Nine: Phase Two: Pilot to Organise 
Around Knowledge and Results of Study. 
SECTION FOUR: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan  
and Conclusion to the Study  
Chapter Ten: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan 
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion and  
Contributions to Knowledge   
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 : Thesis Structure 
 
The final part of this chapter looks at the thesis structure which is organised into four 
sections. (Figure 1.5). Section One comprises three Chapters. Chapter One sets the 
scene and outlines the aims, objectives and structure of the thesis. Chapter Two places 
the study in the context of global Nissan, whilst Chapter Three presents the research 
philosophy, strategy and methodological framework underpinning the study.  
 
Section Two is about understanding the impact of organisational culture and 
comprises of Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Four introduces, debates and compares 
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the different models and typologies for organisational culture that frame the study 
whilst Chapter Five, looks at the impact of organisational culture on knowledge 
management and learning at Nissan.   
 
Section Three is about developing a strategy to organise around knowledge and 
comprises Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. Chapter Six begins to face to what 
knowledge management actually means to the company. Chapter Seven describes the 
background to the proposal to Organise Around Knowledge. Chapter Eight presents 
Phase One and Chapter Nine presents Phase Two of the pilot to Organise Around 
Knowledge. (Figure 1.5) 
 
Section Four comprises Chapters Ten and Eleven.  Chapter Ten debates the future of 
knowledge management at Nissan and  Chapter Eleven concludes the thesis by 
reflecting on the author’s role as a researcher and a practitioner. It also summarises 
what has been achieved against the aims and objectives set out in Chapter One, 
collates the theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge and presents potential 
avenues for further study.   
 
 Each Chapter is preceded by a section of the thesis structure to show how it relates to 
the overall study. 
 
1.7  Conclusion  
  
This chapter has explained the background to the study and the reason for the 
capability challenge and is the building block for the rest of the thesis. It has shown 
that although there are vague and often conflicting views as to the meaning of 
knowledge management within the company there is a consensus that it is somehow 
important.  It has given the author a direction and specific aims and objectives which 
is to use knowledge management as a vehicle for organisational change by first, 
understanding the cultural interactions between partners on their models of learning 
and then to develop and trial a set of tools and frameworks to raise the capability and 
improve the efficiency of Nissan Technical Centre Europe and highlighted the 
problem which, given the cultural history of the company and the current global 
economic conditions is how knowledge is transferred that is simultaneously generic in 
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process and content but culturally diverse in implementation and delivery.  In 
summary, this chapter has: 
  
• Introduced the reader to Nissan and to the Nissan Technical Centre Europe   
• Opened the debate on the meaning of knowledge management within Nissan 
• Explained the broad and specific aims and objectives of the study  
• Described the research philosophy as finding something practical which works 
in “real life.”  
• Discussed the contribution to knowledge which is in understanding the 
implications of culture on learning  
• Gave a brief description of the literature underpinning the study.  
• Presented the overall structure of the thesis.  
 
 
Chapter Two places the study in more detail within the context of Global Nissan and 
Chapter Three introduces the research philosophy, strategy and methodological 
frameworks which underpin it. 
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 Chapter Two 
 
 
The Study in Context 
 
 
2.0  Introduction 
 
 
This chapter puts the study into the context of global Nissan and shows that the 
company’s approach to knowledge management is rooted in the political and cultural 
history of Japan. Knowledge management has been defined as “the explicit control 
and management of knowledge within an organisation aimed at achieving the 
company’s objectives” (Van der Spek and Spijikervet, 1997: 43). Replace the words 
organisation and company with the word Japan and the definition is still relevant. It 
also explains the reason for the Nissan Renault Alliance and describes the effect 
Carlos Ghosn has on the company. The chapter also outlines the strategies the 
company has used to manage knowledge, its future direction and gives a background 
to Nissan Manufacturing United Kingdom (NMUK) and Nissan Technical Centre 
Europe (NTCE). 
  
 
SECTION ONE:  
Introduction, Context and 
Framework for the Study 
Chapter One: Setting the Scene. 
Outlines the Aims, Objectives 
and Structure of the Thesis. 
Chapter Two: The Study in 
Context  
Chapter Three: The Research 
Philosophy, Strategy and 
Methodological Framework 
Underpinning the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1   Japan  
 
Japanese culture has been heavily influenced by China. Befu, (1971) reports 
techniques for the cultivation of wet rice diffused from Central China across the 
China Seas to Southern Korea and Japan about 300BC, at the beginnings of the Yayoi 
period. Eighth Century Japanese documents, the Kojiki and Nihin Shoki record the 
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historical beginnings of a classical civilisation in Japan, as being the fusion of the 
indigenous Japanese traditions with the Chinese civilisation of the T’ang Dynasty, 
which was actively imported from the seventh century. From about the ninth century, 
Japan ceased contact with China and began to select and assimilate borrowed 
elements within its culture. T’ang methods of state administration were modified to 
suit native traditions. Japanese aesthetic style began to reassert itself in various forms 
of art, architecture and literature. Chinese writing was modified to allow the Japanese 
language to be recorded in the kana syllabary. This process of cultural adaptation, 
assimilation and diffusion has been referred to by Foster (1960) as cultural 
crystallisation. Although diplomatic channels may have been closed, the Japanese 
hierarchy allowed their southern provinces to continue trading with China selecting 
and controlling the areas of business that suited them. In effect they had created a 
‘Gaijin Bubble’ in which foreigners were allowed to operate. Gaijin is short for 
gaikokujin, “outside country person.   
 
2.1.1  The Tokugawa Shogunate (also known as the Edo Bakufu) 
 
The Tokugawa Shoguns did something similar in the seventeenth century. The 
Tokugawa Shogunate was a feudal military dictatorship, established in 1603 by 
Tokugawa Ieyasu and ruled by the Shoguns of the Tokugawa family until 1863. This 
period, known as the Edo period was named after the capital city of Edo, now called 
Tokyo, and was based on a strict class of hierarchy. At the top were the warriors, or 
samurai, followed by the farmers, artisans and traders. Prior to the twentieth century 
the majority of Japanese people worked the land. The Portuguese and Spanish began 
trading in Japan from the middle of the sixteenth century. They also bought with them 
firearms, medicines, clocks and Roman Catholic missionaries. The missionaries 
proved to be a problem. Fearful of the spread of Christianity and its required 
allegiance to Rome, the politically astute Tokugawa shoguns recognised that the new 
religion might ultimately undermine their positions and banned all foreigners from 
Japan. In 1639, the last of the missionaries were expelled and Japan withdrew from 
the world for the next two centuries. The only continuous contact with the west was 
with a contingency of Dutch traders who were allowed to operate in a “Gaijin bubble” 
out of Deshima, near Nagasaki on the proviso they did not spread Christianity. Japan 
also allowed China to continue trading through Deshima.  
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Wolferen, (1989) contends that Japan’s relative isolation meant that the Shoguns were 
able to retain power by controlling the inflow and the impact of foreign culture in that 
they were able to benefit from their association with the Dutch and the West by 
carefully selecting goods, techniques and attitudes (knowledge) that would help them 
consolidate their positions of power in society. The Tokugawa Shoguns also banned  
firearms, which were introduced by the Portuguese and Spanish traders. Wolferen, 
believes this was done to minimise the possibility of commoners acquiring the 
necessary skills of learning how to use firearms and rising up against them. Learning 
how to use a rifle is simpler than the art of swordsmanship. The Shogunate wanted to 
learn all it could from the west. Clark, (1979:29) reports:  
 
“the Tokugawa government continued to support institutions, which translated and 
studied western books on a range of subjects. In two domains they even set up 
laboratories for applied research in chemistry, metallurgy and other sciences. The 
reason for this was of course, political and military.”  
 
In 1862, the Shogunate sent an official forty strong delegation to Europe. It was a 
clandestine operation and one of its objectives was to gain knowledge that would 
further Japan’s “desire for wealth and strength that would enable it to fight Western 
imperialism” (Cobbing et al.1998:1). The delegation, experts in western studies 
toured six European countries and compiled a series of reports, the most detailed of 
them being Eikoku Tansaku (Investigation of Britain). These writers have been called 
“the first real pioneers of systematic overseas research.” (Cobbing et al.1998:5) 
 
The Tokugawa Shoguns restricted access to knowledge and manipulated culture to 
control the vast majority of the Japanese population. Downs (1969:79) called it “the 
closest totalitarian system ever to appear in pre industrial society” and Tokugawa 
Ieyasu, the architect of this social order is much admired by modern Japanese 
businessmen (Zimmerman, 1985). In 1853, United States Commodore, Matthew 
Perry sailed into Yedo bay and forced the Shogun to open Japan to foreign trade, thus 
ending the two centuries of Tokugawa policy of isolation. The Tokugawa period 
ended in 1863 with the restoration of the emperor, supposedly to supreme power 
although he was no more than a figurehead.    
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2.1.2  The Meiji Restoration 
 
Highly disciplined managers who had learned their skills during the Tokugawa period 
were recruited into the new order. Albert Keidal (cited in Zimmerman,1988:6) said in 
an article about Business and Society in Japan that the existence of this trained body 
of men was one of the major factors for Japan’s successful transition from a being a 
feudal society to an industrial power. In 1868, under the banner of Wakonm Yosai, 
(Japanese Spirit, Western Techniques) Japan began a process of westernisation. Doi, 
(1973) believed that Japan felt threatened by the west. He said they were militarily 
inferior and maintains that the over riding obsession of patriotic Japanese at the time 
was to learn all it could about the west so it could prevent colonisation. Hunter (1989) 
draws the same conclusion and reports use of another symbolic slogan Fukoku Kyohei 
(Rich Country, Strong Armed Forces) which was used to rally support in transforming 
Japan into a modern nation that was both militarily and industrially strong.  
 
The Meiji Restoration imported practically everything they thought would be useful 
for a new Japan and in 1872 sent a second mission to the west. The Iwakura mission 
visited the United States and Europe and its’ longest sojourn, of four months was 
spent in Britain (Cobbing et al., 1998). They were based in London but managed to 
tour the Midlands, the North of England and Scotland. To put the importance of this 
mission into context it is perhaps useful to note that it was formidably powerful in 
terms of its leadership. Iwakura Tomomi had the status of Ambassador 
Plenipotentiary and was the second highest member of the Meiji Government. The 
three main objectives of the Iwakura Mission were: To secure recognition for the 
Meiji Government, to open negotiations on the so-called Unequal Treaties and to 
assess Western civilisation with a view to adopting those parts which were of value to 
Japan. Kume Kunitake, a thirty three year old Confucian scholar was appointed the 
task of chronicling the journey. His official account of the mission was published in 
1878, entitled “Tokumeo Zenken Taishi Beio Kairan Jikki,” (A True Record of the 
Tour of the Ambassador Extraordinary through the United Sates and Europe). Kume’s 
closely observed, systematic account of Victorian society was an attempt to 
understand the reasons for Britain’s prosperity and to discover information that would 
be useful for Japan. In 1866, the Meiji Government made passports available and the 
number of overseas visitors increased dramatically. Students were also sent to Europe 
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and the United States of America. One of these students, Masujiro Hashimoto went to 
study engineering in America. He returned in 1911 and founded the Kwasishinsha 
Motor Car Works in Tokyo.  
 
2.2  Nissan Motor Company  
 
The Kwasishinsha Motor Car Works was the first of the many companies that either 
by take over or through a series of mergers or alliance, became the Nissan Motor 
Company.   
 
2.2.1  Origins  
 
Initially, Hashimato repaired and imported vehicles but he had ambition. In 1913, 
with the help of three business associates he built Japan’s first automobile, a 10hp 
runabout based on a “Swift of Coventry” chassis. He named the car DAT, an acronym, 
using the first letter from the family name of each of his backers. Marshal, (1967) 
commented that at the time, individual entrepreneurial endeavours were not readily 
accepted by a society built on Confucian doctrines. Outward displays of ambitious 
self-promotion (and sometimes avarice) appalled the Japanese. The conundrum was 
that although the entrepreneur primarily worked for himself, society benefited from 
business. The ends seemingly justified the means but to the Japanese, motives were 
more important than results. The Meiji Government, intent on industrial reformation, 
set about making the change acceptable and newly established business journals 
compared businessmen with Samurai. Entrepreneurs were feted. Obata, (1937) said it 
would not be true to infer a reversal in societal norms but a major change in attitude 
towards business and industry did take place at this time. 
 
Hashimoto’s next vehicle, a two-seater sports car was known as Datsun but the 
Kwasishinsha Motor Car Company struggled in the early years because of a strong 
domestic preference for American cars. In 1925, the company merged with the ailing 
Jitsuyo Motors and six years later, the Tobata Imaon Company, an automotive parts 
manufacturer took over with the intent of mass-producing vehicles for the domestic 
market. The company was renamed Nissan Motors in 1933.  In the early part of the 
twentieth century the four major business conglomerates known as zaibatsu (Mitsui, 
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Mitsubishi, Sumitomoto and Yasuda) were formed. They were controlled and owned 
by family based holding companies, the zaibatsu who dominated Japanese industry 
prior to the end of the Second World War. In the 20s and 30s six other companies, or 
minor houses were allowed to join the zaibatsu. They included the houses of 
Ayukawa (Nissan Motors), Nomura (securities), Asano (chemicals), Okura (mining), 
Furukawa (mining), and Nakajima (heavy engineering including aircraft) (Morikawa 
1978; Okumura 1991).  
 
Nissan was able to consolidate its oligopolistic position making it impossible for Ford 
and General Motors, who had begun assembling vehicles in Japan in the late twenties, 
to compete.  Nissan built a new plant in Yokohama and equipped it with machinery 
imported from the USA and became Japan’s first mass producer of cars. Two years 
before Pearl Harbour, Ford and General Motors withdrew completely from the 
Japanese market. During the Second World War, Nissan switched production to the 
manufacture of trucks and aero engines. After the war, Japan’s industry was 
restructured and Nissan was not permitted to manufacture vehicles. The company 
made technical contracts with Renault, Hillman and Wilbys-Overland and returned to 
the car business in 1952 via a licensing agreement with Austin Motors. This 
agreement lasted for eight years. One research study of international strategic 
alliances confirmed that the primary reason to form alliances was the need for specific 
resources and competencies to survive in global markets (Faulkner, 1995). 
 
2.2.2  Development 
 
Growth was slow. In 1955 Japanese car companies only produced 20 000 units, five 
years later it reached 165 000. However, attention was being paid to the detail of car 
manufacture. Nissan adhered to teachings of US quality control statistician, William E. 
Deming and soon proved that it was capable of producing small, efficient cars.  
Factory automation, just in time management and quality improvements led to higher 
volumes and reduced costs. In 1958, the company started to export vehicles to the 
United States using the Datsun name. Over the next three years Nissan began low cost 
assembly operations in Taiwan, Mexico, Thailand and Chile. The company grew 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s; however, the seventies were difficult because one of 
its key markets was threatened. Two oil crises caused a worldwide slump in the 
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industry plus the dollar was devalued, and import surcharges made Japanese vehicles 
much less competitive in America. Nissan’s countermeasure was to improve the 
management of its US subsidiary and to design vehicles specifically for the American 
market. It proved to be a successful strategy, sales continued to increase with the 
launch of vehicles like the 210 Honeybee that was capable of forty-one miles to the 
US gallon and the prestigious 240Z. 
 
From 1980, exports from Japan increased six fold; however, changes in world trade 
regulations meant Nissan could not rely on export sales for growth but had to 
manufacture in each of its main overseas markets. In 1981, Nissan Motor 
Manufacturing Corporation (NMMC) was established in Tennessee, USA. Two years 
later, the company acquired a stake in the Spanish company, Motor Iberica and, 
encouraged by grants from the UK, decided to build Nissan Motors UK (NMUK) at 
Sunderland in the North East, England. The company also entered a joint venture with 
the Italian car maker, Alfa Romeo to produce cars using shared technology. In 1981, 
the company started to use the Nissan name to market all vehicles and experienced 
substantial growth in the domestic market. Up until the late eighties, when it was 
overtaken by Toyota, Nissan was the largest car manufacturer in Japan.  
 
2.2.3  Recent History 
 
By 1990, Nissan was established as a global player. It had a wide model range, a 
reputation for quality and engineering and manufacturing in all three of the main 
regions (Japan, USA and Europe) but then problems began and Nissan reported net 
losses in seven of the next ten years up to March 2000. The company made 20% 
fewer cars at the end of the decade than it had at the start and shareholders saw their 
share equity fall by approximately 30%. There was a downturn in mature world 
markets and the rapid appreciation of the yen reduced profitability of exporting 
vehicles These problems were common to all Japanese automobile manufactures but 
Nissan was the worst hit due to its poor cost control, a lack of innovative products and 
a conservative organisational culture that slowed decision-making.    
During the nineties Nissan lost one percentage point of the European market which 
equates to 150 000 vehicles. It also failed to anticipate a change in the North 
American market when consumers switched from cars towards light trucks, 
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particularly sports utility vehicles and minivans.  In this decade the company lost 
1.7% of world market share which equates to 600 000 vehicles. This is more than the 
entire sales of a company such as Volvo. Nissan did try to address the issues: it closed 
a domestic plant, reduced its workforce and began rationalising its product range. It 
also shifted its emphasis to overseas markets and upgraded its development and 
manufacturing facilities in the US and opened a European design centre in the UK 
(Nissan Technical Centre Europe). In 1993, Nissan began producing vehicles 
specially designed for Thailand and Taiwan and announced plans to begin 
manufacture in Malaysia and the Philippines. It also opened a factory in Mexico and 
established a joint venture in China with Dongfeng Motors Company.    
 
2.2.4  The Nissan Renault Alliance 
 
In 1988, Nissan was struggling with debts of US $22 billion and according to Magee 
(2003) it had too many factories, too many lack lustre models, too many car platforms, 
too many suppliers and too many Japanese dealers to survive on its own. Nissan had 
been trying to make a deal with Daimler Chrysler but they pulled out, saying Nissan’s 
debt problems were too big a burden. Nissan turned to Renault, the French car 
manufacturer. Renault was strong in Europe but weak elsewhere and needed to 
establish a base in Asia to fulfil ambitious sales plans. In March 1999 Nissan and 
Renault agreed to an alliance and Renault currently holds a 44.4% stake in Nissan, 
whilst Nissan holds a 15% stake in Renault. Together the company would be 
equivalent to the fourth largest car manufacturer in the world. To strengthen Nissan’s 
management, Carlos Ghosn was appointed Chief Operating Officer of Nissan. Ex-
Renault and lauded as “Le Cost Killer,” Ghosn was responsible for the cost cutting 
drive that helped Renault into profit in the mid-nineties.    
 
2.2.5 The Ghosn Effect 
 
Ghosn is Brazilian born to parents who originated from the Lebanon. He was 
educated at the Notre Dame College, the Jesuit school in Lebanon and then later, he 
attended the Ecole Ploytechnique, a top engineering University in Paris. His first job 
was with the Michelin Group, a French based privately held company. By the time he 
was thirty he was the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Michelen’s South American 
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operations and three years later he was named CEO of their operations in North 
America. In 1996 he moved to Renault, responsible for research, purchasing, 
manufacturing and engineering. He answered only to Louis Schweitzer, who headed 
Renault.   
 
It is important not to underestimate the effect Ghosn has had on Nissan. Andy Palmer, 
Corporate Vice President (CVP) of Nissan Light Commercial Vehicles reports: 
“Honda has racing, Toyota has Quality; Nissan has Ghosn.” Ghosn is feted as a 
business celebrity by the Japanese press and people. Numerous Japanese books have 
been written about him and he often appears in newspapers and on television and he 
and his family have been featured in lifestyle magazines. Reischauer, (1977) reports 
that the Japanese respect their elders and it is not unusual for company presidents to 
be hero worshiped if they model themselves on Confucian ideology where the 
emphasis is on relationships, education, hard work and the moral obligations of 
government and business. Favourable media reports and being able to restore Nissan’s 
profitability prepared Japan and Nissan’s shareholders for what at one time would 
have been unthinkable: Ghosn – a Gaijin - was made President and Chief Executive 
Officer of Nissan on June 21, 2001. 
 
Ghosn realised that if he was to change the company he needed the support and trust 
of the people who worked at Nissan. He knew that if he tried to dictate change he 
would fail, undermining morale and productivity. His solution was to create Cross 
Functional Teams (CFTs) and instead of looking for solutions outside of the company 
he adopted a “bottom up” approach. The CFTs were formed, comprising employees 
from different disciplines, they were told to identify problems and recommend 
counter- measures to Ghosn and his Executive Committee about how they could be 
fixed. The CFT members operated across boundaries, debating concepts and sharing 
information with people and departments they would typically not come into contact 
with in daily operations. Many contributors to the knowledge management literature 
recommend the use of work groups, interdisciplinary and cross functional teams to 
foster knowledge creation (e.g. Brown and Eisenhart, 1995; Meyer and Tore, 1999; 
von Krogh et al. 2000). Teamwork may also bring together knowledge, resulting in 
“new combinations” (Schumpter, 1950) that may facilitate cross-functional 
communications, cross-fertilization of ideas and enhance worker involvement.  
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The recommendations made by the CFTs formed the basis of the Nissan Revival Plan 
(NRP). 
 
2.2.6  Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) 
 
NRP was designed to restore the company to profitability. It was a wide-ranging and 
comprehensive analysis of the company’s problems, followed by a detailed series of 
proposals that set largely quantifiable targets for the major areas of the business. Key 
to the success of the revival plan was the successive launch of new and enhanced 
products to attract interest and increase sales in each of the three main regions. Nissan 
met all of its NRP objectives and in 1999, the company was returned to bottom line 
profitability. By the end of fiscal year 2002 it had an operating profit of 4.5% and by 
the end of 2002 it had reduced net automotive debt by half while increasing the 
company’s investment rate from 3.7% to 5% of sales. NRP may have put Nissan 
“back on the map,” (Magee, 2003:195) but it did not give the company an advantage 
over its competitors. To be one of the world’s most efficient automobile 
manufacturers Nissan had to achieve sustained growth. Ghosn used his cross-
functional teams to decide on a strategy to make Nissan a world leader. The result was 
Nissan 180. 
 
2.2.7  Nissan 180 
 
Nissan 180 was launched at the start of the 2002 fiscal year and marked the next step 
in Nissan’s revival process. Again the emphasis was on profitable growth. The 
objectives were defined as: 
 
• 1 million additional unit sales worldwide by October 2005; 
• 8 % operating margin for Fiscal Year 2004; 
• 0 – Zero net automobile debt by end of Fiscal Year 2004. 
 
The achievement of Nissan 180 objectives depended on four initiatives, known as the 
four pillars: Generate More Revenue with Less Cost and More Quality and Speed 
while Maximising the Alliance with Renault. These four pillars drove the company 
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and individual objectives at every level and were linked to targets and strategies, 
which had their own key performance indicators. Management by Objectives (MBO) 
was coined by Drucker (1954) to describe a managerial system, which linked 
company to individual objectives. MBO is a synthesis of three interventions designed 
to increase productivity: participative management, goal setting and objective 
feedback (Rodgers and Hunter, 1991). The criticism is that it is a modern form of 
scientific management and Jamieson (1979) called it a management pressure device. 
The assumption is that most people will direct and control themselves willingly if 
they share in the setting of their objectives and that conflict does not exist between the 
individual and company goals (Humble, 1972). The emphasis is on creating 
individual job definitions, which have the stamp of management authority structures. 
 
2.3  Company Strategy 
 
To support Nissan 180, the company has implemented a broad range of strategies. 
The author does not intend to discuss these in detail but would like to make reference 
to those which shaped and underpinned his own thinking and the resultant strategy for 
Knowledge Management at Nissan Technical Centre Europe. These are as follows: 
 
• Management Development – Competencies, Development Programmes 
and Executive Training. 
• Technical 
• Design 
• Supplier 
• Workforce Integration @ Nissan (WIN) 
• Globalisation. 
 
2.3.1  Management Development Competencies 
 
In April 2000, Ghosn issued a behavioural guide for Managers which contained the 
following headings: Profit Driven, Customer Focused, Cross Functional and Global, 
Bold and Thoughtful and Stretch Goals and Growth. The directive was issued to all 
Nissan companies and duly debriefed in morning meetings and posted on notice 
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boards.  Little attention was paid to the directive within NTCE. At the time, the author 
used the directive to underpin a series of behavioural workshops he was managing 
with designer engineers from the Trim section. At the beginning of one workshop he 
asked for a show of hands as to how many designers had read the directive. Of thirty-
seven people, only one person raised his hand. The fact that the directive was issued 
shortly after the Alliance was announced shows the importance Ghosn puts on 
management behaviours and that he expects to lead by example and manage the 
change. 
 
Areas of Contribution 
 
During the following three years the Behavioural Directive developed into a set of 
management competencies with the definition: “How leaders will attain the Areas of 
Contribution through mastery of specific skills and knowledge.” The following 
management competences have been identified as supporting the Areas of 
Contribution:   
 
Interpersonal Skills 
• Developing Strategic Relationships 
• Customer Orientation 
• Communicating with Impact  
• Cultural Interpersonal Effectiveness 
 
Business/Management Skills 
• Establishing Strategic Direction 
• Business, Global and Cross functional Acumen 
• Operational Problem Solving and Decision Making 
Leadership Skills 
• Selling the Vision 
• Empowering/Coaching 
• Change Management 
• Team Management Recognition 
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2.3.1.1   Management Development Programme 
 
In January 2004, Nissan Europe introduced a Management Training Road-Map for all 
managers (Seniors, Section Managers and above). The roadmap has been developed 
to provide managers with feedback on their strengths and areas for personal 
development in relation to Nissan’s newly developed competences. The competences 
support the “Area of Contribution” expected of Nissan managers’ worldwide. The 
road map involves the individual manager and his/her immediate manager, plus three 
direct line employees giving their opinion on the extent to which the individual 
manager/senior demonstrates the “action statement” within each competency by 
inserting, in an intranet based software package,  a 1-5 score against each statement (1 
= Strongly Agree.  5 = Strongly Disagree). From this a radar chart is produced, 
visually displaying the individual’s relative strengths and areas for personal 
development, overlaying the opinions of the individual’s manager and his/her direct 
line employees. The radar chart is discussed in the annual Performance Appraisal and 
Development Review (PADR) and agreement is reached on the most appropriate 
selection of training modules from within the Nissan Pan European Management 
Development Programme. 
 
2.3.1.2  Global Executive Training (GET) Programme
 
In 2002, Nissan established the Global Executive training (GET) programme to 
prepare high performing executives for accession to top leadership positions in the 
company. The GET programme, developed by Towers Perrin Consultants is a 
systematic two year development programme and provides assessment, feedback, 
formal learning, informal development activities and support to develop selected 
individuals who have been nominated for the programme by top executives, who also 
acts as mentors to their nominees. There are two groups within GET: an advanced 
group consisting of Vice Presidents (VP) who may be eligible for Senior V.P 
positions and an intermediate group consisting of senior manages and directors.  
The purpose of the training is to integrate knowledge, skills and competencies to 
demonstrate “mastery” of the Nissan Areas of Contribution. The training takes the 
form of seminars, on the job assignments and workshops. The workshops provide 
applicants with opportunities to develop and stretch their leadership styles and skills 
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by “trying new approaches suggested by expert panellists, team members and case 
activities that require aggressive or transformational strategies” (GET Executive 
Training Manual, 2003). Organisations that successfully manage change are those 
which have integrated their human resource management polices with their strategies 
and the strategic change process (Johnson and Scholes, 1999). The evidence suggests 
Ghosn understands the difficulties of managing different cultures and is trying to 
minimise resistance to change by implementing a set of social controls designed to 
standardise organisational norms. It is a deliberate attempt to manufacture a cultural 
change by rewarding acceptable behaviours and is a strategy based on behavioural 
theories of learning where the focus is on the objective measurement of behaviours.  
 
2.3.2 Technical Strategy 
 
Nissan prides itself on engineering excellence and since the introduction of the Nissan 
Revival Plan (NRP), Research and Development is receiving more attention and 
investment. In terms of organisation the company is moving towards a globally 
integrated organisation. Headquarters is the Nissan Technical Centre (NTC), which is 
in Tokyo, Japan and there are two regional R&D centres, Nissan Technical Centre 
North America (NTCNA) which is in Detroit and Nissan Technical Centre Europe 
which is in Cranfield, Bedfordshire, England. The aim is to integrate the three 
companies in terms of strategy, processes, standards and benchmarks. However, each 
of the regional companies will take on more responsibility for the entire product line 
offered in their region whether they developed it or not. The emphasis for NRP, as 
already explained was cost saving but now the shift is towards developing core 
technologies and competencies and ensuring that regional suppliers are capable in 
providing parts to Nissan. Engineering productivity will also increase with the 
introduction and extension of more effective and powerful computer aided design 
(CAD) systems. The criticality and importance of R&D is underlined by the fact that 
it is the only part of Nissan where employment is increasing.  
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2.3.3  Design Strategy 
 
Nissan plans to continually introduce new products and revamp existing model ranges 
in all markets.  It aims to be more responsive to market trends by reducing design and 
development lead times in three main areas: 
• Vehicle – platform and upper body;  
• Order to delivery;  
• Start of sales in foreign markets. 
 
For the purpose of this study the author only need to inform the reader about vehicle – 
platform and upper body. Consider the platform as being all parts associated with the 
under floor body metal, the chassis running gear and the engines. Nissan strategy is to 
reduce, and share the number of platforms and engine variants with Renault.  This 
common approach will allow cost savings and efficiencies through shared research 
and development. Typically, a development using modified or carry over platforms 
takes approximately forty months. The upper body refers to all other component parts 
and systems, which make up the car including interior and exterior trim, seats and the 
body metal. Major organisational changes have also been made which impact this 
study. Now each vehicle platform has a Product Director (PD), Chief Vehicle 
Engineer (CVE) and a Chief Product Specialist (CPS). They in effect ‘own’ the cars 
and are accountable for their market success. Previously, the product planners were all 
powerful in making strategic decisions but at the same time unaccountable for the 
product. 
 
2.3.4  Supplier Strategy 
 
60% of Nissan’s total vehicle costs are for vehicle purchase costs for bought out parts. 
The Nissan 180 objective was to reduce purchase costs by 15% and one of the ways 
the company aimed to achieve this objective was to centralise sourcing and buy parts 
on a global basis. All sourcing decisions are now based on suppliers’ performance and 
lower costs rather than on old style keiretsu relationships.  
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A keiretsu is a set of companies with interlocking business relationships and 
shareholdings (Wolferen,1990). Keiretsu were formed after the Second World War 
and coalesced around large manufacturers, like Nissan or banks. The keiretsu held 
stock in each other’s companies preventing takeover threats from foreign corporations 
and reducing the pressure on management to achieve results. The keiretsu also 
purchased goods and services from each other which supported the domestic network 
but also kept exports out of the country. It benefited the Japanese automakers because 
the supply chains were closely interlinked, providing products and solutions to 
problems quickly. Keiretsu associates were non-competitors and helped each other. It 
was not unusual for keiretsu companies to send workers to other companies to learn 
new and improved methods of working and Nissan Managers towards the end of their 
careers often find themselves working in Keiretsu companies to improve the supply 
chain performance. Cusumano, (1985) says Nissan integrated members of its keiretsu 
by dispatching executives, extending long term contracts, buying the entire output of 
factories, providing loans of money or equipment and offering technical guidance in 
design, accounting cost control. The payoff he argued occurred when Nissan could 
shift assembly outside the factory to firms with lower wage scales thereby reducing 
personnel expenses and fixing investment requirements and inventory carrying costs. 
 
However, the Japanese recession in the 1990s had a profound effect on the keiretsu. 
Many of the large banks were hit hard by bad loan portfolios and forced to merge or 
go out of business (Graham, 2003). The keirestu system was no longer seen as a 
viable business model especially since many companies from outside of the keiretsu 
system, such as Sony began outperforming their counterparts. In 2003, Nissan 
committed to rid itself of financial links with the majority of its keiretsu family. In 
1999, Nissan had shareholdings in 1394 companies and in over half of them that stake 
amounted to more than 20%. With the exception of four companies, none are now 
considered indispensable. One of the four companies is Nissan Shatai which produces 
body panels. 
 
This is not the end of the keiretsu, there is more to the relationship than financial 
investment but it does make it easier for outside suppliers to compete for business. 
Another downside of the keiretsu was that they could not always provide Nissan with 
the latest technological advances it needed to offer its customers and remain 
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competitive. Nissan needs to support and encourage relationships with key suppliers 
who can operate globally in providing worldwide best practice and performance in 
terms of cost quality and delivery. Teamwork is being encouraged between Nissan 
engineering and purchase departments and suppliers. Nissan specifications, once 
sacrosanct can be challenged to provide cost savings, proving it does not jeopardise 
quality. The company is committed to building partnerships with its suppliers and in 
return for high performance will commit to providing its suppliers with increased 
business. 
 
2.3.5 Workforce Integration at Nissan (WIN) 
 
The WIN programme was initiated by Nissan Motor Limited in 2003. At the time of 
writing the author knew little about the WIN programme. The aims and objectives of 
WIN only became apparent at the beginning of 2004 and negated the need for the 
author’s proposed strategies to integrate knowledge processes. In essence, WIN is 
multi-phased and aims to transform the way people work at Nissan through the 
delivery of a comprehensive set of enabling tools and services within the employee 
portal, combined with supporting resources. The programme is intended to deliver an 
enhanced user focused intranet and to improve communication and collaboration 
throughout the organisation. It will launch one common employee portal, with an 
image, look and feel that complements the brand. The common employee portal is a 
single global desktop tool that can be accessed at any time from any place and will 
provide a common link to global and regional news. It will also be a forum to share 
lessons learned, locate experts and organise and retrieve documents for the business. 
Nissan used IBM as consultants to advise on the introduction of the tools and systems 
for WIN.   
 
2.4  Globalisation 
 
The Nissan Renault Alliance will accelerate the globalisation strategies of both 
companies. Nissan and Renault intend to share and rationalise distribution networks 
worldwide. This will provide immediate cost savings without damaging the brands. 
Globalisation necessitates the need for the company to restructure its business and the 
way it relates to individual markets. Regarding design and development, Ghosn insists 
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that  Nissan make full use of its facilities in Europe and North America.  Prior to the 
alliance, Nissan Technical Centre Japan handled design and development of new 
vehicles but now  the regional design centres will also be given much more influence 
over their respective markets. To understand this better a more detailed history of 
Nissan Manufacturing United Kingdom (NMUK) and Nissan Technical Centre 
Europe Ltd. (NTCE) will now be provided.  
 
2.4.1   Nissan Manufacturing United Kingdom (NMUK) 
 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd, or NMUK was established in 1984 in 
Sunderland, North East England. The company, which is owned and operated by 
Nissan Europe is the largest car plant in the United Kingdom, and was voted Europe’s 
most productive car company for the years 1986-2004 (Source: Nissan Motor 
Manufacturing: Encyclopaedia).  
 
Nissan Motors Limited (NML’s) initial investment in building NMUK was in excess 
of £650 million. This was underwritten by over £130 million in public subsidies. At 
the time the northeast had the highest level of unemployment in mainland Britain. The 
British government of the day was running down nationalised industries while 
welcoming inward investment from aboard. The region had lost thousands of jobs 
through the rundown of the ship building industry and the closure of coal mines and 
building companies (Stone, 1988). NMUK was built on an 800-acre greenfield site 
and the company’s key component suppliers bought land off Nissan and built their 
own factories around the plant. This vertical integration between NMUK and its 
suppliers is seen as being crucial to the efficiency of the Just-In-Time (JIT) 
production processes. Originally, NMUK employed 3500 people and manufactured 
“knockdown” Bluebirds from Japan. It was very much a screwdriver operation with 
parts sent from Japan to be assembled in NMUK (Keely, 2001).   
 
The company was established by a team of high-ranking Japanese secondees using 
working practices and procedures brought from Japan. The majority of the workforce 
was recruited locally but adverts went country wide and attracted ambitious young 
engineers from other industries and the British Motor Industry which then included, 
Rover, Jaguar and Ford. These recruits brought with them their experience and also 
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their knowledge of how things were done elsewhere. The Japanese took up positions 
as Managers or Senior Advisors and moulded the company. Once Nissan had a 
manufacturing base in the UK, the next step was to control its distribution networks. 
This led to problems with its independent UK importer, or trading company which 
had built up the business over the years. Nissan also believed the importer focused on 
price rather than quality to the detriment of the brand. The case went to court and 
Nissan won but had to rebuild its image and UK distribution network. Sasaki, (1981) 
has argued that although trading companies may be expedient in the short term in that 
they provide entry into a market the process hinders the internationalisation and the 
integration of their business with local cultures and management systems.   
 
The Japanese approach to manufacturing has been documented by numerous writers. 
Oliver and Wilkson (1988) in their study of British Industry called this “a process of 
Japanisation,” it was the beginning of what was to become a widespread model as 
today, Japan’s influence on manufacturing systems can be seen across the world.  
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) “The Machine That Changed the World” is based on 
a five-year study of the auto-industry made by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. It charts Japan’s rise to manufacturing supremacy and took the lessons of 
“lean production” to a wider audience. At the turn of the Twentieth Century, Henry 
Ford and General Motors’ Alfred Sloan moved World manufacturing from craft 
industries into an age of mass production. After the Second World War, Toyoda and 
Ohno of the Toyota Motor Company built on Ford’s and Sloan’s ideas and pioneered 
the concept of lean production. Knowledge, at an individual level was created through 
the cognitive process of reflection and learning (Foss and Mahnke, 2003). 
 
Lean production, (Krafcik, 1986) is considered “lean” because it streamlines the mass 
production process by using less of everything – less human effort, less space, less 
investment, less inventory and produces a product in less time, with fewer defects 
with a greater and ever growing choice for the customers. Other car companies have 
adopted many of these techniques in an effort to improve productivity. Renault, 
through the Alliance, has made a detailed study of NMUK’s manufacturing systems 
and approach to Lean Production. In many cases, Nissan’s European supply base have 
redesigned its manufacturing plants according to Japanese principles. Complete 
factories have been overhauled to supply Nissan with the parts it wants, where quality 
   
John Temple  37  
has been designed into the manufacturing process. Peter Wickens who was NMUK’s 
Personnel Director  from 1984-1995 drew on the company’s operating manuals and 
wrote “The Road to Nissan” in which he said the company operated a humanistic 
system of participative management whereby workers were empowered, through 
teamwork and multi-skilling to produce quality goods (Wickens, 1987). It is very 
much a Post Fordist account of benevolence, offering employee job satisfaction 
(Murray, 1986; Sayer, 1989). On the face of it, Wickens was promoting NMUK as a 
learning organisation where learning is the process of change in individual and shared 
thoughts of action and then embedding it in the organisation. Numerous writers 
(Crossan et al. 1999, Nelson and Winter, 1982; Walsh and Rivera, 1991) argue that 
when individual and group learning becomes institutionalised, organisational learning 
occurs and knowledge is embedded in non human repositories such as routines, 
systems, structures, culture and strategy. 
 
Garrahan and Stewart, (1992) showed the flip side of the coin in their critical study: 
“The Nissan Enigma.” To them, NMUK’s practises are a form of social control 
whereby the employer employee divide is replaced by peer competition and inter-
group rivalry. The very essence of Wickens’ argument becomes company ideology to 
ensure the continuity of the manufacturing process is not disrupted. Wickens makes it 
clear that NMUK is only concerned with those who view the company in its terms 
and sees loyalty to the company as the modern way forward to growth and prosperity. 
For Garrahan and Stewart,  NMUK’s success depends on subordination. Teamwork 
becomes an exercise in exploitation and surveillance reinforcing 
  
“neo-Taylorist (separation of execution and design) and neo Human Relations forms 
of control (reconstitution of the work group around social and organisational 
imperatives) which legitimate this separation. (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992:90).  
 
Supervisors are charged with meeting production quotas and employee development 
and peer pressure and camaraderie are used to give workers less space to object 
through management by stress (Parker and Slaughter, 1989). Kaizen, or 
standardisation is about deskilling the workforce and identifying slack in the process 
whereby improvements can be made (Dohse et al, 1985). The Just-In-Time (JIT) 
methodology reduces workers’ control over the speed of manufacture thereby 
   
John Temple  38  
reducing “ parcels of time” or the rest time they were able to accumulate by working 
up line (Slaughter,1987). Consensus, Garrahan and Stewart argue, is not about 
listening to others and finding the best solution but about toeing the company line. 
The point to note, and of relevance to this thesis, is that the Nissan Technical Centre 
Europe was originally part of NMUK and the majority of NTCE managers worked at 
NMUK and were indoctrinated into the Nissan way. 
 
2.4.2   Nissan Technical Centre Europe Ltd. (NTCE)  
 
Nissan Technical Centre Europe is located in Cranfield, Bedfordshire and employs 
about six hundred and fifty engineers. Similarly to NMUK, NTCE was established by 
a group of Japanese secondees who acted as advisors or managers. Again, adverts 
were placed in local and national press to attract the most ambitious or disenchanted 
from rival firms and other industries. Where they existed, NTCE adopted working 
practices, standards and procedures from Japan and NMUK including the three main 
standards used by Design Engineers: Nissan Engineering Manuals (NEM), Nissan 
Design Manuals (NDS) and Nissan Engineering Standards. 
 
Originally, NTCE was called Nissan European Technical Centre (NETC). The name 
change came in January 2000, to show that the company was part of Nissan Technical 
Centre Japan. It was one company with an emphasis being placed on a global 
functional R&D organisation, sharing and collaborating on work and resources. At the 
same time Nissan Research Centre in Detroit (NRD) became Nissan Technical Centre 
North America. NTCE is dedicated to tailoring Nissan vehicles for the European 
market and services two manufacturing plants, Nissan Motor United Kingdom, 
(NMUK) in the North East of England and Nissan Motor Iberica, (NMISA) in 
Barcelona, Spain. NTCE also has offices in NMISA and at the engine plant in Madrid. 
The Cranfield base was established in 1992 but the company had already been in 
existence for four years, based at NMUK and was originally responsible for 
localisation of parts for the Nissan Bluebird. NMUK had been built with grants from 
the UK Government on the proviso that 60% of the cost of parts used for the Bluebird 
had to be sourced in Europe. In 1990, for the launch of the Primera the Government 
raised this figure to 80%. To meet this new requirement NTCE  issued Japanese 
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designs to local suppliers and concentrated on developing parts that could match the 
quality of the originals.   
 
With time, the skill level and engineering facilities at NTCE were improved and it 
became apparent that the company could contribute to the earlier stages of vehicle 
development by providing a technical perspective relating to the supplier, 
manufacturing and customer requirements that are unique to the European market. 
During the development stages of the Tino, Almera and second generation Primera 
and Micra, European R&D the company has taken ever-increasing responsibility for 
vehicle and upper body development. This has been promoted by teams of engineers 
working on joint development projects in the Technical Centres of Japan and the USA. 
These were Case II development projects, as explained in Chapter One where vehicles 
were designed and developed by NTC Japan and then handed over to NTCE to 
finalise the development and take the vehicle into production at one of Nissan’s 
European manufacturing plants. By demonstrating the ability to support the early 
stages of product development and to successfully manage lifecycle activities, NTCE 
has now been given the opportunity to take the lead responsibility for vehicle 
development for two new projects. These are Case III projects:  For Case III, the 
vehicle platform (chassis) and engine will be designed and developed by NTC Japan 
but NTCE will be responsible for the design and development of the rest of the 
vehicle. Today, NTCE is responsible for all Nissan’s Research and Development 
related functions in Europe. 
  
 2.5   Conclusion  
 
In summary, this chapter has put the study into the historical, cultural and 
geographical context of global Nissan by explaining the company’s background and 
future direction and outlined the strategies the company has employed to manage 
knowledge. It has shown that Nissan was born out of change and has employed 
strategies gleaned from history to survive. In just over a century Japan has evolved 
from an agrarian, feudal society to a modern industrial one and the only way for it to 
survive is by having a favorable balance of trade and the development of companies 
like Nissan has been, and is, fundamental to the future prosperity of the nation 
because Japan has no natural resources to exploit other than its people.  
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Japan has succeeded by employing various strategies to ensure its economy prospers. 
It has always controlled from the centre and fused and assimilated ideas, first from 
China and then later the West. The Japanese created “Gaijin Bubbles” where they 
restricted access to knowledge, and manipulated culture both inside and outside of the 
“bubble” to control the populace. When change was enforced they adapted, 
employing countermeasures for their survival and it has been said that the Japanese 
pioneered systematic research. Likewise, Nissan has created has its own “Gaijin 
Bubbles” to learn from the West. The company learned about automotive design and 
development through carefully arranged strategic alliances and joint ventures. It 
benchmarked competitors, developed and improved on designs and processes and 
established companies abroad, educating locals in the “Nissan way” and watched the 
company grow.  The author has also given a background to Nissan Manufacturing 
United Kingdom (NMUK) and Nissan Technical Centre Europe (NTCE) and more 
importantly identified adaptive organisational and cultural patterns of behaviour that 
he will use to inform this thesis and develop his argument to Organise Around 
Knowledge.  This chapter has made the following theoretical and practical 
contributions to knowledge. 
  
2.5.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
• The author has identified that Nissan and employed strategies gleaned from 
Japanese history to survive. In the past Japan has created, what the author has 
called “Gaijin Bubbles” where they restricted access to knowledge, and 
manipulated culture both inside and outside of the “bubble” to control the 
populace.  Likewise, Nissan created its own “Gaijin Bubbles” to learn from 
the West. The company learned about automotive design and development 
through carefully arranged strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Nissan, like 
Japan has always controlled from the centre and has decided what is allowed 
in and out of the bubble. 
 
 
 
 
   
John Temple  41  
2.5.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
  
• It would be a useful frame of reference for researchers and practitioners to 
identify if other organisations develop their strategies and adopt practices 
taken from history. This knowledge would help them analysis change and 
plan interventions. 
 
The next chapter outlines the research philosophy, strategy and methodological 
framework which underpin this study. 
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 Chapter Three 
 
 
The Research Philosophy, Strategy and Methodological Framework 
Underpinning the Study 
 
 
 
3.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the research philosophy, strategy and methodological framework 
which underpin this study. It explains why the research philosophy is about finding 
something practical that works in “real life” situations and discusses various 
approaches to social research. It debates the research strategy and shows how it is 
crucial to any study as it determines the type of questions being asked and presents a 
flexible action research methodology whereby the knowledge management strategy 
emerges from work grounded in practice and informed by literature in a constant and 
iterative loop of enquiry and reflection.  The chapter also discusses the author’s 
intended role as an internal change agent.  
  
  
 
 
SECTION ONE:  
Introduction, Context and 
Framework for the Study 
Chapter One: Sets the Scene 
and outlines the aims, 
objectives and structure of the 
thesis. 
Chapter Two: The Study in 
Context of Global Nissan 
Chapter Three: The Research 
Philosophy, Strategy and 
Methodological Framework
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Research Philosophy: Real World Enquiry 
 
This research, as stated in Chapter One is about finding something which is practical 
and works in “real life” situations.   Robson (2002:4) believes one of the challenges of 
real world enquiry is in saying “something sensible about a complex, relatively poorly 
controlled and generally ‘messy’ situation.” Robson believes real word research is 
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enhanced by a scientific approach in that it is carried out “systematically, sceptically 
and ethically” (2002:20). 
 
• Systematically means treating the research seriously, in being explicit 
about observations and reflective about the practice and the circumstances 
in which the research is made. 
• Sceptically means scrutinising ideas, observations and ultimately any 
conclusions drawn from the study. 
• Ethically means following a code of conduct whereby the interests and 
concerns of those taking part in the research are respected. He advocates 
researching for the “truth” of the matter, warning against acting as an 
advocate or seeking to promote some particular aspect of the research.   
 
Realism has a long history in the philosophy of science (Manicas, 1987). Initially, 
when known as naïve realism the approach was severely criticised but it is now an 
accepted research method known under a variety of labels:- scientific realism, critical 
realism, fallibilistic realism, subtle realism and transcendental realism. Realism avoids 
the pitfalls of both positivism and relativism, recognises and accepts different 
perspectives and sometimes is used to promote social justice (House, 1991). Realists 
assume there is a reality whether we are aware of it or not. For realists,  
 
“theoretical entities are not hypothetical but real; observations are not the rock bottom 
of science, but are tenuous and always subject to reinterpretation” (Manicas and 
Secord, 1983: 406).   
 
Bhaskar (1989) says the role of critical social science is to criticise the social practises 
that it studies. Critical realists use qualitative data and flexible designs of research 
because they maintain that theory is central to explaining reality rather than data or 
the methods used to produce the data. According to Anastas and MacDonald (1994): 
 
“Flexible or qualitative methods have traditionally included the researcher and the 
relationship with the researched within the boundary of what is examined. Because all 
any study can do is to approximate knowledge of phenomena as they exist in the real 
world (fallibilism) the process of study itself must be an object of study. Because all 
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methods of study can produce only approximations of reality and incomplete 
understanding of the phenomena of interest as they exist in the real world, the 
findings of flexible method research can be seen as no more or less legitimate as 
those of any other type of study” (Anastas and MacDonald, 1994: 60). 
 
In the natural sciences, the validity of results depends on being able to replicate both 
the study and the findings independently and on several occasions.  In real world 
research such attempts are rarely made; indeed some qualitative researchers consider 
it an impossibility as each study is considered unique. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) 
believe the qualitative/quantitative debate is no longer useful and can be counter-
productive.  Bryman (1988) argues the nature of the research should determine the 
research style and Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) suggest:  
 
“Framing the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research in terms of 
these two epistemological poles is important in alerting us to the fact that there are 
competing claims regarding what constitutes warrantable knowledge” (Henwood 
and Pidgeon, 1992:99).  
 
Hartley (1994) argues that techniques are not of themselves positivist or 
phenomenological – it is how they are used and how data is interpreted that defines 
the epistemological assumptions on which they are based.  The author plans to use 
both phenomenological (qualitative and inductive) and positivist (quantitative and 
deductive) tools where necessary. Brewer and Hunter (1989) advocate a pragmatic 
approach to research using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Pragmatism is a 
philosophical position underpinned by the work of Pierce, William James and Dewey 
(Cherryholmes, 1992; Howe, 1998).  
 
For the pragmatist, the truth is “what works.” The research philosophy is therefore 
trans-disciplinary and draws on knowledge from many fields. Tranfield and Starkey 
(1998) argue this approach is more likely to produce results that are of use to 
practising managers.  Gibbons et al.  (2002:1) describe two forms of research: Mode 1 
which is the production of knowledge by scientists, “generated within a disciplinary, 
primarily cognitive, context” and Mode 2 which questions the relevance and 
appropriateness of the more traditionally known knowledge producing organisations 
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like universities, corporate laboratories and governmental research institutions and 
emphasises rather, the production of knowledge from application.  Huff (2000) 
proposes a compromise ‘Mode 1½’ position, which is both a theoretical and practical 
approach to research.  This study draws from the following approaches to social 
research: 
 
• Positivism 
• Phenomenology  
• Post Positivism 
• Constructivism 
 
3.1.1  Positivism (Normative or Standard View of Science) 
  
Byrne (1998:37) suggests that “Positivism is dead. By now it has gone off and is 
beginning to smell” but many scientists still support and promote the so called 
normative, or standard view of science. Essentially, positivists look for evidence of a 
relationship between events, or variables and their theory is deduced by way of testing 
hypotheses. The underlying assumption is that  
 
“there is an objective truth existing in the world which can be revealed through the 
scientific method where the focus is on measuring relationships between variables 
systematically and statistically” (Cassell and Symon, 1994: 2). 
 
Positivism has a long history. Outhwaite (1987) identified three generations: First, the 
Nineteenth century positivists, led by Auguste Comte who developed it as a 
programme of mechanistic social science. Second, the Vienna Circle of logical 
positivists who argued in the early twentieth century that metaphysical explanations 
of phenomena were incompatible with science and that science and philosophy should 
attempt to answer only scientifically answerable questions and third, a post Second 
World War account developed by Carl Hempel which emphasises the importance of 
value-free evidence, hard facts and a prediction on policy development.  
 
Positivist approaches have also come under severe criticism from a number of writers 
including Bhaskar (1986) and Stockman (1983) who contest the idea that every 
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scientist is capable of experiencing the same “reality.” They argue that individual 
characters and perspectives also have an effect on what is “seen.”  Bernard (2002:17) 
believes that today, “positivism is often linked to support for whatever power 
relations happen to be in place.” He argues it is not the positivism of Comte or that of 
the Vienna Circle that is being criticised but that which Bryant (1985:137) has called 
“instrumental positivism.”   
 
During the 1960s, Decision Theory emphasised the importance of quantifiably 
analysing the environment before decisions are made (Simon, 1959; Cyert and March, 
1963). Classical and decision theory approaches are often described as ‘normative’ 
theories of management. Easterby- Smith et al (2003) report quantitative methods are 
still favoured by business schools in the USA and France. The classical view of 
management has persisted even though research has shown that although managers 
work long hours, in reality they are reactive, have little time for forward planning and 
spend most of the time talking to people (Stewart, 1967, Mintzberg, 1973 and 
Hales,1986).   
 
Hall (1975), Mishler (1979) and Nixon (1981) argue that positive research methods 
create over-simplified pictures of complex realties by restricting the researcher’s 
focus to short-run events and isolated variables. Livingston (1971) and Peters and 
Waterman (1982) believe that the use of analytic techniques is of limited use and if 
relied upon entirely they may have a negative effect on company performance. They 
promote managers as visionary leaders ready and able to shape organisational cultural 
values. This led writers like Boyatzis (1982) and Silver (1991) into describing 
effective management as a set of skills or behavioural competencies which are now 
used by Nissan and discussed in previous chapters. 
 
3.1.2  Phenomenology 
 
In the phenomenological and interpretive approaches, the social sciences are applied 
to social phenomena and theory is generated from and grounded in, the data collected 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Qualitative methods allow researchers to develop  
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“theoretically grounded critical accounts of “what happens” which lead to an 
understanding of both practice and generalizable “underlying social processes” (Finch, 
1985: 114).  
 
Qualitative techniques usually focus on constructivist approaches where there is no 
clear cut objectivity and social life emerges from the shared creativity of individuals 
(Filstead, 1978). Hollway (1989) argues social scientists use “quantification” to 
justify and support their approach as being scientific although the reliability and 
validity of their results are often challenged because their cause and effect predictions 
are based on generalizations. Van Maanen (1979) describes qualitative methodologies 
as an:- 
 
“umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with meaning not the frequency, of 
certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world”(Van Maanen, 
1979: 520) 
 
Qualitative research is intrinsically subjective (Bryman, 1988). The argument is that it 
is impossible for a researcher to be objective because his interpretation of events is 
influenced by his perspective on life. Glouberman (2003) agrees, believing people are 
not capable of thinking about anything that does not fit into their normal view of the 
world but adds “the more perspectives we can imagine, the more channels we can 
open up” (Glouberman, 2003: 32). It is believed that qualitative methods are only 
involved with analysing text or behaviour but Burgoyne (1994) believes it is perfectly 
acceptable to quantify phenomena if it helps explain the situation. Qualitative 
methods are flexible, enabling researchers to question themselves and change the 
nature of their interventions with emerging insights. Often situations are complex and 
it is difficult to define issues at the beginning of the study and in such cases the 
triangulation of data and technique by multi-method approaches is paramount in 
answering important research questions. Qualitative methods enable detailed analysis 
of change. Quantitative methods can be used to determine what changed when but 
they cannot be used to determine what processes were involved or why they happened 
in terms of circumstances and stakeholders.    
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Qualitative research, generally can only take place in natural settings (Denzin, 1971; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and focuses on everyday activity as “defined, enacted, 
smoothed, and made problematic by persons going about their normal routines” (Van 
Maanen, 1983:255). Bogdan and Taylor (1975) argue qualitative research aims at 
providing a holistic view, where context and behaviour are interdependent. Flyvbjerg 
(2001:4) believes that “context and judgement are irreducibly central to understanding 
human action.” His argument for making social science matter is based on a 
contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, variously 
translated as prudence or practical wisdom. 
 
“In Aristotle’s words phronesis is a state, reasoned and capable of action with regard 
to things that are good or bad for man. Phronesis goes beyond both analytical, 
scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know how (techne) and 
invites judgements and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso social and political 
actor. I will argue that phronesis is commonly involved in social practice, and that 
therefore attempts to reduce social science and theory either to episteme or techne, or 
comprehend them in those terms are misguided” (Flyvbjerg, 2001:2). 
 
Giorgi (1970) believes qualitative studies focus on understanding the individual and 
his life.  Qualitative researchers interact with people on their own terms (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986). Employees are participants rather than the subjects of the study. They 
are expected and encouraged to play a proactive role in the research process in 
defining the issues which affect them.  This thinking is said to make the research 
process transparent and has led to a view of participative or collaborative research. 
Usually, researchers attempt to separate the quantitative and qualitative traditions 
which are now, more commonly known as “post positivist” and “constructivist” 
approaches.  
 
3.1.3  Post Positivism 
 
Positivists believe there is only one reality. Post positivists also believe a reality exists 
but consider it can only be known imperfectly and probabilistically because of the 
researcher’s limitations. Reichart and Rallis (1994) report that although “post 
positivists” recognise that researchers may be influenced by their values, knowledge 
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and backgrounds they maintain the researcher and the research person are 
independent. 
 
3.1.4  Constructivism 
 
Constructivism, which is also called interpretive (Schwandt, 1994) or naturalistic 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985) research, views reality as being socially constructed.  
Feyerabend (1978) believes reality can only be constructed conceptually; people 
attach different sets of meanings and classifications to the world because different 
cultures and societies have different conceptual systems. Reality is a cultural 
interpretation, presenting it as the truth is merely an invitation to view things from a 
different perspective. Constructivist researchers reject the notion of objectivity. 
Constructivists follow the relativist tradition, where reality is said not to exist outside 
of human consciousness. Constructivists believe the researcher’s role is to understand 
the multiple social constructions of meanings and knowledge and their favoured 
research methods such as interviews and observations enable them to acquire multiple 
perspectives. Research participants help the researchers construct the reality and 
because there are multiple realties the research questions cannot be formulated in 
advance of the process. Abell and Simons (2000) report constructionists seek to 
engage participants in learning processes that:  
 
1. Heighten the understanding of relational processes and knowledge 
management; 
2. Create venues for the expression of multiple stories;  
3. Encourage the engineers to reflect upon their beliefs and values and how 
they impact on project outcomes; 
4. Offer a venue for joint collaborative reflection to occur. 
 
3.2  Research Strategy 
 
The research strategy or framework is crucial to any study as the strategies and tactics 
employed to carry out the research depend very much on the type of question being 
asked (Manstead and Semin, 1988). The research question, in discovering how to 
successfully implement and sustain a knowledge management strategy at NTCE is 
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broadly defined and will most probably be renegotiated as the study progresses and as 
such, the research framework will itself emerge.  
 
To recap, the author argues  the key to sustainability and implementation is in 
recognising and managing within the cultural restraints of the company. The focus is 
on understanding the attributes of the organisational cultural lattice which link the 
knowledge management initiatives at NTCE (Figure 3.1) and then in sharing that 
understanding with management and employees to encourage them to reflect on how 
they might modify their approach and behaviours to make a positive and sustainable 
impact on company profitability.  
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Figure 3.1:   The Cultural Lattice Linking Strategy to Knowledge Management 
Initiatives 
 
This approach lends itself to a flexible design whereby the various activities of 
collecting and analysing data, working with new ideas and questions and perhaps 
even changing the purpose of the study as it develops are still possible.   Figure 3.1 is 
an early example of the cultural lattice (Chapter 7:190), showing separate knowledge 
management activities in a lattice arrangement. The author continues to develop and 
refine the lattice during the course of the study.
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3.2.1  Flexible Designs 
 
Qualitative research is inherently flexible to allow designs to emerge and develop 
during data collection but is sometimes criticised as being untrustworthy because of 
the absence of a ‘standard’ means of assuring reliability and validity. To counter the 
criticism of untrustworthiness Bloor (1997) argues that 
 
“Social life contains elements which are generalisable across settings (thus providing 
for the possibility of the social sciences) and other elements that are particular to 
given settings (thus forever limiting the predictive power of the social sciences)” 
(Bloor, 1997: 37) 
 
The credibility or trustworthiness of qualitative research is also a subject of debate, 
given that some people may only find it credible only because it fits in with their 
prejudices. Writers, like Wolcott (1994) take an extreme relativist stance and 
completely reject the notion of evaluative criteria such as reliability and validity 
because of the inappropriateness of its privileged position. Lincoln and Guba (1985b) 
who use qualitative, flexible designs also deny the relevance of canons of scientific 
enquiry and avoid using the terms, reliability and validity preferring instead, 
“credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability” (1985, 294-301).  
 
3.2.2  Validity 
 
Robson (2002) believes that inappropriate frameworks often lead to the validity of the 
study being questioned. He promotes actively considering alternative explanations 
and unearthing data which does not necessarily support the researcher’s theory.  
Threats to the validity of flexible designs include: reactivity, respondent bias and 
researcher bias. Reactivity refers to the way in which the researcher’s presence may 
influence the behaviour of the people involved in the study. Similarly, there may be a 
respondent bias, ranging from obstructive ness and withholding information if the 
researcher is seen as a threat. Researcher bias refers to what the researcher brings to 
the situation in terms of assumptions and preconceptions, which may in some way 
affect how they behave in the research setting, perhaps in terms of the persons 
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selected for observation or interview, the kind of questions asked, or the selection of 
data for reporting and analysis. 
 
3.2.3  Triangulation 
 
Triangulation, which uses multiple sources to ensue rigorous research, is a widely 
used strategy to help ensure validity. Denzin (1988) has distinguished four types of 
triangulation: 
 
• Data triangulation: the use of more than one method of data collection  (e.g. 
observation, interviews, documents). 
• Observer triangulation: using more than one observer. 
• Methodological triangulation: combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. 
• Theory triangulation: using multiple theories or perspectives. 
 
However, Bloor (1997) argues that while triangulation is relevant to validity, it is 
sometimes problematic in that it is difficult to compare findings collected by different 
methods. Researchers need to be flexible in their design of methodologies. Chesney 
(2001) maintains this approach makes great demands on the researcher, involving the 
‘researcher-as-instrument’ rather than the researcher relying entirely on specialist 
tools and instruments. Without doubt, the resultant quality of a flexible design 
depends very much on the researcher. For people engaged in this type of research it is 
necessary that they are sensitive to the research environment, have open and enquiring 
minds, are good listeners and are able to respond to sometimes contradictory evidence.  
 
To guard against researcher bias the author intends to use not only the experience of 
his section but also that of his Director, his peers and other colleagues within the 
company. The author also plans to discuss and present his findings to respondents at 
departmental, group and individual levels and to keep a full record of his activities 
while carrying out the study. Flexible design traditions relevant to this research are 
case studies, ethnographic and grounded theory studies and action research. 
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3.3  Case Studies 
 
Case studies have been used successfully over the years to examine work in many 
different organisations and fields of endeavour including administration, anatomy, 
anthropology, artificial intelligence, biochemistry, business studies, clinical medicine, 
counselling, criminology, education, relations, jurisprudence, management, social 
work and sociology (Bromley, 1986). A case study is a research strategy, involving 
empirical investigation of problems within their real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1994). Bromley (1986: ix) argues “The individual case 
study or situation analysis is the bed-rock of scientific investigation” but admits it is 
not the common view. However, Cook and Campbell (1979) see case study as a 
legitimate approach and Robson (1993:40) has defined a case study as being the 
development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case, or a small number 
of related, “cases.” A case study can be made of virtually anything and answers the 
why, what and how questions by giving a rich understanding of the context, content 
and the processes being used (Morris and Wood, 1991).   
 
3.3.1   Multiple Case Studies 
 
This research involves multiple case studies. The author considers each box shown in 
Figure 3.1 as a possible case study. Yin (1994) makes the useful analogy that carrying 
out multiple case studies is like doing multiple experiments. It is not about making 
statistical generalisations but to use the findings to make an analytic generalisation or 
theoretical generalisation which may help in understanding other situations. Here the 
data gained from a particular study provide the theoretical insights which possess a 
sufficient degree of generality or universality to allow their projection to other 
contexts or situations (Sim, 1998:350).  
 
The first case study provides the contextual evidence to generate a theoretical view 
about the phenomena. This theory is put to the test using other case studies, thus 
providing patterns of evidence, which are used to either confirm or deny the theory or 
to develop alternative theories. Using multiple cases to obtain and predict a similar set 
of results provides compelling evidence for the appropriateness of theory in 
explaining the situation. This may prove to be an oversimplification because case 
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studies are likely to be multifaceted and difficult to define with a simple theory. The 
theory may only be partially relevant or need further clarification “leading to revision 
and further development of the theory and then probably the need for further case 
studies” (Robson: 2002:183). 
 
3.3.2  Pilot Studies 
 
A pilot study is a small scale feasibility test of the proposed methodology. It gives the 
researcher the opportunity to experiment and further develop the methodology before 
embarking on a full scale enquiry.  Yin (1994) views pilot studies as helping  
 
“investigators to refine their data collection plans with respect to both the content of 
the data and the procedures to be followed”. For Yin, they are a “laboratory for the 
investigators, allowing them to observe different phenomena from many different 
angles or to try different approaches on a trial basis” (Yin, 1994: 74) 
 
3.4  Ethnographic Studies 
 
Ethnography, has its roots in anthropology and provides a description and 
interpretation of the culture and social structure of the group. Ethnographies focus on 
depth rather than breadth, with an emphasis on description and interpretation 
(Atkinson and Hammersly, 1994). They aim to produce “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 
1973) which enable the culture to be understood from the inside. Sometimes the 
quality of research is compromised when researchers “turn native” and get too 
involved with the people being studied but it is argued that it is a necessary risk 
because 
 
“in order to truly grasp the lived experience of people from their point of view, one 
has to enter relationships with them, and hence disturb the natural setting, there is no 
point in trying to control what is the unavoidable consequences of becoming involved 
in people’s lives in this way” (Davidson and Layder, 1994:165).  
 
Ethnography is often unrealistic for real life enquires as it involves working and living 
in the field for a number of years and studying people in their natural environment. 
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However, aspects of the ethnographic approach can be used to help develop theory 
(Layder, 1993).  Blumer talks about using ethnography to lift veils and to dig deeper   
 
“Central to the way in which ethnographers think about human social action is the 
idea that people construct the social world both through their interpretations of it and 
through the actions based upon those interpretations” (cited in Hammersley, 1992: 
44).  
 
Case studies can be approached ethnographically; or an ethnographic study can be 
approached by means of grounded theory. 
 
3.5  Grounded Theory Studies 
  
Grounded theory is both a research strategy and a method for analysing the research 
data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The type of study is about developing a theory 
relevant to the situation which is the focus of the study. This theory is ‘grounded’ in 
data collected during the study, particularly in the actions, interactions and processes 
of the people involved. Such studies have been carried out in a very wide range of 
settings. Typical studies include, ‘living with multiple sclerosis’ (Davis, 1973); 
relationships between mothers and adult daughters (Henwood, 1993); and decision-
making about pregnancy (Currie, 1988). The most common method of collecting data 
is through interviews, the content of which are analysed and categorised into units of 
information, relative to events, happenings and instances. The spiral of interviews, 
analysis and categorisation continues until new information or themes are exhausted.    
It is not a case of random sampling from a known population to achieve statistical 
generalisations but the deliberate and purposeful sampling and analysis of interviews 
and events to glean additional information to generate theory.   
 
3.6  Action Research 
 
The purpose of action research is to influence and instigate change (Argyris et al., 
1985; Wilkinson, 1996). Researchers have interpreted action research in many ways, 
but three common themes have emerged. The first concentrates on the research 
purpose and the management of change (Cunningham, 1995) and the second relates to 
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close collaboration of the researchers and practitioners in the research.  Eden and 
Huxham (1996:75) argue the findings from action research result from “involvement 
with members of an organisation over a matter which is of genuine concern to them.” 
Therefore the researcher is part of the organisation within which the research and 
change process are taking place (Zuber-Skerritt, 1996). Finally, the action research 
should have implications beyond its immediate project, in other words the results 
should inform other contexts. Action research differs from other forms of research 
because of its explicit focus on action in particular promoting change within the 
organisation (Marsick and Watkins, 1997).  
 
Habermas (1972) rejects the notion of action research. He argues that development of 
theory and practice are completely different activities. In constructing theory, the aim 
is to reflect or interpret the truth whilst in developing practice the aim is to achieve 
worldly success. These different mindsets reduce the ability of the action researcher to 
engage in theoretical discourse. Habermas’ criticism is based on a belief that society 
is oppressed and the key to liberation is in the development of theory, out of which 
new practices can emerge. The basic premise of action research is the active 
participation of practitioners, the thought being, if they are involved they are more 
likely to make better decisions and engage in more effective practices. An action 
research values groups of practitioners carrying out their own enquiry into their own 
situations and de-emphasises the role of external researchers. First there is the 
improvement of practice, second there is improvement in understanding by 
practitioners and third, there is improvement in the situation in which the practise 
takes place. Collaboration between researchers and participants is a key feature of 
action research, which is also known as participatory research (Park, 1993) or 
participatory action research (Selener, 1997).  
 
This research study is concerned with what people do and how they behave and an 
obvious way to do this is to watch them. Observation involves the systematic 
observation, recording, description, analysis and interpretation of people’s behaviour 
(Saunders et al. 2000). According to Taylor and Bogdan (1984), participant 
observation involves social interaction between the researcher and informants in the 
milieu of the latter.  It is qualitative, derives from the work of social anthropology and 
is about discovering the meanings which people attach to their actions. The author’s 
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knowledge of the organisation and of having worked as an engineer puts him in good 
stead to be a practitioner researcher adopting the participant observer role proposed 
for the study workshops. It is not necessary for the author to “learn in context” in the 
same way than an external consultant or researcher might. Sarantakos (1998) views 
action research as embodying democratic principles in research where the researcher 
is  
 
“a collaborator and a facilitator: the political nature, the participatory character the 
empancipatory elements and the direct, committing and personal involvement of the 
researcher are at the front of the research activity” (Sarantakos, 1998: 113)    
 
Action research and the flexible qualitative strategy are similar in that both stress the 
importance of close links between the researcher and participants. However, Robson 
(2003) points out that in ethnographic and grounded theory the researcher takes a 
central role which is at variance with the collaborative democratic stance of action 
research. A widely adopted version of action research views it as a spiral or cyclical 
process (Kemmis and Wilkinson, 1998) that involves planning a change, acting and 
then observing what happens following the change; reflecting on these processes and 
consequences and then planning further action and repeating the cycle. Action 
research involves the subjects of the research deciding on what to study and also 
being involved in carrying out the study and interpreting the results. Corey (1953:40-
41) outlines the following steps for action research.   
 
1. The identification of a problem area about which an individual or a group 
is sufficiently concerned to want to take action; 
2. The selection of a specific problem and the formulation of a hypothesis or 
prediction that implies a goal and a procedure to reaching it;  
3. The careful recording of actions taken and the accumulation of evidence to 
determine the degree to which the goal has been achieved; 
4. The inference from this evidence of generalisations regarding the relation 
between the actions and the desired goal; 
5. The continuous retesting of these generalisations in action situations. 
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The action research model is a data based, problem solving model that replicates the 
steps involved in the scientific method of inquiry.  Beckhard (1969) states that there 
are three processes involved in action research: data collection, feedback of data to the 
clients, and action planning based on the data. French and Bell (1984) define action 
research as  
 
“the process of systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system 
relative to some objective, goal or need of that system; feeding these data back into 
the system; taking actions by altering selected variables within the system based both 
on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the results of actions by collecting 
more data” (French and Bell, 1984: 108) 
 
The sequence tends to be cyclical, with the focus on new or advanced problems as the 
client group learns to work more effectively together.  Corey, (1953) also said the 
problem is one of concern to many people or if it is likely that the experiment will 
affect many people the action research should involve these people. It then becomes 
cooperative action research. Kemmis (1980) advocated the incorporation of group 
work into the research process because of the power of group interaction in producing 
commitment to change in attitude and behaviour.  Hord (1981) distinguishes between 
cooperation and collaboration, suggesting that in the former, participants reach some 
agreements but proceed individually toward self-defined goals, while in the latter, 
participants work together on all phases of the project, which provides mutual benefits 
to each party.  
 
Havelock (1969) says collaborative action research, places greater emphasis on 
service to the practitioner systems and on the collaborative teaming of research and 
the practitioner. The inquiry team collaborates on defining goals, on all phases of the 
research and on change strategies. Collaborative action research suggests that each 
group represented in the process shares in the planning, implementation, and analysis 
of the research and that each contributes different expertise and a unique perspective 
(Oja and Smulyan, 1989).  Such collaboration recognises and utilises unique insights 
and skills provided by each participant while, at the same time demanding that no set 
of responsibilities is assigned a superior status. Wallet et al (1981) maintain that 
“parity and equal responsibility” in collaboration  
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“does not mean that each member has an equal role in decision making or input 
during all phases of the study. Role shifts occur depending on the needs of the 
situation. Continuity is provided by their researchers through communication and 
collaboration networks they establish with those involved in the study” (Wallet et al., 
1981:94). 
 
Another point to note is that collaboration also assumes that researchers and 
practitioners will communicate frequently and openly throughout the process to avoid 
possible conflicting perceptions and assumptions which result from their different 
positions in the field (Threadgold, 1985). The key characteristic of action research is 
in collaboration, which allows for mutual understanding and consensus, democratic 
decision making, and common action (Street, 1986). The majority of collaborative 
action research programmes are similar to case studies in that they focus on 
immediate problems as defined by the participating practitioners (Cummings and 
Hustler, 1986; Elliot, 1977). Grundy and Kemmis (1982:87) call for a democratic 
process of “symmetrical communication” which allows all members to participate on 
equal terms.  
 
Hord (1981), Nixon (1981) and Grundy and Kemmis (1982) call for strong leadership 
in collaborative action research. This often means that the leader of the research 
domain must disperse his or her power sharing control allowing others to delegate and 
assume responsibility. Action research requires participants to discuss problems, share 
ideas and be open to learning new skills and behaviours in the research process (Pine 
1981). The assumption is that if participants work together on a common problem, 
clarifying and negotiating ideas and concerns, they will be more likely to change their 
attitudes and behaviours if research indicates such change is necessary (Anning, 1986; 
Cassidy, 1986). Another expected outcome of using action research is that those 
involved will grow professionally. Through action research, participants will gain new 
knowledge which will help them solve other problems, broaden their general 
knowledge base and learn new skills which can be applied to future interests and 
concerns (Street, 1986) and be  more able to solve problems as they arise (Pine,1981).  
 
Anning (1986) and Elliot (1977) conclude as part of their studies on the teaching 
profession that it is only through participation in planning and implementing new 
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practises and observing and analysing their effects will individuals accept and use 
research findings. Oja and Ham (1984) and Pollard (1988) concur; they report that it 
is only through participating in action research that individuals  become more critical 
and reflective about their own practise. However, Adelemen (1989: 179) has criticised 
action research in educational settings as being of poor quality and “inward looking 
and ahistorical.” He describes the view of action research as an “alternative research 
paradigm, as a democratising force and means of achieving informed, practical 
change arising from issues at grass roots” as “overbearing.” Similarly, Atkinson and 
Delamont (1985) have criticised action research in educational research as being 
atheoretical.  
 
Oja and Smulyan (1989) maintain that successful collaborative action research 
depends on a project structure consisting of at least four elements  (i) frequent and 
open communication among participants (ii) democratic project leadership (iii) 
spiralling cycles of planning acting observing and reflecting and (iv) positive 
relationships. Communication can be difficult at the best of times, especially, as in 
this study when we are dealing with mainly Japanese, British and Spanish Engineers. 
Holley (1997) and Threadgold (1985) both say communications can break down due 
to differences in language, perceptions and expectations, which result from their 
different positions in the field. Lewin (1948) explains that action research proceeds 
through spiralling cycles of planning execution and reconnaissance (or fact finding). 
These cycles have been designed into the study by means of encouraging individuals 
to reflect on their behaviours and learning following the workshops and in 
subsequently trying to implement a new behavioural code. Grundy and Kemmis 
(1982) explain that spiralling cycles are necessary to bring the action research under 
control and develop an effective critique of the situation. Ebbutt (1985) sees the 
process of action research as a series of successive cycles each incorporating the 
possibility for feedback of information within and between cycles. 
 
3.7  Research Methodology. 
 
This research, as already explained at the beginning of this chapter is about finding 
something practical which works in real life and as such the author intends to act as an 
internal change agent and adopt a flexible action research methodology whereby the 
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knowledge management strategy emerges from work grounded in practice and 
informed by literature in a constant and iterative loop of enquiry and reflection 
(Figure 3.2).  
 
 
Reflection 
Literature Review 
Knowledge Management Initiatives (Case 
Studies) 
Collect Data 
Analyse Data 
Validate 
Develop Knowledge Management Strategy 
to Raise the Capability of the Company 
Reflection 
Literature Review 
Previous Work/ Nissan Experience 
 
Figure 3.2: Proposed Research Methodology   
 
The beginnings of the methodology are grounded in the years of practical experience 
the author has of working both at Nissan and within the automotive industry.  He 
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intends to use the knowledge management initiatives (case studies) shown in Figure 
3.1. as a baseline for the study. The background and reasons for the initiatives are 
explained in Chapter Six and although each can be justified as a separate study they 
should be seen as a means for deriving a knowledge management strategy rather than 
being the strategy. At the time the author decided on the methodology the initiatives 
were not linked by the coherence of an over-arching strategy.  Quantitative and 
qualitative techniques will be used to analyse data which is collected by various 
means as explained in subsequent sections. 
 
3.7.1  Data Collection  
 
Various methods will be used to collect data however, it is anticipated that they will 
including surveys, interviews, observation, documentary analysis and access to data 
archives within Nissan. 
 
3.7.1.1 Survey 
 
Surveys are usually associated with the deductive approach and used in non 
experimental fixed designs. Surveys are designed to be easily understood and are an 
economical way of collecting data from a large population. Most surveys involve the 
use of standardised questionnaires where the resultant data can be easily compared. 
The questionnaires are usually administered in one of the following ways: 
 
• Self completion: the respondent answers the questionnaire which has been 
sent by post, email or online. 
• Face to face interview: the researcher directly asks the respondent prepared 
questions and records the answers. 
• Telephone interview. 
 
For instance, the author used a questionnaire when trying to understand whether NTC 
engineers approach Design Reviews with a different mindset than their NTCE 
colleagues (Chapter 7:184). The questionnaire, which comprised of eight questions 
was sent to Japanese and British Senior Engineers and Managers who had experience 
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of both working in NTCE and NTC.  Each respondent was asked whether he agreed 
or disagreed with a given statement i.e. Design Reviews are more effective in NTC 
than in NTCE. (Appendix 2).  The questionnaire was emailed or posted to 
respondents in the UK, Spain and Japan. The results were collated and analysed and 
follow up interviews arranged either face or face or by the telephone to ask for 
clarification or discuss issues.  
 
3.7.1.2  Interviews 
 
Interviewing, as a technique is very much used in social research. It is said to be a 
meaningful discussion between two people (Kahn and Cannell, 1957). The purpose of 
an interview is to gather valid data relevant to the research. Interviews can be 
structured (standardised), semi-structured (non-standardised) or unstructured. 
 
• Structured: Use predetermined and standardised questions. 
• Semi Structured: The researcher has a list of questions or themes to choose 
from and leads the respondent into a discussion.  
• Unstructured: These are informal in-depth interviews, with no 
predetermined questions other than an idea of what needs to be discussed. 
They are non directive, in that the interviewee guides the discussion.  
 
For examples of how and when these interviews were employed see: 
 
Interviewing Technique Example Chapter/Page 
Structured Design Reviews 7/185 
Semi structured  Extract from Interview 8/216 
Unstructured Collecting Anecdotal 
Evidence: “There is 
definitely a blame 
culture in NTC ….” 
5/120 
 
 
 
3.7.1.3  Group/Section Interviews 
 
The author also intends to conduct group interviews where he acts as the facilitator 
and manager of the discussion.  Themes are developed through exploring the topic in 
question and as such the interview is bound to be relatively unstructured and free 
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flowing as identified by Zikmund (1997).  In all cases the onus is on the author to 
encourage the participants to relax and to initiate the discussion (Easterby-Smith et al. 
1991). There are distinct advantages to using the group interview as it allows a variety 
of points to emerge and for the group to respond and discuss these issues. The author 
used group/section interviews extensively throughout the study. Often they happened 
during workshops as in the case of the Behavioural Workshops (Chapter 8:210) or 
lodgings, which are meetings held offsite. These meetings are usually held in hotels or 
conference centres and run well into the evening and attendees usually stay overnight. 
They are also seen as team building events. 
 
3.7.1.4  Recording Data 
 
Healey (1991) suggests that a full record of an interview be compiled as soon as it has 
taken place. If it is not, the exact nature of the explanations may be lost. There is also 
the possibility that the researcher may inadvertently mix up data from different 
interviews when a number are carried out in a short period of time (Ghauri et 
al.,1995). The author intends to make notes of the one to one interviews occasionally 
reflecting on his understanding of what is being said and also allowing the 
interviewee to read the notes as they are being written. This is important, especially 
when interviewing Japanese colleagues. The author is conscious that an in depth 
interview at least offers the opportunity to explore meanings, including those which 
may be culturally specific, as identified by Marshall and Rossman (1999). Many of 
the interviews where recorded, transcribed and analysed.  (Appendix 3) 
 
Verbatim from ad-hoc discussions were also made and filed and used to support the 
arguments and findings made in this thesis. For instance: Notes made by the author on 
10th March 2004 
 
Kinoshita san said: “When the French make a presentation they put as little as 
possible information on the slide and expect the presenter to talk around it. It is 
important for the people at the meeting to discuss/debate and understands the 
philosophy of what is being said. In Japan it is different. The context. The philosophy 
of how we do things is already understood. In fact it can be quite shocking if someone 
questions it. Why are you asking that when you know the answer? In Japan we do not 
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expect much discussion during the presentation. Everything will be on the slide. The 
French like to start at zero. They do not like pre-described solutions. They like to 
debate. This is a difference between the cultures. In Japan we have a saying I Shin 
Ren Shin,  which means we can communicate what we’re thinking with our hearts.” 
 
3.7.1.5  Observation 
 
Observing the way people behave and the environments in which thy do so are a 
central part of this study. There are different observational techniques. At the one end 
of the spectrum is participant observation and at the other structured observation.  
Participant observation is a qualitative style usually used in flexible designs, whilst 
structured observation is quantitative and exclusively used in fixed designs.  There is 
a third style, which is called unobtrusive observation, which is non participatory and 
non-reactive. Unobtrusive observation can be structured but it is usually informal and 
unstructured. The author proposes to use participant observation and unobtrusive 
observation as part of this study.  Examples of when participant and unobtrusive 
observation was used include: 
 
Observation 
Technique  
Event/Background Chapter/Page 
Participant Managers Workshop: 
Building Collaborative 
Relationships 
9/247 
Unobtrusive   Developing the PDS 
Mindset Questionnaire 
8/23 
 
 
3.7.1.6  Documents 
 
The author also intends to use documents as part as part of his analysis. These can be 
in the form of written and non- written documentation. Written documentation can be 
from a book, newspaper or magazine, or transcripts of speeches made by prominent 
people about Nissan whilst non-written documentation can be from televised events, 
pictures, drawings and photographs. This approach is also called content analysis, or 
the qualitative analysis of the content of the document which has been defined as “a 
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research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context (Krippendorff, 1980:21). Examples of where documents have been used for 
content analysis are:- 
  
Medium  Example  Chapter/Page 
Newspaper The Japan Times 4/73 
Magazine Automotive News 
(January 2006) 
10/281 
Transcripts of 
Speeches 
“The Power of 
Nissan Comes 
from Inside.” 
10/281 
Televised Events BBC Programme 
“So What Do You 
Do in a Day?” 
4/73 
 
3.7.1.7  Data Archives 
 
Linked to the above the author has access to, and proposes to draw on, the enormous 
amount of data which is stored throughout the company. Some of these records are in 
the form of documentation; others are in the form of quantitative statistical reports 
which may be of relevance to this study.     
Document Chapter/Page 
Internal Executive Report – 
“What’s going on in the EVP 
Office (No. 137) June 30th.   2004 
5/100 
Nissan Europe’s Quality of 
Management Survey Analysis -
2002 
9/264 
 
3.8  The Researcher as an Internal Change Agent 
 
The author accepts that he could be disadvantaged by his preconceptions and 
assumptions of having worked within Nissan for a good number of years and also 
wonders if his position, as Manager in the company, will inhibit interactions with 
participants but believes if they are carefully managed the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages of being both an internal change agent and researcher. Cassell (1989) 
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and Cassell and Fitter (1992) believe the perceived role of the researcher forms an 
important part to the research study. The researcher is seen as being skilled not only in 
research methodologies and techniques, but in their ability to interact with others.  
Qualitative techniques usually focus on constructivist approaches where there is no 
clear cut objectivity and social life emerges from the shared creativity of individuals 
(Filstead, 1978).  Hollway (1989) argues social scientists use “quantification” to 
justify and support their approach as being scientific although the reliability and 
validity of their results are often challenged because their cause and effect predictions 
are based on generalizations. Van Maanen (1979) describes qualitative methodologies 
as an  
 
“umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate and other otherwise comes to terms with meaning not the frequency, 
of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world”(Van 
Maanen, 1979: 520) 
 
Van Maanen argues that because qualitative methods frequently involve a longer term 
commitment, researchers are likely to build closer working relationships with people 
and be able to more easily share insights and experience. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1983) make much of the reflexivity of social research:  
 
“We are part of the social world we study… this is not a matter of methodological 
commitment, it is an existential fact. There is no way in which we can escape the 
social world in order to study it; nor fortunately, is that necessary. We cannot avoid 
relying on “common sense” knowledge nor, often can we avoid having an effect on 
the social phenomena we study” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:15).  
 
For any change agent there must be a decent match of personality and management 
style (Shenson, 1990). The two key benefits of using internal change agents are - cost 
and access to information. In comparison, the costs of training and using internal 
change agents are minimal when compared with using an outside consultancy firm.    
Heller (1986) purports change is a process, not an event and stresses that things can 
go wrong at each stage saying new findings and ideas may not be seriously considered 
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because of deep seated prejudices. Engineers do not necessarily have the expertise in 
the strategies, methods and analytical techniques needed to carry out research. 
 
The internal change agent may also have access to information that the external agent 
cannot hope to get to, no matter how long the project runs. Qualitative techniques 
usually focus on constructivist approaches where there is no clear cut objectivity and 
social life emerges from the shared creativity of individuals (Filstead, 1978). Hollway 
(1989) argues social scientists use “quantification” to justify and support their 
approach as being scientific although the reliability and validity of their results are 
often challenged because their cause and effect predictions are based on 
generalizations. Van Maanen (1979) describes qualitative methodologies as an  
 
“umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate and other otherwise comes to terms with meaning not the frequency, 
of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world”(Van 
Maanen, 1979: 520) 
 
The ongoing availability of the internal consultant to guide implementation of 
recommendations and to use his or her experience across the organisation cannot be 
counted upon with external consultant (Berenbaum, 1997). Internal change agents 
have the advantage of understanding the organisational culture, enabling them to 
better understand people’s reaction when they are involved in change. They may also 
be more socialised into the organisational norms and beliefs and more sensitive to 
local politics and behaviours. McLachlin, (1999) referred to this as a “cultural fit.” 
However, as Marguiles and Raia (1978) point out, to be effective the internal 
consultant is required to maintain a marginal status between being internal and being 
objective. The internal change agent needs to build a personal resilience, including 
some element of “healthy detachment” from the organisation so that he or she 
maintains objectivity. According to McCalman and Paton, (1992:54) the factors 
hindering the internal change agent’s objectivity are: 
 
1. Being too close to the problem; 
2. Being part of the problem; 
   
John Temple  69 
3. Being unwilling to confront issues when promotion and pay issues are 
forthcoming; 
4. Being part of the power system being examined; 
5. Being aware of the needs and demands of superiors. 
 
Two other issues which may inhibit an internal change agent’s ability to effect change 
relate to the method of entry into the change project and the nature of the voluntary 
relationship. In entering the change management contract as facilitator, the internal 
change agent has to convince management and employees within a particular part of 
the organisation of his or her expertise in the area and he or she also has to display “a  
willingness to help” (McCalman and Paton, 1992:54). These issues are no different 
from those faced by the external change agent and the confidence and trust will come 
from running successful change management programmes within the organisation. 
However, the internal change agent has to be more successful than the external 
change agent in making these interventions an open education process for the 
organisation. 
 
Internal change agents have the ability to maintain longer-term relationships and 
interactions with all those involved in change, although it can be fraught at times as 
they try to preserve and change relationships. It is assumed that they can closely 
monitor changes in relation to evaluating effects, although the socialised eye may not 
notice the difference on a day-to-day basis, or may be influenced by knowing the 
organisation too well. There may also be other disadvantages especially if internal 
change agents are perceived by the organisation and its members in a certain way or 
are stereotyped as having certain traits or behaviours. Additionally they many also 
face positional issues whereby their ability to influence certain factions may be less 
than that of an external change agent. They may be seen as a threat to Senior 
Management, who “struggle to maintain their privileged position as stewards of 
organisational truths,” and as such they can “tend to discredit the representations and 
knowledge offered by others” (Fulop and Rifkin, 1997: 45-63). Integrity and 
credibility may also be a problem for the internal change agent. They may be seen as 
management spies, threatening openness and trust, and as Berenbaum (1997) 
remarked it would become “difficult to convince the operating departments that the 
consulting role was anything other than that of espionage.”  
   
John Temple  70 
  
3.9  Conclusion 
 
This chapter gives a clear research framework for the thesis. It explains the 
methodologies, tools and techniques the author proposed to use and where appropriate  
cross references and gives actual examples where and how they were used in the 
thesis. However, in writing this chapter he was well aware that given the emergent 
nature of the study he expected both the strategy and methodology to change, the 
details of which are explained in subsequent chapters. The strategies were emergent 
due to the author reflecting and learning from what he did both as a researcher and as 
a practitioner. The author also returns to the subject of internal change agents in 
Chapter Eleven of this thesis and explains how and why his perceptions of his role 
altered during the study.  In summary, this chapter has outlined the research 
philosophy, strategy and methodological framework which underpin this study and 
has:  
 
• Explained that the research philosophy is about finding something practical 
that works in “real life” situations and discussed the various approaches to 
social research that the author intends to use.  
 
• Debated the research strategy and shown how it is crucial to any study as it 
determines the type of questions being asked. 
 
• Presented a flexible action research methodology whereby the knowledge 
management strategy emerges from work grounded in practice and informed 
by literature in a constant and iterative loop of enquiry and reflection.  
 
• Discussed the author’s intended role as an internal change.  
 
The next chapter opens Section Two: Understanding Organisational Culture. 
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 Chapter Four 
 
Organisational Culture and the Management of Change 
 
4. 0  Introduction 
 
This chapter opens Section Two of the thesis and introduces debates and compares the 
different models and typologies that help frame the study and its grounding in 
organisational culture.  It begins by exploring the philosophical background of the 
word culture and then considers the impact of organisational cultures, leadership and 
change management programmes within Nissan and uses examples to illustrate some 
of the key cultural characteristics of working with the Japanese.   
 
 
 SECTION ONE: The context 
and framework for the study 
Chapter Two: The study in 
context of Global Nissan 
Chapter Three: The research 
philosophy, strategy and 
methodological framework 
underpinning the study 
 
SECTION TWO: 
Understanding the impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four: 
Organisational Culture and 
the Management of Change
Chapter Five: The impact of 
organisational culture on 
knowledge management and 
learning at Nissan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Background 
 
Culture is a relatively modern concept. In an anthropological and social sense the 
word culture refers to “civilisation” and “social heritage.”  It was originally an 
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agricultural metaphor about tending to crops and animals (Morgan, 1986). The 
concept was extended to explain the differences between humans and other animals 
and then to differentiate culture from nature. One of the earliest English definitions of 
culture described it as a  
 
“complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 
1871/1958:1).  
 
In the eighteenth century the words culture and human nature were considered to have 
the same meaning and the Enlightenment philosophers believed in a common human 
nature:  
 
“It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the acts of men, 
and in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains the same in its principles 
and operations.” (Hume, 1748/1994).   
 
However, the philosophy proved impractical, social divisions seemed entrenched and 
it was felt that certain types of people would always be barbarians. This type of 
thinking formed the beginnings of nineteenth century racism. In the late Victorian era, 
racial science was used to explain everything from the origins of African savages to 
class relations in Great Britain. Race was the reason why white, Anglo-Saxon men - 
the Ubermensch – or Supermen, were destined to rule the world. Mainstream support 
for racial superiority disappeared at the end of the Second World War, when the full 
horror of Nazi Germany’s eugenic programmes became clear and post war 
anthropologists, like Levi-Straus popularised the idea that culture and not race 
explained human behaviour and differences.  
In 1946 the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation race was 
declared a social myth and not a biological phenomenon (Unesco, 1945:93). Levi-
Strauss believed that although biologically human beings were the same they were 
culturally different. He compared cultures to trains, moving along their own tracks, at 
their own speed, in their own direction. Every individual is bound up with his culture 
as a traveller is with his train (Levi-Strauss,1987). Similarly, White (1949) said that 
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man could not escape the ways of being that culture and history impose on them and 
Hatch (1997) argued that  
 
“defining culture as sealed compartments of separate and distinct groups of people 
allowed the cultural metaphor to be applied to the study of organisations, since by 
definition, organisations are groups”(Hatch, 1997:204) 
 
4.2 Organisational Culture 
   
The predominant organisational culture of any multinational is usually linked to the 
nationality of the parent company, which in this case is Japanese. The author 
explained in Chapter One that organisational culture became popular as a 
management theory in the 1970’s and mentioned the work of French and Bell (1990) 
who used the metaphor of the organisational iceberg to express the idea of the formal 
and informal organisation. Above the water line is the formal organisation; below, is 
the informal organisation, which is shaped by culture, leadership styles, values, 
attitudes and beliefs. Lewis (2004:275) also used the iceberg metaphor, this time to 
illustrate the speech and thought ratios of the different national cultures. In the case of 
the British and German icebergs the section of thought presented to others is roughly 
equal but for the French, the iceberg shows more ice visible. This means the French 
speak more whereas for the Japanese, the iceberg is nearly completely submerged, 
indicating a more introspective nature and minimal articulation of their thoughts.  
 
The argument that we live in organisational societies dominated by global 
organisations has already been introduced and suggests that national cultures have a 
limited impact on organisational cultures. Other commentators tend to agree. Morgan 
(1986: 113) writes:  
“Many of the major cultural similarities and differences in the world today are 
occupational rather than national.” Similarly, Trompenaars and Woolliams (2003) 
accept that organisational cultures and shared systems of meaning may be dominant 
over national differences and write that 
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“Management of culture is now about creating a corporate culture in which people 
will work together to achieve the organisation’s goals, reconciling dilemmas that 
originate from issues of corporate culture” (2003:101). 
 
However, Hofstede who is a widely cited author in the field of cross-cultural research 
(Sondergaard, 1994;Yoo and Donthu, 1998) believes that organisational values will 
only prevail when they are not in conflict with national values (Hofstede et al, 1990). 
Laurent (1986) also maintains that national cultural values will take precedent when 
they conflict with organisational values. According to Schein (1992), organisational 
culture exists on three levels: artefacts, values and behavioural norms; core beliefs and 
assumptions. He maintains that deeper level, core beliefs and assumptions “operate 
unconsciously and define in a basic ‘taken for granted’ fashion, an organisation’s 
view of its self and its environment.” (1992:6).   
 
Ghosn, Nissan’s Chief Operating Officer  believes cultural diversity is the key to 
success. He said, 
 
“Being global and cross cultural is the way to do business, not just for moral reasons 
but for business reasons….. A multicultural environment is filled with opportunities. 
Benefits are gained in open exchange. You learn the most from interacting with 
people whose makeup is different from your own – from people with a different 
language, education or social experience” (The Japan Times, May 2005). 
 
He expanded on his philosophy when interviewed for BBC 2’s “So What Do You Do 
All Day?” (Broadcast, Tuesday 25th May, 2004). Reporter Adrian Chiles asked Ghosn 
how he coped with “the pressure of managing 130 000 people?” Ghosn’s answer was 
typical of someone focused on positive outcomes. To him, the 130 000 employees 
were people who could supply Nissan with business opportunities. Ghosn is well 
advised on all areas of the business. People who have made presentations to him 
remark that he seems to have already decided on the direction he wants to take and 
listens to confirm his opinion and ensure nothing has been missed. The point is often 
made that Ghosn listens attentively to what is being said and neither, they add, does 
he forget. Ghosn went to Japan, prepared to live and adapt to the country, its people 
and its customs. It was a deliberate ploy: When not at work he is active within the 
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Japanese community, and more importantly, he is seen to embrace local customs and 
learn from the experience. He was well aware of the perils of being seen as a foreign 
aggressor. He explained, “I did not have to tell the Japanese that I liked their country 
… they could see it.” (Magee, 2003:59)  
 
Dominique Thormann, vice president of global communications and investor relations 
at Nissan says Ghosn, “doesn’t believe in cultural clashes. He came here [Japan] and 
saw Nissan only as a maker of cars and went to work from there” (Magee, 2003:62).  
This is a clever use of imagery; the focus is on the product, Ghosn knows previous 
change initiatives at Nissan were de-railed by middle management who blocked 
attempted change initiatives and he wanted them to be in no doubt as to his priorities. 
The evidence suggests that Ghosn has managed to implement change because he 
understands that organisational culture may be the single most important factor 
standing between success and failure (Morgan, 1989). He has changed organisational 
paradigms by weaving his own cultural web and meshed stories, symbols, power and 
organisational structures, control systems, rituals and routines to great effect (Johnson 
and Scholes, 1997). Communication is key to Ghosn’s strategy for change. He uses it 
as a primary management tool and often gets involved in small details of presentations 
and press releases.  
 
“You wouldn’t believe the level of detail he gets involved in. The message has to be 
consistent; he understands how one wrong word could derail his efforts. He micro-
manages the flow of information within and out of the company and constantly puts 
himself on the front-line.”  General Manager Nissan Motors Ltd. 
 
Accompanying an article speculating on Ghosn’s successor (Yamaguchi, 2004) are 
two photographs. One is of Toshiyuku Shiga, the fast rising executive who is said will 
replace Ghosn, and the other is of Ghosn. The interesting point is that Shiga-san is 
dressed in a dark, western style business suit and Ghosn is in traditional Japanese 
costume. Ghosn is dressed in a Kimono, he is kneeling with the palms of his hands 
resting on his thighs and he smiles the smile of a benefactor. The transition is 
complete and the message, clear: Ghosn has succeeded, is in control and will decide 
who runs global Nissan. A new breed of Nissan Directors is being selected, described 
within the organisation as being young, powerful and trusted by Renault. Board 
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meetings are no longer the face saving exercises of the past. Japanese Directors 
criticise, argue and have to defend their positions and reputations. The author wonders 
whether Ghosn purposely managed his image to be seen to have taken on the mantle 
of a Confucian elder or whether the Japanese preferred to see him as such, to allow 
them to accept the unpalatable reforms and changes he brought to the company. An 
article, published on the company website in 1999 just after Ghosn went to Nissan, 
reported that one shareholder complained because he felt Japan was being “invaded 
by gaijins” (Matsumura, 2003). The author has not heard of Ghosn being attacked on 
a personal level now the company is in profit.  
 
The contention of this discussion is that seeing Ghosn as a teacher elevated his status 
within Japanese society. Ghosn became someone corporate Japan could learn from, 
rather than considering him a threat. The Japanese did much the same with the 
statistician and quality guru, Edward Deming who has been credited with helping to 
make Japan a global leader in delivering quality goods. Gregory Clarke, president of 
Japan’s Tama University said the Japanese talked about Deming as if he were a god 
(Magnier,1999). Like Deming, Ghosn’s change initiatives became acceptable because 
it seemed he was acting out of a sense of responsibility for the company and for Japan. 
Ghosn has been careful in introducing change and senior managers who lost their jobs 
did so after they were publicly seen to fail to meet their objectives. The stakes are 
high, as the President of one Nissan Company remarked:  
 
“You can get very rich working for Nissan at the highest levels but you have to 
deliver. Ghosn has got rid of the old guard. They failed and metaphorically speaking 
were allowed to fall on their on swords. The people who are managing Nissan now 
are behind Ghosn one hundred per cent or at least they are behaving as of they are 
behind him. They are saying the right things.” 
 
4.3  Bushido and The Warrior’s Code 
 
“Allowed to fall on their own swords,” is a passing reference to Hara-kiri, or ritual 
suicide. Hari-kiri, which literarily means stomach cutting is a particularly painful 
method of disembowelment, which developed as an integral part of the code of 
Bushido and the discipline of the Samurai warrior class. The point about the Samurai 
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is relevant because two NTCE European Directors who have attended the Global 
Executive Training sessions have been told by different Japanese mentors to read 
Bushido: The Warrior’s code by Inazo Nitobe, which was originally published in 
1899. Nitobe writes:  
 
“To understand Bushido and the feudal system is essential to a comprehension of the 
soul of Japan. Without a working knowledge of them, the moral fibre and idea of 
present Japan is a sealed book.” (2003:5).   
  
The Directors from Nissan Technical Centre Europe were told that the book describes 
what “a good Nissan Manager should be.” One Director said he felt as if he was 
being told the Japanese were “somehow superior, because of their background and 
Samurai heritage. A heritage that only a Japanese could understand and appreciate.”  
The other Director liked the analogy of being associated with the Samurai, it appealed 
to his sense of position within the company.   
 
4.4  Nihonjinron Literature (Theorising on the Japanese) 
 
Before Japan’s economic bubble burst in the 1990’s, many academics used to 
deliberate as to why the country was so successful. Some debated it was due to 
Japan’s late development when compared to the West, others proposed it was because 
of the application of advanced manufacturing systems and another group tried to 
explain the success in terms of cultural factors and promoted particular cultural 
aspects of Japanese life as the root cause. The so-called nihonjinron literature, 
(theorising on the Japanese) proposed that the Japanese from all walks of life 
including industries were somehow different (Morris-Suzuki,1998). Nihonjinron 
literature claimed that the Japanese and Japanese management were unique and was 
popular in both Japan and overseas and according to Graham (2003:11) “was eagerly 
devoured by management studies academics and managers looking for an explanation 
for Japan’s phenomenal post-war success. 
 
Japanese management literature focused on motivational techniques, for example 
Reischauer (1977) argued that Japanese workers were proud to work for their 
respected companies, wore company pins and sang company songs. Ouchi (1981) 
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claimed team efficiencies were due to close, honest and open working relationships 
between people. Vogel (1979) said leaders were devoted to the future of the company 
and Gibney (1998) considered Japan a true meritocracy, whereby people were 
promoted through sheer competence and the ability to follow rules. Some of the more 
outlandish nihonjinron claims include so-called facts about Japanese bodies (Tsutomu, 
1987) and brains (Tadanobu, 1978) being different to Westerners. Graham (2003: 11) 
believes nihonjinron presented a “wholly unbalanced portrayal of Japan” and 
Wolferen (1989: 347) remarked “it is striking how casually Japanese seem to accept 
that they are physically “a race apart” from other peoples.”  
 
After the bubble there was a backlash against nihonjinron and recent literature has 
taken a wider, and more rounded view of life in Japanese companies. However it 
seems few studies have identified and probed employee relationships within the 
company as will be debated in this thesis. Roberson (1998) in his book about the lives 
of the Japanese working class) comments: 
 
“not enough research has attempted to understand (or even just present) company 
employees and factory workers as people, to understand work and employment in 
interrelationships with other contexts and dimensions of people’s lives as wholes” 
(Roberson, 1998:11).  
 
4.5  Hofstede’s Five Cultural Dimensions 
 
Hofstede (1991) has identified five cultural dimensions, which will be useful as 
frames of reference for this study. 
 
• Power Distance; “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that 
power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede,1991: 28); 
• Uncertainty avoidance: “the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.” (Hofstede,1991: 113); 
• Individualism versus collectivism: ranges from “societies in which the ties 
between individuals are loose” to “societies in which people from birth 
onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive groups.” (Hofstede,1991: 51); 
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• Masculinity versus femininity: ranges from “societies in which social 
gender roles are clearly distinct” to “societies in which social gender roles 
overlap” ((Hofstede,1991: 82); 
• Confucian dynamism: ranges from long term orientation to short term 
orientation (Hofstede,1991: 166). 
 
National cultures influence the ways in which organisations are managed. France is a 
Latin country; and using Hofstede’s classification is moderately feminine, strongly 
individualistic with a high power distance. In Latin Europe, the Roman Empire was 
the first large and effective state to be established and Hofstede (2001) argues these 
early societal experiences have had an ongoing impact on French policies and 
institutions. The Roman Emperor had absolute power; when the Empire collapsed, 
Germany invaded France, mixed with the Romanized population and continued with 
the notion of a supreme ruler (Pierenne, 1939). Even today, in France, hierarchy is 
seen as existential: superiors are seen as superior persons “Power is a basic fact of 
society and whose legitimacy is irrelevant” (Martyn-Johns, 1977:350). This is 
apparent when you discuss Ghosn with Renault employees who have worked directly 
for him. They hold him in awe. Aron (1969) said that deep within the French 
collective consciousness is the idea that members of a class belong together.  
 
D’Iribarne (1989) explains how the country’s history and the French notion of honor 
affect modern industrial employee interpersonal relationships. He maintains that 
France has always been a class society; and even compares it with the caste society in 
India. In his study of production plants within France, d’Iribarne said there are at least 
three classes: the manager’s and professionals, the first line supervisors and the levels 
below. These classes are further subdivided and the interaction between the classes is 
governed by a sense of respect for the honor concomitant to each class. This 
concomitant of respect, constrains the types of orders the supervisors can give, 
implying subordinates have a sense of autonomy for certain tasks. Hence, Ghosn’s 
Management by Objectives programme and his expectation that people have a 
responsibility for their work. 
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Contrastingly, Japan is highly masculine, collectivist and has a moderate power 
distance. The Japanese work concept is very different to the Western view.  
Sayle (1982) believes Japanese organisations combine the cultural values of the 
Samurai warrior with rice farmers and this is fundamental to understanding Japanese 
management philosophy. Rice cultivation relies on intensive teamwork; everyone is 
expected to contribute towards a successful harvest and if the crop fails, the group 
fails. Group conformity, respect and inter- dependence and compromise are central to 
the way of life. There is no such thing as an independent, pioneering rice farmer. The 
rice culture has been transposed to the Japanese organisation. The Japanese always 
work best with cultures that will allow compromise and understand the importance of 
the mechanism. This point is significant when you consider the following example of 
the initial cultural clashes experienced by the alliance partners.  
 
Nissan employees are also often at a loss in meetings with French colleagues. There 
are numerous accounts where meetings with the French have disintegrated into 
separate discussion. For instance, during one meeting the author attended in Renault 
the French Chairman seemed to completely lose control of the meeting. He walked up 
and down the room, pontificating as if to himself; gesturing widely with his arms, 
hands and face. No-one seemed to be listening. His compatriots were involved in 
seemingly heated discussions of their own. Nissan representatives looked on in 
amazement. The meeting did draw to a conclusion of sorts but the logic was not 
apparent. One Japanese Vice President of Nissan described his experience of working 
with the French as:  
 
“… somewhat difficult. I sometimes wonder if they want to solve a problem or win the 
discussion. The French always want to win. They want things done their own way.” 
 
4.6 Cultural Norms:  The Practice and Etiquette of making Presentations 
 
The cultural norms of the practice and etiquette of making presentations also caused 
initial problems. In Nissan Technical Centre Japan, Japanese engineers were used to 
listening to presentations in relative silence. Few questions were asked; the slides 
were crowded with detail and the key points were often underlined for effect. The 
presenter, who was the focal point of the presentation, read the slides verbatim. The 
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French had a different approach. They used slides with a minimum of key bullet 
points. The audience actively debated the points being raised and sometimes they 
disconcertingly broke into little groups for discussion and, to the Japanese it often 
seemed that the meetings were breaking down.  The presenter was incidental to the 
debate. In Japan, employees see themselves as collectively belonging to an 
organisation. Work is about collaboration, interdependence, shared concerns, and 
mutual help. They are committed to the organisation, often for life and see it as an 
extension of their family. Caudill and Scarr’s (1962) findings show a dominant 
orientation toward collaterality i.e. working together and cooperating with others 
more or less on an egalitarian basis in the family, the community and at work.   
 
The author warns against accepting these descriptions at face value. The words 
suggest secure working relationships but the reality may be different as highlighted by 
the following episode. He remembers accompanying a Japanese Engineer on a 
business trip to a factory in the North East of England. En-route we stopped off at 
Nissan’s manufacturing plant in Sunderland to collect some parts. While we were 
there the Engineer took a smoke break with some of his Japanese peers. It was a lively 
affair. Afterwards the author asked the Engineer how often he saw his friends from 
manufacturing. The response was surprising but also enlightening in showing group 
dynamics to be driven by sense of obligation rather than camaraderie. He said: 
  
“They are not my friends. They are work colleagues. In Japan you are lucky if you 
have one friend. Someone you can talk to honestly.”  
 
4.7 The Rise of the Salary Man 
 
Clark (1979) argues that the Japanese sense of altruism has its roots in Confucianism, 
a Chinese religious and moral philosophy based on the teachings of K’ung Fu-tsu 
(551 – 479 B.C.E.). Confucianism, which rests on the individual’s relationship with 
society, the world and heaven, underpinned the ideas of business and commerce in the 
Tokugawa period. It supports the notion that everyone has a place in society and a 
responsibility to venerate those above and care for those below. It also demands 
unquestioning devotion and loyalty from subordinates to their superiors and 
conformity to the group values. However, Kakabadse et al. (1996) and Wolferen 
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(1989) both claim the Japanese ruling elite modified Confucian doctrine when it 
clashed with the needs of a modern Japan. Confucius encouraged men to act morally 
and refrain from conforming to practices, however conventional, which they judged 
immoral of harmful. He also expected men to try persuading others to change the 
convention (Creel, 1953). Wolferen (1989:318) argued that although the Japanese 
power holders craved obedient subjects they “had no interest in trying to produce 
moral citizens by invoking abstract principles.” The idea that individual’s conscience 
may be in potential opposition to social practise was totally inconceivable.” Similarly, 
the essential tenets of Buddhism, Christianity and later Marxism were proscribed or 
compromised when they threatened to introduce transcendental and troublesome 
concepts into Japan.  
 
The new Japan needed entrepreneurs but it was essential that they did not undermine 
group harmony. It was thought that Western business values were built on individual 
initiative, determination and avarice. In 1899, the Japanese Government imposed laws 
that reasserted feudal values, were based on the patriarchal family model and appealed 
to a sense of nationalism and the public spirit of a revised Confucianism to encourage 
and marshal entrepreneurial activity (Kakabadse et al.,1996). During the Meiji era, 
public attitudes to commerce and its practitioners altered rapidly and for the first time 
businessmen were compared to Samurai. Comparisons continued to be made and 
encouraged especially after the Second World War when Japan was preoccupied with 
rebuilding its economy and the expansion of its industrial and commercial bases were 
seen as crucial to survival.  Central to this strategy were the white-collar businessmen, 
known as salary man (sarariiman). They were originally named because of the salary 
they received as distinct from the wages of the factory workers and other workers 
lower in the occupational hierarchy. The term salary man connotes much more than 
the office clerk or white-collar worker it stands for a behavioural norm to aspire to. 
The salary man has such predictable concerns and habits that it has become common 
in Japanese to speak of salary man culture.  
 
It is important to note that the managers and engineers, who form the Japanese 
nucleus of this study, are salary men. They were born in the baby boom, which 
followed the Second World War, and are now their late forties to mid fifties. At the 
time of their birth over half the Japanese labour force was engaged in agriculture and 
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Cummings (2003) believes that many of the beliefs and customs that are fundamental 
in Japanese culture reflect this agrarian age or at least the familial setting of the 
mutigenerational household. Large organisations like Nissan were able to force a 
lifestyle on their employees. The salary man seemed to live for work and was lauded 
by society.  Sedgwick (2000) claims that it was books like Vogel’s, Japan as Number 
One (1979) that catapulted the Japanese salary man into the ranks of the samurai as 
ideal representatives of Japan and in popular Japanese imagery the samurai are 
considered real men. It may be a popular image but not one that all Japanese share.  
“The Samurai were very honourable. I think honour is important. The Samurai were 
not top of the hierarchy. They were not well paid but they would not white wash 
anything. I do not think Japanese business man can be like Samurai” NTCE Japanese 
Design Manager.  
 
Approximately one third of young Japanese males become salary men. They are all 
graduates of the Japanese Universities but it used to be the case that even the brightest 
and the best need a recommendation from someone known by the organisation before 
he is accepted. The recommendation can come from an employee or University 
Professor or someone of similar standing.  His background and more importantly his 
past conduct is scrutinised to ensure he is of the right calibre and will be a good 
ambassador for the Company. The following examples illustrate the point. The salary 
man is expected actively to demonstrate loyalty to the firm. There are various ways of 
doing this; the most common way is to work overtime or by spending time with 
business associates after work. These after work sessions usually include drinking 
alcohol and it is not unusual to see salary men the worse for wear. Rather than bring 
disrepute on the company, Nissan forbade employees wearing their distinctive 
uniforms out of work.   
 
Nissan employees are also expected to represent Nissan on the way to work. 
Employees who use the complimentary works buses to travel to the Nissan Technical 
Centre in Atsugi, Tokyo are corralled across roads and along pavements by white 
gloved, Nissan Security guards as they make their way to the bus depot. Nissan staff 
must walk in orderly file and not obstruct local inhabitants going about their daily 
business. Failure to do so means being reprimanded by the security guards and later 
by your supervisor at work. As one General Manager at NTC observed:   
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“Japan is like a big fishing village. Everyone reports on everyone else.” 
 
The salary man is expected to devote much of his time and energy to the company.  
Some commentators have argued the Japanese are uncomfortable spending time with 
their families and prefer the company of other men. Campbell’s (1984) study of blue-
collar workers in rural Japan refutes this and suggests the phenomenon of salary men 
working long hours is a relatively recent development. This does not mean that the 
blue-collar workers are any less serious about their work. A British colleague who 
works at NTCE and is married to a Japanese lady whose family still live in rural Japan 
said:  
 
“There is a strong work ethic amongst older Japanese people. Blue collar, white 
collar and farm-workers are equally industrious. There may be a difference in the 
volume of work between the groups but the attitude towards work is the same.” 
 
4.8  The Cult of Overtime 
  
There is, however, a cult of overtime not only in the Nissan Technical Centre Japan 
but amongst the Japanese working at the Nissan Technical Centre Europe. Here are 
some examples from NTCE, which illustrate how the Japanese have developed their 
own rituals and practices to highlight their commitment to the company.  
 
• Japanese Managers and Seniors will apologise to their staff if they have to 
leave the office before them; 
• More than one Japanese colleague has been known to work until the early 
hours of the morning and then, rather than make the trip home sleeping on 
the floor by his desk, waking to start work at 7.00 am; 
• It is not unusual to receive telephone calls from NTC, when it is very late 
into the evening in Japan; 
• Japanese staff working until the early hours of the morning, forgoing sleep 
and driving to a business meeting. 
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Privately some Japanese do moan about the overtime they have to work but continue 
to do so.  As one Japanese NTCE Director explained: 
 
“Many European staff say Japanese are only interested in the company and in 
working overtime. This is not true. We also care about our families. We want the best 
for them. We work this way to give them the best we can. We are responsible for 
them.”   
  
Nissan Motors Limited  have recently issued a directive to try and curb excessive 
overtime and NTC management have been tasked in ensuring that everyone leaves the 
office early, one day, each week. On one of his more recent trips to Japan the author 
left the office at 6.00pm and bumped into an ex NTCE colleague on the subway. The 
colleague, who had returned to NTC to work as a Manager in the Cost Department 
looked abashed that he had been seen. He apologised: I am told to leave the office. But 
still I have so much work to do.” 
 
The salary man is a prisoner of his academic success. Psychologically he is trapped 
and bound to the organisation for life and in many cases he cannot, or is unwilling to 
find work elsewhere. Some large Japanese companies are reluctant to accept white-
collar workers from other organisations. In the early eighties, when there was a 
demand for engineers and software developers, a free labour market began to appear 
but the establishment did not encourage it.   
 
4.9  Mid Career Scouts 
 
In 1988, NTC introduced an initiative called Mid Career Scout (MCS) to recruit 
experienced engineers from other companies. The numbers recruited were small and 
the emphasis was said to focus on finding people who would fit the Nissan culture. In 
2000 the activity was stepped up because, as reported in the previous chapter Carlos 
Ghosn wanted more products in the market place and to design products, the company 
needed more engineers. This time the emphasis was on finding engineers of the right 
calibre and experience.  The author asked a high-ranking Japanese colleague if the 
new recruits had a problem adapting to the Nissan culture. He answered:  
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“No problem. They came from other Japanese Companies with similar cultures to 
Nissan.” 
 
Miyamoto (1977) has said that although Japan’s national culture influences all 
Japanese it would be a mistake to assume they are all the same. Japanese colleagues 
report the way Nissan conducts its business is different to that of Toyota, and Honda. 
Pascale and Athos’ (1982) study of two other prominent Japanese companies 
Matsushita Electric and its rival Sony confirmed differences in corporate philosophy, 
business styles and culture. Nissan has also started to recruit engineers from abroad 
and this is having an effect on attitudes and organisational culture. 
 
“Since the bubble burst or since Ghosn I do not know which, there have been many 
changes in NTC. Once it was unusual to see foreigners working at NTC – except for 
people from other companies abroad but now NTC employs foreigners directly. Also 
it is not unusual for people to leave NTC and then come back. Like in the UK. Now it 
is accepted.  We have to change our way of thinking to accept these changes. We have 
to work together if the company is to grow” NTC Japanese Manager. 
 
4.10  Individualism and a Sense of Self 
 
In Japan the emphasis is on working together. Mauss (1985) sees individuality as a 
social construct of western society, a social phenomena which does not exist within 
Japan  but from the author’s experience his Japanese colleagues have a firm sense of 
their individual selves but the way in which they achieve individual status is 
completely different to that of many western countries. De Vos (1984) says the 
Japanese view of western style individualism can be equated with selfishness and lack 
of appropriate respect for the group. Dore (1973) noted self-respect and subordination 
have different connotations in Japan. Doi (1985) suggests that mutual dependence in 
relationships removes individual’s need to find independent identity. The focus is on 
one’s responsibility to others and maintaining harmonious relationships. 
Individualistic cultures gain self-respect through competition, which ultimately 
demonstrates the individual’s uniqueness and separateness from others. Morgan 
(1986) reports that in collective cultures, employees are able to achieve self-respect 
through service within the system; they are rewarded for dedication and compliance. 
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The employer and employee are morally bound in a family type relationship, with 
mutual obligations of protection in exchange for loyalty. Interestingly, Hofstede 
(2001) reports that only westerners view Japan as being collectivist, other Asian 
countries consider Japan to be individualistic. In an individualistic society the 
relationship between the employer and employee is seen as a calculative business 
transaction in which both parties are self-interested.    
 
Lewis (2004), Bateson (1972) and Fromm (1942/1960), argue that the differences in 
an individual’s identity which underpin national characteristics, begin at birth. The 
urban Japanese have relatively small families and this means that children are more 
important to parents than in previous generations. It has also put more pressure on 
children to succeed. Befu (1974) notes that the emotional and systematic patterning of 
children which forms the basis of the Japanese personality, contrasts sharply with 
practices observed in the United States of America. In the West babies are separated 
from their mothers at an early age and encouraged to develop initiative and solve 
problems.  Contrastingly, Japanese parents keep their children constantly by their 
sides for the first two to three years.  They are often heavily indulged and demanding 
but in doing so they become completely dependent on human beings close to them 
and so develop an interdependence, which stays with them throughout their lives.  
 
The key difference between Japanese and American mothers is that Japanese mothers 
believe that children are born asocial and must be socialised and American mothers 
believe that dependent children must learn independence as they mature. Caudill and 
Weinstein (1969) found Japanese infants were significantly less verbal than American 
infants; this can again probably be attributed to the close relationship between the 
mother and child. Doi (1962) argues this sense of dependency leads to an adult 
personality in which submission to authority is a salient characteristic. DeVos (1960) 
believes the mother/child relationship underpins Japan’s success. From the beginning 
the heavily indulged child is conditioned to feel indebted to his Mother for life.  The 
mother is anxious if the child acts independently. The child senses her anxiety and is 
emotionally blackmailed into feeling guilty. This sense of guilt is a recurring theme 
and the child is forever motivated to please Mother by succeeding in life and 
continuing to belong to the group. Through servitude, Japanese mothers build a 
mechanism of social control.  The wife of one of NTCE’s Managers, seconded to 
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NTC for two years explained how she was called into school one day to help their five 
year old son make bean bags. 
 
“I didn’t have a choice. It was just expected that I went along and did as I was told. 
The teachers didn’t understand; couldn’t comprehend that I might have other, more 
important things to do. The other Mothers were doing what was expected of them and 
making the right noises. I must say they took it very seriously. ”  
 
4.11 Japanese Decision Making Processes  
 
The Japanese sense of identity hinges on group acceptance. This affects them 
emotionally and influences their opinions and behaviours. Decisions are not only 
based on abstract or universalistic principals but rather on the basis of anticipating 
how others may feel. These observations lead into reflections on two Japanese 
decision-making processes, Nemawashi and the Ringi system, which have been much 
lauded but perhaps misunderstood by the West. Nemawashi (preparing the ground) is 
a consensus building stage leading to the decision being authorised, or rubber-
stamped at formal meetings as part of the Ringi system which is also known as the 
piling up system. The word consensus, is derived from the Latin consentire and 
defined as a general agreement (the consensus of their opinion), as the judgment 
arrived at by most of those concerned (the consensus was to go ahead) or as the group 
or team’s solidarity in sentiment and belief (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
2004). 
 
With Nemawashi it is expected that all parties involved prior to the meeting have 
agreed the decision or countermeasure to the problem. These meetings have been 
formal, almost ritualistic affairs in adherence to the traditions of the company. Ballon 
and Lee (1972) say that while older superiors may convey the decisions, they are 
simply acting as formalizers; younger department heads makes the real decisions. A 
decision is never made without the groundwork being done to ensure the support of 
their superiors, peers and occasionally subordinates. Everyone who is likely to be 
affected by the result is consulted in the Nemawashi process and asked to support the 
proposal. Wolferen (1989) says the Japanese use the word consensus to make it 
appear that there is genuine agreement because everyone involved in the process is 
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given the opportunity to object to the proposal. In reality he says, dissenting voices 
are neither welcomed nor encouraged. Japanese style consensus limits involvement 
and individual opinion because nobody will take the risk or the trouble to challenge 
the wishes of the group, or the group leader. The ringi seido  is a document for 
formalising the decision making process. Richardson and Ueda (1981) report that:  
 
“decisions are often initiated at the lower or middle echelons of the firm. These 
proposals are passed along the hierarchy collecting seals of approval or undergoing 
minor revisions on the way up to the president” (Richardson and Ueda, 1981:9)  
 
Elsewhere, Graham (2003) describes the ringi system as slow but once a decision is 
made it is quickly implemented since people are less likely to contest a decision they 
have been involved with and all potential problems are seen to have been resolved. 
Although Wickens (1995:55) agrees that decisions are quick to implement he 
describes the ringi system as “a method of reverential enquiry to determine that your 
plan is in line with what your boss desires” and debates the difference between 
consensus producing a decision and consensus around a decision. He also sees 
consensus as an excuse for inaction, because so many people are involved the process 
is slow and often indecisive and once a decision is made it is difficult to get people to 
change their minds even if it is detrimental to the business. This may be because there 
is reluctance to go against a superior or group, or to go through the process again or 
because of a need to save face. Tsuji (1969) sees the ringi system as a mechanism that 
compels pseudo family relations and says it is a superb mechanism for diffusing and 
finally absolving individuals of all responsibility. 
 
Cusumano (1985) makes an interesting point about Nissan and consensus in his book: 
The Japanese Automobile Industry when writing about Nissan’s alliance with Austin 
Motors in 1952.  The then President of the company, Genshichi Asahara wanted to 
supplement the existing Nissan range with a bigger car, of which the company had no 
experiences of making. Asahara, unlike some of his colleagues, believed it acceptable 
to copy other company’s designs without acquiring technology rights thought 
technology to be a “product” which could be bought and wanted a tie up with Austin 
Motors. There was no argument or discussion, he forced the deal and Nissan built the 
Austin A50 which seated five and was powered by a 1489cc (1.5 litre) engine. When 
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the tie with Austin ended in March 1960 Nissan introduced its own compact, the 
Cedric, which was modelled in part after the A50. Cusumano writes:   
  
“Contrary to popular myths about the style of Japanese, neither he (Ashara san) nor 
his predecessors and successors were inclined to run the company by consensus. To 
substantiate his position he commissioned a study of the 1288 Austin cars registered 
in Japan, most of which had been imported during the 1930s, and collected reports on 
the car from the United States and Europe. These material indicated that the Austin 
was an excellent vehicle with an especially good engine. Asahara then decided to go 
ahead with the tie up and announced his decision at a board meeting, even though he 
knew that Kawamata and several engineers opposed it. There was no debate over the 
matter since it did not seem that anyone would be able to change Ashara’s mind.” 
(Cusumano, 1985:89) 
 
Peters and Waterman (1982) note that successful US organisations use positive 
reinforcements to motivate and reward employees to become winners. It could be 
argued that Nissan works on the threat of exclusion from the group. The author once 
worked very closely with a Japanese Engineer who was seconded to NTCE for three 
years.  He was in his early thirties, married with one small child. Rather than live in 
the Japanese enclave in Milton Keynes he lived on the outskirts of Northampton. He 
explained: 
 
“I chose to live there because I want us to experience the British way of life. Our 
neighbours invite us into their homes. We meet their families. Go to their parties. We 
learn about being British. If we live in Milton Keynes we would be expected to mix 
with other Japanese. Expected to fit in.” 
 
It was also noticeable that at lunchtimes at NTCE the man in question ate his meals 
with local staff rather than his Japanese colleagues.  It helped that he spoke excellent 
English and was able to engage in conversations but six months before his scheduled 
return to Japan he started to lunch with the Japanese and rebuild relationship. When 
asked about his change in behaviour he explained: “No choice. It’s expected….”  This 
raises the concept of honne- tatamai, and the individual.   
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4.12  The Concept of Honne- Tatamai 
 
Tatamae is the public face, the façade a person adopts and can be a set of agreed 
principles or rules. Honne, the private face suggests that although individuals in the 
group may assent to the tatamae, each may have their own motives and hold different 
opinions to those expressed publicly. Tobin (1992) believes that it is essential for the 
Japanese to learn how to use honne-tatamai. The Japanese regard the inability to 
distinguish between hone- tatemae as immature and some, view westerners as 
transparent simpletons because they are unable to hide their motives (Graham, 2003). 
 
The author once facilitated at a workshop in NTCE involving Japanese, British and 
Spanish Senior Management. The Europeans raised the subject of honne- tatamai, 
saying it was detrimental to working relationships and encouraged their Japanese 
colleagues to enter the zone of uncomfortable debate. On reflection it was a rather 
blunt and culturally naïve attempt to break down barriers. Doi (1985) construes hone- 
tatemae as a social cultural construct of Japanese society and ideology.  Tobin et al. 
(1989) show that pre-school children lack the skills of differentiating between the 
private and public face. Schools encourage children to become sociable and co-
operative and reward them for suppressing their real thoughts and play the role 
expected of them.  
 
A further example of Honne- Tatamai is when the author worked with a Japanese 
colleague in the Design Department and together they agreed the countermeasure and 
plan to a rather difficult technical problem. The following day the Japanese Engineer 
denied having made the agreement. This astounded the author but the engineer was 
unapologetic. His Japanese Manager had told him that the proposal was unacceptable 
and rather than lose face he had realigned his views those of the Japanese 
management stream at NTCE. This behaviour is not unique to the Japanese. Goffman 
(1990) referred to similar behaviours when explaining how people in Anglo-American 
societies present themselves in everyday life and used the terms “front regions” and 
“back regions.” Regions are barriers to perception in which: “The performance of an 
individual in a front region may be seen as an effort to give the appearance that his 
activity in the region maintains and embodies certain standards” (Goffman, 1990:110) 
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whereas, any behaviour which might discredit the fostered impression are relegated to 
the “back region”(Goffman, 1990:114). 
 
4.13 The Japanese and Education 
 
Education, as already discussed, is very important to the Japanese and has a direct 
impact on business. School children are taught that Japan’s economy must continue 
growing and that a favourable balance of trade is the only way for the country to 
survive. It is not uncommon for young children to study until the early hours of the 
morning and the pressure for a child to succeed is enormous. Failure to pass entrance 
exams and then get into the “right” University means he will not get one of the top 
jobs.  
Tsuruta (2003) believes that globalisation and the need for Japan to remain 
competitive is driving educational reform in Japan.  The school system was seen as 
too rigid and the university system too lax (Cummings, 2003).  From April 2002 new 
teaching guidelines were introduced which encouraged children to be interested in 
learning and to think for themselves. The curriculum was also reduced by around 30% 
and the school week to five days. There has also been a shake up of the Universities.  
It seems that many see the University years as “a kind of moratorium between the 
horrendous rigour of school examination hell which precedes it and the routine life of 
the company employee which follow it” (Goodman, 2003:23). The aim is to get 
children to think for themselves rather than to learn by rote.  However, the author 
believes that one of the major benefits of the old “Japanese” education system is that 
it taught the salary man how to pay attention to detail and prepare for meetings. 
 
The author has accompanied high-ranking Japanese colleagues on many fact-finding 
visits both to European suppliers (including Autoliv, TRW, Takata – Europe and 
Petri) and competitors (including Mercedez Benz, BMW, Fiat and Renault). In each 
case the Japanese had been well prepared. They knew the background of the 
companies they were visiting and about their products and sought answers to key 
questions. These questions had been formulated before hand and usually were the 
result of group meetings held in Nissan Japan. British Engineers, the author included, 
tend to think of questions as the discussion develops. His Japanese colleagues listened, 
made notes and asked questions of their own (usually for clarification of some point 
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or other) but the emphasis was on getting the answers to the key questions. Another 
insight is that in preparation for the Knowledge Management meetings relating to this 
study the author sends a copy of the presentation and relevant material to colleagues 
in NTC before hand.  In each instance, the Japanese have produced copies of the 
presentation at the meeting. The copies are heavily annotated. Some of the notes are 
direct translations of the English text; others are questions. The same thing happened 
when the author sent advanced copies of Safety Strategy Presentations. This may be a 
matter of the Japanese working in a foreign language but it says a great deal about 
their attention to detail. 
 
Cummings (2003) believes that Japan is a society where status is based on educational 
background, rather than class or birth.  The following example suggests the 
importance the Japanese place on educational achievement but also on the secrecy, 
and “pecking order” that surrounds that achievement. Not long after the formation of 
the Alliance the head of Renault Human Resource (HR) Department visited NTCE. 
To prepare for the visit the British Deputy Managing Director NTCE asked the author 
to prepare a resume of the company management team. It seemed a simple enough 
request. Name. Age. Background. Qualifications etc.   Surprisingly, the information 
was not immediately available through the company HR Department. The exercise 
came to an abrupt halt when the author questioned the Japanese Manager of the 
Electrical Department. He seemed flustered by my request; said he was and that he 
would get back to me. Fifteen minutes later the Deputy MD withdrew his request. The 
Japanese Manager had contacted the Japanese MD and he had brought pressure to 
bear to stop the activity. One of the Japanese ladies in HR explained: 
 
“We are not allowed to ask which University they are from. Sometimes we know but 
they try to keep it a secret. It is enough that Nissan employs them. They know if they 
went to the same University as someone else. They are like a club. Also there is a 
ranking of Universities in Japan. Our previous MD went to the best University in 
Tokyo. The one we have now did not. He went to the second best.”  
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4.14  Organisational Subcultures 
 
A Japanese Engineer at NTCE diplomatically informed the author that cliques based 
around membership of the university the engineers attended – called gakubatsu - most 
certainly exist within Nissan Japan. His reluctance to disclose details emphasised the 
political strengths represented by these cliques and also the cultural deference to 
authority. Graduates from Tokyo University are recognised as the elite, many enter 
the ministries or are employed by leading businesses like Nissan. The same engineer 
admitted that Ghosn’s Japanese advisors are mostly Todai (Tokyo University) 
graduates. Ghosn is said to enjoy the intellectual challenge they offer however, some 
consider them to be too intellectual and to lack a pragmatic business sense. NTCE’s 
current Managing Director, one of the main benefactors of this study, is also a Todai 
graduate.      
 
Subcultures, like the gakubatsu can be very strong and can sometimes undermine the 
host culture particularly within the alliance where members already have divided 
loyalties between Nissan and Renault. Sub cultural divisions may also arise because 
organisation members have different professional backgrounds as in the case between 
the different functional groups within Nissan Technical Centre, Japan where some 
groups are considered to be doing a higher status job than others i.e. Between the 
Engineering and Administration Departments.  Divisions also exist within 
Engineering Division and the importance attached to the job of a Chassis Engineer is 
deemed to be higher than that of a Trim Engineer  or Seating Engineer. When the 
author was senior engineer for NTCE Seating and Restraint Systems (1992-1997) he 
recalls being surprised at the depth of analysis a Japanese NTC engineer had made in 
writing a report about the installation of a side airbag in a front seat. A Japanese 
colleague explained 
 
“In NTC engineers who work in the Engine and Chassis departments are more highly 
regarded than other engineers. The engineer who made this report is trying to show 
how good he is.”  
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 4.15 The Japanese and the Long Term View 
 
The Japanese are said to take the long-term view. Caudill and Scarr (1962) and Suzuki 
(1970) both report that they are primarily orientated towards the future in that they 
readily accept change. Privately, Ghosn is said to have been surprised at the 
turnaround at Nissan and the flexibility of his Japanese workforce but there are some 
interesting historical and cultural parallels. When it suits, the Japanese have shown 
themselves able to adapt to changing circumstances very quickly. Takeshi (1983) 
believes they are able to adapt quickly because they do not hold any strong religious 
beliefs, which would fuel moral indignation and intellectual argument. Wolferen 
(1989:318) made the same point and called the Japanese “ideological chameleons” 
and used the example of how the Japanese attitude towards the Arabs changed after 
the oil crises from “disdainful indifference to sycophantic solicitude” to make his 
point (Wolfren,1989:320).  
This same argument is used to explain why Japan entered the modern industrial world 
with relative ease compared with China and the other Asian nations because it 
allowed them to “believe one thing and do something else entirely” (Wolferen, 1989: 
318). Commenting on Ghosn and the rapid changes made at Nissan a Japanese 
Manager said:  
 
“In Japan we have a saying. A tree always bends in a strong wind. That is why the 
tree remains standing.” 
 
4.16 Organisation Man 
 
The West had its own salary men. Whyte (1956) coined the term organisation man to 
describe upwardly mobile corporate employees who were intent on working their way 
up through the hierarchical layers in large organisations. Whyte’s study provided 
sociological evidence about the growing conformity of American company men and a 
rise of a social ethic which subjugated the individual to the group. Each step of their 
careers were planned and acknowledged in advance, loyalty to the organisation being 
repaid with job security and steady progress up the corporate ladder. The idea that 
people had careers was relatively new in the fifties. Dahrendorf (1959) suggested that 
for the British middle classes having a career was the supreme social reality. It was 
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the focus of their lives and gave them the long term financial security they were 
looking for. In the Nineteenth Century the middle class figure was an employer, a 
manufacturer, merchant or professional, usually working in the family business. 
During this time, ownership was the supreme social reality and not “career.”  
 
The Second World War had confirmed the permanency of large organisations as 
economic and social entities that were mobilised by managers to support the war 
effort (Sampson, 1995). Burnham (1940) noted the transition from a capitalist to a 
managerial society and showed how managers were taking over as the ruling classes 
in both capitalist and communist countries. Pension plans, investments and 
progressive salary increases in a job for life, gave organisation man a sense of security 
in that he was able to guard against the unforeseen and accumulate money that could 
be enjoyed at a later stage in life. This was in complete contrast to the working classes 
who, despite the welfare state were first to be laid off in an economic downturn. In 
English society the middle classes had careers, workers had jobs. 
 
NTCE Directors were born in the mid to late fifties, most of the managers in the 
sixties and seventies; nearly all have working class roots and the majority university 
degrees. James (2006) argues that although we live in a society that frowns on judging 
individuals on their birth, education or possessions, the majority of the British 
population are middle class. In 1900 it was calculated that the middle classes 
comprised of a tenth of the population; by 2000 it was nearly two thirds (James, 2006). 
For many nations the period between 1950 -1973 was the golden age of growth. 
Britain and USA were already relatively wealthy in 1900 but gross domestic Product 
(GDP) per head per population between 1900 and 1987 increased six fold in members 
of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), the sixteen 
wealthiest nations in the world, fivefold in Latin America, three fold in Asia and 
sevenfold in the USSR. The world has been transformed by affluence, leisure and 
technology; the aspirations of individuals have also changed dramatically. James 
(1998) notes that although society became more affluent in the years 1950-1990 its 
sense of overall well being did not, and for some groups it actually decreased. People 
wanted more; they were not prepared to settle for what they had and went in search 
for something better in the name of self realisation. Inevitably such changes affected 
their patterns of social comparison. The most fundamental change was an increase in 
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upward comparison and in Western culture, people felt constantly pressurised to 
continually improve on their abilities (Halpern, 1995). 
 
One of the triggers for change was when Governments realised that education was 
crucial to economic growth. After 1950, in most developed nations there was a 
substantial increase in secondary and higher education. Between 1950 and 1980 it 
almost doubled in France and Japan. In Britain, before World war II, one in eight 
school leavers went on to higher education, in 1998, it was one in three (James, 1998). 
Academic standards may still be in question but the competition at the top end for 
jobs has never been tougher and in many cases it starts at birth.  In the West, 
individualism supplanted corporate loyalty when job security disappeared (Gunn and 
Bell (2002). Short term gain has replaced the long term view that had characterised 
middle class attitudes to career and financial planning. Increased aspiration and 
individualism have made employees more jobs focused, more eager for promotion, 
increased responsibility and better pay. Also the percentage of people with higher 
qualifications has increased the competition for managerial and professional positions.  
The stakes are higher, there are more people chasing fewer jobs.  
 
“I started work as an apprentice in one of the shipyards in the North East. My Mum 
and Dad were really pleased. I thought I had a job for life. I thought I would live 
there. Bring my family up there. It didn’t happen. The shipyards closed but I was 
lucky. I got a job with Nissan. It was a job with prospects. Of course, we had to move 
south. My Mum and Dad weren’t happy. They wanted to see their grandkids grow up, 
but I got my promotion.” NTCE British Senior 
 
4.17  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has debated and compared the different models and typologies that help 
frame the study and its grounding in organisational culture.  It began by exploring the 
philosophical background of the word culture and then considered the impact of 
organisational cultures, leadership and change management programmes within 
Nissan and used examples to illustrate some of the key cultural characteristics of the 
impact of the change and working with the Japanese that the author will use to inform 
his strategy. It has shown that Nissan’s management philosophy has to be understood 
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in a cultural-historical context. It was once paternalistic, highly traditional and 
deferential where the welfare of the individual is strongly linked to that of the 
organisation and the nation but this may be changing because the system of lifetime 
employment for Nissan employees and the salary men is crumbling and many of the 
Japanese interviewed in the course of this study reported that the younger generation 
of Nissan engineers had different values and may not be as willing to commit their 
lives to one company.  
 
The chapter also explained that Carlos Ghosn has managed to implement change 
because he understands that organisational culture may be the single most important 
factor standing between success and failure but warned that his leadership style may 
be driving conflict underground and creating a superficial appearance of harmony. It 
also informed that reader that NML Board Meetings are no longer the face saving 
exercises of the past and Japanese Directors criticise, argue and have to defend their 
positions and reputations and that a new breed of Nissan Directors are being selected, 
described within the organisation as being young, powerful and trusted by Renault. 
The author does not claim to have looked at all the factors influencing organisational 
culture at Nissan and admits to finding it difficult to separate the strands between 
national and organisational cultures rather the discussion and illustrations have been 
reflective and highlight some of the different agendas, which operate simultaneously 
at normative, social and psychological levels to impact national and organisational 
cultures.  In this chapter the author made the following theoretical and practical 
contributions to knowledge. 
 
4.17.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
  
• Nissan management philosophy has to be understood in a cultural-historical 
context. It was once paternalistic, highly traditional and deferential where the 
welfare of the individual is strongly linked to that of the organisation and the 
nation but this may be changing because the system of lifetime employment 
for Nissan employees and the salary men is crumbling.   
• Previous change initiatives at Nissan were de-railed by middle management.   
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• The Japanese have elevated people like Carlos Ghosn and Edward Deming 
into the position of Confucian elders to make it psychologically acceptable for 
them to be led by gaijins.    
• Organisational cultural norms of making presentations and holding meetings 
cause conflict, distrust, frustration and sometimes misunderstanding in a 
global organisation.    
• The Japanese approach to face saving and hone-tatamai can lead to distrust in 
a multi-cultural setting. 
• Japanese group dynamics may be driven by a sense of obligation rather than 
the camaraderie as suggested by the literature. 
• The salary man’s commitment to the company is his way of providing for his 
family and he is not, as the literature suggests putting the company first.  
• Subcultures, like the gakubatsu can be very strong and can sometimes 
undermine the host culture particularly within an alliance where members 
have divided loyalties. 
• Although Japan’s national culture influences all Japanese companies it is 
incorrect to assume they are all the same. Nissan conducts its business 
differently to that of Toyota and Honda. 
 
4.17.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
 
• Compare and contrast the meaning and boundaries of employee obligations in 
a multi cultural context and its effect on organisational development. 
• To understand how the way in which society is organised impacts the 
organisation and organisational behaviour especially in a global context 
• Consider the effect of how organisational cultural norms of making 
presentations and holding meetings manifest themselves in a global 
organisation.    
  
The next chapter will examine the impact of organisational culture on knowledge 
management and learning at Nissan. 
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 Chapter Five 
 
The Impact of Organisational Culture  
on Knowledge Management and Learning at Nissan 
 
5.0   Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at how organisational culture impacts knowledge management and 
learning within Nissan, debates and challenges some of the related literature and 
further explores themes introduced in previous chapters.  It also explains how the key 
Nissan research and development procedures and processes evolved into the “The 
Nissan Way.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION ONE: The context 
and framework for the study 
Chapter Two: The study in 
context of Global Nissan 
Chapter Three: The research 
philosophy, strategy and 
methodological framework 
underpinning the study 
 
SECTION TWO: 
Understanding the impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four: Organisational 
Culture and the Management 
of Change 
Chapter Five: The impact 
of organisational culture on 
knowledge management 
and learning at Nissan 
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5.1   Managing Knowledge at Nissan 
 
Nissan is serious about managing knowledge. The company has Knowledge Managers 
in each of its technical centres, although the scope and role of each manager is 
different depending on the location. In Nissan Technical Centre Japan, there is a 
Manager responsible for Knowledge Capture and Sharing and another responsible for 
Knowledge Creation. The Manager in Nissan Technical Centre North America has a 
role similar to the author, who covers all aspects of knowledge management at Nissan 
Technical Centre Europe. The purpose of managing knowledge is to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the company and for the Nissan Technical Centres that 
means cultivating  “efficient development capabilities” and enable the “effective 
creation of innovation” to become a world leader in technological advancement 
(Matsumura, 2004). Carlos Ghosn has said the company needs to be a learning 
organisation, emphasising the need to improve the quality of Nissan products in 
design, engineering, manufacturing and sales. He said the strength of the company lay 
in Gemba, or in knowing what happens in the actual workplace (Matsumura, 2004). 
 
The concept of Gemba is well understood within Nissan. One of the first things 
engineers are taught when they start working for the company is the value of the word 
Sangenshugi, which literally means the “3-real-isms.” In  Japanese, SAN means “3,” 
GEN means “real” or “actual,” and is also the first character of GENJITSU, GEMBA 
and GEMBUTSU (or “reality,” “actual place” and “actual item) and SHUGI means 
“ideology.”  Harriman (2004:1) describes Sangenshugi, “as a commonsense, scientific 
approach to problem solving” and paraphrases the philosophy as understanding “what 
is really happening (GENJITSU) but going to the actual place (GEMBA) and 
checking out the actual item (GEMBUTSU).” The message is not only about the 
importance of knowledge and continuous learning but also about the development and 
application of knowledge in “real” situations. In short it is about managing knowledge 
and learning. 
 
Gemba is about understanding the context of any situation and knowledge is context 
specific and contextual (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The principle of context is 
about going to the workplace and seeing the work as it unfolds (Whiteside and Wixon, 
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1988) and is the first and most basic requirement of Contextual Inquiry. According to 
Beyer and Holtzblatt, (1988:66), the four principles of Contextual Inquiry are 
 
• Context: Watch the “work” happening; 
• Partnership: Talk about the work while it happens 
• Interpretation: Find the meaning behind the customer’s words and actions; 
• Focus: Challenge your entering assumptions.  
 
Ghosn recognises knowledge is a key competitive asset which forms the basis of a 
firm’s growth (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995) and sustainable competitive advantage 
(Kogut, 1993).  The Nissan Renault Alliance expects that both companies will learn 
from each other and thereby gain competitive advantage over their rivals (Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2001, Mitchell and Singh, 1996 and Kogut and Zander, 1992). It is 
primarily about knowledge acquisition and learning and is what Hamel et al. (1989) 
call the learning race. Kanter (1994) considers collaborative inter-firm know-how a 
key business asset and Barlett and Ghoshal (1989) argue that part of that learning is in 
understanding and responding to environmental complexities and competition. 
Judging from the balance sheet for Fiscal Year 2003, having sold a record number of 
3,057K units globally with an operating profit of over 825 billion yen Nissan has 
learned, and is continuing to learn how to absorb and use knowledge.  
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989:569-70) define absorptive capacity as “the firm’s ability 
to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment.” This definition 
has three components, in that first knowledge has to be identified and valued as being 
important, secondly, it has to be assimilated and thirdly, the reference to exploitation, 
in the context of business is that it has to be applied to commercial ends. Numerous 
writers have indicated that learning can occur and knowledge can be stored at multiple 
levels of analysis e.g. Walsh and Ungeson’s (1991) concept of organisational memory 
focuses on non-human repositories such as systems, structures, rules and routines.  
Levitt and March (1998:319) note that “organisations learn by encoding inferences 
from history into routines that guide behaviour,” Argote and Epple (1990) call for 
systematically repeating an action and studying its consequences and both Schein 
(1998) and Simon (1991) concentrate on individuals as being responsible for bearing 
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and storing knowledge. Although each of these approaches is valid, Carlos Ghosn is 
only interested in the bottom line and this is key to understanding the dynamics of 
how knowledge is currently managed at Nissan. Bottom-line thinking is quantifiable, 
the implication being that unless changes can be shown to have a healthy return on 
investment they should be disregarded. The use of the term knowledge management is 
indicative of bottom line thinking as it is a managerial mindset that suggests that 
knowledge can somehow be managed and measured. Addleson (2000) writes  
 
“the rhetoric of the bottom line is a privileging narrative that stipulates that only the 
views of experts are relevant to organizing and to assessing the “goodness” of 
organisations.” (Addleson, 2000: 233) 
 
In short, businesses are about making larger profits for shareholders and are managed 
by a select few whose views are the only ones which matter. Aldrich and Whetten 
(1981) and Walsham (1993) argue that the Knowledge Management literature tends to 
be heavy on the notion of negotiation and trust between people but light on power and 
interdependent relationships. Their argument is that dominant views of knowledge 
work are superficial as they neglect institutional power relations that are hierarchical, 
competitive coercive and exploitative. These views may be overly negative and from 
a pragmatic point of view a condition of consensual coercion and exploitation may be 
necessary to ensure the business meets its objectives but it is important when trying to 
manage knowledge to examine extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on both the 
individual and the group because people as already discussed are the conduits of 
knowledge (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
 
The Nissan Revival Plan (Fiscal Year 1999 – 2002), Nissan 180 (Fiscal Year 2002) 
and the Nissan Value Up programme (Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2007) all 
contain simple and measurable targets. Nissan wants to be seen as a value creating 
company aiming to increase its value in a number of ways including customer benefits, 
costs, products, services and company performance. Growth, sustainable profitability 
and double figure operating revenues are planned to maintain a minimum of 20% 
return on invested capital. Nissan’s management focus is primarily on profitability 
and Carlos Ghosn’s strategy for the company hinges on the success of his 
management team. Addleson (1995) argues that this Comtian-Cartesian view of 
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management, known as modernism or positive empiricism, whereby the manager is 
seen as operating in a mechanistic world, controlling events and fixing problems as 
they occur is the dominant Western management style. At first glance this approach 
may seem at odds to some of the literature about management practises in Japan. 
Theories X and Y have been used to characterise the different managerial styles 
(McGregor, 1987). Theory X managers, said to be typical of Western management are 
authoritarian, can be confrontational and permit little if any discussions on their 
decisions. Theory Y managers, which is said to be the dominant managerial style in 
Japan respect their staff, encourage and give scope to their creativity and assume they 
are self starters.  
 
Whilst the author recognises these as different and conflicting managerial traits and 
accepts that Nissan’s management style could be described as Theory Y the model 
needs further debate and contextualisation before it can be properly understood.  The 
reason Nissan has been able to quickly assimilate and adapt to a seemingly alien 
management style is because behind the rhetoric the organisational culture has always 
been elitist and this has had a direct effect on knowledge management and learning 
within the company. The majority of NML Directors and Managers started their 
careers as engineers and whilst this might not necessarily be so for all Nissan 
companies it is fair to assume that the dominant logic of the company is that of the 
engineer.  
 
 “Dominant logic is a conceptual framework for thinking about the processes and 
results of cognitive simplification in top management teams” (Bettis and Wong, 2003: 
343).   
 
5.2 Dominant Logic and Nissan  
 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) who originally coined the term said dominant logic is the 
shared understanding and the strategic mindset of the top management team or the 
dominant coalition. Dominant logic develops over time, as organisations grow and 
become more complex it becomes necessary and important to establish formal 
structures, procedures, systems and processes that reflect and strengthen the existing 
web of relationships and conform to the dominant logic of the company. Controls, 
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such as reward systems, metrics and decision rules are put in place to assure 
compliance with the dominant logic and organisational learning becomes focused on 
developing current competencies because of the consistent biases of the top 
management team. Schwenk (1984) suggests that top management attempt to simplify 
decision-making to give the illusion of control but in doing so decrease their ability to 
appreciate the true complexity of the problems. Nissan engineers pride themselves on 
being logical and rational and of making decisions based on data and facts. It is a 
language that engineers have to learn quickly if they are to appear credible. It is also a 
language which has associated behaviours like looking thoughtful, being serious, 
appearing calm and collected, of being dependable and in control and it is how 
engineers believe the organisation works. Kim (1993) calls these images, “mental 
models” and says that these models arbitrate what information is acquired, retained, 
used and deleted but most importantly  
 
“they not only help us make sense of the world we see, they can also restrict our 
understanding to that which makes sense within the mental model” (Kim, 1993:39).  
 
Senge (1990:174) defines mental models as “deeply held internal images of how the 
world works.” The organisation communicates its mental models internally through 
established standard operating procedures, organisational culture, assumptions, 
artefacts and overt behaviour rules that characterise the organisation (Kim, 1993). 
Communication is the medium through which knowledge is created or disseminated, a 
process that is affected by culture. Intercultural communication, has been defined as 
“the symbolic process in which people from different cultures create shared 
meanings” (Lustig and Koeste, 1992: 52). These images have a powerful impact on 
our framing of behaviour because they affect what we see and what we guide others to 
see and result in a mindset that is accomplished largely in the absence of conscious 
control. Kellerman (1992)  argues that  
 
“tacit or implicit learning refers to unconscious processing, an automatic and 
naturally occurring cognitive activity. In tacit learning, knowledge is acquired 
implicitly, held tacitly and used unconsciously. Behaviour that becomes a routine 
quickly becomes a habit” (Kellerman,1992:294).  
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The more our unconscious is primed with a lens that influences our new view, the 
more permanent the lens that influences our seeing (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Many 
researchers, including Bettis (1991) and Miller (1990; 1994) have argued that the 
failure to discard or “unlearn” old dominant logics is one of the main reasons why 
organisations fail to change despite seeing changes in their environment. Firms that 
can unlearn and reframe their past success programme to fit with the changing 
environment and situational conditions will have a greater likelihood of survival and 
adaptation (Lyles, 1988). Nissan’s failure to adapt in the nineties was largely due to 
the unbending mindsets of the Company elite and the dominant mindset of the 
engineer has been protected, encouraged and nurtured partly by a belief in the security 
of lifetime employment.  
 
5.3 Lifetime Employment 
 
Hasagawa (1986) and Sasaki (1981) both believe that lifetime employment or 
shushinkoyo is the reason behind Japan’s success story, in that it strengthens 
management and fosters company loyalty. Other writers, including Watanabe (1993), 
Hamada (1991) and Plath (1983) disagree. Schlender (1994) maintains that while 
Japan has the world’s most efficient manufacturing plants, its management practices 
including lifetime employment, consensus decision-making and hierarchical 
organisations based on seniority have resulted in bloated and inefficient company 
bureaucracies. In the past, Nissan preferred to recruit new graduates rather than 
experienced people trained elsewhere which is not uncommon in Japan. Inohara 
(1990) reports that the criteria for screening applicants within Japanese companies are 
more social than economic in nature, the key point is that their personalities are such 
that they will culturally fit for lifetime employment with the company. This provides a 
strong justification for firms to invest in the training of their workers. The assumption 
of lifetime employment is that people are recruited for a career, rather than a 
particular job hence selection is about the potential employees’ ability to learn and a 
general grounding in their subject rather than acquired skills. In the mid nineties, 
fifteen-million of the forty-million full-time workers in Japan were employed in 
public enterprises and large firms, like Nissan. This strategic minority, which included 
the salary men, believed they had a job for life 
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The origins of lifetime employment are debatable. Shirai (1992) claims the system 
was introduced to benefit high-ranking personnel in state run enterprises in the late 
part of the Meiji Period (1868-1912) whereas Woronoff (1992) believes the practice 
originated after the Second World War. Whatever its origin it is worth considering 
how lifetime employment affects knowledge management and organisational learning. 
Hasagawa (1986) maintains that although, in principle, a Japanese employee may 
expect promotion and wage increases in relation to the time he has spent working for 
the company, it is not guaranteed. The Japanese recognise the fact that as a man 
matures his technical and work life experiences increase and become more valuable to 
the company and this is reflected in his salary and status within the company (Inohara, 
1990).  In respect to Nissan, these definitions are only partly true. The salary man gets 
remuneration appropriate to the effort he has expended over the years of working for 
Nissan. It is not paid for through the efforts made month to month but for the total 
contribution he has made to the company.  
  
 “It was usual that a young man worked long hours and contributed to the company in 
excess of the money he was paid. As he got older his contribution may not have been 
as high but his wages still rose because of the years he has worked at the company. 
The wage rise can be explained because he has earned the money over the many years 
he has worked for Nissan. It was not unusual to see the older guy sitting with his feet 
on his desk or reading a paper but with Ghosn that has changed. Now everyone is 
rewarded based on his contribution. Because of Ghosn, I have missed out on salary 
increases I would have received naturally because of my age.” NTCE Japanese 
Director, in his mid fifties. 
 
It often appears that the Japanese are only interested in company efficiency and not 
individual self-fulfilment and Hannam (1993: 42) contends it is not uncommon for 
Japanese workers to “work extra hours voluntarily, just for the good of the company.”  
Whilst he is prepared to differentiate between “working long hours” and “spending 
long hours at work” and  accepting that Japanese staff may feel it inappropriate to 
leave the office before their boss and also recognising that they might lose face in 
their local community if they arrive home too early he maintains they often put the 
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company first. This is not fully supported by this study which found that the Japanese 
work long hours to secure their futures and provide for their families.  
 
“I have heard British Engineers say that all we think about is the company. That we 
have no lives. That we do not want to spend time with our families. This is not true. Of 
course we want to be with our wives and children but this is how we provide for them. 
This is our responsibility.”  NTCE Japanese Director 
 
Dore and Sako (1998) predicted that there might come a time when shareholders 
would demand higher profits and force Japanese companies to make redundancies. At 
the time it seemed a remote possibility that it would happen but Nissan is not the only 
company to have made changes and the end of lifetime employment has had a 
significant effect on Japanese society. McNeill (2004) claims that Tokyo is now one 
of the suicide capitals of the world. Suicides in Japan rose dramatically after the 
collapse of the Japanese bubble economy and in 2003 the number rose to a record of 
34,427. This number was heavily weighted by middle aged and retired salarymen, 
more than 70% of the suicides were males aged over forty with financial problems 
cited as the main reason for the suicide. In the current climate fears relating to job 
security provide some of the biggest motivating factors for Japanese engineers. Baker 
and Stauth (2003) believe contemporary fear always fits into one of two categories: 
fear of not having enough and fear of not being good enough. 
  
“Having enough and being good enough are the two factors that best ensure survival, 
so fear about them is rooted to the core of the neurological fear system” (Baker and 
Stauth, 2003:24).  
 
5.4 Job Security 
 
“You cannot ask the Japanese what motivates them individually. We are a 
homogenous society. To ask such a question threatens their safety in the group. They 
might be different. The most important thing to Japanese is job security. It’s the 
security of keeping his or her favourite job. Usually the job is the same with or very 
similar to his or her current job. Due to the unique labour custom in Japan: long 
service for the same company from joining to retirement, respect to seniority and in 
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many cases less aggressiveness of self career development. I have experienced very 
frequently at appraisal interview in NTC that engineers say “I would like to continue 
the current job and reinforce my skill and overall capability for promotion to next job 
rank.” And they ask: “Please tell me how.”  NTCE Japanese Director 
 
The phrase “less aggressiveness of self career development.” Used in the previous 
quotation does not imply that Japanese engineers are not interested in career 
development, only that they approach self promotion and self enhancement differently. 
Ting-Toomey (1999) suggests verbally that collectivist Asian cultures are generally 
self-effacing rather than self-enhancing. Survival in Nissan depends on maintaining 
harmonious relationships and promotion depends on impressing their bosses. Japanese 
engineers are more circumspect in promoting themselves. “I would like to continue 
the current job and reinforce my skill and overall capability for promotion to next job 
rank.” Whilst admitting they are interested in promotion, they are not so bold as to 
pretend they are already proficient in their current job: That decision can only be 
made by their superiors, hence the plea for patronage, “please tell me how.” The 
author wishes to point out, that capability aside, from his experience, promotion in 
Western companies also depends on maintaining harmonious relationships with the 
“right” people but in the West, dissatisfied and ambitious employees can easily move 
on to develop their careers in other companies and until recently that option has not 
been available to Japanese engineers. 
 
 “Now, it is not unusual for people to leave Nissan if they want. If they see 
opportunities else- where they leave. They work hard. Maybe they think Nissan is not 
treating them properly so they leave. Sometimes they come back to NTC, like in the 
UK. Once this would never have happened. The standard of engineer at NTC is 
different. Before the standard was much the same. Now some are better. Some are not 
so good. People maybe only used to use one part of the brain, now some people are 
thinking wider.” NTC Japanese Manager 
 
Remembering that Nissan has mainly recruited its salarymen from the engineering 
departments of top Japanese Universities and that these people would have attained 
the same level and have similar capabilities it was not surprising to hear him say that 
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“before the standard was much the same.”  However the implications of this have 
perhaps not been so transparent because in such circumstances it is quite difficult to 
promote self on the grounds of technical capability so the ability to maintain 
harmonious  relationships with their bosses becomes paramount because it was the 
only way they could promote themselves and secure their futures.  
 
5.5 Global Executive Training 
 
Nissan high-flyers who are seen as future managers have always been rotated through 
key departments in order to increase their knowledge of the business and to test their 
abilities. In the past promotion has, in part depended on belonging to the right  
University cliques or gakubatsu, as explained in Chapter Four. Ghosn has cleverly 
introduced another control model, this time built around Global Executive Training. 
The GET model is instantly recognisable to the Japanese as an alternative to the 
University model, one which incorporates the important socialising aspects of 
Nissan’s organisational culture and by extension the socialising elements of Japanese 
national culture, and preserves the mechanism by which social capital is developed 
within the company.  
 
Lebas and Weigenstein (1986) in their study of control systems based on national 
culture assert that the collectivist tradition in Japan operates as a natural cultural 
control. Managers are frequently rotated; the emphasis is on building, and maintaining 
a human network across the organisation in order to facilitate team working and 
decision-making. It is important for the managers to know who to contact in the 
relevant departments. This communication network is tremendously important and the 
development of social capital requires extensive and systematic socialising processes 
(De Meyer, 1991). The manager’s status and power is based on developing 
connections, and to be seen to win favours and support from key individuals within 
the company. Carlos Ghosn allows this to happen but personally vets everyone the 
executives recommend for GET training. Nominees are requested to go to Japan to 
make business presentations to Ghosn and his first line team. Ghosn uses these 
presentations to “interview” potential GET candidates. He asks probing questions, 
designed to elicit responses which indicate individual thought patterns and mindsets 
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and to see how they react under pressure. People who have been under the spotlight 
have described it as “nerve racking” and “intense.”  
 
“You have to be on your toes. Ghosn is very well advised. You get the feeling he has 
already made up his mind before he asks the questions. It sounds as if he wants to 
know what you are thinking but really he wants to know if you agree with him.”  
British NTCE Manager 
 
“GET is elitist. It is only open to a few. It’s like a club. And to be a member you have 
to behave in a certain way. The training is structured to see how you behave. In one of 
the exercises you have to pretend you’re the newly elected CEO of a company and 
they want to see how you prioritise your workload. In another exercise you have to 
play different roles you could be expected to take within the company.  Everything you 
say and do is analysed.   You’re given a list of expected behaviours and attributes. 
You’re also watched at work. You’re constantly on show. Not behaving in the way 
they expect means your career is derailed. That’s what they call it: Derailed.” British 
NTCE Assistant Chief Vehicle Engineer 
 
“GET training is very difficult for the Japanese. It’s very American. It is about the 
individual and his career development. It is about promoting self interests as well as 
the company but I believe it is the best way for Nissan.  We must take the best of 
Western and Japanese Management styles to make Nissan successful.”   
Japanese NTCE Director 
 
Kopp (1994) in his survey of Japanese, European and US subsidiaries indicated there 
was a “glass ceiling” for host country nationals within multi-national companies. That 
is no longer the case within Nissan; GET training maybe elitist and it is certainly only 
for a small percentage of people. At the time of writing, only 150 out of 
approximately 2500 managers are on the GET training scheme, (these figures include 
three of the sixty managers at NTCE) but it is open to all nationalities. The 
springboards to promotion into management, higher levels of management and 
ultimately into GET and the highest level of management are the aforementioned V3P 
initiatives (Value Up of Product, Process and Programme). Primarily they are said to 
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be about improving company efficiency and effectiveness but they are also 
management development tools. 
 
“V-Up is a kind of test …… it gives people an opportunity to work across companies. 
To show what they are capable of. Also if someone is not so confident, or does not 
know who to talk to in other companies then V-Up gives him the opportunity to make 
contact.” NTCE Japanese Director 
 
These initiatives are about raising the profiles of people who will eventually run the 
company. They are about developing people who can report, present, debate, argue, 
reason and ultimately behave in a way the company wants and is prepared to reward. 
They are also about developing and building social networks of ambitious people who 
will facilitate and manage the necessary change. Gulati (1999) observed that deeply 
embedded social networks are valuable tacit resources but it is not only the managers 
of the company who develop these networks. Although every graduate employed by 
the company can reasonably expect to be considered for a management position, not 
everyone makes the grade and engineers tend to specialize when they are in their mid 
thirties and become the company’s technical experts.  
 
These people are usually employed as senior engineers or team leaders and in Nissan 
Technical Centre Japan some have been promoted to managerial levels responsible for 
technical detail leaving the management of the business to their more career- oriented 
peers (Appendix 4). Nissan charges its technical experts with writing standard 
operating procedures which cover the key aspects of design and development. These 
people are conduits of learning responsible for converting tacit into explicit 
organisational knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). This however, assumes that 
those with the knowledge are willing to share their observations and experiences 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998) which is central in terms of this study.  
 
5.6 Key Nissan Research and Development Procedures and Processes 
 
Nissan’s R&D business revolves around the following procedures: Master Schedules, 
Design Reviews, Planning Drawings, Nissan Engineering Manuals (NEM), Nissan 
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Design Standards (NDS) and Nissan Engineering Standards (NES) which are linked 
by process. According to the Collins English Dictionary (1991: 1238) 
 
“A procedure is a way of acting or progressing in a course of action.” 
 
“A process is a series of actions that produce a change or development.” 
 
5.6.1 Generic Master Schedules 
 
Nissan has developed a series of Generic Master Schedules for the different cases of 
Vehicle Development. These schedules are time related and are used to monitor 
development, from the initial concept through to Start of Production. The Master 
Schedule comprises sub-schedules, the different departments or organisations operate 
in order to build vehicles. These sub-schedules interconnect with each, which can be 
viewed as complex maps, or as a series of input – output process models. These 
processes are used to make more detailed plans which, in turn support the overall 
activity. The different prime activities on a Master Schedule include: Styling, Design 
Concept, Production Specification, Sourcing, Cost, Quality, Vehicle Layout, Weight, 
Project Support, Homologation, Power train and Launch Strategy.  
 
In general terms Nissan Technical Centre Europe needs twenty-six months from 
styling freeze, where the style of the car has finally been agreed to start of production 
(SOP). In comparison, Nissan Technical Centre Japan, using the same milestones 
develops vehicles in eighteen months. Palmer et al. (1999) report that Nissan 
emphasised the development of enabling technologies such as international 
information technology standards, computer supported collaborative working 
technologies, knowledge based systems, virtual reality and simultaneous engineering 
activities in design and development of the Nissan Almera launched 2000. Since that 
report these initiatives have been further developed, changed and re-badged under a 
variety of acronyms, some of which, like WIN have already been introduced  (Chapter 
2:33). Others include: the aforementioned V3P,  ANPQP (Alliance New Parts Quality 
Procedure), GTOP 21 (Global Purchasing Systems) and G2B (Group Global Bill of 
Materials).   
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By 2007, it is expected that Nissan Technical Centre Europe  will have a similar 
capability and working at the same level as Nissan Technical Centre Japan and  
developing vehicles within ten months. To achieve this, NTCE needs to be working to 
the same processes as NTC. Putting aside, for one moment the obvious reasons of 
company efficiency it is also worth noting that NTCE needs to work to the same 
processes in order to survive as an independent and interdependent company. If it 
does not, NTC will find ways of working without NTCE and questions will soon be 
asked about the value the company offers global Nissan. 
 
5.6.2 Design Reviews  
 
Design Reviews are used to guarantee the performance and reliability of both systems 
and components prior to design release and the manufacture of parts.  Reliability 
cannot be guaranteed by physical testing because a potential failure ratio of 0.5% 
would require testing at least two hundred parts, which would be unrealistic in terms 
of both cost and time. Design Reviews are used to 
 
• Level the quality of design at an early stage  
• Identify risks and weaknesses in design and introduce countermeasures 
• Reduce development time by reducing trial and error  
• Confirm target achievement of Quality, Cost and Delivery before each 
build 
• Make a judgement if it is OK to proceed to next stage 
• Capture Nissan Know How 
 
Seven Design Reviews are shown on the Master Schedule for a Case III project but 
the responsible Design Manager for the system or component can hold as many 
reviews as he chooses to assure design. (Figure 5.1) For Case III projects, the vehicle 
platform (chassis) and engine will be designed and developed by the Nissan Technical 
Centre in Japan but NTCE will be responsible for the design and development of the 
rest of the vehicle. 
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Figure 5.1: The Design Reviews for a Case III Project 
(Note Design Review No 6. is Post Start of Production and is not shown) 
 
Each Design Review has a different purpose but basically they cover the following 
elements. (Figure  5.1) 
 
• Clarification of System Requirements e.g. From point of view of the 
customer, engineering and manufacturing 
• Identification of new and changing items of the system e.g. New 
specifications, function, structures, materials, process and supplier. 
• Understanding the impact and eliminating the risk associated with new 
items using analysis tools like Failure Mode Effect and Analysis and Fault 
Tree Analysis. 
• Evaluate the design to confirm that all the systems requirements can be 
achieved 
• Ensure past concerns are not repeated. 
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 Stage Purpose 
DR #1 Review the design concept – does it achieve the system requirements? Focussed on the Concept Sheet concept. 
DR #2 Confirm all engineering requirements are satisfied within the styling condition before Model Freeze. Vi
rtu
al
 
DR #3 Confirm that the design achieves all QCT requirements before initial Production Spec Tender & Design Release. 
DR #3.5 Confirm that S-Lot parts satisfy the design intent and can be used for the trial. 
DR #4 
Review the achievement of all CQT requirements based on S-Lot evaluation.   
Confirm all countermeasures are included in PT1 design release before PT1 refine 
& D/N cut-off. 
DR #5 
Review the effectiveness of PT1 countermeasures and that all CQT requirements 
are achieved. 
Confirm all countermeasures are included in PT2 design release before PT1 refine 
D/N cut-off. 
P
hy
si
ca
l 
DR #6 Review system performance in the market. 
Table 5.1: Purpose of Design Reviews 
 
5.6.3 Planning Drawings. 
 
Planning Drawings are used to specify design against a given set of vehicle targets 
and can be made at different levels i.e. for performance, vehicle, system and 
components. 
 
• Examples of Performance Planning Drawings include:- Fuel Economy, 
Ride and Handling, Safety, NVH, Aerodynamics and Weight. 
• Examples of Vehicle Planning Drawings include:- Platform, Engine Bay, 
Interior and Luggage Room. 
• Examples of System Planning Drawings include:- Cockpit Module, Fuel 
Systems, Front End module (including lamps) and Safety Systems (Active 
and Passive Safety). 
• Examples of Comment Planning Drawings include:- Seat, Seat Belts, 
Combi-Meter,  Headlamps, Sun Roof and Transmission Control. 
 
The term Planning Drawing is a misnomer. Originally, it was the name given to a 
layout drawing showing the part in situ. The drawing was annotated with relevant 
information but over time it became impracticable to capture all the necessary 
information on the drawing and a separate file was made to supplement the drawing. 
For whatever reason, the file and layout became known, collectively, as the Planning 
Drawing. This provides a complete history and background to the drawing in which 
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all inputs are captured and problems encountered during the planning drawing process 
recorded. The idea is that the Planning Drawing becomes a history file, forever being 
updated through experience of subsequent model development. Once vehicle targets 
are agreed and disseminated, work on the Performance and Vehicle Planning 
Drawings start simultaneously, transcribing the targets into design. Work between the 
two drawings is co-ordinated and information on one made to support relevant 
information on the other. Once these are issued, work on the Vehicle and Component 
planning drawings commence. Again, work between relevant Planning Drawings is 
co-ordinated and monitored through a series of sectional and departmental meetings.  
There are four levels of planning drawings, each one with a different objective, the 
higher the number the greater the level of specification and design detail. 
  
5.6.4 Nissan Engineering Manuals (NEM) 
 
A Nissan Engineer refers to three main standards to make a Planning Drawing:  
Nissan Engineering Manuals (NEM), Nissan Design Manuals (NDS) and Nissan 
Engineering Standards. NEMs exist for the majority of vehicle components. These 
manuals are the culmination of design and technical know-how. Their purpose is to 
improve the quality of work through:- 
 
1. Standardisation of development work: 
• To prevent variations in design quality due to differences in skill and 
experience between persons in charge of its design; 
• To prevent any item from being omitted from the planning stage. 
2. Estimation of performance: 
• To estimate the performance of the component/system in order to reduce 
the cost and time required for development. 
3. Improved efficiency of development work: 
• To standardise examination methods to improve development efficiency. 
 
These manuals are intended to be codified technical accounts of knowledge recorded 
to assist the designer and ensure best practise.  It is intended that they be used in 
conjunction with each other. The manual sets the standard for taking out part numbers, 
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explains symbols used on the drawings and describes the different components used 
to make up a seat belt assembly and where they fit in the car. The manual also details 
how components should be designed into the car to meet the legal regulations of 
countries in which the final vehicle will be sold. Components are shown in relation to 
mating parts, with the necessary clearances and fixing/anchorage points. There is also 
a section showing how to benchmark the proposed installation with that of Nissan 
competitors. The Planning Drawing Manual provides a template for the planning 
drawing process. It is a step-by-step guide to the organisation and production of a 
Planning Drawing with examples to illustrate each point. Checklists are lists of items 
to check against given standards. They are derived from previous experience, usually 
mistakes made during the design and development of previous vehicles, and are 
divided into four main areas: Laws and Regulations, Clearance Checks, Operation and 
Construction.  
 
5.6.5 Nissan Design Standards (NDS) 
 
The NDS stipulates the test methods and relevant judgement criteria for the 
component.  The tests are designed to show that the part meets legal requirements and 
to replicate real-life conditions through a range of temperatures and endurance cycles.    
 
5.6.6 Nissan Engineering Standards (NES) 
 
The NES is the standard reference document.  There are three types of Nissan 
Engineering Standards:- one for the basic design (NES-D), another for materials 
(NES-M) and a third for tool steels (NES-T). 
 
5.7 The Nissan Way 
 
The resultant procedures became known as “The Nissan Way,” not only was the 
company learning from experience, it aimed to capture and codify those lessons in 
procedures. Day (1994: 37-52) argues organisations need to remember what has 
worked for them and why, otherwise they will have to “rediscover their success 
formulas again and again.” Nelson and Winter (1982a) and Levitt and March (1998) 
John Temple   
 
  
   
 120
have described the codification of knowledge into rules that guide behaviour as the 
“crystallization” of organisational knowledge. The important thing about procedures 
is that they are used regularly, remain relevant and are kept up to date. Cyert and 
March (1963), Levitt and March (1998) and Nelson and Winter (1982) have referred 
to this type of procedures as tight scripts.  
 
However, within Nissan Japan the scripts are “loose” and seen as guidelines, working 
with culturally understood parameters for an activity; or shikata, a standard way of 
doing things. These loose scripts, written around the Master Schedule are used to 
encourage dialogue between interested parties and informal job specifications and 
procedures are used as teaching materials where context is understood through 
discussion. Miller (1993) said the organisations weed out unsuccessful practices and 
build “architectures of simplicity.” In NTC, they build architectures of complexity 
which are understood through complicit internal coherence rather than externally 
applied logic.  It is only through talking and working together that people will learn 
the tacit as well as the explicit knowledge. By examining the use of the 
aforementioned schedules, procedures and standards we can see how these loose 
scripts have been applied and show how this approach leads to confusion and 
inefficiencies in a global company.    
 
Experience of NTCE Senior Engineers of working in NTC Japan 
 
“I wasn’t told what to do. You learn very much on the job. Asking people: Is this 
right? No one tells you this is the way to do it and it isn’t in the NEM. There are 
underground NEMs. All the people involved know about them but they’re not 
available to outsiders and I suppose that’s what we are:  Outsiders.”  NTCE Senior 
Engineer (1) 
 
“There are local networks where best practise information is being collected and 
shared. I only found out by talking to a Japanese colleague. He told me there was a 
best practise for design HVAC. [Heating and Ventilation]. It was different to the NEM. 
They’ve been working to this new standard for quite some time. Every one working in 
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HVAC knows about these standards. They are passed on by word of mouth.” NTCE 
Senior Engineer (2) 
 
The scripts informed on the what, when, who and how of vehicle development but not 
the all important “why.” The “why” was retained by the experts and it was only in 
consultation with them that the rationale became evident. The “why,” wrought by 
experience, became the source of expert power and the foundation of the engineers’ 
prestige and reputation within the company. The engineers guarded this knowledge 
because it ensured their position and made them valuable to the company. To 
maintain the currency of this knowledge it was claimed to be superior to other 
technical knowledge. Peers, anxious to maintain their own credibility and power bases 
as experts supported this claim and it became authorised as the “Nissan Way” of 
doing things.    
 
“These guys really know their business; they know the NEMs inside out and have so 
much experience. They put things together and make connections. It’s almost like a 
sixth sense.” NTCE Engineer 
 
The NEMs and NDS are sometimes confusing, contradictory and misleading as might 
be expected from translated documentation and indeed, on the front page of all NEMs 
and NDS is the cautionary note:  
 
“The translation of this technical document from Japanese may have required the use 
of English phrases that may be inaccurate when compared to the intent of the original 
Japanese document. The reader should consult the original Japanese document to 
confirm accuracy.”  
 
The author has done so on numerous occasions and working with a translator, or a 
Japanese colleague it has transpired that the original document is also confusing, 
contradictory and misleading. Often, it has been impossible to discuss the NEM with 
its originator because he has often left the company, through retirement, redundancy 
or movement to another section. Once an engineer moves to another section he is 
reluctant to get involved, or to answer any questions saying it is no longer his 
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responsibility. They are frightened of becoming embroiled in conflict and being 
blamed for mistakes.    
 
“There is definitely a blame culture in NTC. People don’t like to commit to anything 
in case something goes wrong and they get the blame. I had an instance when 
something I did went wrong. My Japanese senior asked me why I had done it? I said I 
thought it was right and I had checked it with him. He denied it. Said it was the first 
he’d heard of it.  Fortunately I had an email from him saying it was OK. I showed him 
the email and nothing more was said.” NTCE British Engineer working in NTC 
Japan 
 
Sometimes it is impossible to trace the originators of the NEMs or talk to people who 
would have been involved in the process because the originating section has been 
disbanded. 
 
 “I was a member of the Vehicle performance group. We were an elite group. We 
knew the vehicle and understood design. It is typical of NTC. Many people were 
envious of our group. Our knowledge, so they split the group up and the knowledge 
was lost forever. Now they realise they have made a mistake.” NTC Japanese General 
Manager 
 
This insight touches on the competitive and political rivalry that exists within NTC. A 
rivalry which has a detrimental effect on how knowledge is managed and in this case 
lost within the company. In the Nissan Technical Centre - Japan, knowledge is 
embedded in social networks and central to these networks are technical and 
managerial experts. The experts are recognised by the company, and because of this 
recognition they recognise and value themselves and each other. Nissan is about them 
as “individuals” and their efforts have made the company successful. This insight 
provides an interesting paradox: Ghosn promotes global Nissan as a learning 
organisation but the very people who have made the company successful also hinder 
its development as a learning organisation. The focus of becoming a learning 
organisation is to become more profitable and to survive in a complex and changing 
world. It is a strategy for competitive advantage where learning is said to be reciprocal 
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and happens as people interact with each other which presupposes an organisation 
where people are open to other points of view. (Senge, 1990).  
 
Sethi et al. (1984) claim Japanese companies have a great difficulty in integrating 
foreigners into their decision making process because much of it is based on cultural 
norms and political manoeuvring within the organisation. Sethi’s claim was originally 
made in the context of managers in overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies but it 
is equally true of what is currently happening with NTC. For “foreigner” read new 
starter of whatever nationality. They may well understand the cultural mechanisms at 
work but they have not been indoctrinated into the social and political networks that 
give them access to the information they need to do their jobs.   
 
“Since the bubble burst or since Ghosn I do not know which, there have been many 
changes in NTC. Once it was unusual to see foreigners working at NTC – except for 
people from our companies abroad but now NTC employs foreigners directly. We also 
employ Japanese engineers who have worked for other companies in Japan.  We have 
to change our way of thinking to accept this.” NTC Japanese Manager 
 
In March 2004, NTC’s knowledge sharing group surveyed NTC engineers asking how 
they learnt about the job. Those surveyed included graduates, team leaders, managers 
and recent recruits from rival car manufacturers and other companies. The survey 
showed that the engineers relied on job procedures, check lists and information about 
the previous models to do their jobs. It also showed a distinct lack of codified 
processes and procedures and highlighted, once again that they relied on their social 
networks and “word of mouth” to understand what was required. The survey 
concluded that the engineers wanted detailed written procedures and recommended 
that “it was necessary to translate the “know how” of the expert into explicit 
knowledge” (Takahashi, 2004).   This finding contradicts previous comments made by 
Japanese managers and threatens to undermine the political power base of Nissan’s 
original salary men and perhaps, not surprisingly the knowledge sharing group is 
finding it difficult to capture and codify its expert knowledge 
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“Two years ago we tried to get important knowledge out of the heads of experts and 
onto paper. It was very difficult. It was not possible to explain the preconditions that 
we need to understand the knowledge.” NTC Japanese Manager (1) 
 
“It is difficult for us to capture all knowledge. We tried to do this with the suspension 
group. There were three experts in the group. They all approached the job in different 
ways. They had different ways of doing things. They did not agree with each other.” 
NTC Japanese Manager (2) 
 
The exercise was abandoned because of the magnitude of the job, and the differences 
of approach and opinions of the design experts. They could not reach consensus about 
what was best practice and the Knowledge Management group would not make a 
decision, which might challenge or alienate any of the design groups.  This reluctance 
to challenge the status quo results in each section being managed in a different way. 
 
“Each section makes its own process. It is not always written down. We do not have a 
standard way of making a process. If a process crosses other sections or departments 
we decide on a lead section to make the process. Then the process is offered to others 
to follow. The Japanese do not like to follow best practise. But this causes problems. 
Although the sections work well as individual sections, they don’t always have a 
process. It is done by word of mouth. The problem comes when it comes to working 
with other sections. It is not clear. Things get missed. Mistakes are made.  So many 
mis-communications and inefficiencies.” NTC Japanese Manager (3) 
 
Ghoshal (1987) has reasoned that geographic diversity and exposure to new 
environments should lead to innovation and increased organisational capabilities.  
Bennett (1993) modelled the overall willingness of global organisations to engage in 
other cultures and their readiness to transfer information and knowledge across 
borders. The model has two levels – the ethnocentric and ethnorelative. According to 
Bennett, ethnocentrism is the assumption that one’s own culture is central to all reality. 
Rosinski (2003:31) takes the definition further: “there is no evil intent, simply a 
naïveté or lack of awareness of culture.” The enthnocentric level can be seen as 
avoiding cultural difference, either by denying its existence, by raising defences 
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against it or by minimising its importance (Bennett and Bennett, 2002). The 
ethnorelative level is where people experience their own cultures in the context of 
other cultures. Bennett argues that global organisations need to move to the 
ethnorelative level to increase organisational learning. Nissan has not fully succeeded 
in moving past the ethnocentric level. 
 
Cerny (1996) reports that many large multinational companies fail to transfer 
practices across organisational units due to the firm’s lack of operational experience 
and knowledge of local market conditions. In Nissan’s case it is not because they lack 
operational experience and knowledge of local market conditions but rather, the 
Japanese, who have worked overseas  have a cognitive dissonance between the reality 
of management, work and knowledge being different when working with foreigners 
and when working in NTC. It sometimes seems that the flexibility of working abroad 
is disposed of when they return to NTC because knowledge learned abroad is not 
valued or it would destabilise the status quo and undermine the organisational culture. 
Inkpen and Crossan (1995) argue that the dominant logic of organisations often 
curtails the learning opportunities of working in foreign countries.  
 
One of the major challenges facing global organisations is to develop processes and 
policies that will more effectively integrate the knowledge and experience of their 
management team who have worked in subsidiaries abroad (Berhut, 2001; Birkinshaw, 
2001). In Chapter Two the author explained that when Nissan began its global 
expansion programme in the eighties it seconded teams of experts on foreign 
assignments to start up its overseas subsidiaries. These teams were expected to 
instruct locals in “The Nissan Way.”  There was little in the way of codified processes 
and it seems this practice is not uncommon amongst Japanese companies.  
Negandhi and Serapio (1991) studied twenty-seven Japanese manufacturing 
subsidiaries in the US and found that the parent company had provided very few 
processes.  
 
From the author’s discussions with colleagues at NMUK and from his own experience 
at NTCE the Japanese brought across procedures and forms. Often, the procedures 
had not been translated from the Japanese and although the forms were the same as 
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used by NTC, they were adapted for use by local staff with ‘Japlish’ instructions 
written alongside the Japanese characters. Japlish is a contracted form of "Japanese 
English." It is recognizable as an English word, and is used by native Japanese 
speakers, especially for those utterances that are strongly modified, or influenced by 
rules of Japanese grammar (Wikipedia: The Free Encylopedia, 2004). The company 
encouraged and expected a certain degree of empowerment, initiative and self-
organisation and it was left to NTCE and NMUK staff to decide on the detailed 
process, about how things should be done locally. 
 
“I’ve been with the company for eighteen years. When I started we were building 
Bluebirds. That’s how long ago it was. Nothing was written down. We had to write 
our own processes. The company was flooded with Japanese staff, we’d ask them and 
if they didn’t know they’d phone hone for help. I used to think they had a help line in 
Japan where Japanese engineers could phone and ask for help. Like a control 
mentoring system to get expert advice. Perhaps that’s what we need now.” NMUK 
Senior Engineer 
 
“I was here when the company started, one of the first employees. I started as an 
engineer and was surprised that nothing was written down, not in English anyway. 
The engineers had NEMs and NDS [procedures] but we didn’t have any processes 
telling us how to manage the business. The Japanese knew how it was done in Japan 
but it was all in their heads.  I worked with one of the Sokats [Japanese Engineer] and 
wrote it all down. What we didn’t have, we made up. We put all the documentation in 
Company Manuals. I don’t think they’ve been opened since.” NTCE Director. 
 
Key procedures like the NEM’s and NDS etc. are considered sacrosanct and have to 
be rigorously applied which is sometimes difficult when the content is unclear. In 
effect, they are historical documents of what worked for the company in the past but 
their slavish application has strangled innovation, learning and the use and creation of 
new knowledge within Nissan because the logic, learning and rationale underpinning 
the procedures is not always understood. Sull (1999) believes that good companies, 
which continue to focus on doing what worked in the past, will soon become bad 
which is not necessarily so, if what worked in the past is relevant to today. 
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Arrow (1974) argues that in trying to improve efficiency by making decisions based 
on past experience may lead to rigidity and unresponsiveness to effective change but 
the decisions based on a limited understanding of past experience are also potentially 
damaging to the company as the author knows from bitter experience.  
 
Some years ago he was involved in the development of a new Airbag System for one 
of Nissan’s Vehicles. The relevant NEM and NDS detailing the airbag construction 
and test methods were seemingly inappropriate for the current design. The man who 
had written the NEM had been retired from the company and with no expert to refer 
to, decisions were made which proved costly and nearly delayed the project. It soon 
became obvious why the NEM was written the way it was and had we understood we 
would not have encountered problems. Experiences like these make engineers 
reluctant to challenge the NEM. Exploration is the degree to which a company 
accumulates new knowledge and exploitation is the leverage of existing knowledge 
but engineers need to feel secure in themselves and their environments to be confident 
enough to explore and exploit knowledge.  
 
Leonard-Barton’s (1992) study of new product and developmental processes found 
that that it was difficult to change the value systems embodied in a firm’s existing 
core capabilities (author’s note: or lack of them) suggesting organisational barriers to 
changes may stifle innovation. March (1991) contends that to succeed, organisations 
need to engage in both exploitation and exploration. Exploiting known alternatives 
may have more certain outcomes but it can also mean opportunities are missed. One 
of the ways to raise the technical capability of engineers at NTCE is to follow the lead 
set by NTC Japan and use the Nissan Engineering Manuals as spring-boards for 
deeper learning as illustrated by the following story.  
 
 “NTC engineers told Nakamura san [General Manager and Chief Vehicle Engineer 
(CVE) for C Segment vehicles] that he could not have the fuel tank he wanted in 
P32L [code name for a new vehicle] and still meet the NEM specified ground 
clearance. Nakamura san asked for a cross section of RAV 4 to see how Toyota 
overcame the problem. It showed that Toyota were prepared to have less ground 
clearance than specified in the NEM. Nakamura san said the RAV 4 was for sale 
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worldwide. He also rattled off the figures. He told them to change the NEM and six 
pens came out. Everyone in the room agreed to change the NEM because he said so. 
No questions asked. They respected his judgement. They knew his history. Knew the 
jobs he had had in Nissan. They respected his engineering opinion.” NTCE British 
General Manager 
 
Symbolically, the story is illuminating because it informs us of the importance of 
leadership within Nissan. Nakamura san was leading by example and showing NTC 
engineers how NEMs can be and should be challenged and changed based on a deep 
understanding of a competitor’s vehicle. Interestingly both the man telling the story 
and the man he was talking about are GET trainees  
 
5.8  The Changing face of Knowledge Management at NTC 
 
In August 2004, the British Management team of NTCE Design Department proposed 
a V- Fast activity to develop external training modules for instructing new starters in 
core design and process knowledge. A V-Fast activity is one that can be completed in 
one to two days. The Japanese Managing Director rejected the proposal saying it was 
the senior engineer’s job to develop their staff. This is a fundamental difference of 
approach to training and learning between Britain and Japan. White and Trevor (1983) 
observed that training by technical and managerial staff occurs with much greater 
frequency in Japanese firms operating in Britain than in most European factories.   
 
Dore and Sako (1998) argue that although Japanese firms may compare badly with 
British or American firms against criteria which looks at training expenditure and 
man-hours in formal training they excel in being able to motivate individuals to learn 
to perform their present and likely future jobs within the firm. They also say the 
Japanese feel morally obliged to be good at their jobs and argue it is a product of their 
history and culture. Japanese firms rely more on mutual teaching and on the job 
training (ojt) than on courses provided by training firms or outside consultants and are 
often seen as learning organisations because of this high level of mutual teaching, 
which happens with the introduction of new processes and products and also in the 
form of pre-programmed induction sessions. Mutual teaching and on the job training 
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implies that learning is ongoing for everyone. It is also expected that senior 
employees will help newcomers to learn. Teaching is seen to be part of a manager’s or 
seniors’ job and is rewarded by respect and deference. The manager or senior is also 
judged on his ability to develop others. 
 
Japanese employees are expected to be highly motivated and willing to update their 
skills and acquire new ones to benefit the business rather than for personal gain (Dore 
and Sako, 1998). Van Maanen and Schien (1979) argue that the socialisation of group 
members influences the institutionalisation of knowledge but in NTC exclusion from 
the network means engineers are no longer able to access the information they need to 
do their jobs and they become marginalised and their job security is threatened.  
Loose scripts are a predetermined cultural control which emphasises the different 
ways power is reflected in procedures in Japan and the UK. Japanese procedures 
perpetuate a network of relationships where the power remains with the chief 
stakeholders whereas the British procedures have an authoritative function where the 
power is embodied within the issuing authority.  
 
“The British always want a global policy. Always ask for global procedure. They 
want to be told what to do. They want to follow a process. In Japan engineers just get 
on with it. They deal with the practicalities.” NTCE Japanese Manager 
 
NTCE British engineers want the procedure to understand and debate what is 
expected of them and they expect to be given all the information to do the job and 
understanding why is an important part of the process of learning. The view of 
Japanese management is somewhat different as they expect British employees to act 
within predetermined guidelines and do not understand why they should need to know 
about something that has been decided by the management on their behalf. There 
should be trust that the company (working through the senior management) have 
taken everything into account before asking the engineers to do something. Hasegawa 
(1986) claims that the traditional tendency in Japan has been to make corporate 
decisions from bottom up rather than the top down. He argues that this allows 
everyone to feel as if they are contributing and so raises the morale of all employees. 
March (1992a) agrees to the point that middle managers are able to influence strategy 
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and do play a central role in making day-to-day decisions but maintains that not 
everyone is involved in the decision making process. The evidence suggest that it is a 
fallacy to suppose everyone feels as if they are contributing to corporate decisions and 
argues that by “bottom up,” management actually means it is hearing the voices of the 
selected few and even then, these voices are often, self censoring. 
 
 “I do not understand the westerners need for hierarchies. Always you need to be told 
what to do. The Japanese do not like or need hierarchical organisational trees. NTCE 
engineers expect top down management. People want to be told what to do. In Japan 
management is bottom up. Japanese engineers see the real job. Practically they know 
how to do the job and get on with it.” NTCE Japanese Director 
 
“I have to be very careful when I am talking to Otomo san. [NTCE Japanese Director] 
I do not always agree with him. I can ask maybe one or two questions but no more. 
He makes his position very clear.” NTCE Japanese Senior 
 
This calls into question Hannam’s (1993:44) definition of the Japanese management 
system of consensus as the “management by the consensus of a group rather than 
management by hierarchy of individual managers.” For Hannam, consensus does not 
mean everyone is in agreement but it does mean everyone is involved in the process.  
He reasons employees will respond positively to consultation because it shows that 
others value their opinions and expertise. The author believes that whilst everyone 
appears to be involved, these group meetings are theatres for the performing elite and 
dissenting voices are quickly squashed or marginalised. Involvement means to concur 
with the direction of the company elite.   
 
 “The most frustrating thing is that they won’t make decisions without asking their 
team leader or senior and sometimes he’ll even have to ask his manager. Whereas I’ll 
make a decision and tell my senior about it afterwards they’ll have to talk to someone 
higher. It’s very frustrating. A Manager in NTC will not talk to you or acknowledge 
you directly. He’ll talk to the senior who will talk to the team leader who will talk to 
you.” NTCE British Engineer talking about his experience of working in NTC 
 
John Temple   
 
  
   
 131
Heaven and Child (1999) argue that the Japanese are status oriented, emphasising and 
honouring prescribed power based memberships and this influences their preferred 
style of cultural communication and determines who talks to whom, what information 
and knowledge is shared and even decides who is allowed to determine what new 
knowledge is and it also determines how that information is communicated. Different 
nationalities have a preference for different communication styles and these are 
culturally determined (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2003). Gudykunst and 
Ting-Toomey (1988) report that the British prefer to have clear, meaningful, exacting 
conversations whereas the Japanese prefer a succinct style of communication, 
characterised by understatements, meaningful pauses and silences. This last 
observation needs challenging, whilst the British may prefer to have clear, meaningful 
and exacting conversations the Japanese working at NTCE complain that the British 
are often too polite and the intent of the conversation is far from clear. 
 
“The British are far too polite. Thinking too much about how things should be said. 
We do not understand what you are trying to say. Please speak simply.” NTCE 
Japanese Director 
 
Similarly, it may seem that the Japanese prefer a succinct style of communication, 
characterised by understatements, meaningful pauses and silences but this may be 
because they are unsure of the relationship. Where the relationship is secure the 
understatements and meaningful pauses are accompanied with encouraging or 
discouraging grunts and the associated body language. Some research has shown that 
at least 65% of all communication is non verbal (Harrison, 1970), other research has 
shown it to be 75% (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2003) and yet another study 
places it at 93% (Mehrabian, 1968). The percentages may be questionable but 
according to Bolton (1991) few people dispute the general direction of the findings.  
All nationalities have preferred communication styles and rely on body language to 
manage impressions, convey messages and emphasis meanings but these are not 
always easily understood cross culturally. Japanese Managers claim Japanese 
engineers “know what is expected” and “get on with it” but this view is not 
necessarily shared by British Managers.   
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“I agree that when Japanese Managers or Engineers come to me with a problem they 
also offer one or two countermeasures. The countermeasures are very well thought 
out but they struggle when I leave it to them to decide what to do.” NTCE British 
General Manager 
 
Japanese engineers are able to read the body language of their Japanese Managers and 
it helps them to deliver and say what is expected. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(2003:157) believe organisations are subjective constructs whose employees “give 
meaning to their environment based on their own cultural programming” and have 
defined four types of corporate cultures which vary considerable in how they think 
and learn, how they change and how they motivate, reward and resolve conflicts. The 
four types can be described as 
 
1. The Family: Hierarchical, power oriented corporate cultures in which the 
leader is regarded as a caring father figure responsible for his subordinates. 
2. The Eiffel Tower: Hierarchical bureaucracies with clear divisions of labour 
and a boss who is to be obeyed. 
3. A Guided Missile: Egalitarian, task-oriented and cross disciplinary. This 
type of organisation does whatever needs to be done to get the job done.   
4. The Incubator: Where the organisation serves as incubators for its 
employees self expression and fulfilment. 
 
Japanese companies are said to have family cultures because they recreate and mimic 
aspects of traditional family within the organisation.  These types of organisations 
tend to be high context, which refers to the amount of information and cultural content 
which is taken for granted by organisational members. Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (2003) argue  
 
“the higher the context the harder it is for outsiders to feel that they belong or know 
how to behave appropriately. Such cultures exclude strangers without necessarily 
wishing to do so and communicate in codes which only members understand. 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2003:160)   
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This insight has a tremendous impact on the strategy to raise the capability of NTCE.  
The way knowledge is communicated, acted upon and accumulated in NTC is 
embedded in social networks. Levitt and March (1998) understand knowledge as a 
collective set of assumptions about organisational actions and their consequences. It is 
a “collective” set of assumptions implying people need to be part of the collective to 
have access to the knowledge. Hedberg (1981) contends firms gain new 
understanding in accumulating knowledge by associating actions and their 
consequences. The argument is that learning involves testing and reflecting upon 
associations between causal relations and ultimately selecting a course of action that 
meets the company’s objectives but again, this depends on being in the network. In 
NTC, these are social networks built on relationships, and it is the nature of these 
relationships that determine what knowledge is stored and indeed what knowledge is 
forgotten.  
 
“Relationships are very important in Japan. If there is no relationship then an NTC 
engineer would not even look at proposal from someone he does not know. I know 
John. [The author] If he sends me an email I will read it. People here are very busy. 
They are always busy. It is important to build relationships.” NTC Japanese General 
Manager 
 
“The Japanese are shy. They are reluctant to hear from a guy they do not know. They 
are suspicious of strangers. They will not listen until they know someone. Sometimes 
it is said NTC engineers are too busy to reply but even when they are not busy they 
are reluctant to reply to people they do not know.” NTCE Japanese Director 
 
Gudykunst and Kim (1997) write 
 
“Reducing anxiety is one of the major functions of communication when we interact 
with strangers because it can lead to more accurate predications and expectations 
about a stranger’s meaning and behaviour.”(Gudykunst and Kim, 1997:27)   
 
One of the major aims of Global Executive Training is to create a more cosmopolitan 
management team which will influence the way the company manages knowledge. 
For Merton (1957), cosmopolitanism is an attitudinal stance or mindset that indicates 
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an orientation towards the outside world, Thich (1991) believes it is being attuned to 
another’s assumptions, emotions and cognitions whist Ting-Toomey (1999) reasons it 
is being open to novelty and unfamiliar behaviour. Ultimately, a more cosmopolitan 
management team will challenge and perhaps even change organisational values.  
 
5.9  Toyota 
 
Toyota is relevant to this story not only because it is the world’s second largest 
automotive manufacturer and by far the largest of the Japanese manufacturers 
producing more than 60 million cars per year, which is equivalent to twelve cars every 
six seconds (Toyota Motor Co., 2005) but because it has a different approach to 
knowledge management. Toyota is said to produce the most reliable cars in the world 
and regularly scores highly in J. D. Powers Reliability Surveys.  It has recently 
overtaken Ford in global production terms and is set to pass Chrysler in sales to 
become one of America’s Big Three. The secret of Toyota’s success according to 
Miller (2004) is in meticulous organisation and obsessive vigilance, enshrined in the 
Toyota Production System (TPS) which is built on a philosophy of standardisation 
and continuous improvement (kaizen). Taicichi Ohno who developed TPS said, 
“Where there is no standard there can be no kaizen (improvement). When the fastest, 
safest, best quality, repeatable steps have been identified that is documented as 
standard. That is now the record to beat” (cited in Miller, 2004).    
 
The Economist (January, 2005) argues that Toyota’s success starts with: 
 
 “its brilliant production engineers, which puts quality control in the hands of the line 
workers who have the power to stop the line or summon help the moment something 
goes wrong. Walk into a Toyota factory in Japan or America, Derby in Britain or 
Valenciennes in France and you will see the same visual displays telling you 
everything that is going on. You will also hear the same jingles at the various work 
stations telling you a model is being changed, an operation has been completed or a 
brief halt being called.”  
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The author asked a Japanese colleague who used to work for Toyota, in the Interior 
Design Department how Nissan’s working practices compare to that of Toyota and in 
particular how design reviews were managed.   
 
“Not so much difference. If anything, I think Nissan probably has better processes but 
the processes in Toyota are very tightly controlled.  In Toyota, the drawing is created 
by Toyota and is sent to the supplier. Nissan send the Spec. Tender to the supplier. 
The engineers in Toyota have the engineering skill to produce the drawings. In Toyota, 
for instance in the Interior Design division, the top manager of the division always 
comes from that division. In Nissan the top manager comes from another division and 
very often will not know the technology. In a Design Review (in Toyota), when senior 
managers involved in the Design Review see the drawings they know the part (they 
can easily imagine the detail (including 3D detail) from the 2D drawings   
 
In Nissan, the centre of engineering lies with the Senior Engineer, a Design Review is 
held in effect between the Senior and engineers- it is daily routine work, nothing 
special. Design Review at a higher level cannot be held because of a lack of the 
specialized technical knowledge among the managers. In Toyota there is job rotation 
among staff who are ascending to manager level, but this is within similar sections / 
departments, and they return eventually to work in the same section  department. In 
Toyota, after 10 years an engineer leaves drawing making. Management training is 
also done in-house.” NTCE Japanese Senior 
 
Nissan used to make its own drawings but this ended in the mid eighties when, as part 
of manpower reduction activity, drawings were outsourced to suppliers. Nissan 
defines the specification and issues a Specification Tender to the Supplier to action 
the work. 
 
Toyota does outsource design work but when they do so the supplier’s engineers are 
relocated to Toyota and act as “Toyota engineers.”   
 
“There is a close relationship with outsourcers: they work within Toyota. Toyota 
standards (TS) control the development, including CAD style / format- this is common 
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for all body suppliers. The Master Schedule controls the process. The project 
management functions from the body supplier for each model are also based at 
Toyota for the duration of the development. Between Toyota and its supplier base 
there is a single national culture and that culture is Japanese. There is trust. There is 
responsibility to each other and to the company and there are shared values.” NTCE 
Japanese Senior 
 
There is also disillusionment and frustration as explained by a NTCE Japanese 
Director. 
 
“I was at University with some engineers who went to work for Toyota. Many years 
later we met. They were very frustrated. They felt controlled by the process. They 
could not change anything. One said he used to dream about being the engineer who 
designed the Nissan Skyline.”  
 
The author also spoke to a number of Nissan suppliers who also supply Toyota and 
Honda. They had no problem talking about their working relationships but said they 
preferred working with Nissan which they described as “gratifying.” The Toyota 
equivalent of NTCE is called TMEM and is based in Brussels.  It was described as 
being about the same size as NTCE but is expanding (one supplier thought to about 
2000 people). They have some similarities to NTCE and do similar competitor 
benchmarking and vehicle evaluation but less testing. The main difference is their 
approach to design responsibility. Toyota Japan takes complete responsibility for the 
design and all changes have to be authorised by headquarters. There are local 
engineers but they are given little autonomy and this is very frustrating both for them 
and for the suppliers who want to make changes.  
 
Engineers in Toyota Europe spend six month assignments in Japan where they learn 
the parts and then are given some responsibilities when they return to Europe. The 
ECR (engineering change request) - their equivalent of the design note - is always 
signed in Japan. The factories in the UK and France have no design staff and are more 
similar to NMUK than Barcelona.  Purchasing is spread out; in the factories, in 
Brussels and in Japan. Honda has no equivalent to NTCE but they do have a small 
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design department attached to the factory at Swindon which is less than half the size 
of NTCE. Although they are smaller than Toyota they are given delegated authority 
for some very minor changes but all major design is done in Japan. Honda engineers 
in Europe sometimes undertake evaluation and benchmarking exercises locally but do 
not perform vehicle testing. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has developed the themes introduced in the previous chapter and 
examined how knowledge management and learning within global Nissan have been 
shaped by organisational culture and explained how the key Nissan research and 
development procedures and processes became “The Nissan Way.” It has also debated 
and challenged some of the claims made in the literature and in recognising that 
procedures and processes are seen as “loose scripts” within Nissan gave the author a 
potential strategic focus for the study. He also identified specific cultural attributes in 
this chapter that may later be used to design the necessary frameworks to facilitate the 
interactions between partners and their models of learning. It has also shown how 
knowledge management and learning is crucial to Nissan’s continuing success. In this 
chapter, the author has made the following as theoretical and practical contributions to 
knowledge. 
 
 5.10.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
  
• The GET model is instantly recognisable to the Japanese as an alternative to 
the University model, one which incorporates the important socialising aspects 
of Nissan’s organisational culture and by extension the socialising elements of 
Japanese national culture, and preserves the mechanism by which social 
capital is developed within the company.  
• Carlos Ghosn is only interested in the bottom line and this is key to 
understanding the dynamics of how knowledge is currently managed at Nissan. 
• The reason Nissan has been able to quickly assimilate and adapt to a 
seemingly alien western management style is because behind the rhetoric 
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Nissan’s organisational culture has always been elitist and this has had a direct 
effect on knowledge management and learning within the company. 
• Procedures and processes in Nissan are seen as “loose scripts” and it is only 
through talking and working together that people learn the tacit as well as the 
explicit knowledge. Being excluded from these networks curtails learning. 
• Loose scripts are a predetermined cultural control which emphasises the 
different ways power is reflected in procedures in Japan and the UK. Japanese 
procedures perpetuate a network of relationships where the power remains 
with the chief stakeholders whereas the British procedures have an 
authoritative function where the power is embodied within the issuing 
authority.  
• Nissan’s failure in the nineties was largely due to the unbending mindsets of 
the company elite.   
• Nissan work practices have been compared with those of Toyota and it has 
shown that whereas Toyota tightly control and manage their process Nissan 
has relied on individuals or groups of individuals to deliver. Toyota’s 
knowledge seems to be  in the process, Nissan’s knowledge is in its people.  
• Nissan Japan’s more open approach to recruitment is altering the Japanese 
approach to self promotion and self enhancement.  
• NTCE British engineers want a procedure in order to understand and debate 
what is expected of them and they expect to be given all the information to do 
the job and understanding why is an important part of the process of learning. 
The view of Japanese management is somewhat different as they expect 
British employees to act within predetermined guidelines and do not 
understand why they should need to know about something that has been 
decided by the management on their behalf. They should trust that the 
company (working through the senior management) have taken everything 
into account before asking the engineers to do something. 
• Nissan is shaped by individuals rather than by process; its knowledge is 
embedded in the social networks of Nissan Technical Centre Japan and central 
to these networks are technical and managerial experts.   
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• “Bottom up” management actually means hearing the voices of the selected 
few and even then, these voices are often, self censoring. 
• Japanese management system of consensus is a theatre for the performing elite 
and dissenting voices are quickly squashed or marginalised. Involvement 
means to concur with the direction of the company elite.   
• All nationalities have preferred communication styles and rely on body 
language to manage impressions, convey messages and emphasis meanings 
but these are not always easily understood cross culturally. Culturally 
mediated styles of communication limit understanding in global organisations.  
 
 
5.10.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
• Understand the cultural expectations of organisational procedures and how 
they impact learning. 
• Understand the effects of body language in a global setting.   
 
The next Chapter opens Section Three of the thesis: Developing and implementing a 
strategy to Organise Around Knowledge.  
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Section Three: Developing and Implementing a 
Strategy to Organise Around Knowledge 
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Chapter Six 
 
Putting a Face to Knowledge Management 
at the 
Nissan Technical Centre Europe 
 
6.0  Introduction 
 
The Chapter opens Section Three and traces the development and implementation of a 
strategy to organise around knowledge and comprises of Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight and Nine. This Chapter opens the action oriented part of the study and begins to 
put a face to Knowledge Management at NTCE. It covers the period from January – 
December 2003 which was very much a time of wide ranging experimentation, 
reflection and learning as the author grappled to find practical applications for his 
work and his section. The study also begins to determine the scope and role of a 
knowledge manager and the meaning of knowledge management within global 
Nissan. Included in the forthcoming chapters are copies of actual presentation slides 
that were used to sell the idea of knowledge management to NTCE Directors and to 
colleagues in NTC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1   Making a Knowledge Management Strategy at NTCE 
 
The author’s main job at NTCE is in making and deploying knowledge management 
strategies. The premise for making a strategy is that the value of knowledge is in how 
a company uses that knowledge in its daily business. Knowledge management 
strategies and activities need to be aligned with the business strategy if they are to 
become a source of competitive advantage. In Nissan’s case, Nissan Motors Limited 
SECTION TWO: 
Understanding the Impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four:  
Organisational Culture and 
the Management of Change 
Chapter Five: The Impact of 
Organisational Culture on 
Knowledge Management and 
Learning at Nissan 
 
SECTION THREE: Developing and 
implementing a Strategy to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Six: Putting a face to Knowledge 
Management at NTCE  
Chapter Seven:  The proposal to Organise 
Around Knowledge 
Chapter Eight: Pilot to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Nine: Organise Around Knowledge 
Methodology 
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(NML) sets the direction and overall strategy (Figure 6.1).  Nissan Technical Centre 
and Nissan Technical Centre Europe align their strategies with each other and with 
those of Nissan Motors Limited. The way these strategies are aligned moderates the 
relationship between knowledge, learning and performance (Vera and Crossan, 2003). 
This is a trade off; for instance, the opportunity for learning may be curtailed because 
the team cannot afford the time to debrief colleagues, despite the obvious advantages 
of transferring knowledge and identifying process improvements (Zollo and Winter, 
2003).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Figure 6.1: Aligning Strategies 
 
The point of a knowledge-based strategy is to make money (Buckman, 2004) whereas 
Manville and Foote (1996) offer the following broader principles for building a 
knowledge based organisation: 
1. Knowledge based strategies begin with strategy not knowledge 
2. Knowledge based strategies need to be linked to traditional measures of 
performance 
3. Executing a knowledge based strategy is not about managing knowledge it 
is about nurturing people with knowledge 
4. Organisations leverage knowledge through networks of people who 
collaborate – not through networks of technology that interconnects 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Management Activities   
         Global Strategy  (NML) 
 
          Company Strategy (NTC/NTCE)
 
              
                           
               
                
               
                 
 
      Knowledge Management Strategy
 Department Strategy
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5. People based networks leverage knowledge through organisational “pull” 
rather than centralised information “push.”  
 
In making knowledge management strategy Seddon (2003) suggests that the key 
question should be: What role does knowledge serve in the decision making and 
performance improvement? He is dismissive of knowledge vendors who focus mainly 
on knowledge capture. Simply, using Garud’s (1997) definition as a baseline, NTCE 
is in the business of knowing the how, why, what, who, where and when of vehicle 
design and development. The author argues  NTCE’s competitive advantage is to do 
things faster than our competition and so raise our value to the global organisation.  
This requires a knowledge management strategy to focus on: 
 
• Increasing the speed at which we do things 
• Guaranteeing the quality and accuracy of our work 
• Maximising our human asset value by improving capability. 
 
This was the justification put forward to NTCE Directors and the Knowledge Sharing 
Group at NTC at the beginning of 2003. After some debate it was accepted and the 
three maxims have become the pillars for the work of the Knowledge Management 
Section but it still did not explain what it was the section would deliver. NTCE 
Directors wanted something tangible, what would the section actually deliver? How 
would we contribute to the “bottom line?” NTC colleagues were faced with the same 
problem. 
 
 “We have been talking about knowledge management for two years and still do not 
know what to do. Please help us. We have many new starters. Forty nine per cent of 
NTC staff have been with the company less than five years and forty two per cent less 
than three years. We need knowledge management. We must work together and share 
ideas.” NTC Manager, Knowledge Sharing. 
 
Knowledge management is a complex, multi layered subject and can be analysed at 
various levels involving socio cultural, organisational, behavioural and technical 
dimensions and resultant knowledge management strategies fall under three main 
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headings, behavioural (e.g. communities of practice), information (e.g. data mining) 
and technology (e.g. expert systems) based strategies. Table 6.1: Shows the 
Knowledge Management Projects being considered in January 2003. At this stage 
they were ideas for discussion or small pilot activities. They made sense; they were 
being debated by academics and written about in the literature. Company intelligence 
also suggested other organisations interested in knowledge management were working 
in similar areas. More importantly, links could be made to the business and company 
strategies but they were not yet fully aligned. They were projects waiting for internal 
sponsors, waiting for justification; waiting for a company buy in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Knowledge Management Projects January 2003 
 
(Note: The numbers in brackets refer to the section in the thesis where the activity is 
discussed). 
 
6.2   B32A Knowledge Capture 
 
The first activity to gain support was B32A knowledge capture. The company was 
about to send a small joint development team of fifteen design engineers to Japan for 
twelve months to work at NTC on a new model code named, B32A. This was not the 
first time the company had undertaken such an activity but it was the first time that it 
was concerned with knowledge capture. Previous knowledge had been lost, people 
had returned from Japan and had either left the company or since been moved to other 
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sections or departments within NTCE without codifying or articulating their 
experience.  With this in mind, the author designed a knowledge capture pack.  This 
was not an attempt capture all the knowledge of the B32A joint development team but 
to provide a framework for a wider company initiative to provoke discussion and 
learning and was divided into seven parts: 
 
1. Job Outline 
2. Planning Schedule 
3. Flow Chart 
4. Learning Points 
5. Social Network Maps 
6. Supporting Information 
7. Personal Profile 
 
6.2.1  Job Outline 
 
The joint development team engineers were asked to write a summary of their time of 
working in NTC. They were asked to consider their areas of responsibility and report 
on what went well, what did not go well and the problems they faced. These 
summaries were used as the basis for one to one interviews the author held with the 
team members on their return to NTCE. The interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.   
 
Extract from interview with Platform Liaison Engineer 20/03/03. 
 
“My main job was Platform Liaison for the suspension area. I probably spent 80%     
of time working on suspension related issues. Within that I was liaising with upper 
body people and other platform areas. I represented the Suspension Department at 
Planning Centres, fielding questions and taking back requests about vehicle planning 
for example, vehicle posture because it affects all body groups. They need sight lines 
and the H point. They need reference points to tell them where the ground is in 
relation to wheel centres. These things change as the programme progresses because 
we get new information. Weight changes and commonality issues may all compromise 
ground clearance…….” 
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6.2.2   Planning Schedule 
 
The engineer was asked to take key events from the master schedule and create a plan 
recording the sequence of events. This was the beginning a cross functional map 
which shows how the organisation’s major work processes cut across several 
functions (Figure: 6.2).  
 
 
 
Figure: 6.2 Planning Schedule – B32A Suspension 
 
6.2.3  Flow Chart 
 
The engineer was also asked to make a flow chart (Figure 6.2.1) and to highlight what 
resources were needed to do the job (reference material, CAD files, NEMS, Drawings 
etc.). Flowcharts are perhaps the best-known tool for illustrating work processes. 
They have been used for a long time in industry to define the job or to develop 
procedures for accomplishing a specific job responsibility.  
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Figure 6.3: Flowchart to Calculate Posture. 
 
6.2.4   Learning Points 
 
Key learning points were recorded and bullet points outlining their significance were 
captured on preformatted tables (Table 6.1.2). It was accepted that the language used 
would be that of experts and specific to learning domains (i.e. Suspension). The 
learning points were meant as prompts for discussion and it was expected that anyone 
using the charts would have a fundamental understanding of Nissan design and 
development standards. 
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Table 6.2: Extract Learning Points Suspension 
 
Explanation of item 1: Posture setting refers to the way the vehicle is positioned 
relative to the ground and key to this is defining the wheel centres at the design stage. 
Explanation of item 2: To ensure the engineer understands suspension design he or 
she needs have an in depth knowledge of the design and function of the components 
which make up the ride and handling system. 
Explanation of item 3: Engineers need to be aware of the differences between Renault 
and Nissan layout and parts specification to maximise opportunities for parts 
rationalisation.   
 
6.2.5   Social Networks 
 
Taking on board the comments of previous joint development team engineers, who 
said it took them at least six months to establish the necessary networks to allow them 
him to function in their roles at NTC,  the B32A team were asked to record who they 
spoke to and why, and who spoke to them, and the reason for the communication. 
Social networks are essential for the transmission and creation of knowledge (Van 
Wijk et al., 2003). The aim was not only to map social networks of the joint 
development team but also the reason for the interaction in order to classify that 
knowledge into the know-what, know-how, know-when, know-where, know-who, and 
know-why components (Garud, 1997) of vehicle design and development (See Table 
6.3).  
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Table 6.3: Extract Social Network Platform Engineer 
 
6.2.6  Supporting Information 
 
The engineers were asked to list key information and the source of the information 
that they needed to do their job. Cross and Prusak (2003) report that many 
organisations find it difficult to access available information and knowledge, these 
inefficiencies are due the incompleteness of information, the asymmetry of knowledge 
and the localness of knowledge. Incompleteness of information is described as when a 
firm does not know where to find their own knowledge. Asymmetry of knowledge is 
where; in one department there is abundant subject knowledge that would be useful to 
other departments had they known about it or had access to it. Localness of 
knowledge is a knowledge of the market actors (Who has the power? Who makes 
decisions?), knowledge of the market price systems and knowledge of the market 
signals (Table 6.4)  
 
Item  Content Location 
KD1-26111 Nissan Engineering Manuel: Front Lamps NTC Standards Support database 
KD1-26001 Nissan Engineering Manual: Lamp Calendar NTC Standards Support database 
26010 NDS00 Nissan Design Standard: Headlamps NTC Standards Support database 
ECE 1&2 Headlamps NTC Homologation Group shared drive 
ECE 8 Halogen Headlamps NTC Homologation Group shared drive 
Table 6.4: Extract Table of Supporting Information Headlamp 
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6.2.7  Personal Profile (Expert Finder) 
 
The final request was that the engineers completed a personal profile (Figure 6.4), 
Only the area in grey of the Table was mandatory. People and organisations acquire 
information through social networks, and a portion of this information becomes 
knowledge. Whereas, Nelson and Winter (1982) propose that the knowledge of any 
firm lies primarily in its routines, Cross and Prusak (2003) believe it also lies in a 
dynamic web of relationships that underpin the organisation and that it does not 
simply flow through the organisation but is bartered, blocked, exchanged, and 
modified by the people who hold the knowledge. The author proposed to make the 
profile available on the company intranet and put people in touch with each other by 
first breaking down barriers of recognition (Figure 6.4).  
 
 
 Ext. Tel. No:. 01234 755642 
Int. Tel. No.: 5642 
Fax: 01234 755799 
E-mail: Dave.Holloway@ntc-europe.co.uk 
  
Department: DK0 
Group: Chassis Design 
Section: DKG 
Sub Section: DG5 
Location: !st Floor North, Cranfield 
Line Manager: Terry Owen 
Photo 
  
  
Current Job Role:  Responsibilities: 
Mar 03: DKG PNCAP (Handling) Co-ordinator ;  DKG Ride & 
Handling Performance Planning Co-ordinator 
 R & H co-ordination for new models. PNCAP 
(Handling) strategy  
 
Previous Nissan Experience: Skills: 
June 02 > Feb 03: STA in Japan (B32A Platform liaison) 
June 99 > May 02: Senior Engineer , Suspension Design & 
Test 
June 98 >May 99: Senior Engineer, Drivetrain Design & Test 
Jan 93 > May 98: Engineer, Drivetrain Design & Test 
Sept 90 > Dec 92: Graduate Engineer, Chassis Design 
Project Management skills 
Man Management & Interpersonal skills 
Suspension & Drivetrain Design & Test 
knowledge 
Other Relevant Experience: Hobbies & Interests: 
Sept 86 > June 90 Loughborough University; B.Tech (Hons)  
Automotive Engineering & Design 
Member of Lotus Cars Owners Club  
Scuba Diving  
Cookery 
Music & Films 
 
   
Last Update: 4/3/2003 
Figure 6.4: Example of Personal Profile 
 
The tool could also be used to put people in touch with experts but at the time of 
writing there was no definition or agreement as to what was meant by expert. This 
problem was not unique to NTCE as one NTC General Manager explained. 
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“Who is the expert? It is very difficult to decide. Before this job I worked for many 
years in the engine department I would say I was an expert in this area but maybe 
people who work there now there would not agree. We have had many discussions in 
NTC about this. Some people say he is an expert but others do not agree.” NTC 
General Manager 
 
6.3   Joint Development Teams 
 
Joint development engineers said that working in NTC was “tough” and much was 
expected of them in terms of commitment and performance. They described it as a 
high pressure work environment where the pace of work was frantic. They were 
expected to work long hours and had to balance cost and quality targets, shortened 
delivery times and learn how to use new systems, tools and processes. The onus was 
on them to deliver and there was no formal knowledge capture or sharing. (Figure 
6.5).  
 
A previous Joint Development Team Engineer explained: 
 
“I felt I was thrown in at the deep end. I didn’t know what it was I was supposed to be 
doing or who to ask. I didn’t even know what questions it was I was supposed to be 
asking and I was overloaded with information. I didn’t know what to do with it. It was 
a night mare!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Pressures on the Joint Development Team Engineer 
     Master Schedule
- - -
Kick Off
                      NO KNOWLEDGE CAPTURE 
Cost Down 
Quality Up 
New Tools
  New Processes 
   New Targets 
Case III
  
FUTURE
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The complaint of information overload is commonly heard in business but Nonaka 
(1994) makes the point that information is not the same as knowledge   
 
 
“information” and “knowledge” are used interchangeably, there is a clear distinction 
between information and knowledge  … information is a flow of messages, while 
knowledge is created and organised by the very flow of information, anchored on the 
commitment and beliefs of its holder.” (Nonaka, 1994:15) 
 
Other writers have made similar distinctions. Armbrecht et al. (2001:21) define 
knowledge as “that which is within and between the minds of individuals, and is 
tacitly possessed” whereas information, according to Davenport and Prusak (1998), is 
knowledge that makes a difference. Craig (2000) makes another distinction, he argues 
that although information is a source of knowledge, it is outside of our control and 
adds other sources of information are observation, experience and feelings. The first 
step in managing knowledge and making the necessary strategies is to understand and 
manage the information on which to build knowledge and this is the basis for the 
author’s knowledge management strategy. 
   
6.4   The Formation of the Strategy 
 
The author’s framework for a NTCE Knowledge Management Strategy includes 
categories for knowledge creation, knowledge storage and retrieval, knowledge 
transfer and one for audit and is shown in Table 6.5. The following sections describe 
the formation and the philosophies underpinning the strategy. The author believes the 
key to organisational learning and knowledge capture within Nissan are the master 
schedules (Chapter 5: 110). These schedules are the gateways or framework to help 
the company mine for the information it needs. The author’s proposed strategy was to 
build around the master schedules, capturing the processes and the knowledge and 
thereby creating the necessary human and non human infrastructures to retain and 
build on the knowledge base. The master schedule shows how the major functions of 
the business interact with one another in the form of processes. It allows boundaries to 
be drawn around what needs to be done, when and in what order and also what needs 
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to be known at that point in time. Being able to access information quickly is an 
essential skill in any business.  
 
Drucker (1999) argues that management of knowledge has to encompass and improve 
business processes. These processes can be codified and articulated as business 
practices or they can be the less understood processes of how human beings relate to 
each other in organisations. From a social constructivist point of view, these processes 
are conduits of business practice and traditions. Continually reflecting on process is 
the way we generate meaning together. The organisation must continually reconstruct 
their nature in order to keep them alive and remain sensible in the face of rapid global 
change. Tiwana (2002) differentiates between internal and external organisational 
memory. Internal memory is the knowledge held by individuals or groups of 
individuals within an organisation and includes organisational culture. External 
memory is explicit, codified knowledge found in organisational policies, procedures, 
manuals and computer files. Walsh and Ungeson’s (1991) model of organisational 
memory also deals with non-human repositories such as systems, structures, rules, and 
routines. Whereas, Schein (1998) focuses on human beings as repositories for 
knowledge and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) look at the role individuals play in 
converting tacit to explicit knowledge in creating organisational knowledge.  
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System/ Part Reviewed 
Knowledge: The how, why, what, who, where and when of vehicle design and Development 
Knowledge Audit Knowledge Creation Knowledge storage and 
retrieval 
Knowledge Transfer Knowledge 
Application 
An assessment of what 
knowledge is needed, available, 
missing, applied and contained 
within the company 
The development of ‘new knowledge’. 
At the individual level, knowledge is 
created through cognitive processes 
such as reflection and learning. Social 
Systems generate knowledge through 
collaborative interactions and joint 
problem solving. 
The development of organisational 
memory (i.e. stocks of organisational 
knowledge) and the means for 
accessing its content. 
The transmission of knowledge from 
the initial location to where it is 
needed and applied. 
The use of 
knowledge for 
decision 
making and 
problem 
solving by 
individuals and 
groups in 
organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
People to 
People 
 
- Learning 
History 
- Capture of 
knowledge 
from 
e-mails 
-key circle workshop 
- supplier expertise 
-Teamroom Discussions 
- Recurrence prevention Seminars 
- Key process teams 
- Developing technical expertise 
- Knowledge Circle Homepage 
- Department Homepage 
- Com timing schedule 
-Generic Technical Schedule 
- Knowledge Circle Workshops 
- Teamroom discussions 
-Recurrence prevention Seminars 
- New starter introductions 
- Skills matrices 
- Objectives 
 
 
- On-the-job 
Training 
 
Description 
of IT 
requirement 
- E-learning systems- computerised 
systems in which the learner interacts 
with the learning material 
- Collaboration Support Systems- 
- Data Warehouses- centralised 
repositories 
- Data mining capability- looking for 
patterns/anomalies etc. 
- Communication support systems for 
the exchange of messages 
- Transmitting codified info between, 
repositories and individuals 
- Expert 
systems- rule 
based systems 
& case based 
systems. 
- Decision 
support 
systems. 
 Existing 
NTCE 
Software 
- CAD systems- IDEAS, Alpha TDM, 
Links, Space vision, data, Visual 
Basic. etc 
- Operating Systems- windows, 
servers 
-  Bespoke Systems- ANEMS, NEBS, 
D-NET etc. 
- Database- MS access 
- Concern Management Tools- NTI, 
CUS, DPRS, ETPR 
Supplier Management systems- NETS 
- Test, DCS, 
CADICS-M 
- Company 
intranet 
Finance- 
TIMES etc 
External 
Software 
 - Goldfire - e-RM  
 
People to 
Tools 
 
 
 
Equipment - Videoconferencing,  electronic 
whiteboard 
   
Externalisation- Tacit to Tacit Combination- Explicit to Explicit Combination- Explicit to Explicit Internalisation- 
Explicit to tacit 
Knowledge 
Conversion             
Socialisation- Tacit to Tacit 
 
Table 6.5: The Knowledge Strategy Framework 
 
Reviewed for Generic 
content 
Identification of Processes 
to be reviewed 
People to Processes 
Added to Generic 
Schedules 
DMDR’s 
Concept sheets 
Key Process 
Audits 
E11A 
W32L 
Technical 
Audits 
JDT Audits 
Supplier 
Relationship 
Audits 
Archive Audit 
Knowledge capture 
Monthly Reports- 
individual Learning 
points 
Benchmarking 
Henley KM forum 
KM pro  
SNA  
E- learning 
Knowledge 
Circles 
Supplier 
Networks 
Development of timing 
schedule 
Development of 
technical schedule 
Development 
procedures portal 
page 
KC Homepages, 
Project Pages, 
Department Pages.  
Procedure Developed
Generic Technical 
Schedule 
Add to 
Training 
Requirements 
and New 
starter Pack 
etc.  
Planning 
checklist 
Recurrence 
prevention 
Knowledge Circles 
 
Issue/ 
Imple
ment 
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The proposed strategy is shown pictorially in Figure 6.6 with feedback loops into the 
next project and will be discussed under three headings:  
 
• People to Process 
• People to People 
• People to Tools 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The Strategy Formation 
 
6.5   People to Process 
 
Nissan, as already explained builds its business around processes. NTC are 
responsible for global technical processes, and the latest being developed under the 
banner of V3P, (Value Up for People, Process and Tools) are about improving 
company efficiency and effectiveness and comprise of the following: 
• Digital Build: A virtual build based on CAD data. 
• Physical Build:  A build with actual parts 
• Global Bill of Materials (G2B): A list of parts needed to build vehicles 
• Product Data Management (PDM): A system to manage CAD data. 
• Computer Aided Engineering (CAE)/Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
Tools: Computerised systems to aid design. 
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The responsibility for understanding the development of these tools lies with other 
NTCE managers. The author will return to the subject of V3P in Chapter 6: 154, when 
he explains his proposal, from a Knowledge Management perspective, for the 
strategic implementation of the tools to raise the capability of the company. To 
understand the key design and development processes used by engineers the author 
held a small workshop and made an interrelationship map. An inter-relationship map 
shows the big picture of how the major functions or business processes interact with 
one another (Figure 6.7). The number of feedback loops emphasise the importance of 
the key processes and were identified as: 
  
• Nissan standards 
• Planning drawing 
• Design reviews (including DMDR – Digital Mock Up Design Reviews) 
 
These have already been introduced in Chapter Five and central to the whole process 
is the Planning Drawing. The author developed a model and proposed a systematic 
knowledge capture and learning tool for a Planning Drawing Design Contextual Map 
Figure 6.8) which are explained in the next section 
 
                        
Figure 6.7:  Design and Development Interrelationship Map 
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6.5.1    Planning Drawing Design Contextual Maps 
 
The model was built on the premise that the planning drawing was a process with a 
series of inputs and outputs. The word “context” is key because the information and 
knowledge is in the context of today’s design. It is a customer–centred model, 
optimising work processes and managing the interpersonal dimension of design and 
development in a cross functional team by clearly stating objectives and deliverables 
and in the process, discovering design implications. Contextual Design externalise 
good design practice for a team (Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1988). On average a Planning 
Drawing has in excess of forty input groups, ranging from manufacturing 
requirements to media reports and often the inputs and outputs of a planning drawing 
are interrelated. Each input group comprises of numerous other inputs. The author 
proposed  to make a tool which was a “one stop shop” for the inputs and outputs and 
also to store the technical justification needed to understand the job (Table 6.6)   It is a 
tool for capturing the “Know Why” of design and supplements the V3P CAD “Know 
How” as being developed by the Nissan Technical Centre, Japan (Chapter 1: 8). The 
technical justification was captured by asking and codifying the answers to the “5 
Whys,” a technique used by Nissan engineers in their daily business to deepen their 
understanding of any particular problem..  
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Following are examples of showing how the tool was populated by members from the 
vehicle safety section for their planning drawing for a passenger airbag.    
 
Figure 6.8: The Basic Concept of a Planning Drawing Design Contextual Map 
 
6.5.2  Input/ Output Model   
 
This entry shows an input to Planning Drawing for the Passenger Airbag from the 
trim section (DKT). Vehicle safety needs to understand the material of the cockpit 
module as part of their calculation for the reaction forces on the occupant. It shows 
when the information is required and the expected format for that information. 
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Process 
Who 
Provides? 
What type of 
information? 
Why 
needed? 
When 
required? 
(Phase 0, 
1 or 2) 
Format Process How 
Long 
(weeks) 
Who 
Does 
Tool 
 DKT 
(Trim 
Section) 
Cockpit Surface 
Material 
Properties 
To 
calculate 
reaction 
force on 
occupant 
Phase 1 Email Simulation  Supplier MADYMO 
Table 6.6: Input Output Model 
 
6.5.3  Planning Drawing Matrix 
 
 The matrix shows other NTCE sections and the names of the seniors of those sections 
who are impacted by the Planning Drawing for the Passenger Airbag. The tool would 
be so designed that these seniors would be notified of any change to the Planning 
Drawing for the Passenger Airbag that might affect their work. Problems arise when 
changes to Planning Drawings are not communicated between sections.  
 
Planning Drawing Name  Section/Senior Engineer 
Passenger Airbag DA6             DR5         DR6 
J. Jones     A. Abe     S. Wall 
 
6.5.4  Technical Justification: The 5 Whys? 
 
Phase Two is the methodology to unearth the “Design Whys” Encouraging the 
engineer to question the importance of the information he needs and justifying his 
design in technical terms. The line example below shows why the Hip Reference 
Point is important in occupant protection. Each question opens up to a deeper level 
and understanding of knowledge. 
 
Outputs/Customers 
Which  
section 
uses? 
Why needed by 
section? 
When 
required 
Where 
needed 
What type of 
information? 
How received? 
DKT 
(Trim 
Section) 
To inform the 
CPM supplier 
what surface is 
required 
Concept 
Sheet 1 
NTCE   Email/Report 
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Table 6.7: The 5 Why Technical Justification for the Hip Point 
 
6.5.5 Technical Data Supporting the Justification 
 
The 5 Whys are linked to technical data which supports the justification. In this 
instance it shows how the restraint system has been optimised to meet its performance 
target. 
 
6.5.6 The Planning Drawing Design Contextual Map as a Learning Tool 
 
The author proposed that  the Design Contextual Mapping tool was owned and 
continually updated by the Subject Matter Expert who was to use it as a learning tool 
for both him and herself and also in    discussions with engineers. It was built using 
Kolb and Fry’s (1975) work on Learning Circles,  
• Observation and Reflection 
• Forming Abstract Thought 
• Test in New Conditions 
• Concrete Experience.  
 
Kolb and Fry (1975) argue that the learning circle can begin at any one of the four 
points and that it should be approached as a continuous spiral (See Figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.9: Using the Planning Drawing Design Contextual Maps as a Learning 
Tool. 
 
6.6   People to People 
 
The second part of the strategy was the creation of Knowledge Circles Designed to 
put people in touch with each other. Knowledge Circle was the name the author chose 
to re-brand and launch communities of practice at NTCE. It was another instance of 
having to use the language games of the company to sell the idea of knowledge 
management and promote change. The author had used the term “communities of 
practice” with colleagues in some early discussions and it was met with blank 
expressions. It was not easily recognisable and in danger of being dismissed as “more 
theoretical mumbo jumbo” so rather than instantly de-railing the initiative the author 
decided to capitalise on Nissan’s use of “Quality Circles” and promote the business of 
creating and sharing knowledge through Knowledge Circles. He also stressed that 
other auto makers already had communities: FIAT emphasises learning through 
communities; Daimler Chrysler has Tech Clubs and Renault have Club Metiers in 
operation at all of their manufacturing plants. The author used “benchmarks” knowing 
that in the past, the Directors had used similar tactics to justify their own arguments. 
Drew (1996) rates bench-marking as a core knowledge management activity in 
 
 
Concrete 
Experience
Observation
& 
Reflection 
Forming 
Abstract 
Thought 
Test in 
New 
Conditions
Subject Matter 
Expert 
Engineer 
Global 
Technical Review
Learning Circle 
- Kolb and Fry 
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enhancing organisational efficiency equal in importance to processes for knowledge 
capture, creation and distribution.   
 
The argument the author used when making his proposal for Knowledge Circles, or 
Communities of Practice to NTCE Directors was that where there is practice there is 
always community. Communities consider new ways of meeting their objectives by 
building on what is known and can be viewed as learning how to learn 
organisationally. Communities of Practice deal with critical work issues, have clear 
project deliverables, and comprise of people who learn on the job (Brown and 
Duguid, 1991). The premise was that Knowledge Circles would connect people, they 
would be cross functional, provide a forum for discussion and learning, enhance 
capability, improve performance and lead to creativity and product innovation. The 
framework for the circle was the previously mentioned Generic Master Schedule and 
Knowledge Capture Pack.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: The Knowledge Circle 
There was another, perhaps more contentious side to this argument that was not 
discussed at the Directors Meeting. For the organisation to learn and be innovative it 
needs to fuse existing and new knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992). The author has 
     Master Schedule
- - -
Kick Off 
 Capture Knowledge 
 Enhanced Capability
   Cross Functional 
Sharing Best Practice 
Sharing Information 
  Greater Knowledge 
  Improved Performance
  Improved Bottom Line 
          Knowledge Repositories 
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already explained the importance the Japanese place on social networks and 
relationships and he has written about the underground NEMs and explained that if 
NTCE is to learn from NTC it needs to be part of these networks. The author’s intent 
was to get the company to accept Knowledge Circles as a learning tool and thus ease 
the way for engineers to enter discussions with each other. Vygotsky (1978) and 
Leontiev (1978) formulated the theories relating to higher mental functions which 
gave rise to the social and constructive nature of knowledge. Learning is situated and 
contextual (Brown et al., 1989), knowledge is about learning on the job and is a 
coordinated and shared understanding between people. Knowledge is socially 
constructed through collaborative efforts or by debating different and sometimes 
opposing perspectives. Knowledge cannot be passed like an object or divided into 
physical pieces rather it is created by individuals through cognitive processes such as 
reflection and learning, or in groups, through collaboration and joint problem solving 
(Alavi, 2000).  
 
Nonaka and Konno (1998) used the concept of ‘ba’ to explain how knowledge is 
created in organisations. Knowledge Circles were intended to be frameworks for ‘ba,’ 
which is described as a shared space for emerging relationships where the knowledge 
of either the individual or collective is enhanced. Nonaka and Konno (1998) further 
describe this space as being originating ba, interacting ba, cyber ba or exercising ba. 
Originating ba, is where people share feelings, emotions and experiences and tacit 
knowledge is made explicit. Interacting ba, is where people integrate the way they 
think through discussion and use a common language to describe their ideas which 
facilitates the translation of tacit into explicit knowledge. Cyber ba is where people 
exchange and disseminate their ideas with others facilitating the synthesis of explicit 
knowledge across the organisation. Exercising ba, is where people learn by 
continuously reflecting on the shared language and ideas, facilitating the conversion 
of explicit into the organisation’s tacit knowledge. 
 
The Generic Master Schedules and Knowledge Capture Packs focus on individual and 
explicit knowledge and posits that knowledge is easily represented through symbols 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) and can be delivered as bespoke packages.  
At this level, learning is considered an explicit, conscious process resulting in a 
change in either knowledge or behaviour but organisational learning is often a subtle 
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change of meaning. Knowledge is “what we know” whereas meaning involves the 
interpretation of knowledge, “what it means to us” and involves construing 
relationships between or among given pieces of knowledge and other pieces of 
knowledge. Semantic Organisational Learning relates to meaning, not only of words 
but also of symbols and actions and involves a change in how the community 
understands itself. It is not necessary for this change to be articulated because learning 
and meaning often exists in the collective interactions of the community. Semantic 
learning is the collectively shared sense of what specific knowledge means to the 
community. This learning is so subtle that it is not even labelled as such until 
retrospective sense making occurs or until external feedback raises their awareness of 
the change. Once it is brought to the collective’s attention, it can officially be labelled 
“learning” by those involved (Corley and Gioia, 2003) and become explicit in their 
actions and future meaning-making efforts. 
 
The author was also aware that learning is sometimes compromised by perceptions of 
individual and organisational identities and challenging these identities can be 
threatening because often, our self perception is different to how others see us (Corley 
et al, 2000). Weick and Ashford (2001: 711) suggest that “individuals learning about 
their own performance or that of their organization often make trade-offs between the 
desire for accurate information and the desire to defend the ego.” The premise is that 
in building relationships these identities are enhanced rather than threatened and that 
learning is facilitated within the Knowledge Circle. Knowledge Circles are about 
primarily about learning and are different to teams although the author accepts there is 
a great deal of learning within teamwork. The author makes the distinction between 
Knowledge Circles and teams because Nissan provides itself on teamwork and often 
learning is not part of the team agenda. Knowledge Circes are driven by values 
whereas teams are driven by deliverables (Nickols, 2000). Table 6.8 summarises the 
key differences. 
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Table 6.8: The Key Differences Between Knowledge Circles and Teams   
 
6.7   Knowledge Circle Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The author proposed a raft of roles and responsibilities for the Knowledge Circle,  
suggested by Nickols, (2000) as being necessary in making a Community of Practice 
or Knowledge Circle work and asked the various groups for volunteers. Nickols 
emphasises the importance of nominating facilitators whose responsibility is to 
encourage, interpret and evaluate participation in cross community electronic forums. 
(Table 6.9) 
Knowledge Circles/Communities of Practice Teams 
Driven by Value: 
•  Shared interest or practice 
•  Value discovered / evolves 
•  Value in ongoing process 
Driven by deliverables: 
•  Shared goals and results 
•  Value defined by charter 
•  Value in results delivered 
Defined by Knowledge: 
•  Interdependent Knowledge 
•  Permeable boundaries 
Defined by task: 
•  Interdependent tasks 
•  Clear boundaries  
Develops organically: 
•  Variable contributions 
•  Managed by making connections 
Develops through a work plan: 
•  Everyone contributes 
•  Managed objectives through objectives 
and work plan 
Bound by  identities: 
•  Reciprocal contributions 
•  Based on trust 
•  Core group / coordinator 
Bound by commitment: 
•  Joint accountability 
•  Based on explicit agreement 
•  Team leader or manager 
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Role Description Responsibilities 
Sponsor 
The Sponsor is the link between 
the Knowledge Circle and the 
formal organisation. They promote 
the value of KC’ s across the 
company, encouraging KC growth 
and commitment of resources 
 Builds support for the KC among Senior 
Management 
 Coordinates allocation of resources 
 Removes barriers and obstacles to the KC 
Champion 
The Champion sets the strategy for 
KC’s. He gives direction to and 
provides guidance to the KC 
 Stimulates interest in KC’s 
 Works with KC leader to track progress of 
the KC 
 Obtains official support when necessary 
 Communicates the contributions of the KC 
to senior management and wider company 
 Communicates company support to KC 
Members 
KC Leader 
The KC leader is an active member 
of the Knowledge Circle and is the 
acknowledged leader. He is a 
subject matter expert on the topics 
for discussion in the KC. 
 
N.B. Leadership in a KC can shift 
as the issues and concerns of the 
KC shift 
 Interfaces with sponsor 
 Promotes best practice within the KC 
 Provides leadership in resolving problems 
with and in the KC 
 Evaluates KC performance 
 Is alert for potential KC changes – new 
members, topics for discussion etc. 
Coordinator 
The Coordinator ensures the 
administrative workload for a 
community is taken care of 
 Plans and schedules KC activities 
 Arranges for equipment / facilities 
Facilitator 
A Facilitator ensures circle 
meetings are productive for all 
members by acting as a 
independent KC expert 
 Provides expertise about group dynamics 
and techniques to help the KC solve 
problems and evolve over time 
 Ensures dissenting points are heard and 
understood 
 Keeps discussions to topic 
 Reconciles opposing points of view 
Member 
The Members are the people who 
populate the KC. Membership is 
voluntary, the members are self-
organising and participate because 
they get value from their 
participation 
 To share knowledge and experiences 
 Participates in meetings and team room 
discussions 
 Acts as a subject matter expert 
 Raises ideas and concerns regarding the KC 
 Is on the lookout for ways to enhance KC 
effectiveness e.g. new members, practices 
etc. 
 Creates and updates the knowledge 
repository 
Table 6.9: Knowledge Circle Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The proposal was met with a level of scepticism by engineers involved in one of the 
launch meetings for Knowledge Circles. 
 
 
 
John Temple                                                                                                    
 
167
British Senior Engineer  
 
“Posh concept for something that should be happening already. People talking to 
each other! I’m wary of another initiative. Like the idea of a chat room for different 
groups, ‘normal’ language should be used. 
 
British Engineer 
 
“People could view these descriptions of the roles and responsibilities as 
management speak and it will turn them off!” 
 
6.8  People to Tools 
 
The third part of the strategy was to use information technology and create an infra-
structure to guide people directly to the tools that they need to do their jobs. Tools, in 
this instance refer to the processes – global and sectional – and the codified 
knowledge documented by the company.  Alavi and Tiwana (2003) report that in the 
majority of organisations codified knowledge is fragmented in many databases and 
NTCE is no exception. There are two types of Information Communication 
Technologies: integrative and interactive applications (Hayes and Walsham, 2003).  
 
Integrative applications are structured databases that allow employees to store and 
retrieve project information. Knowledge repositories are a technical solution to the 
storage and retrieval of codified knowledge and provide a unified access point to 
content from various data sources. Knowledge Management is sometimes thought of 
as data mining. Data warehouses are used to convert large volumes of raw data into 
manageable chunks of interlinked information and it is assumed that valuable 
information is embedded in the data. Data mining is defined as the process of 
automatically searching for unknown correlations in the data by looking for 
interesting patterns anomalies and clusters (Alavi and Tiwana, 2003).  
 
The author proposed to use technology to rationalise, systematise and connect these 
databases and develop a readily accessible system for the storage, retrieval and 
transfer of information which will act as an organisational memory for stocks of 
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organisational knowledge).  The knowledge stock model refers to knowledge that can 
be codified and made available in repositories. Expert systems are built on rules 
derived from the process of codifying valuable knowledge. The rules are used by 
others who lack the necessary expertise thus reducing the overhead of routine 
reapplication of that knowledge. It also allows the experts to concentrate on other 
activities which are difficult to automate (Tiwana, 2002). The technology was also to 
be used to aid collaboration and knowledge creation by supporting learning and 
collaborative interactions. The proposal was to use the existing NTCE portal as a 
gateway to knowledge with a series of windows: 
 
• Departmental Homepage  (Figure 6.11) 
• General Affairs Homepage (Figure 6.12)  
• Knowledge  Circle Homepage (Figure 6.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Image of Departmental Homepage 
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Figure 6.12: Image of General Affairs Homepage 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Image of Knowledge  Circle Homepage 
 
The second information Communication Technologies is interactive applications 
(Hayes and Walsham, 2003). Interactive applications are discussion forums allowing 
individuals to share experiences regardless of physical location. Video Conferencing, 
Voice Over The Internet – Video Conference. Web cams. Modem etc. The author was 
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aware of these technologies and gave no serious consideration for them at the time of 
writing because he placed the emphasis on creating the necessary infrastructure for 
the aforementioned storage, retrieval and transfer of information 
  
6.9  Audit 
 
The fourth part of the strategy was to introduce and emphasis the use of knowledge 
audits within NTCE. The rationale was that the audit and the audit results would give 
the case for knowledge management credence and win support of the management 
team. 
 
Tiwana (2002) claims knowledge audits are used to report on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the company and are also useful when making knowledge management 
strategies, designing knowledge manage systems and leveraging existing knowledge. 
Teece (1998) advises knowledge management audits also focus on intangible assets, 
including rituals, processes, structure, communities and people.  
The goal is to invest in areas with the most potential for future strategic advantage. 
NTCE audits are proposed to be formal, systematic reviews of the efficiency, 
effectiveness and reliability of written standards and systems against explicit criteria.  
The results of an audit can be used to improve quality and efficiency within the 
business. They are a catalyst to ensure that current practice meets the expected level 
of performance and, where this is not the case to recommend countermeasures. The 
objectives of NTCE Knowledge Audits are: 
 
• Monitor the effectiveness and implementation of written standards and 
systems 
• Identify where new written standards and systems may be required 
• Identify significant trends or deficiencies 
• Identify opportunities for training 
• Identify best practices in written standards and systems implementation 
• Investigate known or suspected areas of weakness or omissions in written 
standards and systems 
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• Recommend ways in which written standards and systems or their 
implementation can be improved 
 
6.9.1   Proposed Audits 
 
The author suggested a three pronged audit strategy to gather knowledge. The strategy 
comprised of a Preparation Audit, Knowledge Capture Audit and a Skills Audit. See 
Figure 6.14: Audit Strategy Proposal. 
 
Preparation Audit: The proposal was to use the project schedule and raise potential 
concerns or risks to the programme that might occur over the next six months. These 
concerns would then be categorised into Organisational, Departmental, Sectional or 
Individual groups and then themed for prioritisation and management of key 
concerns. 
 
Knowledge Capture Audit: It was proposed to standardise the format of the monthly 
report and make completion of the report mandatory across the company. These 
reports would record what needed to happen when in the project and why, and would 
be used as a base line for the next project. The reports would be stored on line and 
linked to relevant files, minutes and development reports. Case studies would be made 
of the major concerns and used to enhance learning. 
  
Skills Audit: The third audit procedure was to create a skills matrix for each engineer 
showing the necessary technical, processual and core skills needed for the job. These 
matrices would be owned by the engineers and reviewed every six months with the 
manager. In taking ownership, the engineers accept and become responsible for their 
own training and development rather than be reliant on the company. 
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Figure 6.14: The Audit Strategy Proposal 
  
Unfortunately, the author was unable to finder a backer for the proposal and the 
Assistant Chief Vehicle Engineer of the project for which it was designed was 
dismissive. It was seen as extra and necessary work probably because of the pressure 
the team was under to deliver. 
 
 “These guys have enough to do without filling in even more forms. They are up to 
their necks in it! Sure, I understand what you’re trying to do by capturing and sharing 
knowledge. It makes sense to learn from experience but we haven’t the time. I’ll agree 
to have a review meeting at the end of the projects we can discuss what we’ve learnt 
but nothing else. OK?”  Assistant Chief Vehicle Engineer 
 
6.10 Knowledge Management Metrics 
 
Given the importance NTCE puts on metrics and “bottom-line thinking” (Chapter 5: 
102) the author also proposed to use knowledge management performance measures 
to gain management support and help them manage the business. 
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“Knowledge Management initiatives should continually gauge their progress in 
achieving their objectives to ensure success. Given the complex and dynamic nature 
of modern organisations, Knowledge Management as well as all other organisational 
initiatives cannot guarantee that plans and strategies will succeed. However, well 
designed performance measures will yield insight to help managers understand and 
adapt their organisations.” (The Department of Navy, 2001) 
 
The metrics were chosen to: 
 
• Justify the initiative. 
• Monitor progress and provide feedback 
• Provide targets 
• Measure, retrospectively the return on investment   
• Develop future benchmarks  
• Aid learning from lessons learned 
 
The author also proposed to use a set of metrics for the Knowledge Circles based on 
work by The Department of Navy (August, 2001). 
Activity   Metrics 
Knowledge Sharing Ranking among top contributing units for the last time period 
Number of resources contributed per person per time period 
Number of times resources were accessed 
Raising Quality Percentage of firm’s knowledge codified on Portal 
Percentage of information needed that employees can find on Portal 
Percentage of information that is less than one year old 
Percentage of material that is older than one year that has been revalidated 
Use of Portal 
 
Resources most often downloaded or accessed 
Total number of unique users per time period 
Total number of unique contributors per time period 
Knowledge Efficiency 
 
Time saved in product development / regulatory process 
Time to implement a best practice 
 
Table 6.10: Knowledge Circle Metrics 
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6.11  Presentation to NTCE Directors 
 
The author presented his strategy for Knowledge Circles to NTCE Directors in March 
2003.  This is a summary of their comments: 
  
• Excellent bottom up approach to share learning 
• Great tool to improve technical quality. 
• Directors to decide strategy for B32A and decide which Circles should be 
wide and thin and which should be deep and narrow. 
• Knowledge Circles should be self-sustaining. 
• Objectives should be rewritten to include Knowledge Circle Objectives 
• Knowledge Circles are a summary of each person’s learning. 
• True bottom up approach staff have to be willing to share learning.   
• Company to consider how to reward and recognise the importance of 
Knowledge Circles 
 
The Directors gave permission to pilot three Knowledge Circles with the committed 
resource. 
 
Activity Resources 
3 pilot Knowledge Circles in 2003: 
    Project Management Department 
    Cockpit Module Section 
 Noise Vibration and Handling Performance  Section 
 
1 half day meeting per month for 
each Knowledge Circle 
     X61B (Codename for new Pathfinder) Knowledge Capture  
  
10 hours per person over 2 
months 
Knowledge Circle  Infrastructure 
    Knowledge Circle  Homepages (short term c/m) 
    Collaboration areas (‘Team rooms’) 
    Develop long term requirements 
 
Joint development by VY1 & 
Knowledge Circle throughout 
2003 
 
Table 6.11: Request for Resource for Knowledge Circles 
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The Directors may have agreed but implementation of the circles was not straight 
forward. They had given a direction but section managers and the engineers 
themselves still had to be convinced. The Assistant Chief Vehicle Engineer for X61B, 
the code name for the recently launched Pathfinder, a Sports Utility Vehicle, did not 
see the need for the knowledge capture pack and instructed his joint development 
team not to use it. The proposal for knowledge circles was also met with a level of 
reluctant cynicism. 
 
“I see what you’re trying to do and it’s quite ambitious. Really they are about 
personal relationships. They’d be hugely beneficial if we could get global knowledge 
circles. It would mean we could keep in contact with our Japanese engineers when 
they return to NTC but we’d have to start with a simple structure.” NTCE British 
Engineer (1) 
 
 “Is this just another initiative? What’s different about this? What’s going to stop it 
failing?” NTCE British Engineer (2) 
 
 “People might want to be involved in Knowledge Circle meetings because it’s the 
right thing to do. You could make a career out of attending Knowledge Circle 
meetings!” NTCE British Engineer (3) 
 
The Manager of Nosie Vibrantion and Handling would not, under any circumstances 
support the idea of knowledge circles. 
 
“We’re too busy to sit around talking all day. Cannot see how having a Knowledge 
Circle would benefit the section. We know what we’re doing. We don’t need this. It’s 
a complete waste of time.”  
 
It also became apparent that company and sectional processes were not in place and 
key events on the master schedule were either, not understood or there was 
disagreement about the activities. Design refused to comply with a request to 
complete proformas outlining the purpose and input and output of each process. 
Towards the end of 2003 work stopped on the Knowledge Circles. Nissan Japan was 
working with IBM to produce an enhanced user focused intranet to improve 
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communication and collaboration called Workforce Integration at Nissan (WIN) 
which would provide the global tools the company needed (Chapter 2: 33). It was said 
that IBM had made a strategy after consulting with all Nissan subsidiaries but this is 
not the case. The man who devised the strategy telephoned the author the day before 
he made his proposal to Nissan Board and said he had only just learned of our work. 
This may sound surprising given that the author had presented his work to his 
knowledge sharing colleagues in NTC on at least three occasions prior to the call but 
this is indicative of the silo organisational culture which exists within NTC. The 
author was talking to colleagues responsible for knowledge sharing and not creation, 
who wee responsible for WIN. Never the less the experience gained from Knowledge 
Circles was put to good use when the author and his section led the first pilot of global 
e-rooms for the introduction of a Global Bill of Materials (G2B) for a new model.  
 
6.12 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter opened the action oriented part of the study and began to determine the 
scope and role of a knowledge manager and the meaning of knowledge management 
within global Nissan. The author explained difficulties he experienced in trying to 
implement his strategy for knowledge creation, storage and retrieval, transfer 
application and audit and his proposed re-design of the company intranet, the use of 
Knowledge Circles and the development of Planning Drawing Design Contextual 
Maps as learning tools. In this chapter, the author has made the following theoretical 
and practical contributions to knowledge. 
 
 6.12.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
• Knowledge management at Nissan is about aligning strategies and developing 
the models, tools and methodologies to improve the competitiveness of the 
company.  
• Knowledge management initiatives need high level sponsorship within Nissan 
if they are to be successfully adopted by the company because people in 
positions of authority have the power to dictate what is learnt and what is 
worth knowing. 
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• Knowledge management initiatives must be of use to people and be seen to 
have practical applications.  
• There is no formal knowledge capture or transfer processes in global Nissan. 
• A suggested first step in managing knowledge and making the necessary 
strategies is to understand and manage the information on which to build 
knowledge. 
• The key to organisational learning and knowledge capture within Nissan are 
the Master Schedules. These schedules are the gateways or frameworks to help 
the company mine for information. 
• Learning is sometimes compromised by perceptions of individual and 
organisational identities and challenging these identities can be threatening 
because often, our self perception is different to how others see us 
 
6.12.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
 
• Understand what the word “practical” actually means in the context of their 
work and who makes the judgement as to practicality to ensure research time 
is not wasted 
• Understand that learning is sometimes compromised by perceptions of 
individual and organisational identities and challenging these identities can 
undermine charge initiatives.  
• Recognise that knowledge management has to encompass and improve 
business processes. These processes can be codified and articulated as 
business practices or they can be the less understood processes of how human 
beings relate to each other in organisations. These processes are conduits of 
business practice and traditions. Continually reflecting on process is the way 
we generate meaning together. The organisation must continually reconstruct 
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their nature in order to keep them alive and remain sensible in the face of rapid 
global change. 
  
The next Chapter describes how the learning of this chanter was utilised to make a 
proposal to Organise Around Knowledge. 
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 Chapter Seven 
 
The Proposal To Organise Around Knowledge  
 
7.0  Introduction 
 
 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter and shows how and why the author 
adapted his strategy and the focus of his research and describes the background and 
philosophical underpinnings of the Organise Around Knowledge Methodology which 
he made to the Directors of NTCE in July 2004. 
  
SECTION THREE: Developing and 
implementing a Strategy to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Six: Putting a face to Knowledge 
Management at NTCE  
Chapter Seven:  The proposal to Organise 
Around Knowledge 
Chapter Eight: Pilot to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Nine: Organise Around Knowledge 
Methodology 
SECTION TWO: 
Understanding the Impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four:  
Organisational Culture and 
the Management of Change 
Chapter Five: The Impact of 
Organisational Culture on 
Knowledge Management and 
Learning at Nissan 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1  A New Strategy 
 
At the beginning of 2004 the author felt deflated; the majority of his knowledge 
management strategies had failed to find sponsors (Table 7.1). The three pronged 
audit strategy to gather knowledge comprising of a Preparation Audit, Knowledge 
Capture Audit and a Skills Audit had been rejected and the strategy to reconfigure the 
existing NTCE Portal and develop a business infrastructure had been made redundant 
by the WIN team working in NTC who were about to launch a global portal and asset 
repository system.  The proposal for Planning Drawing Design Contextual Maps had 
also been dismissed by the Japanese Design Director as impractical with the words: 
 
“It will not work. Do you know how many items (inputs to the planning drawing) there 
are? Thousands.  It would take forever. It cannot be done.” 
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Knowledge Management Strategy Judgement 
Capture Design Key Processes 3 
Knowledge Capture Packs 2 
Planning Drawing Design Contextual Maps 2 
Knowledge Circles 2 
Portal: Business Infrastructure and Asset Repository  2 
Audit strategies ( Preparation/Knowledge Capture/Skills Audit) 2 
Table 7.1:  Status Proposed Knowledge Management Strategies 
 
The lesson about making knowledge management initiatives “practical” had hit home; 
it also had to appear practical. The company was not looking for something that was 
feasibly practical and viable in the long term.  The Directors were not interested in 
knowledge management; neither were they prepared for mammoth change. Easterby-
Smith et al. (2003) made the point that managers tend to be powerful and busy people 
and unlikely to allow research access to their organisations unless they see some 
commercial or personal advantage to be derived from it. People and organisations, 
despite the potential positive outcomes are resistant to change and according to 
Mullins (1999) this appears to be a common phenomenon. People, it seems are 
naturally wary of change and associate it with being out of control. The only changes 
the Directors were willing to accept had to be imposed from NTC or geared to small 
scale efficiencies that reinforced the image that they were in control of the business.  
 
The author decided that rather than continue investing time in wide ranging pilots and 
then trying to convince the Directors of the potential benefits of the initiatives the 
time had come to focus on what the main power brokers in the company wanted. 
NTCE is a modern business and can be viewed as a coalition based political system  
(Cyert and March (1963). The Directors are in positions of power and have what 
Weber (1947) called “rational legal authority,” in that the power bestowed on them, 
because of hierarchical positions gives them the right to order others to do things or 
refuse other people’s requests. 
  
Handy (1993) links positional power with resource power by arguing that if some 
control over resources does not come with the position, the source of this power will 
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be invalid. Management, because of its central role in the distribution of scare 
resources in organisations, is “steeped in politics” and that those promoting learning 
organisations and knowledge management have to take into account power and 
politics (Coopey and Burgoyne, 1999;  Hayes and Walsham, 2003). 
 
 The author chose to use the functional and processual approach for assessing and 
minimising the effects of political ramifications at NTCE (Knights and McCabe). The 
functional approach views politics as an aberration and sees the author working 
closely with the Directors to eradicate what is assumed to be employee irrationality. 
In the processual approach, change processes are seen as being infused with group 
politics which in turn, subvert management’s strategies if not properly managed.  
Both approaches are useful, assuming that those leading the company are not 
themselves, being “irrational” and that their own political actions are not subverting 
organisational strategies. The only remaining strand of the author’s original strategy 
was the capture of key development processes and he had a sponsor, the Assistant 
Chief Vehicle Engineer of the B32A project. The ACVE was a vocal advocate of  
Fast D (Chapter 9: 258)and he still had a stack of original copies of Fast D processes 
clipped together in his desk drawer. 
 
“I use them all of the time,” he said. “Only the other day I was in a meeting with the 
planning group and someone asked how something was done. I showed them one of 
the Fast D processes and said that’s how we used to do it. Not sure how it’s done now 
but again, no-one is. We’ve to get back to basics.” NTCE Assistant Chief Vehicle 
Engineer 
 
The Japanese Managing Director of NTCE also lent his support:  
 
“NTCE is much better at looking at processes and how to manage than NTC. In NTC 
each section manages in its own way. There is no consistency. NTC do not think as 
process in the way NTCE do. They do not see the importance of systemising a process 
and following a process because it is all captured in the minds of the engineers. There 
is no need to write it down but here, we do.” 
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The author proposed to use their support as a catalyst for cultural change, the idea 
being that mapping company processes would highlight what needed to be managed 
and what needed to be learnt. The rules of Fast D, were that strategies could only be 
written on one A3 sheet and the accompanying process flow and the “How To Do” 
(i.e. How to complete a Design Note, How to complete a Specification Tender) on A4 
sheets. The argument was that people were too busy to read unnecessarily detailed 
procedures, besides in a multi national company, was it fair to expect everyone to be 
able to read and understand the complexities of written English?  Keep it simple: 
Anything that needed to be known could be captured on one sheet of paper (Palmer, 
2004). The process flows and “How To Dos” were lauded as best practice and each 
engineer kept a copy of relevant processes in a leather backed NTCE filofax (Figure 
7.1):  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Example of Fast D Process Flow 
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7.2  Four Fields Maps 
 
The author saw how the use of process flows could be improved when he visited one 
of Nissan’s suppliers (for Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning  units) and came 
across “Four Field Maps.” The supplier told the author that they were a TQM tool but 
the earliest reference the author can find is by Dimancescu (1992) who found these 
maps being used at Komatsu, Texas instruments’ semiconductor plant in Kyushu, 
Japan in the late eighties. A four field’s map shows the process at its highest level and 
has links into detailed elements. (Not dissimilar to Business Process Re-engineering 
Maps (Hammer and Champy, 1992)).  The making of the maps stimulate cross 
functional discussion and learning.  Dimancescu argues in his book that it would be 
possible for a company to use this method to develop a portfolio of corporate process 
maps, each one describing process methods, procedures, experiences and relevant 
testing methods and writes: 
  
“Four fields mapping is one of the most elegant and productive techniques used by 
cross function teams. It allows the members to determine in advance not only who does 
what and when, but also the flow of information, or who needs to know what when. 
This collaboration is a critical feature of a cross function process. From the start, it 
forces team members to specify how they will identify and communicate customer 
requirements systematically both across vertical department and suppliers.” 
(Dimancescu, 1992 :100)   
 
A Four Fields Map integrates four information fields (Figure 7.2): 
 
1.   The team members: shown in vertical fields. 
2.   The phases: showing entry and exit points. 
3.   The tasks to be performed. 
4.   The standards used. 
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1. THE TEAM MEMBERS 
2. THE PHASES: 
With entry/exit  
 
criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. STANDARDS 
Listed for  
 
 
 
 each task  
  
Figure 7.2: Basic Layout of a Four Fields Map  
(Adapted from Dimancescu, 1992). 
 
Whereas Fast D had been about capturing processes, the author was interested in 
knowledge and learning and proposed to rename four fields maps as Four Field 
Knowledge Maps. The shift from “Process” to “Knowledge” was an intentional ploy 
to start to influence the culture of the company because using the term “Knowledge 
Maps” centres the activity on people rather than process. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
purport that individuals are conduits for learning and knowledge in a collaborative 
setting and Dickson and Weaver (1997) report that the effect of context can interact 
with individual characteristics to affect learning. Accepting that organisational 
learning is the process through which an organisation constructs or reconstructs 
knowledge (Huysman, 2000) the author proposed to use these maps as frameworks for 
discussion and learning. In mirroring the organisation the maps become a construct 
for institutionalising knowledge. Berger and Luckman (1966) describe three phases or 
moments that can be discerned during the institutionalisation of knowledge: 
externalising, objectifying and internalising.  In the case of the knowledge maps these 
moments occur when the map is initially made and knowledge is codified by the 
A  
 
 
 
   
B  
 
 
C 
  
 
  
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
3. THE TASK FLOW
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experts (externalisation), when the way of working is taken for granted (objectifying) 
and finally when it becomes accepted as organisational knowledge (internalising). 
 
7. 3  Design Key Processes: Design Review 
 
The author had already made an inter-relationship map (Chapter 6: 151) which 
showed design’s key processes how they interrelated and the relative importance of 
each one. The map also confirmed the results of a Fast D audit, made in 1997, which 
asked engineers to rate which of the processes impacted them most. The key 
processes are:  
 
• Planning Drawing 
• Design Reviews 
• Target setting 
• Concept sheets 
• Digital Lots 
 
At the Directors’ request the author and the senior of the knowledge management 
section updated the Fast D procedure and made the associated Four Fields Knowledge 
Maps for the Design Review. Presentations of the process were also made to Design 
Seniors and selected engineers but only 13 people attended from an expected audience 
of 30. The Design Director was so concerned about the quality of design that he 
invited Nissan’s global expert to come from Japan to give a series of lectures about 
the Design Review process at NTCE.  The author invited himself to the lectures and 
requested a meeting with the expert to understand the design review philosophy. Note 
that the author “invited himself to the lectures” and “requested a meeting with the 
expert” even though, it could be argued as logical to have involved knowledge 
management in such an important activity from the start.  
 
The author received telephone calls from the Design Director’s intermediary, who 
was arranging the expert’s visit to the company asking why he wanted the meeting as 
Takahashi san, was on “a very tight schedule.” After some discussion the author’s 
request was granted but he thought the meeting would have only seemed “logical” to 
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the Design Director had he valued the role of knowledge management NTCE. The 
global design expert was very forthcoming and gladly outlined his design review 
philosophy and left Japanese documents explaining the detail. These were translated 
and the procedures and Knowledge Maps updated to reflect the latest position. To 
encourage people to read the procedures key points were translated into Japanese and 
Spanish and the option became apparent in the electronic format when the reader held 
the mouse over highlighted text (Figure 7.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Extract from Design Review Procedure with key points 
translated into Japanese and Spanish 
 
7.4  Design Review: E- Learning Game 
 
To encourage people to learn about Design Reviews the author sanctioned an e-
learning design review game, a first for NTCE. The format was based on the “Who 
Wants to Be a Millionaire” television programme. Information technology can be 
used to facilitate collaborative interactions between people and groups and also to 
support an individual’s learning experience and the knowledge creation process and 
numerous studies have proved e-learning to be effective. (Alavi and Tiwana, 2003). 
E-Learning systems are computerised systems, where the learning is mediated through 
technology and offers distributed learning environments, where learning interactions 
are dispersed over time and, or distance. Two models of distributed learning have 
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been described as synchronous and asynchronous (Alavi and Tiwana, 2003),  The 
synchronous model resembles a classroom in which the instructor and the students are 
located in two or more remote locations. In the asynchronous (or online) model, the 
student is in charge of his own learning and is able to access the course material in his 
own time and pursue it at his own pace.  The design review game was based on the 
asynchronous model. In the game, fifteen questions, increasing in difficulty were 
posed and the engineers were given a choice of four answers, only one of which was 
correct. The game proved to be very popular; in the first two and a half days after 
launch 414 engineers visited the site staying on average for 17 minutes (Figure 7.4):  
Figure 7.4: Screen Shot E-learning Design Review Game 
 
7.5  Design Review: On the Job Training 
 
The author showed the game to the global design expert when he was on a subsequent 
visit to the company. It made him smile but insisted the only way to learn was on the 
job training. The author asked how he could be so certain. His answer was short but 
enlightening, illustrating yet another cultural difference between British and Japanese 
engineers. He said: 
 
“Because NTC General Managers say so……”   
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It seems the word of NTC General Managers is sacrosanct. These are all powerful 
people who are charged with delivery and how they manage their resource is their 
prerogative. Through discussion it transpired that although Takahashi san was 
acknowledged as a global expert, he had developed and successfully trialled his 
methodology with one General Manager at NTC and in consequence this 
methodology had been ‘offered’ to the other departments for adoption.  
In the West “offered”  is often an euphemism for “told” but that is not always the 
case in NTC and although this was not the first time the author had heard this phrase 
used, it was still a revelation to discover that something as important as the process of 
design reviews was not standard company practice.  It would be untrue to say that 
everyone in NTC is happy with the situation as the author discovered when talking to 
the General Manager responsible for Quality at NTC. 
 
“I do not agree with this approach. It is left to the Manager’s to decide how they run 
their business but there should be a standard and people should follow the standard. 
We must ensure quality and the way to do it is through standardisation.” NTC 
General Manager 
 
Nissan Technical Centre Japan relies heavily on on the job training (OJT) to ensure 
quality of design and Japanese seniors and managers take the responsibility of training 
their staff upon themselves. The training can take many forms, described by a 
Japanese colleague as “just watch my back” where the trainee learns by watching the 
expert, or by being asked to do something specific. (In the West “just watch my back” 
is often interpreted as protection). It is not uncommon for engineers to be asked their 
opinion about something and then be challenged about their response to test the level 
of their understanding.  Often they are made to do this in the shape of written reports 
which will take an age to complete. This constant request for reflection and perfection 
leads to a deeper level of understanding and the assumption that knowledge is created 
through the socialisation process or the interaction between people. “Socialisation is a 
process of sharing experiences and thereby creating tacit knowledge such as shared 
mental models and technical skills” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995:62). The following 
quotes are taken from transcripts of the global design experts while meeting with NTC 
General Managers about OJT. 
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“There is no effective training method to raise technical capability. We must 
concentrate on OJT.”  NTC General Manager (1) 
 
“Engineers are like soldiers. We must establish fundamentals for each field of 
expertise. Once such fundamentals are taught we send them to the battlefield. But 
knowing the fundamentals will not produce a general in 20 or 30 years time. Of 
course we must provide a minimum level of education. Classroom lectures can 
provide no more than 5% of what is required. The rest is from OJT.” NTC General 
Manager (2) 
 
“Gaining a deep understanding of something, like a chemical reaction, requires 
certain duration of time. This can only be achieved by OJT.”  NTC General Manager 
(3) 
 
“When it comes to developing future chief engineers, education is not useful. 
Fostering chief engineers can only be achieved through actual practice. (OJT)” NTC 
General Manager (4) 
 
The General Managers are unanimous in believing that on the job training is the only 
way to raise technical capability and ensure quality designs.  Again, this is a culturally 
mediated belief. In comparing American and Japanese approaches to Quality Control, 
Cusumano, (1985) reports that Japanese companies have never felt comfortable with 
the rigid rules and routines of Taylorism and in allocating responsibilities to workers 
and the labour management divide. Cusumano cites that the absence of powerful 
industrial unions and enforced job classifications in Japan, after the mid 1950s 
allowed Japanese companies to rotate employees freely and to assign them multiple 
tasks and train them as they saw fit. He argues that the vertical character of personal 
relationships in Japan made it seem natural for managers to make quality control a 
line rather than a staff function and to extend the responsibility to maintain quality to 
the factory level while reducing the roles of staff specialists. He continues that 
because employees stayed with a company for life, training was seen as a profitable 
investment and employees usually applied themselves to acquiring skills more 
seriously than transient workers did. The legacy of Taylorism and its clear division of 
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labour are apparent in NTCE. Generally, NTCE (British) engineers tend to want to be 
sent on training courses and to collect the associated certificate of attendance and 
learning. British managers and seniors also expect the company to provide the 
necessary level of tuition.   
 
“Brits definitely expect to be sent on a course, especially when they are fresh out of 
university and in certificate mode. I imagine they think it makes them more 
marketable. It gives them something to trade on.” NTCE British Manager 
 
“I have enough to do getting the job done without training people. Don’t see why I 
should.  I don’t need them to understand what they do. They just have to do as I tell 
them. I’m the expert.  Not them!” NTCE British Senior Engineer 
 
7.6  Design Review Quality 
 
The Japanese approach to learning and more especially, the associated self-discipline 
does not necessarily apply outside of NTC. In separate discussions with the Design 
Director and Hanaoka san, the Company President, they confided that they were 
worried about the performance of some of the Japanese seniors, currently seconded to 
NTCE.  It seems that they were not as diligent about the preparation and execution of 
Design Reviews as they had been when working in NTC. NTCE’s Japanese Managing 
Director particularly wanted to understand the reasons underpinning what he 
considered to be a cultural dysfunctionality.  The author devised and issued a 
questionnaire to six Japanese senior engineers and six local seniors who had worked 
in NTC asking them about Design Reviews and followed up with a series of one to 
one interviews.   
 
7.6.1  Summary of Results from Questionnaire
 
There are different perceptions about the quality of design reviews held in NTC and 
NTCE.  All of the Japanese Senior Engineers believe design reviews in NTC are more 
effective where on the job training is used to teach what is expected in the design 
review. They feel they have the same sense of responsibility when working in NTCE 
as they did in NTC but perceive local seniors as having a lower sense of personal 
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responsibility and that local engineers do not take design reviews as seriously as their 
counterparts in Japan. The majority of local Senior Engineers (with NTC experience) 
also believe design reviews are more effective in NTC but maintain they have a 
similar sense of personal responsibility as their Japanese colleagues. They believe that 
whilst local engineers do have a sense of personal responsibility, it is lower than that 
of the seniors. 
  
The author followed up the questionnaire with off the record, face to face discussions 
with the seniors. The interviews with the Japanese senior engineers were mediated by 
a Japanese speaking English man who works in Knowledge Management. (Appendix 
5) 
  
“I’m aware that I’m not completely honest in design reviews. I know there’s a 
problem, but I don’t acknowledge it, thinking that I’ll fix it later”  Local Senior 
Engineer (1) 
 
“There doesn’t seem to be the same approach as when we did Design Reviews for 
Almera. (Nissan vehicle launched 1998) Then, questions were encouraged but now, if 
I ask questions there is a feeling of awkwardness. It’s as if I’m spoiling the agenda”.  
Local Senior Engineer (2) 
 
“I have attended design reviews in NTCE where there are no representatives from 
Test, Marketability or Nissan Europe Production Engineering.” Local Senior 
Engineer (3)
 
 
“I need to hold a New Mechanism Design Review, but I don’t know what’s involved. 
What things do I have to consider?” Local Senior Engineer (4) 
 
“Design Reviews need a reviewer with technical experience. The managers in NTCE 
have little technical experience” Japanese Senior Engineer (1) 
 
“The feeling of tension and anxiety about design reviews is not present in NTCE” 
Japanese Senior Engineer (2) 
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Design Reviews are not only a check on the current design status they are also a time 
for discussion, interrogation, reflection and learning.  They are a stage on which 
individuals can become encultured in the role of a Nissan Engineer (Brown et. al., 
1989) and accepted as such by their peers and managers.  In this way, learning is more 
about developing an identity and becoming a practitioner through social interaction 
with others than it is about learning objectively about the practice of being an 
engineer (Brown and Duguid, 1991) but if learning is situated in practice, then 
practice precedes knowledge (Hedegaard, 1995).  
 
In NTC, there is no standard process for Design Reviews; engineers learn what is 
acceptable from their seniors and managers through ojt (on the job training). The 
social processes of holding a design review, manifest themselves externally first and 
then act as a conduit for knowledge sharing and creation and are internalised through 
a transformational process. During socialisation, individuals share experiences and 
develop common mental models. Vygotsky (1978) calls the distance between the 
actual development level of individuals using their own means and the potential 
development level of individuals under the guidance of those more capable, the zone 
of proximal development. The zone of proximal development is dependent on a 
shared situational understanding which is known as inter-subjectivity and “is the act 
of transcending the private, and becoming one with the other.” (Plaskoff, 2003:165).  
 
This is not happening to the same level at NTCE and this inability to learn from each 
other is in danger of undermining whatever trust there is between the groups and 
engender a defensive attitude toward sharing knowledge (Child and Rodrigues, 2003).   
 
Knowledge Maps can be used to align the cultural models by identifying common 
reference points for the design review (Rogoff, 1990) but they are frameworks for 
learning; the depth and detail of knowledge needed to make a design review cannot be 
made explicit and codified on the map because in this case, experience is the key to 
learning . The   
 
“rules of art (in this case the knowledge map for a design review) can be useful, but 
they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a 
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guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art” 
Polanyi (1962: 50) 
 
What needs to be known must be passed from the manager or senior to the engineer 
but to learn by example is to submit to authority (Tsoukas, 2003). Was the reason 
some of the Japanese seniors were not performing as well in Design Reviews as they 
did when in NTC because they consciously or subconsciously refused to submit to the 
authority of local managers who they considered inexperienced? Child and Rodrigues 
(2003) warn: 
 
“it also appears that people’s awareness of their own culture and identity is promoted 
by the provision of more information about other societies or communities, which 
enables comparisons that clarify cultural distinctiveness. This enhanced awareness of 
national identity may add to the difficulties of achieving learning that relies upon the 
integration between different national groups.” Child and Rodrigues (2003: 550) 
  
McElroy (2003) believes the first generation or supply side of knowledge 
management has been about capturing, codifying and sharing valuable knowledge and 
getting the right information to the right people at the right time but in recognising 
that organisations are social systems and therefore, by definition adaptive in nature he 
distinguishes between knowledge management and knowledge processing and argues  
knowledge management is the management of knowledge processes not the 
management of knowledge. Knowledge processing is a social process that 
organisations follow in order to produce (make) and integrate (share) their knowledge. 
This was a useful distinction in helping the author define his role as a knowledge 
manager at NTCE and led to the philosophy underpinning the Organise Around 
Knowledge  Methodology. 
 
7.7  The Philosophy Underpinning the OAK Methodology 
 
NTCE is driven by Company Objectives but is managed according to the dictates and 
experience of managers. At best, it works because of the extraordinary efforts and 
ambitions and relationships of the people involved. At worst, it is an inefficient 
piecemeal attempt which fails to deliver its objectives. It is a mistake to assume that 
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empowering staff by setting objectives, encouragement, devolved responsibility, 
management dictate or organisational structures will naturally lead to increased 
knowledge, learning and improved performance. Empowerment has to come from 
within; people have to feel comfortable with the idea and the author’s strategy for 
organising around knowledge is to provide opportunistic frameworks for 
empowerment and self development which are aligned to the company strategy. 
Handy (1993) has likened the study of motivational theories to the search for the 
“Holy Grail” but the research seems to indicate that motivation is culturally mediated.  
 
Nissan Global Culture is the amalgamation of cultures from multiple organisations, 
scattered across the globe which are unified by a common vision and harnessed by 
objectives. The question needs to be asked whether culture change be managed. 
Cultural change is dynamic and cannot be controlled, however by studying culture 
organisations can learn to accept, appreciate and understand the reasons for the 
differences and identify interventions which may assist in helping culture develop in a 
particular way, minimising the dysfunctional elements but making the most of the 
cultural strengths that each company brings to global Nissan. This is not the same as 
actively forcing change but by understanding the dynamics which cause the changes 
we can learn how to communicate that change within a cultural context.  Efficiency, 
sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge based learning culture can only be 
realised by organising around knowledge (Buckman, 2004). Currently, NTCE have a 
myriad of processes, some of their own making, others from global Nissan but often 
they are out of date and more importantly they are not interlinked so no-one really 
understands, or has an overview of how the business is managed as a whole. The 
author strategy for knowledge management at NTCE is to align company and 
knowledge management strategies by identifying and organising around the 
knowledge which is core to the business and the future direction of the company.  
 
The first step of the strategy is to identify and codify core departmental and sectional 
knowledge and then to channel the efficient flow of that knowledge throughout the 
organisation. These organisational knowledge flows are mapped and become the 
frameworks for knowledge maps which structure and focus attention on the business 
need. Procedures, controls and processes, like the knowledge maps help to reinforce 
the social web of relationships (Bettis and Wong, 2003). These knowledge maps 
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reflect the way NTCE manages, or intends to manage, its knowledge. This can be 
through the use of Design Knowledge Maps, Development Knowledge Maps or 
general Business Knowledge Maps. Knowledge Maps include all of the information 
necessary to complete the task: objectives, ownership, responsibility, deliverables, 
stakeholders, knowledge flow, the timing and description of the task and a list of the 
necessary tools for its completion. 
 
More importantly the Knowledge Maps are about “accountability,” which in turn, will 
hopefully encourage open and frank dialogue; reflection and learning with the sole 
purpose of meeting the business needs. Learning is situated in the daily working 
context where knowledge gains meaning (Abma, 1999).The author writes “hopefully” 
assuming a positive response to the Knowledge Maps but accepts that some people 
may merely comply or manipulate their perceived contribution to the detriment of 
others.  
 
 The term learning in organisations refers to the interwoven nature of the social and 
the cognitive. It suggests that the process of learning is constituted by the process of 
organising and learning takes place where there is a social need for it. In effect, the 
knowledge maps become agendas for learning oriented conversations that allow for 
the effective transfer of accurate and relevant information between individuals and 
groups (Argyris, 1993). The focus of the Knowledge Maps is on enhancing dialogue 
to engage organisational members in a learning process that focuses on the 
organisations goals (Edmondson and Woolley, 2003). The “openness” in this instance 
is direct and measurable, because the objectives are supported by clear definitions of 
the task and when it needs to be undertaken in relation to programme timing. 
Knowledge Maps can be used to assess necessary skill levels and because each Map is 
by definition, resourced in terms of cost, timing and capability they can be used for 
man-power planning to ensure work is fairly distributed across the company, which is 
a common complaint made by staff members (including managers).  
 
7.8  Organisational Lives 
 
The Knowledge Maps are also intended to structure the lives of people working in the 
organisation. Organisational lives often fail to meet fundamental human needs: the 
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need for status, law and order, territory and possessions and the need for emotional 
attachments, including care giving and receiving, the need for emotional and physical 
contact, and altruism (Griffin and Tyrrell, 2004). The author’s premise is that 
organising around knowledge, clarifying objectives and specifying tasks and 
deliverables will facilitate the fair distribution for the responsibility for Knowledge 
Maps and help create a safe environment in which people can work and flourish as 
individuals and co-exist in a way that benefits global Nissan. Knowledge Maps can 
also be used to determine if work can be placed more cost effectively else where. 
Knowledge Maps can also be used to identity the necessary cultural mindsets to 
manage the business efficiently.   
 
This is of course dependent on management; clarity does not always lead to equity 
and fairness. The mindsets of senior managers, especially their criteria for business 
success and their mental maps of factors are significant for achieving business success 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2003) and also fundamental to creating safe working 
environments.  These mindsets are national and organisational cultural givens and by 
understanding the meaning and implicit assumptions of them we can develop a suite 
of Knowledge Management tools (including Knowledge Maps) which add to the 
“bottom line” by facilitating the efficient management of knowledge, increasing 
capability and encourage reflexivity and learning. Knowledge Management is like any 
other function within Nissan, it is about deliverables and Knowledge Maps are the 
frameworks for developing the necessary cultural mindsets to deliver company 
objectives.  They formalise relationships and encourage the development of informal 
relationships, mimicking the connectivity and collaborative aspects of a collective 
culture of Nissan Technical Centre Japan by clearly delineating objectives, ownership, 
responsibility and accountability.  
 
7.9  Collaborative Frameworks 
 
It is proposed that the Knowledge Maps become the collective and collaborative 
frameworks which underpin the organisation. They become the framing narratives 
which structure the meanings of organisation and within the organisation. The idea is 
to think of them as screen-plays people know and use, “scripts” to represent 
organisational life, identifying it as different from other aspects of life, which enable 
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people to participate on discourses of organisation and make meaning of how to be in 
organisations and how to organise (Czarniawska, 1997). Company knowledge resides 
in relationships and it is through relationships that data and information become 
actionable and by definition knowledge. The way Nissan employees relate to each 
other is a key to the success of the company.  Knowledge is articulated in 
relationships, so any relationship is about shared knowledge. Relationships enable the 
making of meaningful connections and sustainability is pursued through the creation 
of the necessary cultural frameworks to manage those relationships - clarifying, 
codifying and mediating expected cultural mindsets. This will lead to new behaviours 
and new organisational cultural norms and to a deeper understanding of our 
knowledge base and expertise-creating arenas for creativity and innovation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: The Cultural Lattice 
 
The key to sustainability and implementation is in recognising and managing within 
the cultural constraints of the company with a focus on understanding the attributes of 
the organisational cultural lattice which link a series of knowledge maps that are core 
to Nissan’s business. The lattice (Figure 7.5) is a permeable conduit, linking, and 
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accepting the differences between cultures and shaping organisational mindsets and at 
a global level the lattice spans nationalities and countries. Previously, NTC and NTCE 
managers and engineers have used the same terminology but had different 
understanding due to different cultural frames of reference. The aim of the author’s 
strategy to Organise Around Knowledge is to define a common mindset with a 
common meaning, allowing for different cultural interpretations about how that 
mindset can be fostered. The intention is not to remove the differences in culture but 
to overcome the effects of those differences.  
 
7.10  Organisational Mindsets 
 
The author imagines these mindsets to be conduits for dialogue as envisaged by David 
Bohm, (1917-1992) the distinguished physicist. The word “dialogue” is derived from 
the Greek, dialogos, with dia meaning through and logos meaning the word. A 
dialogue can be between numerous people, but anyone can have a sense of dialogue 
within himself. Bohm argues that: 
 
“The picture or image that this derivation suggests is of a stream of meaning flowing 
among and through us and between us. This will make possible a flow of meaning in 
the whole group, out of which may emerge some new understanding. It’s something 
creative. And this shared meaning is the “glue” or “cement” that holds people and 
societies together.” (Bohm, 2004:6)  
 
In contrast, a “discussion,” means to break things up and is about analysis, where 
people argue different points of view. Discussion is a competition whereas, a dialogue 
is a process, which according to Bohm explores the nature of humanity and, perhaps 
most importantly, he proposes that thought, is generated and sustained at the 
collective level rather than being an objective representation of reality. This approach 
leads people to question the values of culture, meaning and identity of a fragmented 
world. Dialogue is about understanding and challenging the assumptions, or thought 
processes which underpin society. It is about the development of common minds and 
meanings which are capable of constant transformation and change.  
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“If we can all listen to each other’s opinions, and suspend them without judging them, 
and your opinion is on the same basis as anyone else’s, then we all have “one mind” 
because we have the same content – all the opinions, all the assumptions. At that 
moment the difference is secondary. Then you have in some sense one body, one 
mind. It does not overwhelm the individual. There is no conflict in the fact that the 
individual does not agree. It’s not all that important whether you agree or not. There 
is no pressure to agree or disagree.” (Bohm, 2004: 32) 
 
According to Bohm, people naturally assume their representations are true pictures of 
reality rather the conditioned reflex of unexamined memories. The challenge is to test 
those realties which are often tacitly formed and held at a collective level. He writes 
about literal thought and participatory thought processes. Literal thought is results 
oriented and aims to capture “what is” practically and technically. Literal thought is 
the core of the author’s organisational mindset. Participatory thoughts are not 
bounded, they are sensed, tacitly held and culturally tuned and have underlying 
relationships with one another. The author intends that people become aware of these 
thoughts through structured dialogue about knowledge maps (Figure 7.6).  
   
                        
Participatory  
      Thought 
Literal Thought 
Organisational Mindset 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Cross Section Through the Organisational Mindset  
 
Bohm’s theory can be extended to apply to people of the same nationality working in 
different organisational sub-cultures. In the case of NTCE this includes the 
organisational subcultures found not only in the various divisions and the associated 
departments and sections found in:-  Project Management Office, 3-3-3 Promotion 
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Office (Cost),  Vehicle Engineering, Power Train Engineering, Vehicle Experiment, 
Product Development Support and Business Development but also the subcultures of 
the different professions and technical and non technical staff.  Culture is so 
enormously influential and invasive that it cannot be managed into a homogenous 
entity. Whilst accepting that cultural diversity can be destructive the author also 
recognises that the richness of that diversity can also underscore organisational 
success. The premise of this study is that efficiency, sustainability and the beginnings 
of a knowledge based learning culture can only be realised by organising around 
knowledge and that knowledge management and organisational learning is a mindset 
that must be understood in a cultural context.   
 
7.11 The Impact of National Culture on Organisational Culture 
 
The author recognises the lasting impact that national cultures have on Nissan’s 
organisational cultures and works within this understanding to create frameworks to 
facilitate the knowledge flows and clarify and align expectations and deliverables. He 
does not attempt to manage an idealised organisational culture or attempt to change 
the way people think; empathy and understanding are a desirable  
by-product rather than an objective. Neither is it possible to articulate change through 
a cultural lens, the language is considered too abstract and it is therefore important to 
have a sense of audience when promoting Knowledge Management initiatives. The 
concept of reciprocity is the ability and willingness to take on a new message and 
although the people shaping the company may understand and agree with the theory 
underpinning this study they pride themselves in being engineers and as such, are only 
interested in results and the practicalities of delivery. Academic rigour is an anathema 
because it is seen to be too theoretical is said to lack the urgency of the “real world.”   
 
The author proposes to concentrate on mapping and codifying organisational 
knowledge in Knowledge Maps whereby learning is fostered through people taking 
ownership of the maps and then using a set of predetermined questions which direct 
action, application and planning to continuously improve the efficiency of the process 
and the quality of the output. It is about developing the Nissan mindset as an 
organisational cultural norm, and is the “way we are,” or rather “the way we aspire to 
be” and so becomes the arbiter of quality. Individual aspirations moulded to fit the 
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collective mindset are framed by continually probing and asking questions. The 
learning is in continually being able to ask relevant questions and then reflecting on 
answers rather than merely capturing and codifying answers, which are context 
dependant. The aim is to create a heuristic culture which incorporates the necessary 
expertise and conditions to facilitate learning and problem solving. 
 
7.12  Presentation of OAK Kaizen Methodology to NTCE Directors 
 
The author presented his findings about Design Reviews to NTCE Directors and also 
used this opportunity to present his strategy to Organise Around Knowledge, which 
was packaged, at the suggestion of his boss, and Director of Product Development 
Support as the OA K (Organise Around Knowledge) Kaizen Methodology. It was a 
deliberate ploy to link OAK with Kaizen. The Japanese word, Kaizen, generally 
understood as continuous improvement (the literal translation is “change for the 
better”) was instantly recognisable and held deeply ingrained connotations of what 
constituted a Japanese company and would not be challenged. Kaizen is the process of 
making incremental improvement, no matter how small and achieving the lean goal of 
eliminating all waste that adds cost without adding value (Liker, 2004). The argument 
for OAK was based on the belief that any organisation positioned for the future has to 
be organised around knowledge. 
 
“We’ve come to realise that an organisation positioned for the future will have to be 
organised around knowledge – how to create it, share it, capture it and apply it – 
rather than around process. Once everybody in the company is in the network for the 
business at hand it only takes a slight shift of thought to open the way to an organic 
organisation. To activate this organic organisation requires a major cultural change 
but it comes more and more easily as individuals learn to assume responsibility to 
making things happen for themselves.” (Buckman, 2004:Xiii) 
 
Imai (1986) argues there are two contrasting approaches to progress, which he calls 
“gradualist,” and “the great leap forward approach.”  He argues Japanese companies 
favour the gradualist approach whilst companies in the West rely on innovation or the 
great leap forward approach and writes: 
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“Western management worship at the altar of innovation. This innovation is seen as 
major changes in the wake of technological breakthroughs, or the introduction of the 
latest management concepts or production techniques. Innovation is dramatic, a real 
attention getter. Kaizen on the other hand, is often un-dramatic and subtle, and its 
results are seldom immediately visible. While kaizen is a continuous process, 
innovation is generally a one shot phenomenon.” (Imai, 1986:23) 
 
7.13  OAK: The Bedrock for Innovation 
 
The author also sees Organise Around Knowledge as the bedrock for innovation. 
Whilst accepting innovation can be about novelty and the development of radically 
new ideas it can also be about the simple, incremental development of what is already 
there and about making a difference to a particular situation which, within the 
innovation literature is described as the difference between radical and incremental 
innovation (Bessant et al, 2005). Womack et al. (1991) argue that the Japanese car 
manufacturing industry has been successful due to a sustained, forty year programme 
of systematic and continuous improvement of both product and process design. 
Bessant (2003:3) makes the point that “we confuse ‘invention’ – coming up with a 
bright idea – with ‘innovation’ – the whole process of taking that idea into successful 
implementation and use.” He believes most innovation falls into patterns of 
occasional breakthroughs followed by long periods of continuous improvement and 
cites 3M’s, Corning Glass, Philips and General Electric as companies who are 
successful at managing this process. Gundling (2000) also argues that not only do 
companies need the ability to manage innovation in product development they also 
need to be able to create and refine the process underpinning those products. 
 
7.14  Summary of the OAK Methodology  
 
The Ten Step OAK Methodology begins with the creation of an interrelationship map 
which is used by senior management to identify value added and non value added 
activities. A decision is then made about non value added activities: should they be 
transferred to more appropriate departments within the company or should work on 
them stop? Once this has been decided the interrelationships map should be 
transfigured and the department re-organised around the knowledge which is crucial 
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to the business. Senior management should then prioritise the order in which the 
knowledge maps should be created. The responsibility for completing each of the ten 
steps, with a description of the activity, objective and deliverable is shown in Table 
7.2.  
 
Activity 
 
Objective 
 
Deliverable 
 
Step Responsibility 
 
1 Identify all activities 
& distinguish 
between value added 
and non value added 
and link related 
activities. 
Identify and distinguish 
between value added and 
non value added  
activities and agree with 
managers. 
Inter-relationship 
Map. 
• Section 
member 
• Kaizen pilot 
 
• Senior  
• Manager  
2 Organise around 
knowledge. 
 
Transfer non-value 
activities to other sections 
or stop doing altogether. 
More effective/ 
efficient 
organisation. 
 
• Section 
member  
• Kaizen pilot 
• Senior  
• Manager  
3 
 
Prioritise processes 
for capture. 
Declare the processes that 
need to be tackled first 
and when 
Prioritised list of 
processes for capture 
agreed with manager. 
 
• Senior 
• Manager 
4 
 
Capture the process 
as it is currently 
performed and 
transfer, together 
with timing, onto a 
knowledge map. 
To capture accurate 
working practices, 
identify all stakeholders 
and identify timing. 
Knowledge map of 
current process. 
• Section 
member 
• Kaizen pilot 
• Senior 
5 
 
 
Critique/modify the 
process using 
previously logged 
concerns. Level the 
‘new’ knowledge 
map with manager. 
Capture any concerns 
with the current working 
process. Highlight 
problem areas on the 
knowledge map. Propose 
countermeasures for 
concerns. 
New levelled 
knowledge map. 
• Section 
member 
• Kaizen pilot 
• Senior 
• Manager 
6 
 
 
Identify key 
performance 
indicators. 
To enable managers to 
monitor performance 
against knowledge map. 
Effective key 
performance 
indicators. 
• Senior 
• Manager 
7 
 
 
Identify skills and 
tools needed to do 
tasks/jobs.  
To use as part of Skills 
matrix. 
Skills matrix. • Section 
member 
• Kaizen pilot 
• Senior 
8 
 
Level the process 
with all stakeholders. 
Modify where 
necessary.  
To obtain buy into the 
process from all 
stakeholders. 
Validated knowledge 
Map for publishing 
on portal. 
• Senior 
 
• Manager 
9 Train staff. 
 
Develop staff capability 
skills. 
A capable workforce. • Section 
member 
• Senior 
10 Validate Training. Group effectiveness of 
training and learning. 
Quantitative method 
of validating 
improvements on 
capability and 
efficiency. 
 
 • Manager 
         
Table 7.2: The Ten Step OAK Methodology. 
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7.15  The Directors’ Response  
 
The Directors’ response to the presentation of Design Reviews was to appoint a 
manager responsible for Quality and to set a standard for the Design Review Process. 
During the meeting NTCE’s Managing Director described OAK as a “good strategy” 
and although the Directors seemingly agreed they stopped short of agreeing to 
implement the methodology. Again the author was left without a sponsor for the work.  
From experience, it is always easier to get the support of European Directors for 
projects they consider to offer a substantial return on investment than it is to get them 
to talk about realigning and improving existing processes. It is indicative of a self 
promoting individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001; Trompnaars and Hampden-Turner, 
2003) Talk about process, however takes time and effort and requires substantial 
management commitment. OAK means investing in people. Help came from an 
unexpected quarter in the form of his line Director who was plagued with problems of 
his own yet agreed to pilot the methodology in his own department (Product 
Development Support). At that time he admitted to not being a convert of the OAK 
methodology but said he recognised something in what the author was saying after 
continuously being faced with responding to reactive management.  
 
7.16  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the background and philosophical underpinnings of the 
Organise Around Knowledge Methodology. In this chapter the author learned that if 
he was to be successful in knowledge management he had to take into account the 
power and politics within the organisation and adjust his strategies to suit. There is a 
great resistance to change and the decision as to what made a strategy practical 
depended entirely on the viewpoint and personal agenda of who was making the 
judgement. The chapter also highlighted that there are different cultural approaches to 
learning and strongly affects patterns of learning. In NTC the emphasis is on the job 
training whereby engineers are expected to submit to authority and the constant 
request for reflection and learning leads to deeper levels of understanding through the 
socialisation of shared experiences and mental models. It is only through submission 
that engineers are included in the networks and are able learn which in itself 
reinforces the strength of the collective. This chapter also introduced the philosophy 
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underpinning the OAK strategy and methodology and the concept of the cultural 
lattice. This chapter has made the following theoretical and practical contributions to 
knowledge. 
  
7.16.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
• Knowledge Management initiatives have to be practical. 
• Japanese Managers in NTC do not see the need for processes because it is all 
captured “in the minds of the engineers.”  
• In the West “offered” is often a euphemism for “told” but that is not always 
the case in NTC. The word of NTC General Managers is sacrosanct. These are 
all powerful people who are charged with delivery and how they manage their 
resource is their prerogative which leads to inefficiencies due to lack of 
standardisation. 
• Nissan Technical Centre Japan relies heavily on on the job training (OJT) to 
ensure quality of design and Japanese seniors and managers take the 
responsibility of training their staff upon themselves.   
• In NTC, there is no standard process for Design Reviews; engineers learn what 
is acceptable from their seniors and managers through ojt (on the job training). 
The social processes of holding a design review, manifest themselves 
externally first and then act as a conduit for knowledge sharing and creation 
and are internalised through a transformational process. During socialisation, 
individuals share experiences and develop common mental models. 
• Generally, NTCE (British) engineers tend to want to be sent on training 
courses and to collect the associated certificate of attendance and learning. 
British managers and seniors also expect the company to provide the necessary 
level of tuition.   
• The Japanese approach to learning and more especially, the associated self-
discipline does not necessarily apply outside of NTC. 
• On the job training is a culture whereby engineers are expected to submit to 
authority. 
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•  Nissan Global Culture is the amalgamation of cultures from multiple 
organisations, scattered across the globe which are unified by a common 
vision and harnessed by objectives.  
• Cultural change is dynamic and cannot be controlled, however by studying 
culture organisations can learn to accept, appreciate and understand the 
reasons for the differences and identify interventions which may assist in 
helping culture develop in a particular way, minimising the dysfunctional 
elements but making the most of the cultural strengths that each company 
brings to global Nissan.   
• Efficiency, sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge based learning 
culture can be realised by organising around knowledge 
• Knowledge Management is like any other function within Nissan, it is about 
deliverables and Knowledge Maps are the frameworks for developing the 
necessary cultural mindsets to deliver company objectives.   
• NTC and NTCE Directors set the direction, rather than dictate the direction for 
the company. They expect others to follow but it is not mandatory and 
providing managers deliver, they can decide how things are done.  
• The way Nissan employees relate to each other is a key to the success of the 
company.  Knowledge is articulated in relationships, so any relationship is 
about shared knowledge. Relationships enable the making of meaningful 
connections and sustainability is pursued through the creation of the necessary 
cultural frameworks to manage those relationships - clarifying, codifying and 
mediating expected cultural mindsets. 
• The key to sustainability and implementation is in recognising and managing 
within the cultural constraints of the company 
• Nissan has been built around people and not process and that for any initiative 
to succeed or even be launched within the company it needs a strong sponsor. 
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7.16.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
 
• Understand the cultural expectations of training in any given organisational 
setting when making and implementing training and learning strategies 
 
 
The next Chapter presents the pilot study for Organising Around Knowledge in 
Product Development Support. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Phase One: Pilot To Organise Around Knowledge 
 
8.0  Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents Phase One of the Pilot to Organise Around Knowledge (OAK) 
in the Product Development Support Department (PDS) at Nissan Technical Centre 
Europe. It begins with a short description of the purpose, structure and composition of 
the department and then outlines the emerging and changing research structure and 
methodology which is shown in the form of a flow diagram and then discusses and 
presents a summary of the results of the pilot activity.  The Chapter concludes with a 
detailed description of the revised OAK Methodology. 
 
 
 SECTION TWO: The 
context and framework for 
the study 
Chapter Two: The study in 
context of Global Nissan 
Chapter Three: The research 
philosophy, strategy and 
methodological framework 
underpinning the study 
 
SECTION THREE: 
Understanding the impact of 
Organisational Culture 
Chapter Four: Organisational 
Culture 
Chapter Five: The impact of 
organisational culture on 
knowledge management and 
learning at Nissan 
SECTION FOUR: 
Developing and 
implementing a strategy to 
Organise Around Knowledge 
Chapter Six: Putting a face to 
knowledge management at 
NTCE  
Chapter Seven:  The proposal 
to Organise Around 
Knowledge Methodology 
Chapter Eight: Phase One: 
Pilot to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Nine: Phase Two: 
Organise Around Knowledge  
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8.1   Product Development Support Organisational Structure 
 
The purpose of Product Development Support (PDS) is to support NTCE (Appendix 
6) through all stages of vehicle design and development and life-cycle management. 
PDS is organised into six functional departments, each with a different remit (Figure 
8.1) and is staffed by ninety nine people, the majority being permanently employed 
British males (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director 
(VY0) 
Product Development Support 
UK 
Manager 
(VYP) 
Knowledge Management & 
Audit 
UK 
Manager 
(VYZ) 
Homologation 
UK 
 
Manager 
(VYR) 
Trial parts/vehicle 
Management 
UK 
Manager 
(VYX) 
Digital Process Promotion 
UK 
Manager 
(VYS) 
Trial Vehicle Build 
Engineering 
Spain 
Manager 
(VYQ) 
Engineering Administration 
& Data Validation 
UK & Spain 
Figure 8.1: PDS Organisational Chart and Department codes VY0 etc. 
 
8.1.1  Engineering Administration and Data Validation
 
Engineering Administration has four main roles: specification management, 
administration of engineering documents, co-ordination of the Design Support Team 
(DST) and control of the exchange of design data between NTCE and its supplier base. 
The Engineering Administration and Data Validation section has offices in the UK 
(Cranfield) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid).   
 
8.1.2  Trial Parts & Vehicle Management
 
This section is responsible for sourcing and procuring trial parts to support the first 
physical trial build. It also manages the material budget of each vehicle programme. 
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Trial Parts and Vehicle Management is based in the UK (Cranfield) and Spain 
(Barcelona). 
 
8.1.3  Trial Vehicle Build Engineering
Vehicle Build Engineering is responsible for the first physical trial build, known as S-
Lot (Simultaneous Lot) but also for Digital Mock-up Design Reviews (DMDRs) held 
at each of the four digital build phases. They also manage the closure of concerns 
raised during these builds. The Trial Vehicle Build Engineering Section is based in 
Spain (Barcelona and Madrid and Cranfield).  
 
8.1.4  Digital Promotion Office 
 
This section is charged with the task of educating NTCE Design Engineers in the best 
use of the digital design facilities available to them, including I-DEAS (CAD 
Generation) and Space-Vision (CAD Validation). It is also responsible for introducing 
Value-Up Innovation of Product, Process and Programmes (V3P) and methodologies 
into NTCE. The Digital Promotion Office is based in the UK (Cranfield).  
 
8.1.5  Homologation
 
Homologation are responsible for working with the Design and Test departments to 
ensure that the vehicles developed at NTCE have the necessary certification required 
to enable them to be legally sold in the destination markets. The Homologation 
Section is based in the UK (Cranfield). 
  
8.1.6  Knowledge Management and Audit Section 
 
The aim of Knowledge Management and Audit section is to reduce the Design and 
Development resources required to develop Case III projects, where NTCE take full 
responsibility for the upper body freeing up resources to develop higher-value 
products and technologies. The section aims to facilitate this by supporting NTCE in 
making full use of the knowledge and experience it possesses. The Knowledge 
Management and Audit section is based in the UK (Cranfield). 
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Section Director Managers Seniors
Engineers/
Controllers
Admin 
Officers
Admin 
Assistants
Totals
Homologation 1 1 5 1 8
Trial Parts & Vehicle Management 1 2 14 3 1 21
Engineering Administration 1 3 18 4 2 28
Digital Promotion Office 1 2 10 3 16
Knowledge Management & Data Validation 1 1 6 8
Trial Vehicle Build Engineering 1 3 11 2 17
99Department Total
1
Table 8.1: Product Development Support Breakdown (as of August 2005) 
 
Total 
Staff 
Nationality Gender  Contract Type 
& Number of Staff 
 
British 70 (71%) 
 
Spanish 28 (28%) 
 
 
Male 67 (68%) 
 
 
 
Permanent Contract 74 (75%) 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
Japanese 1 (1%)  
Female 32 (32%) 
 
 
Temporary Contract  25 (25%) 
Table 8.2: Product Development Support Composition
 
8.2   Phase One: Product Development Support Pilot Activity 
 
The Director of Product Development Support kicked off the pilot activity in his 
department in Cranfield in August 2004 and followed up with presentations in 
Barcelona and Madrid in the following month. He sated that if the pilot was 
successful it would be rolled out across the rest of the company and stressed the 
importance of capturing the processes to improve efficiency and pledged his support 
and that of his management team to the activity. In line with the Managing Director’s 
request for “bottom up” thinking each section was asked for volunteers to act as 
Organise Around Knowledge Kaizen Pilots, who would lead the sectional activities, 
supported by the Knowledge Management Section. Some of the pilots volunteered 
willingly, others were coerced. After an initial flurry of excitement, interest waned 
and meeting attendance dropped, especially in those meetings led by uninterested 
pilots. The promised support of the management team was not evident. They said 
people were “too busy doing the actual job” to attend meetings; besides “they had 
already mapped their processes.” The author initiated an audit and proved this was not 
the case: Thirty two processes were reported to be up to date, twenty nine required 
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updating and forty six new processes were required (Figure 8.2). However, these 
figures are misleading because when pressed, copies of the thirty two processes said 
to be up to date failed to (and have still failed to) materialise and should rightly be re-
categorised as needing updating.  
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Figure 8.2: Results of PDS Process Audit 
 
The Director’s countermeasure for the section’s saying they did not have the time was 
to dedicate every Tuesday morning to the OAK Kaizen activity. Reasons for not 
attending meetings had to be sanctioned by the section manager. Initially, to show his 
support and encourage participation the Director “walked the talk” and attended group 
meetings to see what was happening and hear feedback   
 
8.3 Phase One: Research Structure 
 
Once the activity was kicked off the author, and a member of his section interviewed 
people at different levels within PDS about the OAK pilot. A second interviewer was 
necessary because some respondents said they felt uncomfortable talking openly to 
the author who was a manager in the company.  
 
    John Temple                                                                                                              213
  
 
 
Kick Off Activity 
August 2004 
 
 
 
Pilot 
Workshops: 
Building Collaborative 
Relationships I 
Output: Feelings 
Presentation to  
PDS Director and 
Managers 
 
In 
Conversations:
 
Collecting 
Anecdotal 
Evidence 
 
 
 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
Results 
Themes 
Revised OAK 
Methodology 
Figure 8.3: Phase One: Research Structure 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and based on the initial findings of the pilot and 
also on anecdotal evidence about working in Nissan that the author had gleaned from 
conversations with colleagues. These anecdotes have been used throughout this thesis 
to support arguments or illustrate points of view. The research structure shown in 
Figure 8.3 is presented as a guide to the rest of the chapter. It was made after the event, 
and puts the research into a logical sequence of events with deliberate and measurable 
outcomes. In reality the research structure was not planned, and could not be planned 
in a predictive manner rather it evolved over the course of the study, with one step 
tentatively leading into the next. Sometimes those steps were backward steps, it was a 
sense making process, constantly revisiting and re- interrogating data.   
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8.4  Summary of Results of PDS OAK Kaizen Activity 
 
The findings of the OAK Kaizen Pilot Activity are summarised and shown below as 
“Findings,” “Lessons Learned” and suggested “Actions.” The “Findings” are  
paraphrased statements taken from the interviews and from discussions with people in 
PDS. The “Lessons Learned” and “Actions” were discussed with the PDS 
management team and staff and used to develop and revise the OAK Methodology. 
The findings have been numbered 1-30 and are referenced later in the Chapter 
(Section 8.8) to give the background and reasons as to how and why the author 
developed and revised the OAK Methodology. 
 
 
No FINDINGS LESSON ACTION 
1 Some staff members have different 
agendas and will undermine the 
activity if allowed to do so.  
Some people supported the activity, 
some were resistant to change and 
some were indifferent. 
The OAK methodology is not 
sustainable without strong 
leadership. 
Ensure Director support 
and active, determined 
leadership                          
2 Staff need platforms to promote 
themselves and express their anxieties 
and will jeopardise the actvity 
Accept the need.  Design and allow for 
formal and informal 
meetings for groups and 
individuals.  
3 PDS Cranfield operate in an 
individualistic culture  
Accept this as fact  Design the methodology 
to make the best of an 
individualistic culture. 
4 Some staff use lack of direction as an 
excuse for not delivering. 
 
People need clearly defined 
objectives and deliverables and 
delivery against time. 
Objectives need to be clearly 
managed.  
Clarify objectives and 
deliverables and manage 
against the timing. 
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No FINDINGS LESSON ACTION 
5 Business processes are not integrated.  [ Processes need to be linked 
to form a business and R&D 
infrastructure. Isolated  
processes, however well 
codified are ineffective  
Use OAK Methodology to 
create infrastructure.  
6 Managing at a higher level sometimes 
means we only understand the business 
at a superficial level. “There is a danger 
of throwing the baby out with the bath 
water.”   
Need to understand the 
background so that informed 
decisions can be made.  
Debate and test the level 
of understanding.  
7 Past company initiatives were reactive 
strategies and driven by individuals 
rather than mid/long term strategic 
intent.   
People welcome change 
only when they see or have 
felt the need for change.  
Develop strategic 
leadership 
8 Inexperienced managers are not able to 
validate processes  
Managers need to 
understand the business. 
PDS needs 
Subject Matter Experts in 
every area of its business. 
Regularly moving managers 
is counter productive. 
 Promote/Recruit 
Managers who know the 
Business. Identify and 
develop Subject Matter 
Experts 
9 Staff map what they think they should 
be doing 
and not what they are actually doing   
Do not take it for granted 
that people are doing what 
they say they are doing.  
Manage the process. 
Make it central to the 
operations. Constantly 
check and look for 
improvements and address 
concerns. 
10 PDS Managers/Seniors believed, and 
argued, that the processes were in 
place. This proved to be a false 
assumption. Company processes/ 
infrastructure were not in place  
Do not assume anything. 
These beliefs are rooted in 
the past. It is a myth to say 
PDS (the company) has too 
many procedures. 
Ask to see the process. 
Check it is up to date. 
Check it is applied. 
Practice Shangenshuji. 
(Understand what is really 
happening. See it for 
yourself. Check out the 
process).  
11 Staff members deliver at all costs.  Staff have different modus 
operandi which are not 
necessarily aligned to 
business efficiency. Without 
discipline staff will work 
away from process. 
Mandate a standard way 
of working. Mandate the 
use of 
processes/knowledge 
maps and procedures 
12 Staff are reluctant to collaborate and 
share knowledge.  
Frameworks are needed to 
encourage the transfer of 
knowledge.  
Identify and develop the 
necessary frameworks 
(Explicit and tacit 
knowledge). 
13 Staff “hide” things. Whether 
unconsciously or consciously is up for 
debate  
Independent audits of 
process/procedures are 
needed. Do not 
underestimate the 
importance of audits. 
Develop a robust audit 
procedure. Audit 
regularly. 
14 Difference in opinion about roles and 
responsibilities at all levels:  
Director/Manager/ 
Senior/Engineer/Controller. 
Do not assume people know 
or understand their roles and 
responsibilities 
Mandate the use of the 
role/responsibility matrix.
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No FINDINGS LESSON ACTION 
15 Some staff members are 
intransigent about the necessity of 
change. They identify and value 
themselves with old ways of doing 
things.  
Do not expect everyone to 
immediately buy into the process 
of organising around knowledge. 
Accept that some people will use 
the methodology to promote self 
interests. 
Develop a strategic and 
determined style of 
leadership. 
16 The style of management is 
predominately reactive  
Need to emphasis and promote 
the importance of proactive 
management. 
Make time for structured 
discussion using the tools 
and templates from the 
OAK methodology 
17 PDS has a “tick box” culture of 
delivery.  
Ticking the box does not always 
equate with efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
Check the detail.  
18 Words/labels have strong 
associations. For some, the use of 
the word “Kaizen” meant reactive 
problem solving  
Be careful of the words used to 
“sell” the message. It can be 
counter productive. 
Choose words carefully 
19 Staff believe PDS has a blame 
culture.  They 
do not like following processes 
and are 
reluctant to identify Key 
Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) because they are 
worried they will be used against 
them.  
Blame cultures are not conducive 
to the OAK methodology. 
Organisational efficiency depends 
on a leadership that allows for the 
design, development and 
implementation/management of 
culturally sensitive 
frameworks/structures/mindsets 
which are focused on the 
business.  
    
Need to be firm but fair.  
 
Develop the appropriate 
leadership styles and 
relevant frameworks.  
 
  
20 Staff do not readily accept 
criticism, however constructive. 
They take it personally.  
  
Talking around codified 
processes/knowledge Maps 
focuses the discussion. Without 
the processes/maps the 
conversation tends to wander. 
What usually happens is that staff 
discuss their hidden agendas, 
which are usually about self. 
To counterbalance 
“focusing” only on 
processes/maps the 
Director/ 
Managers/Seniors should 
have informal 
discussions with their 
staff where other issues 
can be aired. 
21 Past mistakes are often repeated.  
 
We reinvent the wheel. 
Lessons are not learnt. Staff are 
reluctant to 
update sectional concerns and 
opportunity logs.  
It is a fallacy to believe that they 
will 
remember what happened and 
complete the log 
at the end of the project. 
Mandate the use of the 
Concerns and 
Opportunity Logs. Use 
these logs to update the 
processes and knowledge 
maps 
22 Focus is on Key Performance 
Indicators/Output  
Manage the process and not the 
output 
Cultural changes: 
Manage the process and 
not the output 
23 Staff will shirk responsibilities/ 
blame others if responsibilities are 
not clear  
Ensure responsibilities are clear Ensure every 
process/knowledge maps 
has an owner  
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No FINDINGS LESSON ACTION 
24 Some knowledge Maps do not contain 
enough information for the job to be done 
without 
reference to an expert  
Some knowledge map 
needs a procedure, 
outlining the map and a 
job instruction sheet. Use 
Knowledge Maps to focus 
discussion. 
Write Procedures and Job 
instructions where 
necessity has been 
agreed. 
25 Staff do not readily refer to 
Processes/Knowledge Maps and they 
quickly become irrelevant.  
It is important to keep the 
processes/maps “alive.” 
Knowledge promotion is 
key to sustainability 
Develop strategies for 
knowledge promotion  
26 PDS (the company) have relied on 
individuals/personalities to inform them 
of “the way things are done around here.” 
The message is inconsistent and 
sometimes confusing.  
Use polices, procedures 
and knowledge maps to 
structure the company 
culture  
Mandate the use of  
polices, procedures and 
knowledge maps 
27 Over emphasising the use of process 
negates the importance of knowledge.  
Use of the term 
“Knowledge Maps” shifts 
the focus from process to 
people.  
Promote use of the term 
“Knowledge Maps” 
28 Skills matrices are task-based not 
knowledge-based. They are not linked to 
the knowledge maps.  
It is in the continuous 
improvement of people, 
and the relevant OAK 
frameworks that 
knowledge will be 
built/captured and shared. 
Rewrite the skills 
matrices around 
knowledge maps and 
continuously appraise 
staff. Need to set 
attainment of knowledge 
and judge against that 
standard. 
29 Knowledge Maps were not levelled with 
stakeholders  
Knowledge Maps seen as a 
tick box exercise. Staff 
believed the initiative 
would fade away. 
Promote Knowledge 
30 Often staff were not aware of how their 
jobs contributed to the delivery of the 
product.  
Knowledge Maps must be 
linked to the Generic 
Master schedule.  
Link Knowledge Maps to 
Generic Master Schedule. 
 
Table 8.3: Findings of the OAK Kaizen Pilot Activity 
 
8.5  Building Collaborative Relationship Workshops I 
 
Blame cultures are not conducive to the collaboration necessary for the transfer and 
sharing of knowledge (Storck and Hill, 2000) and in this case, the successful 
implementation of the OAK Methodology. PDS Directors, Managers and Seniors talk 
about trusting their staff but many were concerned that their opinions about OAK 
would be misconstrued. 
 
“I actually think OAK is a good thing. It has got a lot of things going for it but not 
everyone is telling you as it is. Sometimes they say things half in joke – I’ve heard 
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them - but they mean it really. Deep down they mean it.  Or they’ll tell you what they 
really feel but then say: “Don’t put my name to it!”  I don’t want that used against 
me! They are worried about repercussions. People here have long memories.”  NTCE 
British Controller 
 
Clegg and Hardy (1996) warn that often the rhetoric of trust and collaboration 
masques an organisational reality of manipulation, capitulation and aggressive self-
interest but without trust, knowledge initiatives will fail, regardless of how thoroughly 
they are supported by technology and rhetoric.  However, learning to trust is a 
complex emotional process, it is not something that is simply present or absent from a 
social relationship but is negotiable and contextually, structurally specific and one that 
shapes and sustains relationships and organisations. The author surmised that for the 
Maps to work people have to behave and feel in a certain way (Figure 8.4) and 
devised and held a series of workshops to determine how people would like to feel 
and the associated behaviours necessary for the effective implementation of 
Knowledge Maps.   
 
 
 
 
Behave like 
this . . . 
 
 
Feel like 
this . . . 
 
 
Knowledge 
Map 
Figure 8.4: Managing the Knowledge Maps 
   
There were 7 workshops involving 54 people (Table 8.4). The workshops were group 
exercises, the participants were asked first, what behaviours they would need to 
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exhibit to successfully implement the OAK Methodology and work with the 
Knowledge Maps and then asked how they would like to feel when exhibiting those 
behaviours.  
 
 
Workshop Section Location Number of 
Participants 
1 Knowledge Management & Audit  (VYP) UK/Cranfield 6 
2 Engineering Admin & Data Validation (VYQ) UK/Cranfield 8 
3 Trial Parts & Vehicle Management (VYR) UK/Cranfield 9 
4 Trial Vehicle Build Engineering (VYS) Spain/Barcelona 10 
5 Engineering Admin & Data Validation (VYQ) Spain/Madrid 8 
6 Homologation (VYZ) UK/Cranfield 7 
7 NTCE Japanese Senior Engineers   UK/Cranfield 6 
Table 8.4: Building Collaborative Relationships Workshops I 
 
The participants were asked to record both sets of answers on post-its. The post-its 
were then consensually grouped and the behaviours and corresponding feelings were 
linked together. Group 1 shown on Figure 8.5 (taken from a workshop held in 
Madrid) shows how desired behaviours exhibiting professionalism etc. were linked to 
feelings of confidence, safety and motivation. The author accepts that some of the 
post-its under the Behaviour banner are not behaviours but a pre-requisite necessary 
for the behaviour to be exhibited.  
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Behaviours 
Feelings (To have the behaviours, I need to 
feel . . .) 
 
Group 1 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5:  Building Collaborative Workshops  I – Example taken from 
Engineering Administration and Data Validation Group Madrid (VYQ) 
 
From the workshops the author concluded that in order to display the behaviours 
necessary to make the knowledge maps work and Organise Around Knowledge, PDS 
staff need affirmative: Recognition, Respect, Reward, Trust, Support, Safety and 
Relationships but it also became apparent through many discussions that these words 
were culturally mediated, in that they meant different things to different cultures 
(Table 8.5).  
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 Emotions UK (Cranfield -British) Spain (Barcelona) Spain (Madrid) 
UK (Cranfield –
Japanese) 
Recognition 
 As individual 
As a member of a 
professional group As a family / team 
 - Recognising others
 - Praising others         
- Not about self 
Respect 
 As individual 
As a member of a 
professional group As a family / team For others 
Reward 
 For self 
Expect to be 
remunerated as 
professional 
employees, as a 
group 
Expect manager to 
reward fairly. 
Caring organisation. 
Natural fairness 
assumed.   
Trust 
 
Bounded trust. 
Written records 
important. 
Trust in 
professionalism as 
group 
Team trust manager Trust taken for granted. 
Support 
 Negotiated support 
Support as 
professional group Support as family Support of company 
Safety 
 
From individual 
criticism 
Safety against 
external criticism 
Safety as extended 
family 
Safety within 
company 
Relationships 
 
Emphasis on 
work/formal 
relationships 
Professional 
relationships 
Family support 
'paddle tennis' 
Informal & formal 
relationship given 
equal recognition 
Table 8.5: Organise Around Knowledge – How emotions mean different things to 
different cultures. 
 
British staff based in Cranfield want to be recognised, respected and rewarded as 
individuals. It is all about them and their careers. There is an element of fear, they do 
not like being criticised and trust is bounded and written records are important to 
protect and justify individual actions. The emphasis is on formal work relationships 
and support is negotiated in that they are continually “watching their backs.” 
Trompenaars and Hampden- Turner (2003) report in individualistic cultures, 
organisations are seen as serving the needs of individual owners, employers, 
customers and employees enter relationships because it is in their individual interests 
to do so. The organisation is about serving self and they co-operate only because they 
have a vested interest. Each expects to be individually reward for his effort and 
knowledge is used to make the organisations work effectively.  
  
The Spanish living in Barcelona build their identities and value themselves as 
professionals offering their services to the company. They take pride in their positions 
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within the company and within society. These people react strongly if they feel their 
professionalism is being threatened. Lewis (1999) warns that you must never, under 
any circumstances say anything that might offend Spaniard’s sense of personal honour 
or dignity, which the author found out to his cost. One of the people from Barcelona 
took umbrage when the author interviewed her about her job. She did not tell the 
author directly but confided in a British colleague who later informed the author. 
 
“You really upset her. She wanted to know why you were asking her questions. She 
thought you were questioning her ability and that you thought she didn’t know what 
she was doing.”  NTCE British Controller 
 
The same can be said for the Spanish from Madrid, although the impression was that 
they were not as easily affronted as their compatriots in Barcelona. The Spanish 
accepted autocratic management styles but it manifested itself differently in Barcelona 
and Madrid. Although both were paternal, the Manager in Barcelona was firmer and 
less friendly than his counterpart in Madrid. The Director of Product Development 
Support described the Manager in Barcelona as being the “more professional of the 
two.” The people in Madrid see Nissan as a caring organisation and they feel they 
work together well, as a team. In many ways they treat the company like an extended 
family with weekly get togethers to play “paddle tennis.” Likewise, the Japanese 
assume the company will treat them fairly and given them the opportunities they need 
to progress. Trust is taken for granted; everyone has a place, and knows their place in 
the company and within society. When talking about recognition and respect, it is 
always for others and not about “self.” It could be argued that in talking about others, 
others are talking about them and it is part of the reciprocity of Japanese relationships.  
The results of the study point to the British favouring individualistic organisational 
cultures while the Spanish and Japanese prefer a more communitarian organisational 
culture. Two dimensions for classifying societies, which have already been introduced 
(Chapter 4: 72) are “power distance” and “individualism versus collectivism” 
(Hofstede, 1991). Power distance is the degree to which subordinates accept 
inequality in their relationships to people in authority, which may influence the 
managerial styles of those power.  Using Hofstede’s scale, Spain (57) and Japan (54) 
display a relatively high power distance which would indicate they would accept a 
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more autocratic style of management whilst Britain (35) has a lower power distance. 
Individualism versus collectivism, measures the strength of individual ties within 
society. Britain (89) said to be very individualistic in comparison with Spain (51) and 
Japan (46) which are more communal.  In communitarian cultures organisations are 
seen in a social context which gives its members a sense of meaning and purpose and 
organisations are often likened to a large family, community or clan which develops 
and nurtures its members.  
 
The author re-examined the twenty two interviews he had made with people involved 
in the pilot and found it was possible to use the same emotional headings and findings 
of the Building Collaborative Workshops (I) to categorize and understand the 
underpinning sentiments of what was actually being said (Figure 8.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Extract from One of the Interviews with the Text Highlighted and 
Categorized with the Emotional Headings from Building Collaborative 
Workshops I 
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These feelings are not only what Product Development Support staff need from their 
management team but they are also what everyone needs to develop and flourish as 
human beings. These findings are supported by a study made by Griffin and Tyrrell 
(2004) who coined the term “human givens” to describe a human being’s physical and 
emotional needs.   
 
8.6  Themes from OAK Kaizen Pilot 
  
Overall, the OAK Kaizen Methodology has shown that Product Development Support 
is not fully in control of its business and the department lacks direction. This charge is 
aimed at all manager and supervisory levels: Director, Manager, Senior, Engineer and 
Controller and is endemic of the organisational culture. The way they manage their 
business is reactive and piecemeal; processes are unclear, out of date or non-existence 
and there is a difference of opinion about roles and responsibilities at all levels.  The 
Company has relied on individuals to drive it forwards and is not learning from past 
mistakes. There is a blame culture and past change programmes have failed to become 
embedded leaving the workforce cynical about any new initiative resulting in 
resistance to change. These organisational mindsets have been allowed to develop 
over the years and are contrary to the efficient running of the department. The people 
involved in the OAK Kaizen Activity broadly wavered between five groupings, 
depending upon their viewpoint at any given time. The groups are: 
 
8.6.1  Sponsors 
 
The over-riding sponsor for this activity and for Knowledge Management in general, 
is NTCE’s Managing Director. His four year tenure is nearly over and he is preparing 
his legacy for his successor; he is well aware of the importance NTC is putting on 
capturing and sharing knowledge and wants to put something similar in place at 
NTCE. Rather than blindly follow what Nissan Technical Centre Japan has to offer he 
wants NTCE to complement their activity with something appropriate to its own 
organisational culture. He has charged NTCE’s Knowledge Management section with 
designing an infrastructure for organisational learning within the company. It is sense 
of pride, of a job well done and is honouring his responsibilities as Managing Director. 
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The Director of Product Development Support is also a sponsor but because of the 
disjointed efforts of his management team he has had to take on the role of driver. The 
MD and the Director of PDS acted as “Champions” (Clarke and Pratt, 1985) and 
defended and supported the OAK Kaizen Activity from the beginning. They are also, 
what Strebel (1996) referred to as change agents, using their voice to break the 
dominant culture of resistance, starting with top management. 
 
8.6.2  Drivers 
 
Drivers see OAK Kaizen as fundamental to the success of the business and to their 
own careers or other self interests and in effect these people acted as “Tank 
Commanders” (Clarke and Pratt, 1985). Generally, there is the perception that OAK 
Kaizen is yet another management fad or flavour of the month that will soon be 
forgotten. As yet, that has not happened as the Director of Product Development 
Support values the activity because it gives him a transparent management framework 
and the confidence to challenge and direct. However, the department feel his initial 
support has waned, promises of weekly “walkabouts” and review meetings have not 
been kept. OAK Kaizen supporters accept that the Director is busy but believe that if 
the activity really is a priority it must be treated as such and he should “walk the talk” 
(Taylor, 2005). The author obviously sees himself as a “Driver.” The methodology is 
his “brain child” And he believes fervently that it will work. He wants to make a 
difference and have the opportunity to influence and work with the people who shape 
the company. He also wants to develop his career as an expert in knowledge 
management, organisational learning and change management. People in his section 
share the same sentiment. They believe they have something to offer and want to 
develop their careers in knowledge management. The driving factor here is that the 
section has to demonstrate its value otherwise it will follow the pattern of previous 
fledgling sections which have failed to deliver and been disbanded.   
 
8.6.3  Supporters 
 
Supporters value OAK Kaizen because they see how potentially it could help them 
manage their business or careers. It is a shield to hide behind, giving them the 
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opportunity to promote themselves and show how they would manage the job if left to 
their own devices. Although OAK Kaizen supporters recognise how it could help 
them and the department they are confused by mixed messages: Not everyone is 
involved and there is a perceived lack of management support. The vision for PDS 
and OAK Kaizen is unclear at a working level and the danger is that cynicism sets in 
and rots their enthusiasm. They are also scathing of the fact that people are not 
reprimanded for not supporting the activity.  
 
8.6.4  Detractors 
 
The main detractors are those people who feel threatened by the activity because it is 
seen to undermine their authority or way of life they find comfortable.  Initially some 
managers and seniors claimed they understood the business and had the necessary 
processes in place. This has now been discredited and the argument against OAK 
Kaizen has shifted from being “a theoretical waste of time” to “important but the job 
must come first.” The inference is that OAK Kaizen can be side tracked to a time 
when work pressures have lessened and people have the time to think. This viewpoint 
perpetuates an organisational culture of reactivity. The Managers and Seniors do not 
always work together as a team because if a lack of common agreement of roles and 
responsibilities. They have intransigent views about how the company operates and 
are difficult to manage and although they work extremely hard, efforts are disjointed 
and not always complementary towards OAK Kaizen. Other detractors, although 
initially offering their support withdrew it once they discovered it contradicted their 
opinions of what they believed Kaizen meant. There is a dislike of structure, imposed 
processes and standardisation. It smacks of control. Codifying knowledge threatens 
their positions and futures and their ability to promote themselves. Often you find 
Managers doing the jobs of seniors and seniors doing the jobs of engineers and 
controllers. The argument that Kaizen will reduce the stressful feelings of overload 
and help them manage their business is lost on them. The paradox is that the very 
people who have not delivered, or who are struggling to deliver, pride themselves on 
delivery and are psychologically wired to value themselves in being able to manage a 
crisis.  
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8.6.5  Indifferent 
 
The fifth group are comprised of people who are indifferent to OAK Kaizen. They see 
management as being the job of managers: “It’s what they are paid for!” They are 
either not prepared or not comfortable enough to become involved in the activity. 
What ever the case, indifference in this instance is not necessarily counter productive. 
It is a fact of life and it is unreasonable to expect everyone to be positive about OAK 
Kaizen or, indeed see the bigger picture. This group needs to be managed by using the 
Knowledge Maps and making deliverables and tasks clear.   
 
8.7 Revising the OAK Methodology 
 
Based on the findings presented in Table 8.3 the OAK Methodology (Chapter 7:195-
6) evolved from ten steps to three phases and twelve steps, each with a subset of 
activities (Table 8.11). The three phases are: 
 
No Phase Countermeasures   
1 Knowledge Strategy Findings 1-13 
2 Knowledge Mapping and Mindsets Findings 14-18 
3 Knowledge Promotion Findings 19-30 
 
The author also baked the findings from the Workshops: Building Collaborative 
Relationships (Table 8.3) into the methodology but they are not easily categorised into 
the three phases, rather they should be considered as a way of working and sustaining 
the methodology.  
 
8.7.1  Phase One: Knowledge Strategy  
 
The first revision to the methodology was to drop the word “Kaizen,” as it 
inadvertently caused too many problems. It meant different things to different people. 
One engineer, who used to work in NMUK (Nissan Motors United Kingdom) refused 
to act as a pilot for the activity saying,  
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“This isn’t Kaizen. It’s not the way we used to do it. It’s not about management. It’s 
about solving problems as they arise.”  NTCE Engineer 
 
He was adamant he was correct. Discussions ensued but he was not open to other 
interpretations: It had to be his way. This in itself is about “control” and a reflection of 
an individualistic culture and is only one example of intransigent attitudes. Often, 
people would only accept an opinion or direction if it correlated with their view of the 
world. On the other hand, Japanese colleagues had no problem in accepting it as a 
Kaizen activity. They approached it organically, as a group; the British contingent 
approached it as individuals. To the Director of Product Development Support the 
word Kaizen meant more than continuous improvement. It meant a commitment to 
continuous improvement. A commitment to take responsibility and a commitment to 
deliver as promised. The second change was to the role and need for the OAK pilot. 
In line with the Managing Director’s request, the initial OAK Methodology (Chapter 
7: 194) was planned to be a bottom up exercise and led by OAK pilots who were at 
either engineer or controller level but it soon became apparent that they were unable 
to deliver the agreed maps. Although supposedly empowered by the Managing 
Director and the Director of Product Development Support they were not able to 
authorise change or insist people attended the meetings because their efforts were 
subsequently blocked by either the seniors or the managers. One PDS British Manager 
in particular was affronted by not being involved at every stage and complained: 
 
“I cannot abide a process which misses out a line of management. I’ll have nothing to 
do with it.”  NTCE British Manager 
 
Empowerment is about giving employees the responsibility for decision making and 
the freedom, autonomy and self-control over their work and has to be allowed to 
develop over time through a change in beliefs, and attitudes of participants (Pieperi, 
1997). An empowered workforce is said to lead to innovation and improved 
organisational performance (Nixon, 1995) but despite the rhetoric many companies 
fail to involve employees and it seems for some PDS managers and seniors, their staff 
are “empowered to do as they are told.” 
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“I’m the organ grinder; they’re the monkeys. They do what I tell them to do.” NTCE 
British Senior 
 
Knowledge Strategy comprises of four steps and is the responsibility of the Managers 
and Seniors. In setting the strategy the Managers and Seniors are agreeing the 
direction for the section and answering the charge staff had said about a lack of 
direction. 
 
Step  1.1 Agree Role of Section 
 
At every level there was disagreement about the role of the section. Director, Manager, 
Senior, Engineer and Controller all had different and often conflicting views about 
their role in the company which often meant they had their own agendas.  In setting 
up sections, the Directors had assumed that in giving the section a name and broadly 
explaining the direction, everyone would have the same level of understanding about 
its role which was not the case. The role of the section emerged given time and the 
individual aspirations of the people involved. The author’s counter measure was to 
produce a template which asked three key questions and was based on work by 
Radtke (1998).   
 
1. What is the purpose of the section?  (What are the organisational needs or 
opportunities that the section addresses?)         
2. What is the business of the section? (How does the section address these 
needs?)  
3. What are the section’s commitments? (When will the section address these 
needs?)   
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Role of Trial Build Engineering – VY6 
   
Physical Build 
 
[What] Support top level project planning in respect to physical trial requirements. 
 
• Provide feedback to PMD about achievability of Project Master Schedules. 
• Provide feedback to PMD Planning Paper about feasibility of vehicle assembly 
timing, location and quantity. 
 
Plan the detailed activity required to deliver Physical Build activities in line with PMD 
planning papers. 
 
[How] 
[How] • Prepare detailed Body/Vehicle assembly plan and maintain NETS accordingly. • Estimate manpower requirements and confirm that NLH can match requirements. 
• Agree physical build job-share with BX6 
 
[When]         In line with timing on Master Schedule 
Figure 8.7: Example of Completed Role of Trial Build Engine 
 
The author found that verbal agreements were still open to conjecture and that 
discussions only became meaningful when the Managers and Seniors actually tried to 
write down the role of the section. The written word somehow demanded more 
attention, probably because it was becoming a contract of employment. Some found 
writing a problem and others wrote long descriptive pieces, which were more about 
justifying their jobs rather than the role of the section. The template was introduced to 
shape their thoughts and force a concise writing style that allowed the roles of the 
sections to be compared and understood. Once agreed and cross checked with both the 
Departmental and Sectional Strategy and Objectives it was levelled with the Director. 
In setting and agreeing the role of the section the organisation is not only telling 
people what they should be doing it is also giving them the respect they need as 
individuals. Respect is an attitude, or value, that people matter in the sense they are 
cared about (Addleson, 2000).  Figure 8.7 shows how Trial Build Engineering used 
the template and the questions to define the role of the section. 
  
Step 1.2  Make Inter-relationship Map 
 
In this the Managers and Seniors make an Inter-relationship Map identifying activities 
undertaken by the section and the processes by which they are managed.  
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 An Inter-relationship Map shows the customer supplier relationships or how 
processes are linked, arrows are drawn from each process to all the other processes 
with which it impacts (Figure 8.8). Interrelationship Maps are useful for quickly 
identifying where a change to one process may affect another and to distinguishes the 
predominant processes within a section; although the Maps are most often used to 
show the “big picture view” they portray how the major functions of the business 
interact and can be drawn for any level of the organisation (Damelio, 1996). Once the 
Inter-relationship Map is made, the Manager and Senior use the Role of the Section as 
a qualifying statement to identify value added and non value added processes and 
activities undertaken by the section. They ask themselves a very simple question: “If 
this is the role of the section should we be doing this work? From the exercise in 
Product Development Support, the answers fell into three categories:   
 
• Adds value to the section 
• Adds value to the company but not the section/department. 
• Has no value to the section or the company. 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Extract from PDS Inter-relationship Map 
TBC
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At departmental level 14 % of process were said not to add value (Figure 8.9) these 
were transferred to the most relevant departments, or discussions were opened with 
the heads of those departments: getting them to accept responsibility for those 
processes was not always easy. At section level, decisions were made as to whether to 
stop the activity or transfer it to other sections within Product Development Support. 
92
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 Figure 8.9:  PDS Value Added/Non Value Activities 
 
Step 1.3 Organise Around Knowledge 
 
Once the department or section is stripped of non-value added jobs it is time to focus 
on objectives and deliverables and reorganise around the knowledge that is crucial to 
the success of the business. Each Manager was given a list of processes he was 
responsible for and he in turn, delegated that responsibility and the appropriate 
processes to his Seniors or Controllers. The difficulty here came not in agreeing 
objectives or deliverables but in the realisation that effective reorganisation and re-
appropriating processes meant that a manager would lose some of the people 
reporting to him. It threatened hierarchy, careers, well won power bases and spans of 
control. Taking the logic further, it even threatened livelihoods by questioning why 
Product Development Support needed six highly paid managers. Work was divided 
between sections in Barcelona and Cranfield and managers were doing aspects of the 
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same job, and sometimes the same job for different projects in different ways. It made 
sense to centralise the job in either location but each site had a different manger. The 
compromise was talk of working together, dual responsibilities and dotted lines of 
reporting functions. The Director of PDS argued: 
 
“I’ve two experienced managers who have been with the company for a long time. 
Surely we will benefit and the company will benefit if we can get them to work 
together.” 
 
Step 1.4 Prioritise Processes to be Captured 
 
The next step is to prioritise the processes to be captured, this was done using a 
workload analysis matrix which showed the timing for upcoming projects and showed 
what processes needed to be in place by when (Table 8.6). Completing the matrix 
enables the senior to prioritise the knowledge mapping activities. The analysis sheet 
also shows the resources available and capable of carrying out the processes and the 
time necessary to perform each process (Table 8.7). 
 
Process/Activity
Value 
added/Non-value 
added VA/NVA
Activity/Sub-process Who Resource
Man Hrs PW
Existing
(documented)
Exists but 
needs 
update
New H M L Project to 
Support
Date 
Required
Ordering
NVA Design release (Proto ANEMS to NETS) DW 1 1 P32L May-05
VA Send Trial Parts Orders to suppliers (TPO Faxing) Buyers 33 1 1 P32L Dec-05
NVA Module component release monitoring & control MG 2 1 1 X61B May-05
VA Send  Special Parts Forms Buyers 5 1 1 E11A Jun-05
40
Purchasing
NVA Cost Estimation HM 10 1 1 X61B
VA Trial Parts & Tool Quotations analysis Buyers 20 1 1 X61B
VA Cost Negotiation Buyers 20 1 E11A Nov-05
VA Purchase Order Confirmation Buyers 5 1 1 E11A Aug-05
Procedure Priroty Program Stage
Supplier Management - VY4
"By focusing on NTCE's QCD targets and adhering to relevant legislation, procure trial parts to support Nissan's vehicle 
development schedules and Value-Up activities"
 
Table 8.6: Workload Analysis Sheet 
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The following table explains how the Workload Analysis Sheet can be understood by 
describing the activity against each column heading.  
 
Column Title Description/Activity 
Process/Activity: States the Main process to be mapped. 
Value Added 
/Non-Value Added 
 
Asks for a judgement: Is the process value added or non value added?. 
Activity/Sub 
process:  
 
This lists the activities or sub activities breaking the main process into 
more manageable sub-processes. This may be necessary where a single 
individual is only responsible for part of a bigger process. 
Who Individual(s) responsible for carrying out this process 
Resource  The total number of hours per week required to perform this process. 
Procedure   
  
 
Existing (documented): a procedure exists and is currently up to date. 
Exists but needs update: a procedure exists but is no longer up to date. 
New: no procedure currently exists therefore a new procedure is 
required. 
Priority  
 
The priority of the process within the section. (High/Mediuim/Low) The 
priority can be chosen due to a number of factors such as: - 
• Percentage of resource required on section 
• No procedure exists or current not up to te and will soon be 
necessary on a specific project. 
• Number of staff that can carry out this process is limited. 
Programme Stage  
  
 
The process is necessary to support which Vehicle programme (eg. 
P32L) and the date by which the procedure needs to be completed – up 
to date. (eg. May 05) 
Table 8.7: Understanding the Workload Analysis Sheet 
 
8.7.2  Phase Two: Knowledge Mapping & Mindsets 
 
Phase Two is about understanding the business; making the Knowledge Maps, 
deciding the necessary mindsets and specifying what needs to be delivered, when it 
needs to be delivered and why and how it needs to be delivered.  
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Step 2.1:  Make Knowledge Map 
 
The Knowledge Maps were made from the perspective of the people working in 
Product Development Support. Culturally, the Four Field Knowledge Maps (Chapter 
7: 178) proved inadequate and through the pilot expanded into eleven fields to act as a 
countermeasure to some of the previously mentioned findings of the study. The author 
imagines the original format may have sufficed at Komatsu, Texas instruments’ 
semiconductor plant in Kyshu given the Japanese sense of collective responsibility but 
it needed to be more focused and responsibilities needed formalising to accommodate 
NTCE’s individualistic organisational culture.   
 
 
Figure 8.10: Knowledge Map European Specification Tender Management 
 
Step 2.1.1   Title 
  
The title of the Knowledge Map, in the example above shown as European 
Specification Tender Management gives the name of the process being mapped and 
the knowledge needed to work the process. Specification Tenders are used by Nissan 
to inform Suppliers about the technical requirements of a system or component. The 
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Knowledge Map shows how that information is relayed to the Supplier and managed 
by the company. 
 
 Step 2.1.2  Knowledge Map Number 
 
This is the number which has been allocated to the Knowledge Map. VYQ is the code 
name for Engineering Administration and Data Validation Section. The following 
letter and numbers indicate where the Map is stored on the Portal (NTCE Intranet). 
 
Step 2.1.3 Prior Process/Following Process 
 
These boxes show the Prior Process and the Following Process. In the example shown 
(Figure 8.10) the Prior Process is the Specification Notice, which details the 
specification and the Following Process is the Design Release, the process for issuing 
and managing the authorised drawings and associated CAD files. It is linked to the 
Generic Master Schedule and informs the reader where the processes and the people 
doing the actual job fit into the bigger picture of Design and Development. It also 
shows which processes need to be improved if the inputs from the prior process are 
sub-standard. Defining inputs and outputs not only for the overall process but also for 
its sub processes will help focus the process flow, aid in identifying Key Performance 
Indicators and in determining the timing of sub processes.   
  
Step 2.1.4 Objective 
 
This box clarifies the objective of this process, if the objective is not clear, it is 
difficult to find the most efficient way of achieving and meeting the objective. In the 
example the objective is “for the creation and release of Specification Tenders to 
initiate Supplier activity in support of the Design Release Process.” It defines a clear 
objective for the whole process and also the sectional objective as part of that process. 
This was found to be necessary to keep a focus on the overall purpose of the process 
and to aid in determining what is in and out of scope with regard to the mapping 
activity itself and ensuring people have a common purpose which in itself builds trust 
(Kramer, 1999).  
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Step 2.1.5  Level of the Knowledge Map and Date Issued 
 
The level and date the Knowledge Map is issued is necessary for tracking purposes 
and ensuring the latest level Map is being used. It also acts as a history file to ensure 
lessons are learnt and mistakes are not repeated and for people to demonstrate the 
benefits gained by mapping knowledge and to see how knowledge and experience 
have improved the process.  
 
Step 2.1.6  Owner 
 
This is the role of the person accountable to Senior Management for delivering the 
objectives of the process. He or she manages the process and is responsible for the 
upkeep of the Knowledge Map. This clearly lets others in the company know who 
they should contact if there is a problem with the process or if the process 
requirements change or if the Inputs/Outputs need to change. Allocating an owner was 
perhaps the most important change to the knowledge map. The study proved that if a 
process does not have someone accountable for it, it is less likely to be performed 
well. Meetings were held, processes were mapped but there was no collective sense of 
responsibility or in many cases, agreement about who should deliver what when 
things went awry.  It was difficult to ascertain whether people were shirking 
responsibility or genuinely had different interpretations and understanding of their 
responsibilities but it was clear that discussions only became meaningful and delivery 
guaranteed when people were allocated responsibilities and names were put against 
each knowledge map. Managers were given responsibility for all the processes 
grouped and ballooned together as being their responsibility on the interrelationship 
map. Similarly, the managers appropriated responsibility to their seniors for sectional 
processes and for producing the appropriate knowledge maps. The seniors then 
allocated the tasks shown on the knowledge maps to their staff. In the example shown, 
the Senior of VY2 (a subset of VYQ) is the responsible engineer and owner of the 
Knowledge Map.  
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Step 2.1.7 Stakeholders 
 
These boxes list all the stakeholders at organisational, divisional, departmental or 
sectional level involved in the process and show exactly what they are responsible and 
accountable for or that they need to be consulted or informed about something that 
has happened in the process. It is a formalised and structured network of contacts 
which legitimises contact between those involved and goes some way to mimicking 
the more social and informal networks in NTC by acting as an invitation to dialogue. 
It gives them permission to enter a community for the purpose of executing their jobs 
and the author hopes that by knowing and fulfilling their job role they will win the 
necessary respect and recognition they need from their management and peers. They 
will also earn trust and be given the support they need to do their jobs and with time 
relationships will mature and they will feel safe in their work. Building a culture of 
trust will let the dialogue go to another level; socialisation allows the company to 
learn how to share substantive matters (Buckman, 2004). Knowledge is more easily 
disseminated between people who interact socially, have developed trusting 
relationships and share common values and norms (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) 
 
Step 2.1.8 Process Flow 
 
This shows the flow of information between the different stakeholders which is 
managed by the process owner. The steps for agreeing the process are shown below:- 
  
• Identify, at high-level, the main activities (core processes) that occur 
within the overall process. 
• Gradually breakdown these activities into sub-activities adding more detail 
as necessary. Breaking the process down in this way helps maintain focus 
on the process objective. 
• Using Knowledge Map symbols (Figure 8.11) transfer the process flow 
onto a Knowledge Map and add task descriptions, any necessary skills, 
tools, and identify the Key Performance Indicators needed to measure the 
progress of the process.  
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• The final level should show enough detail to understand, monitor, manage, 
and analyse performance. 
 
Step 2.1.8.1  
 
 The symbols used for making the Knowledge Map are those recommended by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation. (Figure 8.11) 
 
 
Action/Process 
Start or End 
On Page Connector 
System Activity 
Decision 
Document 
End 
No 
Yes Yes 
Direction of Flow 
Off Page Connector 
Start 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11: Knowledge Map Symbols 
(International Organisation for Standardisation, ISO 5807 (n.d.)). 
 
Step 2.1.9 Time 
 
This box shows the time it takes an experienced, competent person to carry out the 
task and can be in minutes/hours/days/months/day of week. By using the “ideal” or 
“target” time, rather than actual time it is easier to identify where staff need to be 
developed and can be used to support personal development and training plans. It also 
shows, in relation to “Start of Production” (SOP) when the activity takes place. 
During the study completion of this box was perhaps the most contentious – and still 
is - because it smacked of time and control” and people worried that if they failed to 
deliver within the allotted time they would be blamed      
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2.1.10 Task Box 
 
The task box provides details of how to perform the task or activity and also includes 
“care-points” or guidance notes based on experience to ensure past mistakes are not 
repeated. 
 
Step 2.1.11 Tools/Forms/Skills 
 
This box lists all the Tools/Forms/Skills required to perform the task. E.g. Excel Skills, 
Negotiation skills, Spanish etc. and the required level of attainment necessary to help 
people learn the process more quickly,  support staff training plans and risk 
management. This box also houses the agreed Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for 
the process. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) help define and measure progress 
toward goals. They are quantifiable measurements that reflect the critical success 
factors of the process. In developing KPIs, a user or developer defines target 
performance levels and then decides the best way to represent variance from that 
target.  (Information Builders, n.d.). KPIs should complement a business overall 
targets and relate to its core activities and can be used as a performance management 
and improvement tool by focusing employees on achieving the business goals 
(Cranfield School of Management, n.d.) but one of the findings of the study is that 
there is a danger of “tick box” management in focusing on KPIs rather than the 
process. The key learning points about setting KPIs were that they: 
 
• Must reflect and be critical to the success of the business 
• Must be measurable and comparable 
• Must allow for corrective action  
• Must be used sparingly, this keeps everyone focused on the key objectives 
and makes performance monitoring easier.  
Step 2.2 Develop the Mindset Questionnaire 
Another finding of the study was that some managers and seniors were unable to 
validate the Knowledge Maps because they lacked the necessary experience. It was 
usually because they had been promoted to managerial positions in other parts of the 
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company and then transferred to Product Development Support. The author decided to 
develop a mindset questionnaire after having witnessed many of the meetings that the 
PDS Director had with his managers. “A mindset is the habitual or characteristic 
mental attitude that determines how people interpret and respond to situations” 
(Dictionary.com, n.d.). Irrespective of subject matter, a clear pattern emerged 
highlighting that the theme and type of questions being asked were similar in each 
instance. Noting this, the idea was to make frameworks for learning or mindsets by 
capturing the questions asked during meetings. The author shared the questions with 
the Managers and Seniors but not the answers and encouraged them to find and 
explain the answers for themselves because giving people a structured set of answers 
to choose from often results in a tick box mentality. It was hoped that the working 
relationships that developed as a result of these meetings would sustain the flow of 
knowledge and experience and lead to further questions and deeper understanding and 
that this would lead to a questioning rather than a checklist mindset. Generally, 
questions asked about processes include:- 
 
• Who are the customers of the process? 
• Who performs each activity? 
• What generates the task? 
• How do we do it and why? 
• What decisions are made in the process? 
• What happens next? 
• Who reviews it and when? 
• What are the nature, frequency and cause of errors/problems? 
• How are errors/problems/exceptions handled? 
• What is the risk to the project? 
• What are the bottlenecks and why do the still exist? 
• What is the output? 
• Where does the output go? 
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The author listened, recorded and grouped the questions being asked and summarised 
them in the following table:-  
  
What is being done? Why is it being done? What else is being done? 
Who is doing it? Why are they doing it? Who else could do it? 
When are they doing it? Why then? When else could it be done?  
Where are they doing it? Why there? Where else could it be done? 
How is it being done? Why that way? How else could it be done? 
Table 8.8: Mindset Questionnaire 
 
Step 2.3 Critiquing the Standard and Format of the Knowledge Map  
 
Table 8.9: Questionnaire for Critiquing the Standardisation and Format of 
Knowledge Maps. 
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It also became apparent through the study that there needed to be a standard for 
formatting and making the Knowledge Map and an acceptable level had to be set for 
each of the eleven fields to ensure the standard was met and maintained. It was also 
important that this standard was codified to open and facilitate discussions with 
intransigent people who believed the Knowledge Maps were complete. The reason for 
their “intransigence” was difficult to categorise under one any one of the findings in 
Table 8.8 but it most certainly existed and the author’s countermeasure was to 
produce the checklist questionnaire as shown in Table 8.9.     
 
Step 2.4 Levelling the Knowledge Map 
 
The Knowledge Maps were made from the perspective of working in Product 
Development Support and once completed, they should be discussed and levelled with 
all stakeholders in the process to clarify responsibilities and expected inputs and 
outputs from all those involved in the process. This needs to happen before the 
Knowledge Map is submitted for approval by the Director of PDS and publication on 
the Portal as the “way we do things around here.”   
 
 
8.7.3  Phase Three: Knowledge Promotion 
 
Knowledge Promotion, as its name suggests is about continually promoting the 
importance of the management of knowledge within the company. The strategies for 
knowledge promotion revolve around leadership, discipline and learning. This is 
probably the most difficult of the three OAK stages because it entails a commitment 
to change not only in the way of working but to the philosophy underpinning those 
practices and ultimately the organisational culture and at the time of writing is still 
under discussion with NTCE Directors. Knowledge Promotion is about constantly 
reflecting on practice and building and sustaining an organisational knowledge base 
through the constant use of the Knowledge Maps. The Knowledge Map is a contract 
between the organisation and its members and to make them work requires discipline 
at every level of the organisation and to make this happen there has to be a long term 
commitment to OAK which has to be driven from the top.    
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The following steps outline the author’s strategies for Knowledge Promotion. 
 
Step 3.1   Make Knowledge Maps Focal to the Business 
 
The author proposes that Knowledge Maps become the focal point of the business by 
using the techniques described above. Knowledge Maps are meant to be in a constant 
state of flux always open to continuous improvement and innovation. They are not 
rigidly bureaucratic but offer a flexible framework in which to operate and people are 
able to change the map at any time providing it improves efficiency. They are social 
support systems for decision making, knowledge application, communication, 
dialogue and for finding information. They allow for different cultural interpretations 
and accommodate people to learn in different ways and should be constantly critiqued 
with a view to improving efficiency and issues resolved as they arise.  
 
VY0/VY6 Project & Concern Issues
Name Date Raised Dept Effect
Project 
Effected Concern Countermeasure
Repetitive 
Concern Y/N
Closed / 
Open
David Maxwell 15-Apr-04 VY6 E11A
Karmann Data was 
repeated on 
various TCF'S, 
printing of paper 
copies was also 
required to cross 
reference data.  
Feedback required 
to Karmann, 
requires a more 
efficient method of 
checking that NTC-
Europe receive all 
the correct data.
5 hrs Y C
Neil Fleury 21-Apr-04 VY6 P32L
Design had gained 
access to a 
complete space 
vision cell, and 
then saved over 
VY6 completed 
work.
Restored the file to 
last saved copy, via 
IT.  Read only 
access outside of 
VY6.
10 hrs N C
Kim Dennis 22-Apr-04 VY0 E11A
C2 - metal tooling 
not K/O to plan 
resulting in 
probable late parts. 
VY6/5/2/3 were 
requested to 
gather information 
at short notice to 
support a meeting.  
Information was 
gathered from 
various lists from 
different sources 
(Design, NMUK, 
VY5, VY2, and 
VY3.
1 Control Document 
(ETRS). 
20 hrs N
Additional 
Hours 
 
Table 8.10: Proposed Concerns and Opportunity Log 
 
The author initially proposed that each section kept a log of concerns and 
opportunities for review (Table 8.10) which gives a brief description of the concern 
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and countermeasure and also the amount of time it took to resolve along with the 
name of the engineer who raised the concern, the date on which it was raised and the 
affected department and project in question but the sections involved in the PDS pilot 
found it easier to highlight areas on working drafts of the Knowledge Maps rather 
than continually updating the Concerns and Opportunity Log.   
 
Step 3. 2  Train Staff 
 
People have to be motivated to learn and if that learning is not intrinsic, from within 
the individual then it must be extrinsically motivated, which means it has to be from 
the environment (Fontana, 1985). To extrinsically motivate people the author 
proposes to change the current task based skills matrices (Figure 8.12) to one which is 
built around Knowledge Maps and then reward people for their performance against 
the maps (Figure 8.13).   
SKILL MATRIX - PROTOTYPE ENGINEERING (VY6)
Points
Section VY6 - Prototype Engineering I
Group L
Date U
O
A B C D E F G H
O O I U I N/A I N/A
O O I U I N/A L O
U U I I I N/A N/A N/A
I I U O N/A N/A N/A N/A
I I O N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
I I O N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Staff
Chassis structure
Project Management
Vehicle Structure
Engine Structure
DMDR Planning
 SECTION 1  -  Skill Listing 
DMDR Execut ion
 EXPERT - Highly competent, can train others 
Tasks
SECTION 2  -  Current Level
Individual Current Level 
Nissan Technical Centre Europe
 AWARE - Basic appreciation but limited experience 
 FAMILIAR - Detailed knowledge, and practical experience 
 SKILLED - Considerable knowledge and expertise 
 
Figure 8.12: Current NTCE Skills Matrices Built Around Tasks 
 
The current Skills Matrices lists the task:- DMDR (Digital Mock Up Design Review) 
Planning,  DMDR Execution, Project Management etc. and against each staff member 
(A-H) rates them as Being Aware (I), Familiar (L), Skilled (U) or Expert (O). The 
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proposed Skills Matrices lists the Knowledge Maps, in the following example shown 
as the Design Element Plan (Reference Number VYS-06-A-003), list the necessary 
skills or knowledge (Planning Paper Knowledge Map, Meeting Skills, Basic MS 
Excel Skills etc.) and against staff members (A-F). The proposed Skills Matrices also 
includes columns for individual target capability levels and existing and target levels 
for the section. 
 
Nissan Technical Centre Europe
Tasks / Skill / Knowledge / Process
Name Reference Number AA BB CC DD EE FF
Design Element Plan Process [Key Process] Design Element Plan VYS-06-A-003
Planning Paper Knowledge Map K K O - I I L
ETRS Knowledge Map K K U - I I U
Meeting skills K K O - L I L
Listening skills K K U - L I U
Basic communication skills K K O - U I U
Basic MS Excel skills K K L I U I I
Basic MS Outlook skills K K U I U I I
Design Element Plan Job Instruction K K O I I I L
Intermediate MS Excel skills K K O I I I L
WIN CMA Publishing skills K K O L L I L
Time Management skills K K O I I I I
Knowledge Map
SECTION 2  -  Current Level / Target
Individual Current Level
Aware - Basic appreciation, but limited experience
Familiar - Detailed knowledge and practical experience
Skilled - Considerable knowledge and expertise
Expert - Highly competent, can train others
SKILL MATRIX - TRIAL 
ENGINEERING (VY6)
 
Figure 8.13: Proposed NTCE Skills Matrices Built Around Knowledge Maps 
 
The author proposes people are made responsible for their own training. The manager 
has the responsibility for developing his senior and the senior has the responsibility 
for developing his staff but the training and development plans are owned by the staff 
members themselves. They are responsible for attending the relevant courses as 
provided by the company and in effect become responsible for their own learning. 
This cycle of continuous learning is explained in Figure 8.14. Targets are set against 
the learning necessary to execute tasks shown on the Knowledge Maps and capability 
is improved over time. The Knowledge Maps are continuously updated and improved 
from the experience of daily business and there are regular reviews with employees to 
gauge the effect and success of their learning (Figure 8.14). 
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Figure 8.14: Cycle for Continuous Learning 
 
Step 3.3  Reward Performances, Learning and the Management of Knowledge 
 
Nissan, as already discussed is driven by management intent on meeting objectives. 
Promotion depends on performance; it is a race, a competition. It is about the survival 
of the fittest where comparisons are made and achievements are scrutinised and 
measured. The company wants people to capture, codify and share knowledge and yet 
rewards people for individual contributions through Management By Objectives 
which can inhibit cooperation in teams (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1992). 
Management has to strike a balance and move from command and control to direct 
and enable. Carroll et al. (2003) report that organisations move out of the control 
stage when they recognise the limitations of top-down control and start to promote 
participation and the open exchange of information throughout the organisation and 
between the organisation and the outside world. It is a difficult balance and needs to 
be culturally mediated to ensure organisational efficiency and sustainability.  
 
People are reluctant to share knowledge because they fear being marginalised or 
becoming expendable. Neither will they learn in a vacuum, their learning has to have 
meaning in that it addresses what they perceive is important to them and is relevant to 
Continuous Learning
Knowledge 
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    John Temple                                                                                                              248
  
 
the context in which learning takes place. They are also looking for a return on their 
investment for the time and effort it takes them to learn and most frequently this is in 
the form of reward and recognition, which may lead to greater job security and 
enhanced career prospects (Antonacopoulou, 1999). Knowledge is power; it gives 
people a sense of worth, a position of privilege and superiority or they may resent not 
being adequately rewarded for sharing for what they believe, is hard-won success 
(Szulanski and Capetta, 2003).  
 
The author does not propose that the company abandons Management By Objectives,  
but to use a combination of individual and team based incentives to encourage people 
to share (Foss and Mahnke, 2003) and work collaboratively which is crucial for 
successful knowledge management activities (Quinn et al 1996; Pan and Scarborough, 
1999). He also suggests that teams are empowered to distribute rewards amongst 
themselves based on a subjective evaluation of performance. This is based on their 
having inside knowledge about team dynamics, and of how individuals have 
contributed to the team performance which, according to Gibbons (1998) is probably 
superior to that of external management.  
 
Step 3.4   Audit Knowledge Maps 
 
The author proposes to have independent audits made of the Knowledge Maps. Staff 
“hide” things, whether consciously or unconsciously is debateable but independent 
audits are necessary to ensure consistent and sustainable working practices.  
Independent audits are also necessary to confirm that people are actually doing what 
they say they are doing rather than what they “think” they are doing.  
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Phase Title Step Activity  Responsibility 
1.1 Agree Role of Section 
1.2 Make Inter-Relationship 
Map 
1.3 Organise Around 
Knowledge 
1 Knowledge Strategy 
1.4 Prioritise Process to Capture 
Manger and Senior 
2.1 Make Knowledge Map 
2.2 Develop Mindset 
Questionnaire 
2.3 Critique the Standard and 
Format of the Knowledge 
Map  
2 Knowledge Mapping 
and Mindsets 
2.4 Level with all Stakeholders 
Senior, Section and 
Manager 
3.1  Make Knowledge Maps 
focal to the point of business 
 All 
3.2  Train Staff All 
3.3 Reward Performance and 
the Management of 
Knowledge 
 Director 
Managers and 
Seniors 
3 Knowledge Promotion 
3.4 Audit Knowledge Maps Audit Section  
Table 8.11: Revised OAK Methodology 
 
8.8  Presentation to PDS Director and Managers July 2005 
 
The author presented the results of the study and the proposed OAK Methodology to 
the PDS Director and Managers in July 2005. Whilst accepting the themes, results and 
initial analysis of the study the PDS Director was concerned that they were subjective 
rather than objective and believed they would be dismissed by the other Directors as 
inconsequential.  
 
“Engineers deal in facts. That’s all they are interested in. You know what they are 
like. They see themselves as being logical and rationale. I agree with all you say. I’ve 
lived it. I’ve seen it for myself but how do we convince them?”  PDS Director 
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 8.9  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented Phase One of the Pilot to Organise Around Knowledge 
(OAK) in Product Development Support Department (PDS). It began with a short 
description of the purpose, structure and composition of the department and then 
outlined the emerging and changing research structure and methodology and then 
discussed and presented a summary of the results of the pilot activity.  Phase One of 
the pilot showed that Product Development Support is not fully in control of its 
business and that  processes are unclear, out of date or non-existence and there is a 
difference of opinion about roles and responsibilities at all levels. It also showed that 
people need recognition, respect, reward, trust, support, safety and healthy 
relationships not only to make the Knowledge Maps work. The author used the 
findings of the study to revise the OAK Methodology but the Directors still not 
convinced, they needed facts and objective data. The chapter concluded with a 
detailed description of the revised OAK Methodology. This chapter made the 
following theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge. 
  
8.9.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
  
• NTCE has relied on individuals to drive it forwards and is not learning from 
past mistakes.  
• There is a blame culture at NTCE and past change programmes have failed to 
become embedded leaving the workforce cynical about any new initiative 
resulting in resistance to change. These organisational mindsets have been 
allowed to develop over the years and are contrary to the efficient running of 
the department.   
• People need affirmative feelings of Recognition, Respect, Reward, Trust, 
Support, Safety and Relationships to work efficiently. Although these feelings 
are the same as needed by human beings to thrive in any circumstances it is 
important to note that this research indicates that the words labelling these 
emotions are culturally mediated and had different connotations depending not 
    John Temple                                                                                                              251
  
 
only on the nationality of the people involved but also the organisations to 
which they belonged.  
 
8.9.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
 
• Understand the culturally mediated affirmative meanings of Recognition, 
Respect, Reward, Trust, Support, Safety and Relationships in the organisations 
in which they work 
 
The next chapter presents and debates the results of phase two of the pilot and 
concludes the field work for the study. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
Phase Two: Organise Around Knowledge  
 
9.0  Introduction 
 
The Chapter describes Phase Two of the Study to Organise Around Knowledge 
(OAK) where the author revisits, reconfigures and justifies his findings based on both 
subjective to objective data. It also reflects on the key findings of the study and shows 
how organisational cultures can sometimes become dysfunctional and closes Section 
Three of the thesis.   
 
 
 
SECTION THREE: Developing and 
implementing a Strategy to Organise Around 
Knowledge 
Chapter Six: Putting a face to Knowledge 
Management at NTCE  
Chapter Seven:  The proposal to Organise 
Around Knowledge 
Chapter Eight: Phase One Pilot to Organise 
Around Knowledge 
Chapter Nine: Phase Two Organise Around 
Knowledge  
SECTION FOUR: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan 
and Conclusion to the Study  
Chapter Ten: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan 
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion; 
Contributions to Knowledge 
Management within NTCE and 
implications for further study.  
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9.1  A New Strategy 
 
“Engineers deal in facts. That’s all they are interested in. You know what they are 
like. They see themselves as being logical and rationale. I agree with all you say. I’ve 
lived it. I’ve seen it for myself but how do we convince them?”  PDS Director 
 
The author struggled with this conundrum for quite sometime. The basic premise of 
his argument is that efficient knowledge management is in identifying and organising 
around the knowledge which is crucial to the future of the company. The study to date 
had resulted in the OAK Methodology and the feelings underpinning the collaborative 
relationships thought necessary to successfully implement and use Knowledge Maps. 
It was this train of thought that led to the development of the next part of the research 
strategy.  Previously the author surmised that for the Maps to work then staff have to 
behave and feel in a certain way. Taking this logic further it seems reasonable to 
assume that for the Maps to work people have to behave in a certain way, feel a 
certain way and be managed in a certain way for the efficient management of 
knowledge. (Figure 9.1)   
 
  
 
Behave like 
this.. 
  
Managed 
  like this.. 
 
 
Knowledge
 Map 
 
 
Feel like  
this.. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 9.1: Managing the Knowledge Maps 
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Based on this hypothesis the author devised a strategy to identify and quantify these 
managerial attributes. He proposed that the pilot continued in PDS for a further six 
months using and testing out the revised OAK Methodology. During that time, he and 
his colleagues would hold a series of workshops at Managerial, Senior and Staff 
levels. There would be two workshops, the first in August to identify and quantify the 
necessary managerial behaviours and the second in December to confirm the August 
findings. Once again, the strategy which is presented in Figure 9.2 is shown as a linear 
activity but in reality it emerged over time. In between these workshops the author 
proposed to revisit the original interviews to triangulate and quantify the findings with 
the seven Behavioural Workshops held to identify the way staff needed to feel to 
work collaboratively and successfully implement OAK. 
 
 
Revised OAK Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pilot Continues 
Workshops: 
Building Collaborative 
Relationships II 
 
Output: Behaviours 
August 2005 
Workshops: 
Building Collaborative 
Relationships III 
 
Output: Behaviours 
December 2005
Presentation to Managing Director NTCE 
March 2006 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Phase Two: Research Structure 
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9.2 Building Collaborative Relationships II 
 
There were three peer led workshops, the author led the management group, the 
Senior of the Knowledge Management Section led the workshops with his peers and 
an engineer from the Knowledge Management section led the group comprising of 
staff from the engineer/controller and administration level of the company (Table 9.1). 
This was felt necessary to facilitate a more open and honest response at every level 
but the methodology employed for each workshop was the same.  
 
Workshop Total Number in PDS Number of Workshop Attendees 
Managers 6 5 
Seniors 12 9 
Engineers/Controllers, 
Administration Officers 
and Assistants 
80 17 
Table 9.1: Number of Attendees for Building Collaborative Relationships 
Workshops II 
 
Each group was asked how they needed to be managed and how they needed to 
manage themselves to successfully implement the OAK Methodology. They recorded 
their answers on post-it notes which were then collaboratively and consensually 
grouped as themes and underlying factors and duplicates were removed (Table 9.2). 
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Themes Underlying factors 
Mixed reaction about activity Experimentation, Communication 
Some sections seem reluctant to admit benefits of 
activity Feedback, Evaluation, Reviewing  
Some sections very positive found 10 Step 
Methodology extremely useful (Even if OAK 
activity is abandoned section will continue to use 
methodology). 
Self-discipline, developing capabilities 
Shows we are not in control of our business 
Management, Leadership, Discipline, 
accountability 
Too much knowledge is concentrated in too few 
individuals. 
Collaboration, sharing, training, development 
Value added/non value added activities very 
useful 
Asking why, Evaluation, Identifying 
opportunities 
Useful as learning tool and training experience  
Training method, Personal development, 
Improved quality, Fewer resources 
Failure and reluctance of some seniors to see the 
bigger picture 
Business ability, high-level communication, 
company vision,  
Knowledge management not seen as being part of 
their job. 
Self-development, personal development, 
discipline, delivering quicker and with fewer 
resources 
Don’t want to codify/share their knowledge 
Job insecurity, lack of infrastructure for 
knowledge sharing, lack of time 
Contractors not interested Professionalism, incentives 
Company at risk by have too many self interested 
contractors 
company strategy, sharing, respect 
Cynical workforce 
poor planning, lack of feedback, alignment with 
strategy 
Seen as another initiative, another management 
fad that would disappear.  
poor planning, knee-jerk actions, lack of joined-
up management, unwillingness to experiment 
Counterproductive associations with Fast D Lack of follow-through,  
Table 9.2: List of “Themes and Underlying Factors” from the Behavioral 
Workshops
  
The author, together with the leaders of the other two groups took the resultant themes 
and underlying factors and collectively made an affinity diagram (Figure 9.3) and 
again removed duplicates and agreed that the main managerial attributes required for 
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the effective implementation of OAK could be grouped under the following six 
headings: Leadership, Management, Teamwork, Professionalism, Entrepreneurship 
and Authority (Expertise) 
 
 
.   
Figure 9.3: Affinity Diagram of the Main Managerial Attributes Required for 
the Effective Implementation of OAK  
 
The author recognised that the six main managerial attributes required for the 
effective implementation of OAK did not occur in isolation but that they were related 
to each other. By analysing the number of connections between the six factors (Table 
9.3) and representing each bi-polar connection as a percentage of the total number of 
connection (Table 9.4) the author was able to quantify, or rather present qualitative 
data statistically and conclude that Leadership, Management and Professionalism 
have the greatest influence at this point in time on the successful implementation of 
the OAK methodology (Table 9.3). 
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Table 9.3: Correlating the Six Main Managerial Attributes required for the 
effective implementation of OAK with the Underlying Themes. 
 
For example, taking the first line of the above chart the author and the leaders of the 
other two groups decided that “Experimentation” and “Communication” impacted 
Leadership, Management, Teamwork and Entrepreneurship.   
 
 
Figure 9.4: Graph One Showing the Degree of Interdependency between the Six 
Managerial Factors  
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By taking each of the factors individually and counting the number of times there is a 
connection with each of the other five factors, we can see the nature of the 
interdependencies that exist between all six factors. For example, examining the first 
row in the table, we can see that ‘Experimentation, Communication’ is determined by 
Leadership, Management, Teamwork and Entrepreneurship. Thus, there are three 
connections between Leadership and the remaining five factors: Leadership-
Management, Leadership-Teamwork and Leadership-Entrepreneurship. Looking at all 
the underlying factors where Leadership is a determinant, we can see that there are 
fifteen instances where Leadership is a factor and that there are a total of thirty-five 
connections with the other five factors. The most numerous is the interdependency 
between Leadership and Management which represents fifteen of the thirty-five  
connections (42.9%), followed by Professionalism with 22.4%, Teamwork (17.3%), 
Entrepreneurship (10.2%) and Authority (7.1%). (Figure 9.4) 
 
Managerial Attribute Behavioural Percentage 
Management 29.6% 
Leadership 20.4% 
Professionalism 19.5% 
Teamwork 12.2% 
Entrepreneurship 9.9% 
Authority 8.4% 
Table 9.4: Managerial Attributes Behavioural Percentages (One) 
 
Analysing all of the six factors individually and avoiding double-counting i.e. 
Leadership-Management and Management-Leadership, we see that the six managerial 
attributes are not of equal importance in determining the successful implementation of 
the OAK program. Management, Leadership and Professionalism are the most 
important of the six factors. 
 
From these initial results the author concludes: 
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1. For OAK to work, there has to be strong Leadership, Management and 
Professionalism 
2. Entrepreneurship and Authority are relatively minor influences on the 
success of OAK within PDS at this time. 
3. The biggest factors on the Leadership required to make OAK work are its 
Management ability and Professionalism. 
4. Similarly, Managers who wish to implement OAK effectively must have 
strong Leadership and Professionalism. 
5. Authority of Leaders and Managers within PDS is not seen as less 
important to make OAK work. 
6. Management and Leadership have the biggest impact on whether the 
necessary Teamwork and Professionalism exists for OAK to flourish. 
7. There is a perception that Entrepreneurship is not an important requisite 
for OAK to be successful, but that the existence of the necessary 
Entrepreneurship is determined primarily by Management. An individual’s 
Professionalism and the effect of the Leadership are the next two biggest 
determinants. 
 
9.3   Building Collaborative Relationships III  
 
The third Collaborative Workshop was held in December 2005 and followed the same 
methodology as employed for Workshop II. The Workshops were led by the same 
people and a similar number of people attended. 
 
Workshop Total Number in PDS Number of Workshop Attendees 
Managers 6 5 
Seniors 12 10 
Engineers/Controller, 
Administration Officers and 
Assistants 
78 16 
Table 9.5: Breakdown of Workshop Attendees 
 
Again, each group was asked how they needed to be managed and how they needed to 
manage themselves to successfully implement the OAK Methodology. They recorded 
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their answers on post-it notes which were then collaboratively and consensually 
grouped as themes and underlying factors and a graph made of the resultant themes 
and affinity diagram (Figure 9.5). 
 
 
Figure 9.5: Graph Two Showing the Degree of Interdependency between the Six 
Managerial Factors  
The results of Workshop III concurred with those of the previous workshop, in that  
Management, Leadership and Professionalism remain the biggest influencing factors 
on the success of the OAK rollout (Knowledge Maps) and that there remain 
deficiencies in the way PDS is managed that prevent the department from reaping the 
full benefits from Organising Around Knowledge (Table 9.6). 
 
Managerial Attribute Behavioural Percentage 
Management 25.5% 
Leadership 22.0% 
Professionalism 19.9% 
Teamwork 17.7% 
Entrepreneurship 8.0% 
Authority 6.9% 
Table 9.6: Managerial Attributes Behavioural Percentages (Two) 
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From Workshop III the author concludes: 
 
The importance of Leadership, Management and Professionalism remain as important. 
1. The Management ability of the Leadership is seen as slightly less 
important as it was in the initial study, but Teamwork is seen as more 
important. 
2. The Entrepreneurial ability of the Management is seen as a less important 
factor in the successful rollout of OAK. Their Leadership is seen as more 
important, but their Professionalism has declined as a factor 
3. Although authority remains a minor influence on the success of OAK, it is 
seen as being based much more strongly on a person’s Professionalism and 
less on their ability to Teamwork. 
4. A person’s authority has become a less important factor in the effective 
Teamwork required to roll OAK out successfully. 
5. Management’s influence on the Professionalism required to make OAK 
work is seen as being much weaker, but there needs to be a good level of 
Teamwork. 
6. Teamwork is seen as being a bigger determinant in creating the required 
entrepreneurship. This increase has come at the expense of Management, 
which is perceived as much less important. The influence of Leadership 
has increased slightly. 
 
Overall, Leadership, Management and Professionalism remain as important for 
making the knowledge maps work as in the initial study but now teamwork is seen to 
be a driving factor for change probably because the OAK Kaizen methodology is 
starting to become embedded within Product Development Support as the “way we do 
things around here” but it is still dependant on the commitment of a strong, vocal 
leadership. Initially people are resistant to change and often go through a traumatic 
process of shock and denial before they come to acknowledge and adapt to a new way 
of working (Clarke, 1994). It has not been an easy transition and various strategies 
have been employed to facilitate the introduction of change as identified by Kotter 
and Schlesigner (1979) and have included education and communication, 
participation and involvement, facilitation and support, negotiation and agreement. It 
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has also been necessary for manipulation, co-option and explicit and implicit coercion 
to make things happen. 
 
9.4  Company Infrastructure 
 
A key finding of the study is that Nissan’s Technical Centre Europe’s infrastructure 
for business processes is not integrated. The company has a culture of reactive 
management which has inadvertently and unconsciously allowed this to happen.  
Drucker (1989) argues that although a good organisational structure does not 
necessarily guarantee good performance, a poor one, no matter how good the 
individual managers may be, make good performance impossible. In organising and 
re-organising NTCE, Directors and Managers spend time discussing and agreeing 
organisational structures and spans of control but there has been little or no thought 
about the design of the business infrastructure, which is wrongly assumed to be in 
place. This assumption is based on a myth, which is rooted in the past that the 
company has hundreds of processes. Global Nissan does not have a strong corporate 
culture. It was established through a series of mergers and, despite the reference to 
Masujiro Hashimoto (Chapter 2: 21), the company has no clear founder, unlike other 
Japanese overseas oriented companies like Toyota (Sakichi Toyoda), Sony (Masaru 
Ibuka and Akio Morita), Honda (Soichiro Honda), and Matsushita (Konosuke 
Matsushita) whose company cultures are directed or affected by the strong 
characteristics of the founders.  
 
Take, for example, Soichiro Honda who founded Honda. He was known as the 
oriental Henry Ford and learned the hard way about quality. His first two businesses, 
an attempt at manufacturing piston rings and then another to make motorised bicycles 
with two stroke engines adapted to run on pine root extract both failed. However he 
persevered and started to reverse engineer European motorcycles, not only copying, 
but improving the design. European manufactures believed it was impossible to run 
motorcycle engines at 15,000 rpm, with even faster burst. Honda proved them wrong 
and instigated the beginnings of a company philosophy which is still followed to this 
day: Honda does not buy technology. To create is to lead. The whole secret of Honda 
was his direct participation with the organisation and its employees; sometimes that 
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involvement could be considered too direct. Carling and Heller (1995) relate this 
anecdote in their book, The Way to Win: 
 
“A bolt that had been tightened by a young worker made a few more turns when 
Honda did it himself. “You dammed fool. This is how you’re supposed to tighten 
bolts,” shouted Honda as he hit his employee over the head with a wrench.”(Carling 
and Heller, 1995: 210) 
 
An engineer who used to work at Honda’s plant in Swindon showed how this 
philosophy manifests itself in today’s working practices at Honda in the UK. 
 
“When I worked at Honda there was a saying that the Japanese, in particular were 
very keen on instilling into staff as a working culture: “Pass it on with Pride.” It 
originated from the production line and was intended to encourage staff to take pride 
in their work and pass on “quality” to the next man in the chain. It used to drive me 
mad but in hindsight it worked as at least within the office areas there wasn’t much 
“tat” passed through the administration process.” NTCE Engineer (ex-Honda 
employee 
 
Nissan was not influenced by a founder’s philosophy, policy, or image. At one level 
this gave Nissan Directors the freedom to direct as they chose. It also meant that top 
management positions were open to all employees who were motivated enough to be 
interested. However, the absence of a strong philosophy or visible embodiment of the 
founder makes it difficult to unite the whole company, provide a clear sense of 
direction and keep the company moving forwards causing the company problems. 
Although Nissan had a good reputation for high quality products it had a poor external 
image, which it tried to address in January 1987 when on the first page of its annual 
report it stated: “Nissan – growing and changing to meet the needs of today’s 
customers.” With its long history of overseas business and operations Nissan points 
out two issues as key to success, one is to be an insider in the markets in which the 
company is present and the other is to promote globalisation of the headquarters in 
Japan. Asakura and Schneider (1998) argued that the absence of a strong corporate 
philosophy impacted Nissan’s policy towards overseas operations. The company had 
a “clear and loose means policy,” in that there was no standard way of doing things 
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and providing they were operating in a way to realise Global Nissan’s objectives local 
managers were allowed a certain amount of autonomy to find their own way. They 
write: 
 
“For example while the Mexico plant is run in a typical Japanese style, the American 
one in Smyrna, Tennessee is run in an American way with American top management. 
The British plant in Sunderland is run in a half British half Japanese style. This 
variety depends on many factors such as the location form (Greenfield site or joint 
venture), history, technological level, product, human resource availability, target 
market and so on.” (Asakura and Schneider, 1998:188)  
 
It could be reasonably argued that Carlos Ghosn, CEO has become the founder of a 
“new” Nissan and is using his influence and character to direct and shape the 
organisational culture in much the same way as Soichiro Honda did with his company 
but when NTCE was formed in the early nineties, it was the “old” Nissan and the 
Japanese managers and senior engineers instructed locals through on the job training 
(Chapter 7: 180). It was the Nissan way of doing things, they collaborated with local 
staff and procedures were written, translated and adapted from the Japanese 
procedures to cover the basic processes necessary to run the business (Chapter 5: 115). 
These procedures were kept and filed away for reference in NTCE company manuals 
and formed the basis of individual learning and understanding. The problem was that 
these procedures were never updated or standardised and the learning became 
individualised and adapted for the different sections and the ever changing stream of 
managers and seniors.  
 
Knowledge became power as individuals became experts in reactive management and 
were forever adapting processes until each section managed things in a different way. 
The evidence suggests this was compounded by the cultural expectations of the 
original team of Japanese engineers who set up the company. They had come from a 
company in which the managers were all powerful and they expected this to be 
replicated at NTCE. They believed that in recruiting experienced managers from the 
UK automotive industry they would be getting a similar calibre of person and 
expected local managers to act in a similar fashion and take on the same 
responsibilities as NTC managers. In the main the Japanese engineers recognised and 
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accepted that there were differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures 
but they did not understand how those differences impacted the organisation. The 
Japanese did not necessarily understand the strength and power of the networks in 
Nissan Technical Centre and the subtle form of command and control in operation. 
Neither did they understand why local managers were not similarly imbued with an 
obligatory sense of respect and responsibility and the need for relationships and the 
need to fit in with the group.  
 
In NTC best practices, lessons learnt and processes are “offered” to managers. They 
are not enforced and standardisation is not obligatory. Managers are charged with 
delivery but how they deliver is their responsibility. The onus is on the individual to 
deliver at all costs which leads to competition and a silo mentality, all of which are 
“delivered” within the framework of a collectivist culture. In NTCE, Western 
Managers interpret the sense of respect and responsibility within an individualistic 
cultural framework that also leads to competition and silo mentalities that manifest 
themselves in a different way but in both instances it is about “self.” For NTC 
Japanese managers, “self” is negotiated through their obligatorily relationships with 
others, for NTCE Western managers, it is also negotiated but out of the necessity of 
circumstance rather than the obligation of relationships. It follows that negotiating self 
through relationships is supportive and leads to a long term view whereas negotiating 
self out of the necessity of circumstance is relatively short term.    
 
NTCE needs processes and Knowledge Maps to structure and mimic the relationships 
of Nissan Technical Centre Japan to ensure the company runs efficiently. The author 
used these insights to illustrate and explain the importance of integrating NTCE’s 
business infrastructure when presenting his case to NTCE’s Directors and further, 
used the example of product design to make his case. In designing cars the company 
sets out with a specification and then has a well proven project management template 
for design, test and final report before launching the vehicle. Each milestone has a 
countermeasure feedback loop of learning (Figure 9.6). 
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Figure 9.6: Product Design and Development 
 
In designing NTCE’s organisation the company moves from the objectives and targets 
directly to the report. The Directors spend a great deal of time carving up or building 
empires and the relevant spans of control but no, or relatively little, thought is put into 
the design of the organisation and the implications of change (Figure 9.7). This is 
compounded by the fact that the organisation is usually changed twice a year, once in 
January and again in August.  
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-Objectives 
-Specification 
- Targets 
 
Figure 9.7: Organisational Design at NTCE. 
 
The author proposed that product and organisational design should be approached in 
the same way. When designing NTCE’s organisation the company should not only 
align global, company and knowledge management strategies (Chapter 6:137) they 
should follow the OAK methodology and Organise Around Knowledge (Chapter 8: 
240), set up the necessary business infrastructure and then implement and manage the 
change with countermeasure feedback loops designed into the process. (Figure 9.8). 
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Figure 9.8: Proposal for Organisational Design at NTCE 
 
9.5  Company Initiatives Revisited 
 
The findings of the study prompted the author to revisit previous company initiatives 
that he had been involved in to a greater or lesser extent. They are COGENT, CUPID 
and FAST-D, all of which purported to contribute to improving efficiency, shortening 
design and development lead times and involved mapping processes. The COGENT 
Programme (from the Latin “to drive forward together”) ran from 1996 to 1999 and 
was designed to improve the ability of first tier suppliers to co-develop designs with 
NTCE. COGENT aimed to raise the capability of European suppliers through the 
alignment of three key elements of Product development: People, Process and 
Products. This alignment was achieved by building awareness of the need for co-
development, gaining commitment to change, identifying priority improvements and 
creating an environment for sustaining change (Wyatt, 2001). COGENT was viewed 
as a success but the methodology was dropped immediately the Company strategy 
became one of cost reduction. 
 
CUPID, was about understanding the voice of the European Customer. CUPID is an 
acronym for Customer Understanding Processes In Design. It was a three-year project, 
made between 1999 and 2002 to establish generic processes that would improve 
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product attractiveness and identify and USPs (Unique Selling Points), which could be 
designed into the product (Burns, 2003). Workshops were held across Europe to 
understand how target customers used vehicles in various scenarios including 
commuting to work, visiting friends, poor traffic conditions, off road, high volume 
loading, occasional long journeys and shopping expeditions. Although the processes 
still exist only certain aspects of them are utilised. They have degenerated into a series 
of checklists, used by NTCE engineers without them fully understanding or further 
developing the voice of the customer.   
 
The “Fast D” project was introduced for the new Almera launched in 1997.  Fast D 
was an acronym for Find A Way to STreamline Development. The author was 
Manager, responsible for the project.  It had two main aims, the first was to capture 
and record processes. The second aimed to reduce the number of design changes that 
usually happened after the design has been finalised and released for production. The 
methodology was based on analysing past data and pinpointing when and why the 
design change was made. The biggest single reason was classified as workability 
concerns or assembly problems. Each design change is estimated to cost £13,000 and 
the number of changes had run into several thousand pounds with previous vehicle 
programmes. It was recognised that “Right First Time” was unachievable in that late 
changes were always necessary to satisfy previously unidentified customer 
requirements. The engineers were set a target of reducing design changes by 80%, 
which would reduce development costs by 40% (Palmer, 2004). Once the car was 
launched people fell into their old ways of doing things and managers said they did 
not need to be micro-managed complaining that the company was already “a myriad 
of processes.” This study has proved that thinking of the company as a “myriad of 
processes” was a myth and it was widely believed.   
 
In 2000, NTCE’s Deputy Managing Director launched another initiative, called 
reNew which was aimed at shaping the future of the company with the slogan “more 
than just a car.” One of the author’s colleagues used Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) 
Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to ascertain NTCE’s 
organisational culture. The instrument, which is basically a questionnaire for 
diagnosing and changing organisational cultures is used to profile the culture as it is 
currently and then the same set of questions are asked to profile the desired 
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organisational culture, which supports the company direction. The questionnaire is 
based on the Competing Values Framework (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) and is a 
quadrant of competing values; each representing a distinct set of organisational 
effectiveness indicators which have been labelled Clan, Adhocracy, Hierarchy and 
Market (Figure 9.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clan 
 
Family, teamwork,  
participation and consensus 
Adhocracy 
 
Dynamic, innovative, creative, 
leading edge, 
unique products 
Formalised, structured 
procedures 
dependable delivery, smooth 
operations 
 
Hierarchy 
Results orientated, winning, 
competitive actions 
stretch targets 
 
 
Market 
Questionnaire - Measures how dominant each cultural definition is within NTCE 
  
 
 
Figure 9.9: The Competing Values Framework  
(Adapted from Cameron and Rohrbaugh, 1983)  
  
 Thirty staff members, representing all levels from across the company were asked to 
complete the questionnaire and the resultant profiles plotted on the Competing Values 
Framework. The results from the survey are shown in Figure 9.10, the full black line 
indicates they believed the company had a hierarchical culture with formalised, 
structured procedures and based on this understanding, the Directors decided that 
there needed to be a cultural shift towards a more results oriented company to take the 
company forwards, shown as a dotted line. In the same way that Cogent, Cupid and 
Fast D collapsed when they lost their main sponsor, so did the reNew initiative when 
the Deputy Managing Director left the company shortly after the results of the survey 
were known. 
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 Clan 
Adhocracy 
Hierarchy 
Market 
Now - All Staff Future - Directors 
The decision to shift from a 
hierarchical to a market 
driven culture was based on 
having a solid infrastructure 
 
Figure 9.10: The Required Cultural Shift 
 
In 2002, Nissan Europe conducted a pan European Quality of Management Survey to 
gauge if management were following the corporate management philosophy.  
Between October 2002 and April 2005 the survey was issued six times, described as 
waves and looked at all aspects of management. The answers to Question 55: Is the 
workforce well organised for a quality job is relevant to this study and are shown in 
Figure 9.11. The full black line represents the overall response from NTCE, the dotted 
line shows that of Product Development Support. In October 2002 (Wave 1), 63% of 
the company believed the processes were in place.  In May 2003 (Wave 3), this figure 
was as high as 90% but in April 2005 (Wave 6) there was a dramatic reversal of 
opinion and the figured dropped to 43%. The reason for this change of opinion is that 
the company had recruited many new staff members and the lack of development 
processes became apparent as they struggled to design and develop the latest vehicle 
without the processes being in place.    
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Figure 9.11: Nissan Europe’s Quality of Management Survey Analysis 
 
These results are in line with the author’s study but there is still reluctance within the 
company to accept them as fact. The author wonders if people confuse the number of 
forms and reports that they are asked to make with processes. It is common to hear 
NTCE staff complain about form filling.   
 
“There is a form for this and a form for that. There is a form for everything in this 
place. It drives me mad. All I seem to do some days is fill in forms or make yet 
another report for yet another meeting. It’s never ending. I spend more time filling in 
forms than I do doing my actual job of design.”  NTCE Engineer 
 
One of the reasons Managers are asked to fill in forms or ask their staff to fill them in 
is because it is a way that those in positions of power and responsibility can feel that 
they are somehow managing the situation. The author believes that this may be 
exacerbated in an individualistic organisational culture like NTCE especially so, when 
an integrated business structure is not in place. 
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9.6  Individualistic Cultures 
 
Individualistic organisational cultures can lead to management ineffectiveness and 
sometimes, unfortunately to employee burnout (Boyatzis and McKee, 2005).  They 
also inhibit learning and the creation of knowledge. NTCE managers are 
tremendously ambitious and naturally competitive and were promoted on proven track 
records for delivery.  Most freely admit they like the status associated with the 
position and enjoy the perks of the job: the two cars, the pension and the private 
health care. Their organisational lives have evolved and revolve around meeting short 
term objectives. It is a paradox but they deliver in spite of organisation and do 
whatever it takes to get the job done. They are successful but their learning is reactive, 
with little time for reflection and they live in a constant state of anxiety. This activates 
the “fight or flight syndrome,” which makes it difficult for them to stay open to new 
ideas  and stops what  Senge et al (2005) have called “deep learning.” They write: 
 
“All learning integrates thinking and doing. All learning is about how we interact in 
the world and what types of capacities develop from our interactions. What differs is 
the depth of the awareness and the consequent source of action. If awareness never 
reaches beyond superficial events and current circumstances, actions will be reactions. 
If, on the other hand, we penetrate more deeply to see the larger whole that generates 
“what is” and our own connection to this wholeness, the source and effectiveness of 
our actions can change dramatically.” (Senge et al, 2005:11) 
 
To reinforce their positions they concentrate on goals and of doing more of the same. 
The danger of this is that they start to demand perfection of themselves and in doing 
so they become unapproachable to new or to alternative ideas like knowledge 
management and organisational learning.  Symptomatic of this failure to adapt is “self 
talk” when individuals start to blame others and use the words “If only they had 
listened to me…”. The company still gets results but often due to efforts of other 
talented people and unfortunately, for the individual involved this behaviour 
sometimes leads to burnout. One of the striking factors of this model, shown 
pictorially in Figure 9.12 is that it constantly reinforces itself and strengthens the 
attributes of an individualistic culture.   
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Individualistic Culture 
 
Drive/ Competitiveness 
  
Promotion/ Rewards/ Status 
 
Short term Objective 
 
Reactive Management: Do whatever it takes to get “the job” done.   
 
“Fight or Flight” 
 
Difficult to stay open to new ideas – Reactive, rather than “deep learning” 
 
Concentrate on Goals
   
 
  
Do more of the same 
 
 
Demands Perfection 
 
 
Becomes unapproachable 
 
 
“Self Talk” – blaming others 
 
 
“If only ………..” 
 
 
Get results – but often it is due to other talented people  
Model based on work by 
Boyatzis and McKee (2005)  “Burn Out” 
 
Figure 9.12: How Individualistic Cultures Lead to Management Ineffectiveness, 
Stops “Deep Learning” and sometimes leads to Burn Out. 
 
What follows are two verbatim illustrating the effects of stress at NTCE. The first is 
from a British NTCE Manager, who has since left the company because of a stress 
related illness and the second is a comment made by a British NTCE Senior.  
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“It was getting too much for me. I realised it and took time off. I was worried about 
how people would react. It’s seen as a sign of weakness. That I’m a failure but I’m 
not. I realised I had to do something otherwise I’d be ill or worse. I went to the 
doctors. He was only a young man but he spent an hour talking to me. I was worried 
about the people who we kept waiting but he listened and told me to rest. He told me 
to spend time doing what I liked. My wife was worried at first but fortunately she 
understood. We talked it through. I’m OK now but I recognise the signs. I realise 
when things are getting too much. We keep busy at the weekends. We go places. Do 
things. See people. I don’t leave myself too much too much time to brood about what I 
haven’t done. There is always something. But I see it in other people. The stress. Not 
being able to manage and not daring to admit it. I talked to Adrian about it. He said 
the company was preparing a course explaining what stress is and how to manage it. 
I’ve seen what they’re doing but it doesn’t really help. It’s the culture of this place.”  
NTCE British Manager. 
 
“I blame the Directors and the Managers. They don’t seem to realise what’s 
happening in this place. The pressure they are putting people under. The stress levels 
caused by what they ask to be done. They don’t realise that not everyone is as driven 
as them. Not everyone is as focused. What they consider as being reasonable isn’t 
how others see it. Look at Joe. He’s off with stress and high blood pressure. In the 
past year he has been to the States twice and to Spain thirty times. It’s killing him and 
then they ask him to withdraw his application for manager. What is that supposed to 
do to the man? It’s been handled badly. I used to want to be a manager. Still would, 
but not on these terms. What do they expect? I don’t want the crap or the politics that 
goes with it. It’s not worth the risk to my health or the reward. Joe has spent the last 
eighteen months trying to prove he’s worth the job and he hasn’t had a life. There has 
got to be a work life balance. I’d rather see my daughter grow up.” NTCE British 
Senior (Note: “Joe” is a pseudonym)  
 
The author does not pretend that the OAK Methodology will totally eradicate 
organisational inefficiencies and prevent “burn out” but believes it will act as a 
management framework and go some way in protecting the interests and the health of 
all employees (Chapter 7: 188-195).   
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9.7  Status December 2005 
 
In December 2005, 80 Knowledge Maps had been captured and codified and 
validated by the managers as being a correct representation of the processes and 
grouped into six “families,” which correspond with time periods on the Generic 
Master Schedule (Table 9.7). 
 
No Family/Time Period   Required Knowledge Maps 
1 Pre-requisites and Planning Related to the planning stage of the vehicle programme 
2 Digital lot Process Required to provide CAD models for the digital/virtual 
build. 
3 Test Parts Necessary for the procurement of parts for test   
4 S-Lot Required to support the Trial Production Build 
5 SOP Required to support Start of Production Build 
6 Post SOP Required for six months after the Start of Production 
Table 9.7: The Six Families 
 
The Director of Product Development Support asked his Managers and Seniors to 
identify all missing knowledge maps by the end of March 2006 and to create those 
maps by the following August. He also asked Seniors based at Cranfield to prepare 
presentations about the “Success of OAK” in their section. It was a given that the 
OAK pilot was “a success” however, of the 80 validated Knowledge Maps: 
  
• Each Section had modified the format as issued by the Knowledge 
Management Section   
• 91% had not identified Key Performance Indicators. 
• 30% had no timing identified. 
• 26% had no tools/forms/skills identified. 
• 19% had no task description identified. 
 
These are hard facts and to the author’s knowledge only four of the twelve PDS 
Seniors levelled their Knowledge Maps with all stakeholders, especially those outside 
of PDS. The emphasis was being seen to deliver Knowledge Maps on the required 
date rather than and than providing ones that actually mapped the job. They were still 
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operating on a tick box mentality. One of the Controllers also confided in the author 
by saying that all the maps produced on her section did not reflect reality. 
 
PDS Controller 
 
“It makes me angry. I was told by my manager not to say anything but he ripped the 
maps up we were doing and used the maps made by Spain. They were ahead of us and 
yes, the maps look good and he submitted them on time but it’s not the way we do 
things in Cranfield.  I thought we could do things differently as long as we understood 
those differences.”   
 
In the week before the seniors made their presentations, Product Development 
Support found itself at the centre of yet another build problem. The PDS Director 
called the two responsible Managers into a room to discuss the matter and asked to 
see the Knowledge Maps and show him where things went wrong. The Knowledge 
Map they produced, and for which they were jointly responsible was described by the 
Director “as full of holes!” An engineer who witnessed the meeting reported: 
 
“It is almost as if there was an implied criticism of their management, it is the 
elephant in the room. Every one recognised the truth of what was being said. It was 
palpable but at the same time they were ignoring it because they knew it was what 
they should have been doing. It was how they should have been managing.” 
 
The seniors’ presentations were equally illuminating in that they duly obliged with 
facts about how their section had improved through the OAK activity. The first Senior 
admitted that his thoughts had changed about OAK from negative – “another 
initiative” – to positive – “we would have gone under without it” – over the year.  
Senior Two painted a positive picture as did Senior Three who used figures to 
demonstrate improved efficiency. The fourth Senior outlined the benefits without 
emotion and Senior five raised “Care Points,” which could only be seen as being 
reasonable although others may have shown them as negative outcomes. The sixth 
Senior presented slides made by one of his staff and it showed. He was not 
particularly “au-fait” with the content and the impression he gave was that OAK was 
part of a job he already did and that his job, and the job of his fellow professionals 
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was too complex to map. At the end of the presentations the Senior, who had been 
first to speak held back. He obviously had something on his mind. He hesitated before 
asking if he could present a light hearted poem he had written about OAK. The poem, 
reproduced here in full, speaks volume about his true feelings. The author has boxed 
the underlying message against the relevant verse for reference. 
 
Note:  
• Derwent House the name of the building from which PDS operate in 
Cranfield. 
• Dave refers to the Director of PDS 
• JT/John is the author. 
                    
The Poem: Underlying Message: 
 
A while ago in Derwent House 
Drinking coffee on the landing 
Dave was pondering where we are  
And of processes outstanding 
 
 
 
 
Managers drinking coffee – not 
working – pondering – not 
working!  Whilst the workers were 
toiling/noses to the grindstone 
 
 
 
He thought of the additional work 
And PDS staff movements 
And all the things we had to do to make process 
improvements 
 
 
Injected workload. Not additional 
staff 
 
 
Is this a recognition that processes 
need changing? 
 
He thought “although we manage well and meet 
the business need” 
There must be something we could do  
In order to proceed 
 
 
 
We already meet the business need 
so why change? 
 
So off he went to see JT 
To ask of his advice  
“Well to tell him what he wanted  
Just to be precise” 
 
 
 
 
Direction from the top! 
 
 
 
 
I want a plan, I want it now  
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He put John on the spot 
I want some formal method  
To show me what we’ve got. 
 
Use of the word “formal” 
suggesting the poet believes that 
the informal – way we do things 
around here –is not valued/not 
respected 
 
 
Acknowledging the role of 
Knowledge Management 
So off John went to read his books 
And look for inspiration 
And there on page 473 
Was knowledge map creation 
 
 
 
“Out of books” A reference to 
theory and not practice…Also 
implies that the author had to 
scramble around for half baked 
ideas. 
 
Then John went all proud and smug  
To tell Dave what he’d found 
And explain the KAIZEN process 
Was the thing to spread around 
 
 
The author running to the boss 
 
Reactionary. He was questioning 
why other Directors had not 
adopted the methodology   
 
We’ll roll it out in PDS 
Dave said with obvious glee 
“I want it working by the year end 
Or they’re answerable to me.” 
 
 
 
Answerable to the boss! Worried 
about failure. Worried about blame 
 
So John set up the kick off 
To explain the way to go 
But answers to our questions 
He really didn’t know 
 
 
The impression that the method 
was not thought through. 
Management was an ass! 
 
 
 
But every Tuesday without fail 
From our normal work were torn 
To sit around our table 
Till a knowledge map was drawn 
 
 
Torn from our work to make 
Knowledge Maps!  As if they had 
not better things to do! The 
workers had fulfilled their side of 
the bargain. Any failure was the 
result of management and the 
knowledge management section 
 
We’d look at all the problems 
And the “Cock Ups” from the past 
And create a working process 
That was written down at last 
 
 
 
 
An admission there had been 
mistakes and the process did need 
capturing 
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But then at the Seniors’ meetings 
We’d present our knowledge tool 
To be told that what we’d done was wrong 
They’d changed the bleedin’ rules 
 
 
 
 
Again: Incompetent management! 
 
 
It wasn’t only knowledge maps 
They wanted us to fill 
But mission statement, mindsets 
And matrices of skill 
 
 
Again: Incompetent management 
and more injected work load. 
 
 
 
But still they couldn’t break us 
We continued with our quest 
Despite the rising workload 
We wouldn’t let it rest 
 
 
Them against us. Management 
versus the workers! 
 
Doggedly we grafted 
To support the boss’s whim 
We drafted maps and mindsets  
But there was no pleasing him 
A determined workforce?  Beasts 
of burden? 
 
A whim? Still a reluctance to 
accept a new way of working. 
Suggests the strategy was not 
planned 
 
A hard taskmaster? 
Just when we thought we had them right 
We took them out to Spain 
But found they did things differently 
So we had to start again 
 
 
 
 
Incompetent management.  Why 
was Spain not involved from the 
beginning? 
With weeks of frank discussions 
Listing  everything 
 We know 
We eventually reached agreement 
And had a common flow 
 
 
 
 
 
Success through the efforts of the 
workers and not management. 
 
As time went by we realised 
That our output had improved 
Our standard jobs ran smoother 
 
 
 
Slow realisation about the benefits 
of change 
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And “no value” ones removed 
 
But what had made is better 
In the work we do each day  
And what had made frustration  
And confusion go away? 
(Poetic Licence) 
 
 
We looked around for answers 
Then it became quite clear 
The stuff that we had moaned about  
Earlier in the year 
Had actually been well worth it 
And was starting to succeed 
In giving us direction 
To the way we should proceed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An admission that the OAK 
methodology was working 
 
So if you see John Temple 
In a room with Dave someday 
Be certain of the outcome 
More work will come your way! 
 
 
 
 
Final dig. Managers talk but it is 
the workers who deliver. 
Senior Engineer 
 
December 2005 
 
 
 
The poem is British banter at its best with side swipes at management inefficiencies 
and at how they, “the boys sorted it out.” The underlying message is that success of 
OAK is through the efforts of the workers and not management. The senior, once a 
detractor is now a convert to OAK. He was slow to realise the benefits of change and 
the necessity for OAK. He sees the need for it because it benefits him but more 
importantly, he accepts it on his own terms. He acknowledges the meetings the author 
has with the Director as being “planning” and will result in “injected work” for him. 
He also acknowledges that the author use “books” to make his case but he values 
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hands on pragmatism over theory and implies that the author has to scramble about 
for ideas. Theory has no place in his world.  
 
The conclusions of the OAK “Kaizen” pilot activity run in Product Development 
Support between August 2004 and December 2005 is that: 
 
• Knowledge management at NTCE is about organisational efficiency 
• Organisational efficiency depends on an organisation, strategically 
designed around knowledge. This knowledge is twofold: 
• Knowledge which is crucial to the future of the business 
• Knowledge of organisational culture. 
 
The author also concludes that organisational structures must reflect that different 
cultures need managing in different ways and that may change over time. At this point 
in time, Product Development Support needs: 
 
• Strategic, directive leadership and management 
• A consistent message 
• Chain of command 
• Discipline at every level 
• Standards. 
 
Organisational efficiency also depends on a leadership that allows for the design, 
development, implementation and management of culturally sensitive frameworks, 
structures and mindsets which focus on the business. The OAK Methodology is a 
framework for a learning organisation. Whereas knowledge management is primarily 
concerned with the capture, codification of knowledge and the exploitation of 
people’s experience by developing better tools and methods. The creation of a 
learning organisation emphasises culture management and leadership to harness the 
learning capability of the organisation so it is perhaps no surprise to see that PDS staff 
members say success of the activity depends on strong Leadership, Management and 
Professionalism. A learning organisation considers knowledge as embedded in 
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organisational routines, culture and languages. A place where reflexivity is the norm 
and where: 
 
“People continually expand their capacity to relate the results they truly desire, where 
new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set 
free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together (Senge, 1990:3) 
 
NTCE has a reactive and fire-fighting culture with people regularly pulled off jobs to 
sort problems. The Company revolves around the Directors and Managers, not as 
facilitators but as authoritarians who are the focus of power and where all interactions 
within the group move towards them. Blake and Mouton (1964) found that people in 
managerial positions usually have a dominant management style, which has been 
determined through personal history and values and the organisation itself. This 
authoritarian or autocratic style of management is the result of a control organisation 
where individuals have been judged and promoted for the way, and speed at which 
problems are resolved and control reasserted. There is a belief that any error is 
avoidable through managerial controls hence the reliance on Key Performance 
Indictors. The Directors and Managers may have openly pledged their support for the 
OAK activity but their staff are watching them and are waiting to be led, waiting for 
signals to tell them what their management team really believes is important to the 
company. Culture management, in this sense is about message management. 
 
“Culture is about what is really valued – demonstrated through what people do, rather 
than what they say. When the “walk” and the “talk” do not line up, it’s the “walk that 
shapes the culture.” (Taylor, 2005:7) 
 
This study has provided a Methodology for Organising Around Knowledge. It has 
also identified how Product Development Support needs to be managed, where 
management needs to focus its attentions and the affirmative feelings it needs to foster 
in its workforce to successfully implement and sustain OAK. These four pillars: PDS 
Management Way, OAK Methodology, Management Focus and Method of Delivery 
need to be understood in a cultural context and styles of leadership and management 
should emerge out of that understanding. Work to integrate these four pillars and 
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develop a Model for Organisational Efficiency is ongoing and outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
PDS Management 
Way 
OAK 
Methodology 
Focus Method  
of Delivery 
Strategic directive 
leadership and 
management 
A consistent message 
Chain of command 
Discipline at every level 
Standards. 
Knowledge 
Strategy 
Knowledge 
Mapping and 
Mindsets 
Knowledge 
Promotion 
Leadership 
Management 
Professionalism 
Authority 
Entrepreneurship 
Teamwork 
Recognition 
Respect 
Trust 
Support 
Safety 
Relationships 
 
Table 9.8: Model for Organisational Efficiency. 
 
 9.8   Conclusions  
 
The chapter has described Phase Two of the Study to Organise Around Knowledge 
(OAK) and shown that the author needed to revise his research methodology to 
establish how people needed to be managed for the efficient management of 
knowledge. He also revisited, reconfigured and justified his findings based on both 
subjective and objective data. He also realised in writing this chapter that any 
initiative within Nissan needs a high level sponsor to implement it because Nissan 
employees of whatever culture or nationality are waiting to be led, waiting and 
watching for signals to tell them what their management team really believes is 
important to the company. The creation and management of knowledge is driven by a 
need and in organisations that depends on those in positions of power either creating 
that need in others or by making them deliver. It also reflected on the key findings of 
the study and shows how organisational cultures can sometimes become dysfunctional.  
This chapter made the following theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge. 
 
9.8.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
• NTCE business infrastructure is not integrated. 
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• NTCE has a reactive and fire-fighting culture with people regularly pulled off 
jobs to sort problems. The Company revolves around the Directors and 
Managers, not as facilitators but as authoritarians who are the focus of power 
and where all interactions within the group move towards them.  
• This authoritarian or autocratic style of management is the result of a control 
organisation where individuals have been judged and promoted for the way, 
and speed at which problems are resolved and control reasserted. There is a 
belief that any error is avoidable through managerial controls hence the 
reliance on Key Performance Indicators. 
• Global Nissan does not have a strong corporate culture. Nissan was not 
influenced by a founder’s philosophy, policy, or image. At one level this gave 
Nissan Directors the freedom to direct as they chose. It also meant that top 
management positions were open to all employees who were motivated 
enough to be interested. However, the absence of a strong philosophy or 
visible embodiment of the founder makes it difficult to unite the whole 
company, provide a clear sense of direction and keep the company moving 
forwards causing the company problems. 
• In NTC best practices, lessons learnt and processes are “offered” to managers. 
They are not enforced and standardisation is not obligatory. Managers are 
charged with delivery but how they deliver is their responsibility. The onus is 
on the individual to deliver at all costs which leads to competition and a silo 
mentality, all of which are “delivered” within the framework of a collectivist 
culture.  
• In NTCE, Western Managers interpret the sense of respect and responsibility 
within an individualistic cultural framework that also leads to competition and 
silo mentalities that manifest themselves in a different way but in both 
instances it is about “self.”  
• For NTC Japanese managers, “self” is negotiated through their obligation-
orientated relationships with others, for NTCE Western managers, it is also 
negotiated but out of the necessity of circumstance rather than the obligation 
of relationships. It follows that negotiating self through relationships is 
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supportive and leads to a long term view whereas negotiating self out of the 
necessity of circumstance is relatively short term.    
• Knowledge Maps are formalised, codified structures mimicking relationships 
found in Nissan Technical Centre Japan. 
• Organisational cultures can become dysfunctional.   
  
9.8.2  Practical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
  
• Understand how the absence of a strong philosophy or the visible embodiment 
of a founder has on corporate culture and vice versa.  
• Understand how “self” is negotiated in a cultural context and how that impacts 
organisational behaviour 
• Recognise that organisational cultures can become dysfunctional  
 
 
The next chapter opens Section Four of the thesis and debates the future of knowledge 
management at Nissan. 
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Section Four: The Future of Knowledge Management 
at Nissan and Conclusions to the Study 
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 Chapter Ten 
 
 
The Future of Knowledge Management at Nissan  
 
10.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter opens Section Four, it begins with a global overview of Nissan’s 
business at the time of writing; continues with a debate about the future of knowledge 
management within R&D and shows how and why, in the context of current changes  
the OAK Methodology is becoming more widely accepted at NTCE  
 
 
SECTION FOUR:  The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan 
and Conclusions   
Chapter Ten: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at 
Nissan 
Chapter Eleven: 
Conclusions; Contributions to 
Knowledge Management within 
NTCE and implications for further 
study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.1 Global Nissan 
 
Nissan’s CEO, Carlos Ghosn was probably the key catalyst for change at Nissan. He 
has led the company back from the brink of disaster and shown the remarkable results 
that suitably motivated and rewarded people can achieve in a relatively short period of 
time. In April 2006, Nissan announced its sixth straight year of record profits that rose 
by 1.2 per cent to approximately 2.32 billion euros. The Nissan Renault Alliance is 
now the fourth largest global automobile maker having sold 6.1 million vehicles in 
2005, Nissan, alone sold 3.5 million vehicles (Figure 10.1). In 2007, Nissan plans to 
launch nine new vehicles worldwide and has recently announced a strategic tie up 
with Suzuki Motor Corporation, to jointly develop new vehicles and to use each 
other’s manufacturing facilities, especially in emerging markets such as India. It is an 
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amazing story of recovery and is sure to be a text book case for business schools 
worldwide. 
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Figure 10.1: Fiscal Year 2005 Sales Performance – Internal Nissan Report. 
 
In April 2006, Ghosn announced plans to invest $200 million in a new assembly plant 
in St. Petersburg, Russia. The plan is subject to the approval and signing of an 
agreement with Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade but when 
fully operational, the plant will employ around 750 people with a currently planned 
capacity of up to 50,000 units per year. The plant will produce a variety of vehicles 
specifically adapted for the Russian market.  
 
Nissan is not alone in looking to expand in Eastern Europe. Snyder (2005) reports 
auto production is booming in central and Eastern Europe. Production is expanding in 
already established factories in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and the Ukraine and new plants are about to open or are under 
construction in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Western Europe, the picture is 
bleak; plants are making production workers redundant and reducing capacity. 
Automakers are now planning to build the next generation of some new cars in 
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Eastern rather than Western Europe. In 2005, both the Jaguar and MG Rover plants in 
the UK closed. Between 1999 and the end of 2003 western auto makers reduced their 
1.12 million workforce by 5.6 per cent (59,175 workers). The shift east is not unique 
to the automotive industry, less than 15 per cent of jobs in Britain today are in 
manufacturing. Nissan is also considering off-shoring activities in order to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs. The company faces tough targets to maximise 
opportunities and reduce costs – 14 billion yen in 2006 -   and is, or is planning to off 
shore jobs to low competitive countries including Hungary, Romania, Egypt, Vietnam, 
Mexico, Thailand, India and China. 
 
The drive to offshore production has been triggered by lower wage costs, which are 
typically 50-60% cheaper in Eastern Europe, 75% cheaper in India and 80% in China. 
China is the world’s top location for contracting out manufacturing, workers are well 
educated in basic computing and mathematics skills and although they are said to lack 
creativity they are disciplined, readily trained and good at doing tedious jobs with 
repetitive, rules based tasks like data entry, form processing and software testing. 
India continues to dominate higher value functions such as research and design which 
require greater creativity and language skills but when businesses need finely tailored 
products, delivered quickly and flexibly then Eastern Europe scores highly.  
 
Saul (2005) argues that “globalisation” and the promise that economies and not 
politics or arms would determine history have failed to materialise. He pictures a 
world where governments are reasserting their national interests and cites the USA 
ignoring international critics and Europe’s reaction to problems of immigration, 
racism and terrorism as examples of renewed nationalism. He writes about the 
collapse of globalisation, the decline of competition and the return towards monopoly 
and oligopoly. 
 
“The most common themes for a quarter of a century have been cost reduction, most 
often stripping out the structures of employee stability. Both of these are about profit 
retention, selling at the cheapest possible price in unstable markets with the aim of 
destroying smaller competitors; selling at the highest possible price in other areas 
where there are already elements of oligopolistic combines in place.” (Saul, 
2005:176) 
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In an interview with Automotive news in January 2006, Ghosn advised struggling 
automakers to cut its workforce sooner rather than later. He talks about money being 
the scorecard and people being the objective. He claims people are a company’s main 
asset and add value only if they are motivated and properly managed but management 
has to make tough decisions to ensure the company remains in business. He said: 
 
“The score card has very simple terms. It’s net income. It’s return on invested capital.   
That’s the law. Unfortunately, human society still has not figured out a better system 
than this one to create value. By acting too much in advance, you’re weakening your 
people’s motivation. But if you wait too long, saying “I’m people oriented I’m not 
going to do what the job requires me to do.” Well, that is the Nissan story before 
1999.” (Treece, 2006:10) 
 
However, he does not underestimate the importantance of a committed workforce. In 
his Fiscal Year 2006 Message, entitled “The Power of Nissan Comes from Inside,” 
Ghosn praises Nissan employees for their efforts in achieving the Nissan 180 
commitment – the one million additional sales. The speech was a testament to the 
importance of organisational culture but in thanking people, he is also reminding them 
that the business is paramount. It is not about employees’ welfare and a feel good 
factor; it is necessarily about shareholder value, competition and organisational 
survival.  
 
“Our strategy was effective only because it engaged the latent power of Nissan’s 
culture. The conclusion I draw from this experience is that corporate culture is the 
key driver of value creation in this age of globalisation. Tangible corporate assets 
have a certain break up value. But to create additional value with these assets you 
need motivated employees. Such motivation can occur only on a wider scale in a 
healthy and dynamic corporate culture.” (Ghosn, 2006) 
 
Ghosn’s strategy, as already explained (Chapter 5: 107) is driven by an elite core of 
individuals who have much to gain and everything to lose. It is a long term strategy 
for the company based on the extraordinary efforts of individuals. It will be 
interesting to see if the Japanese allow this to continue. The author has already heard 
rumblings of discontent from senior Japanese colleagues. 
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“Burn out not only happens in the west. We are now seeing it happen in NTC. All 
Ghosn is interested in is cost. In financial performance. How far can you go with it? 
There is no thought for people. No sense of responsibility for people.” NTC Japanese 
General Manager 
 
He actually means a sense of responsibility for the welfare of people as a collective 
and not for people as individuals.  It is the benevolent Confucianism, rather than 
compassionate Buddhism. It is about extending care to others. For the Japanese, the 
welfare of the group is paramount and exceeds the needs of individuals. Initially, the 
collective was a “cultural strength” of NTC with its consensual decision making, long 
hours of work, attention to detail and the tribal allegiances but over time these same 
strengths became its weakness. Senior management at NTC recognised these 
weaknesses but were unable to rectify them and, as with previous times in the 
country’s history, they were prepared to learn from “outsiders” and duly formed an 
alliance with Renault, which arguably kept Nissan in business. The evidence suggests 
that Ghosn has purposely been allowed to operate within a “gaijin bubble” (Chapter 2: 
18) of his own so that the company learns a more competitive style of man 
agement more suited to the twenty-first first century. It would be interesting, for 
future researchers to investigate what remains of the Ghosn legacy, or rather how that 
legacy, which pitches the needs of the individual against the collective has been 
assimilated into the organisational culture.  
 
10.2  Knowledge Management at Nissan Technical Centre Japan 
 
In Chapter Five the author mentioned that Nissan has Knowledge Managers in each of 
its technical centres, although the scope and role of each manager is different 
depending on the location. The Manager in Nissan Technical Centre North America 
who had a role similar to the author and covered all aspects of knowledge 
management left the company and his work was not progressed. In Nissan Technical 
Centre Japan, there is still a Manager responsible for Knowledge Capture and Sharing 
and another responsible for Knowledge Creation. The author has been unable to 
contact the manager for knowledge creation but at the same time that he was 
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developing his strategy for Organisational Efficiency and Knowledge Management, 
his Knowledge Sharing colleagues at NTC had also been busy.  
 
They had concentrated on developing the aforementioned WIN Portal (Chapter 2: 33) 
and writing job procedures. The stated purpose of the job procedure is to improve 
efficiency, job quality and the transfer and storage of knowledge. They have 
employed a team of technical writers, called them knowledge engineers, and set them 
the task of interviewing nominated experts and creating job manuals which are aimed 
at new starters and mid career scout personnel (Chapter 4: 83) and are divided into 
seven levels (Table 10.1). 
 
Level Category Name of Level Summary  Purpose 
1 
 
Job flowchart outline 
 
Documents describing the general 
description and position of the 
target job, and output on main 
phases in the overall vehicle 
development process 
 Understand the general 
description of the target job in 
the target department and the 
position in the vehicle 
development process. 
2 
 
Job flowchart 
 
Documents describing the job flow 
(job to be implemented, 
implementing department and flow 
of job) for the target job 
 Understand the job flow for the 
target job. 
 Understand major output as job 
result. 
 Understand the time required for 
job flow. 
3 
Job flow-
chart 
 
Job flowchart detail 
 
Documents describing detailed job 
flowchart and steps in the own 
department for each job of the "Job 
flowchart" 
 
 Understand the job flow of the 
target job in the target 
department and the person who 
implements it. 
 Understand the information 
required for the job, and output 
of the job. 
4 Job procedure 
outline 
 
Documents describing further 
details of the job in "Details of job 
flowchart drawing" 
 In the target job, understand the 
general description of job 
requiring a detailed explanation. 
 Understand the information 
required for the job and the 
output of the job. 
 
5 Documents describing further 
detailed steps for each job step are 
shown in "Description of job 
procedure" 
6 
Job 
Procedure 
 
Job procedure 
detail 
 
Documents describing the further 
detailed explanations and terms of 
"Details of job procedure" as 
required 
 Understand the steps of the job 
requiring a detailed explanation 
of the steps in the target job. 
 Understand the detailed 
information required for the job 
and the output of the job. 
7 Others* 
 
Job flowchart 
(Meetings) 
 
Documents indicating the general 
description of major meetings, 
schedule and items, etc. to be 
submitted in the overall vehicle 
development process 
 Understand the agenda and the 
schedule of major meetings, etc. 
 
Table 10.1: Structure of Nissan Technical Centre Japan Job Manuals 
(Showing Seven of the Eight Levels of Detail) 
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Nissan Technical Centre’s Job Manuals have been developed to explain the processes 
required in designing any of the major systems in a full vehicle development 
programme. The job procedures can contain up to eight levels of detail (Table 10.1). 
The first three levels (Job flowchart) define the activities that need to be carried out 
and the duration of time between the major milestones. Each level gives more detail 
than the last: Level 1 shows the whole development schedule, Level 2 provides an 
inter-relationship of the activities occurring within each development phase and Level 
3 gives an overview of the inputs, outputs and roles associated with one process. The 
next three levels (Job procedure) provide progressively increasing detail on how to do 
the process, including the time (in man-hours) that each activity should take. Level 7 
is used to describe the major meetings that should happen to support the development 
of a vehicle and finally, Level 8 is used for any other supplemental information. 
 
NTC have also used IBM advisors and the job flows or processes are shown 
horizontally and look similar to the previously discussed formats promoted by 
Business Process Re-engineering. (Chapter 1: 4). At the end of 2005, the company 
had produced ninety manuals, which came as a complete surprise to the author. 
Twelve of those manuals have been translated into English and sent to NTCE and are, 
at the time of writing with the relevant sections for appraisal. Given that the author 
has regularly updated his knowledge sharing colleagues in Japan about his study and 
developing knowledge management strategy it seems strange he was not aware of the 
direction they were taking. His only explanation is that he, and his section were 
allowed to operate in a “gaijin bubble” so that NTC could learn from them. There has 
been no directive from NTC to follow their lead and adopt their standards; NTCE is 
allowed to manage its own business. Currently the author is aligning the NTC and 
NTCE methodologies and trying to understand what is happening. At first glance the 
manuals are impressive but closer examination reveals that they: 
 
• Contain only basic technical specification. 
• Are design-centric – ‘silo mentality’, 
• Are designed to bring everyone to the same basic level, 
• Are task-based – do not encourage understanding of why we do the job, 
• Are not designed to promote deeper learning or raising technical capability. 
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The manuals are not about learning and certainly not about standardisation. For the 
twelve manuals the six vehicle phases have been described differently (Table 10.2). 
The author asked the Senior Vice President of the Company, and the man ultimately 
responsible for Knowledge Sharing and Creation in NTC about his plans for updating 
the manuals. His response was enlightening: 
 
“Of course tomorrow they will only be perhaps 98% accurate and next week 90% 
accurate. It is very difficult to keep them up to date. The way we do our job is always 
changing.” Senior Vice President – NTC 
 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
No.  
Procedure 
name 
Preparatory 
Phase 
 
Examination 
of 
Specification 
/ Sourcing 
 
Examination 
of Design 
Production 
Design 
Release 
Prototype 
Vehicle Build 
Production 
Preparation 
 
 
1 
Monotsukuri 
Policy 
Meeting 
Before concept 
Monotsukuri 
Policy Meeting 
Before Profile 
Monotsukuri 
Policy Meeting 
Before contract 
Monotsukuri 
Policy Meeting 
 
 
 
2 
Progress  
Meeting 
Preparation and 
implementation of 
#1 Progress 
Meeting 
Preparation and 
implementation 
of #2 Progress 
Meeting 
Preparation and 
implementation 
of #3 Progress 
Meeting 
Preparation 
and 
implementati
on of #4 
Progress 
Meeting 
Preparation and 
implementation 
of #5 Progress 
Meeting 
Preparation and 
implementation 
of #6 Progress 
Meeting 
 
 
3 
Eng Project  
Management 
Unit family 
concept planning 
P/T Concept 
review 
UD-Lot UC-Lot Production 
Design Release 
After 
production 
design release 
 
 
4 
 
Front End 
Module 
Preparatory study Examination of 
spec/Sourcing 
Examination of 
Design plan 
and styling 
 
Production 
Design 
release 
Prototype 
vehicle 
Production 
preparation 
Table 10.2: NTC Job Manuals Phases 1-6 
 
The manuals are not a half hearted and failed attempt to codify the company’s 
knowledge but a deliberate ploy to control the new starters and mid-career scouts.  It 
tells them who the company recognizes as the subject matter expert and introduces 
them to the subject with a basic level of knowledge and then expects them to learn 
through building a relationship with the subject matter experts. If they fail to perform 
or conform to the group norms then access to the knowledge they need to do their jobs 
and forward their careers will be denied. These relationships of obligation hold NTC 
together. It is the same strategy the company employed when writing the original 
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Nissan Engineering Manuals. It is history repeating itself, a cultural pattern of 
reinforcing obligations (Chapter 5: 114). 
 
In January 2006, Yamishita san, Executive Vice President of Nissan Global Research 
and Development made a speech in which he introduced the concept of “Meisters,” or 
subject matter experts to the company. He admitted that Nissan had made a mistake in 
the past by making experts redundant and recently, for the first time in the company’s 
history  “Meisters” are now acknowledged as experts in the organisational tree. 
Knowledge writers are also shown as belonging to the design organisation, 
highlighting their importance to the company. The Meisters are the guardians of 
quality and the arbiters of company truths. They set and maintain the standard, not 
only of a way of working but also the mindsets. Masuzawa (2001) argues that 
Japanese employee training is strongly related to “norm acquisition”, i.e. not teaching 
how to (skills) but teaching act standards (norms). He believes that the Japanese think 
of their seniors as mentors rather than trainers and job descriptions are not thought of 
as business manuals but as ethical codes.  
 
The answer to the Managing Director’s question as to how the company raised the 
standard of its Design Reviews is to enforce discipline and promote learning at NTCE. 
NTC engineers are culturally indoctrinated to think deeply, they are expected to 
understand the detail, whilst a NTCE engineer’s learning tends to be reactive and 
linear, both forms of learning are reflections of different organisational cultures. 
NTCE engineers react to problems, one action leads to a counter action with shallow, 
loosely linked thoughts. Problems are solved quickly but the depth of thought is 
sometimes lacking. They are prized for getting the job done. It is a competition to see 
who can do what and indicative of an individualistic culture. Individualistic cultures 
gain self-respect through competition, which ultimately demonstrates the individual’s 
uniqueness and separateness from others.  In collective cultures, employees are able to 
achieve self-respect through service within the system. They are rewarded for 
dedication and compliance. In NTC engineers have been programmed to think more 
deeply. Their understanding is regularly challenged through the learning process. 
Senge et al. (2005) argue that learning is the integration of thinking and doing, if 
people’s awareness never progresses beyond a superficial understanding of events and 
current circumstances, actions will be reactions. If the capacity to learn is deepened, 
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the source and effectiveness of their actions can change dramatically and a new truth 
emerges (Figure 10.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem   Problem 
Solved
NTCE
NTC approach 
Depth of 
Thought 
 
Deeper learning 
Reactive learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Different Approaches to Problem Solving  
 
An interesting organisational and cultural by-product of this standard of training is a 
more efficient use of time. A Japanese Manager commented that his British 
counterparts always spent the first part of any presentation justifying their positions. 
 
NTCE Japanese Manager 
 
“It is always the same, when British managers make a presentation they spend the 
first fifteen, twenty minutes justifying why they are doing what they doing. It wastes so 
much time. Why do you have to do it? This is your job. You are the expert.” 
 
The study suggests that British Engineers fear individual criticism and are constantly 
on the defence (Chapter 8: 210) and indeed, the main argument of this thesis is that 
national culture is so invasive and influential on organisational culture that it can 
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become dysfunctional in a global organisation. The “way we do things around here” is 
a powerful mechanism by which people value themselves and build their identities. 
Rather than try to homogenise cultures, the aim is to create structures which maximise 
the different cultural strengths and create agendas for dialogue which, longer term 
will help build relationships, understanding and empathy. The author is pragmatic 
enough to realise he is not going to change cultural mindsets. “Managing within the 
cultural restraints of the company” means recognising and understanding the history, 
background and implications of the patterns of interaction operating within the 
company and designing frameworks which minimise misunderstandings and facilitate 
learning.  
 
Patterns of interaction are culturally ingrained to the point where they are difficult, if 
not impossible to change, and any attempt to do so, at an organisational level is futile. 
Although individuals can be swayed by the logic of an argument it does not 
necessarily mean they will alter the way they behave because people, at different 
times in their lives, depending on their lives, culture and experience are motivated by 
different things and in different ways. Births, deaths, marriage, illness, divorce, 
separation impact our ever changing lives. Is it reasonable or indeed realistic to expect 
everyone to be as committed to the company as the Global executive team? One 
middle aged senior engineer said although he wanted to do a good job, his biggest joy 
was to be on the golf course twenty minutes after he finished work at 5pm. He said:  
 
“Once, I had a career. I was here all hours. It’s not worth it. Now I have a life.” 
 
10.3  Knowledge Management at Nissan Technical Centre Europe 
 
In the first two months of 2006 the author made three separate presentations, two in 
the UK and one in Spain to all staff that worked in Product Development Support and 
had been involved in the pilot. In March 2006 he presented his findings to the 
Managing Director of NTCE. This was in the week before the MD, who had been the 
main sponsor for the study left the company and returned to Japan. To recap, the 
study began when the Managing Director posed these three questions (Chapter 1: 6-9) 
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How do we use Knowledge Management to raise the capability of the company – the 
spiral up of knowledge? 
 
Does culture impact the way in which we manage different nationalities? 
 
How does the company facilitate “bottom up” thinking?  
 
 The Managing Director said the author had answered his questions and he was very 
pleased with the study; he even mentioned knowledge management in the farewell 
speech he gave to the company at the beginning of April, 2006.  
 
 “Now I’m going to refer to something special, it’s Knowledge Management. In line 
with our capability improvements, I feel that Knowledge Management is very much 
important to expand our use of  knowledge and to transfer this existing knowledge to 
NTCE and we are now creating our own knowledge and transferring it onto other 
colleagues, in other regions. So Knowledge Management is very much important not 
only now but for the future, and I analyse that NTCE is very much or has a very good 
opportunity or potential to lead this Knowledge Management and processes onto 
global R&D”.  
 
NTCE is currently debating its own future. What is its unique selling point, what 
value does it add to global Nissan? NTCE opened an office in Moscow in October 
2005 and will open another in Western Germany in July 2006. Both these locations 
have been established to deepen the company’s understanding of customer needs. To 
paraphrase Drucker (1954): “What is our business? Who is our customer? What does 
the customer consider of value? The author has just kicked off a study to understand if 
the meaning of quality is culturally mediated, or how much does culture affect how 
people value quality. These are interesting pointers for the NTCE’s future direction. 
Much of the work the company does now could be, and will be done cheaper 
elsewhere in the very near future. NTCE is also proposing to establish and manage 
Nissan India Design and Development Centre and its justification is based on:  
   
1. Language: English is the most used business language in India. 
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2. Culture: India was part of the British Empire; there is a strong cultural link 
between the UK and India.  
3. Foreign Service Assignments: The Company proposes to second people to 
India to manage the Centre.  
4. Communication Infrastructure: Use Nissan global IS / IT tools e.g. WIN, 
Space Vision, G2B etc. Establish Communication room (s) with 
‘Smartboard’, TV meeting and iMeeting capability.                  
5. Processes / Key Performance Indicators: All processes to be clearly 
defined with clear roles and responsibilities between the UK and India. 
 
The OAK Methodology is key to the NTCE’s strategy for setting up and managing 
the Indian operation and to progress matters the Director of Product Development 
Support has seconded a small team of experts to the knowledge management section 
to progress OAK activities. These people report directly to the author, there are no 
dotted lines of dual responsibility. Perhaps, not surprisingly these people have been 
nicknamed, “Acorns,” “Oak Saplings” and even “Tree Huggers.” (Figure 10.3). In 
line with the OAK Methodology this team of subject matter experts have been given 
the following objectives: 
 
1. To Improve PDS efficiency by continuing to implement and sustain the 
methodology to Organise Around Knowledge. 
2. To define and create the standard of a generic OAK model that can be used 
across Global Nissan. 
 
The author has been given the responsibility to roll out the OAK methodology across 
the NTCE and then to use and adapt the models he has developed throughout this 
study for use and the transfer of knowledge to India.  
 
 
 
   
  John Temple                                                                                                             301 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.3: Tree Huggers Unite 
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The author also proposes to develop a tool or model to classify the Knowledge Maps. 
The model will use Davenport’s (2005: 27) classification structure for knowledge 
intensive processes as its base (Figure 10.4). The author proposes to categorise the 
tasks on the knowledge maps by developing a standard glossary of key words which 
must be used when describing the task. The tool for knowledge classification will be 
designed to search the maps for these words and automatically categorises them. This 
information can be used for analysis: what is value added, what is non-valued added 
and what jobs can easily be off-shored with minimum risk to the company. 
 
Davenport argues that many companies fail to maximise the productivity of their 
knowledge workers because they try to manage everyone in the same way. The author 
supports this claim. It is clear from the results of his study that management styles can 
block learning and the effective use of knowledge. Davenport identifies four 
categories of knowledge workers – transaction, integration, expert and collaborative 
workers and proposes a framework for matching each category with management 
strategies.   
 
Collaborative 
Groups 
Individual  
actors 
 
 Integration model 
 
• Systematic, repeatable work 
• Reliant on formal Processes, 
methodologies, or standards 
Collaboration model 
 
• Improvisational work 
• Highly reliant on deep expertise 
across functions  
 
 
 • Dependant on integration 
across functional boundaries 
• Dependant on fluid deployment of 
flexible teams  
Transaction model 
 
• Routine work 
• Reliant on formal rules, 
procedures, and training 
Expert model 
 
• Judgement-oriented work 
• Highly reliant on individual 
expertise and experience  
 
 
 • Dependant on low-discretion 
workforce or information 
• Dependent on star performance 
 
 
 
Routine 
L
evel of interdependence
Complexity of work
Interpretation/ 
Judgement 
Figure 10.4: Classification Structure for Knowledge-Intensive Processes 
(Davenport, 2005:27) 
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Davenport believes that understanding how to improve the productivity of knowledge 
workers is one of today’s most pressing economic issues but he was not the first to 
argue this point. Drucker (1911-2005) introduced the term “knowledge workers” in 
his book “The Concept of the Corporation” which was a portrait of General Motors 
and published in 1946. In the book he argued, and indeed, continued to argue 
throughout his life that the world was moving from an economy of goods to an 
economy of knowledge, from a society reliant on the brawn to one ruled by the brains 
of knowledge workers. He also believed in empowering workers and treating them as 
resources rather than like cogs in a human machine. He wanted to engage the 
creativity of individuals but admitted there was a balance to be made, rely too much 
on empowerment and the result is anarchy, rely too much on command and control 
and creativity is stifled. He reasoned knowledge and hence education was the most 
important resource for any advanced society.  
 
Drucker (1954) was also responsible for introducing management by objectives and 
emphasised the importance of managers setting long term objectives and then 
translating those objectives into more immediate goals. He wrote extensively about 
Japanese management techniques long before they became popular in the west but he 
also exported many American techniques to the ever eager Japanese who wanted to 
learn from the west. In 2001, he was reflecting on a lifetime of learning and predicting 
that future global multinationals would be directed by a new elite core of managers 
capable of balancing the conflicting demands of short and long term deliverables 
using various strategies including alliances, joint ventures and know how agreements. 
The author wonders just how much Ghosn has been influenced by the late Peter F. 
Drucker.   
 
10. 4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described what is happening in global Nissan and debated the future 
of knowledge management at Nissan. It has described how globalisation and off-
shoring is impacting the author’s knowledge management strategies. It has also 
brought the study to an end and shown how and why the OAK Methodology has 
become key to NTCE’s strategy for setting up and managing the Indian operation. 
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This chapter has made the following theoretical and practical contributions to 
knowledge. 
 
10.4.1 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge  
  
• For the Japanese, the welfare of the group is paramount and exceeds the needs 
of individuals. Initially, the collective was a “cultural strength” of NTC with 
its consensual decision making, long hours of work, attention to detail and the 
tribal allegiances but over time these same strengths became its weakness. 
Senior management at NTC recognised these weaknesses but were unable to 
rectify them and, as with previous times in the country’s history, they were 
prepared to learn from “outsiders” and duly formed an alliance with Renault, 
which arguably kept Nissan in business.  
• Ghosn has purposely been allowed to operate within a “gaijin bubble” of his 
own so that the company learns a more competitive style of management more 
suited to the twenty-first first century.  
• NTC job manuals are not necessarily about learning and standardization.  
They are a deliberate ploy to control the new starters and mid-career scouts.  It 
tells them who the company recognizes as the subject matter expert and 
introduces them to the subject with a basic level of knowledge and then 
expects them to learn through building a relationship with the subject matter 
experts. If they fail to perform or conform to the group norms then access to 
the knowledge they need to do their jobs and forward their careers will be 
denied. These relationships of obligation hold NTC together. It is the same 
strategy the company employed when writing the original Nissan Engineering 
Manuals. It is history repeating itself, a cultural pattern of reinforcing 
obligations. 
• NTC engineers are culturally indoctrinated to think deeply, they are expected 
to understand the detail, whilst a NTCE engineer’s learning tends to be 
reactive and linear, both forms of learning are reflections of different 
organisational cultures.  
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• NTCE engineers react to problems, one action leads to a counter action with 
shallow, loosely linked thoughts. Problems are solved quickly but the depth of 
thought is sometimes lacking. They are prized for getting the job done. It is a 
competition to see who can do what and indicative of an individualistic culture.  
• Individualistic cultures gain self-respect through competition, which 
ultimately demonstrates the individual’s uniqueness and separateness from 
others.  In collective cultures, employees are able to achieve self-respect 
through service within the system. They are rewarded for dedication and 
compliance.  
• NTC engineers have been culturally programmed to think more deeply. Their 
understanding is regularly challenged through the learning process. 
 
10.4.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge  
 
It would be useful for researchers and practitioners to   
 
• Understand how national and organisational cultures affect learning and an 
individuals sense of self respect.  
• In the years to come it would be interesting to investigate what remains of the 
Ghosn legacy, or rather how that legacy, which pitches the needs of the 
individual against the collective, has been assimilated into the organisational 
culture.  
 
The next chapter concludes the thesis and discusses the contribution to knowledge 
management and implications for further studies. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
 
Conclusion and Contributions to Knowledge  
 
11.0  Introduction 
 
This Chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting on the author’s role as a researcher 
and a practitioner. It also summarises what has been achieved against the aims and 
objectives set out in Chapter One, collates the theoretical and practical contributions 
to knowledge and presents potential avenues for further study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION FOUR: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan  
and Conclusion to the Study  
Chapter Ten: The Future of 
Knowledge Management at Nissan 
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion and 
Contributions to Knowledge.   
 
SECTION ONE:  Introduction  
Chapter One: Setting the scene, 
outlining the aims, objectives 
and structure of the thesis. 
 
 
 
11.1 Reflections of the study and findings as a researcher and as a practitioner 
  
This section discusses the thesis in terms of the journey the author made both as a 
practitioner and researcher and shows, given the reflective nature of the research, that 
the strategy and the research methodology emerged in tandem and were dependant on 
each other. It shows how key learning points emerged and themes developed which 
shaped the author’s thinking and resultant OAK Methodology and comments on how 
the author came to see himself as a participant observer or a commentator rather than 
an internal change agent. 
 
The author used a strong narrative approach to tell this story and present it as close as 
possible to real life. One of the challenges of real world enquiry as highlighted in 
Chapter Three and addressed by this study, is in saying something sensible about 
complex and relatively poorly controlled or uncontrollable situations. The study was 
in depth and context specific and the research methodologies were designed 
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accordingly. The author’s research and data collection methodologies were systematic 
but the way it which it is presented reflects what actually happened working in the 
messy interface of organisational lives.  His knowledge management strategy 
emerged from work grounded in practice and informed by literature in a constant and 
iterative loop of enquiry and reflection. The research included structured and semi 
structured interviews at group and individual levels and a number of facilitated 
workshops. The making of the Knowledge Maps were in effect case studies in that 
they were studies of how people worked;  and the data from the interviews, case 
studies and workshops were analysed and formatted quantitatively and qualitatively 
and presented to all those directly involved and to the company Directors to make the 
case for organising around knowledge. The data gathering techniques, which were 
rooted in ethnographic procedures, worked exceptionally well in the early stages but 
more focused questions, were necessary as the study developed.   
 
The author accepts that, as with any action research, the way he acquired data and 
classified and quantified the results is open to discussion but a mix of research 
techniques and analytical procedures (triangulation) was adopted to help improve the 
reliability of the research. The workshops and presentations were a useful way of 
validating the results as they gave the managers and staff members the opportunity to 
voice their opinions and dissent. The conclusion of this study, which did not become 
apparent until the last chapter was being written and the author was able to identify an 
emerging pattern of events by re-reading the thesis, is that knowledge management at 
Nissan is a process of cultural change, shaped by those in positions of power and 
dependent on the interaction of structural, organisational, technological and 
procedural elements which cannot be treated separately; and that efficiency, 
sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge based learning culture can be 
realised by organising around knowledge and that knowledge management and 
organisational learning depend on developing a global mindset which allows for a 
variety of cultural contexts.   
 
In Chapter Two the author described how Nissan’s approach to knowledge 
management is rooted in the political and cultural history of Japan and upon reflection, 
the author realises that that the quest for knowledge has always been driven by a need, 
which is shaped by the ambitions of those in power at any point in time. Japan and 
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likewise Nissan have adapted but always tried to control from the centre as they fused 
and assimilated ideas in their search for knowledge and growth. It explained how in 
the early 9th Century Japan all but ceased contact with China allowing only a “gaijin 
bubble” in the southern provinces to selectively trade in areas which suited them and 
assimilate borrowed elements within its own culture to satisfy the need for 
independence and to establish a Japanese identity. It continued by explaining how the 
Tokugawa Shogunate did the same in the 17th Century expelling European traders and 
missionaries effectively closing off Japan from the rest of the world for two centuries 
but allowing the Dutch to operate through a “gaijin bubble” in Deshima on the 
proviso that they did not spread Christianity. The need for knowledge in this instance 
was political control and military strength but at the same time the Japanese continued 
to learn from the West. They did something similar in 1862 when they sent a 
delegation to investigate and learn from Britain. This time the Shogunate wanted the 
“inside-knowledge” that would make them richer, help them fight Western 
Imperialism and keep them in positions of power.  
 
Ten years later the Meiji Restoration sent out a second delegation to learn from the 
west, this time to adopt the necessary practices to make it competitive as a country 
and at the same time it set about changing societal norms to accept a new breed of 
entrepreneur like Masujiro Hashimoto, who founded the company which eventually 
became Nissan. Prior to the Second World War the Japanese Government supported 
companies like Nissan and stopped foreign companies becoming established in Japan 
and after the War it instigated Keiretsus, companies with inter-locking business 
relationships to stop takeovers. The Keiretsus also purchased goods from each other 
and their links enabled close supplier change management and a quicker response to 
problems being solved. Nissan also shifted assembly and the majority of its managers 
when they reached the age of fifty to the keiretsu to strengthen the links but also to 
reduce costs. In this they were acting out of a Confucian sense of responsibility for the 
company, the community and Japan but above all, it was about control.  
 
After the War, Nissan established a licensing agreement with Austin Rover and 
created a different kind of gaiijn bubble and learnt more about the business of making 
cars. The Japanese automotive industry was also willing to learn and put into practice 
the lessons of US quality control guru, William E. Deming to improve customer 
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satisfaction and build on Henry Ford’s and Alfred Sloan’s ideas to establish the 
concept of lean production, a process of streamlining mass production by using less of 
everything. Again, Japan showed that by assimilating ideas and practices from the 
West it could take learning to a new level. Nissan grew in the sixties and seventies 
and in the eighties, a change in world trade regulations meant that it could no longer 
rely on export sales for growth but had to manufacture in each of its main overseas 
markets. The company adapted to survive and also learnt that it with its key markets 
threatened it needed to design vehicles specifically for the markets involved and 
opened technical centres in the USA and Europe. The nineties saw a reverse in the 
fortunes of the company, a down turn in the world market was exacerbated by a lack-
lustre product range and an organisational culture which slowed decision making. The 
very things which were said to have made Nissan great – its people, its organisational 
culture, its products - were the things making it dysfunctional.   
 
The company rationalised its product range, made people redundant and closed a 
plant in Japan but it was not enough to ensure survival and once again, learning its 
lessons from history it looked outside for help and forged an alliance with Renault and 
brought in Carlos Ghosn, a gaijin to help it face the unpalatable truth that it needed to 
change. It was an alliance whereby it could share synergies and learn for its partner 
rather than a takeover.  The company now has global design, technical, manufacturing 
and supplier strategies; it also has introduced Global Executive Training (GET) for its 
elite who go through a process of assimilation, taking and adapting western 
management ways to suit Nissan and ultimately benefit Japan. Again, the thirst for 
knowledge is driven by ambitious needs of those involved not only for the survival 
and profitability of the company but to promote themselves and their careers. The 
GET people are the global reincarnations of the 9th Century Japanese diplomats, the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the Samurai and the salary men. They run Nissan by managing 
the bottom line and key performance indicators. Bottom line thinking is quantifiable 
and is about making profits for shareholders but the rhetoric of the bottom line 
stipulates only the views of experts (in this case the Directors) are relevant to 
organising and assessing the goodness of organisations. Using Key performance 
indicators a one dimensional approach to making things run smoothly are indicative 
of straight line thinking. On the one hand they stretch people by focusing thoughts 
and creating a need which is a precursor for the use and creation of knowledge but on 
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the other, the danger shown by this study is that when organisations neglect basic 
human needs and become blindly target driven it can override the very purpose of the 
organisation 
 
It was not until Chapter Six that the author realized that he had to take into account 
the power and politics within the organisation if he was to find a sponsor for his 
projects. He also realised that in doing so that he was in effect becoming a politician 
himself and purposefully used, fostered and relied on the support of his immediate 
Director and that of the Managing Director to promote his knowledge management 
strategy and spent his time as a participant observer, making and influencing strategy 
through them and as such was forced to rethink his role as a change agent.  In Chapter 
One the author explained that NTCE’s Managing Director initiated this study because 
he wanted to know how we used knowledge management to raise the technical 
capability of the company to undertake Case III projects.  The study was driven by the 
need of the Managing Director not only to raise the technical capability of the 
company but also to promote himself and his career. The author made much of the 
direction and more importantly the support of the Managing Director but in reality, 
although it was a clear invitation to study, expected outcomes were unclear. What did 
he expect?  From experience the author had seen sections like Knowledge 
Management set up with very good intentions and then disbanded.  The author had a 
vested interest in the section, not only did he enjoy his work but it was the subject of 
his doctorate and he wanted to develop his practice. He had the self belief, need and 
drive to make things happen. The author needed the knowledge to make his strategies 
and satisfy the MD’s request and in doing so protect his position within NTCE. It is 
only on reflection that the author realised his research strategy and methodologies 
were shaped by a need to satisfy the Directors. 
 
In Chapter Ten the author wrote that the OAK Methodology was a key element of 
NTCE’s strategy for setting up and managing the Indian operation. It is an act of 
serendipity that this study concluded at a time when the company needed a 
methodology for knowledge capture and transfer, but the evidence suggests that 
NTCE Director’s are now willing to adopt the OAK Methodology because they have 
a need to be seen to be managing and leading the change. They are listening because 
they can see a practical application of the author’s work that suits them rather than 
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they having been convinced by the logic and rationality of the argument. The author 
argues the OAK Methodology was well thought out, it was logical, rational, 
underpinned by theory and above all else practical but it was found that this was not 
enough on its own, it needed a high level sponsor to implement it. The author initially 
saw himself as an instigator of change but he soon realised it was a part he would not 
be allowed to play. In May 2005, the author was invited by the Course Coordinator of 
Global Executive Training into an e-mail discussion with six GET trainees, who have 
since been elevated to high positions within global Nissan. There had been some 
discussion at one of the GET Workshops about the benefit of capturing and utilising 
best practice across the company and the coordinator who knew of the author’s work 
wanted his input into the debate. She asked the question:  
  
“What if we could identify those best practices that individuals at Nissan are already 
using, share them so as to elevate performance through the enterprise to make Nissan 
best in class in all of our mission critical endeavours … wouldn’t we blow at the 
competition” 
 
Quite simply, if the company levelled and worked to best practice it would be a 
significantly better company.   The author argued that the problem is in getting people 
to adopt and accept what others consider to be “best practice.” From his limited 
experience of GET trainees he  imagined they would be the worst culprits because 
they always seemed to lay claim to “better” ideas and insisted things were done their 
way and they often reformatted data and information to promote their cause. The 
author maintained that the company was not going to learn or share best practice until 
it had the processes (and discipline) in place to structure meaningful dialogue and 
learning and saw himself as a change agent instigating the change through the OAK 
Methodology - but the GET trainees disagreed.  
 
“The GET people have to be the catalyst for change that begins the process. By 
definition these people were selected for their ability to create and manage change (at 
least I hope so or we will never change). After all isn’t GET about leadership? The 
people and the GET process provide the perfect opportunity and platform to change 
how we work.”  GET Trainee (1) 
 
   
  John Temple                                                                                                               312
 
“We may need different definitions for change management. I do agree we need to 
develop process and a culture that embraces and implements best practices. I just 
think as leaders, it is our job to lead and instigate that change and I hope working 
from the GET foundation we can develop the beginnings of that change.” GET 
Trainee (2) 
 
One of the trainees in complete exasperation wrote:  
 
“What are we if we are not change managers and agents?” GET Trainee (3) 
 
The debate continued but for the author, an input from another trainee put the 
argument into context causing him to reflect deeper on his role, the overall purpose of 
the study and on his personal journey of learning and enlightenment. 
 
“There seems to be some reluctance for us to want to accept that we can really learn 
from ourselves, go out there and look and then do something about it. My frustration 
is that there is a lot of low hanging fruit out there and many of us don’t want to grab 
it, but would rather spend our time wondering what “outsiders” are doing or 
justifying our own performance. The key step in my opinion is not leadership and 
change management but the willingness to learn to put pride aside.” GET Trainee (4) 
 
“Put Pride Aside ……..” This caused the author to reflect on his motives for claiming 
to be a change agent. Pride is connected with the need for status (Griffin and Tyrrell, 
2004) and is the inner sense of satisfaction of achievement. However, in high stress, 
target oriented organisations people often gauge their self worth and that of others on 
their ability to meet targets and failure to meet them can result in low self esteem 
which is damaging to the individual. The same is true of high self esteem which 
manifests itself in self satisfied boasting, smugness, abusing power relationships, 
adopting an air of superiority and being blind to one’s own faults.  The author 
wondered was he guilty of high self esteem. He admits that perhaps at times it was 
ego that drove him but he wanted to prove his competence and have his ability 
recognized.  
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The author originally entitled his final presentation to the Managing Director as “The 
Justification for Organising Around Knowledge” but changed it at the last minute to 
read “The Reasons for Organising Around Knowledge.” He wondered why he felt 
impelled to justify his work.  Using the word “reasons” was still fact adduced and 
served as an argument to organise around knowledge but somehow it seemed a softer 
word, a reasoned argument rather than a justification which is perhaps indicative of 
the individualistic organisational culture in which the author operates and one where, 
as this research has indicated, employees fear blame and individual criticism. He now 
understands he needs to internalize that competence and to be self aware and assured 
rather than to continually trying to prove himself in the eyes of others.   
 
NTCE is a European Company owned by Nissan, which has its headquarters in Japan. 
Managing NTCE needs a predominantly “European” mindset focused on managing an 
individualistic workforce. Managing NTC needs a predominantly “Japanese” mindset 
focused on managing a collective workforce. Knowledge of national and 
organisational culture is a strategic necessity for any organisation and needs constant 
debate and reflection. Organisational cultures cannot be dictated but they can be 
shaped. Operationally, things may appear to be the same across borders but the 
cultural mechanisms to facilitate operations are inherently different; this difference 
needs to be understood and appreciated.  Organisational efficiency depends on being 
able to draw on nationalistic and organisational cultural strengths whilst accepting 
that these strengths need balancing to ensure they do not become self defeating. The 
author accepts that his argument is a perspective, one of many perspectives about 
what is important for organisational efficiency and it is unrealistic to assume that 
everyone will readily accept the need or even consider the logic of this argument 
because for many (including those in NTCE, and Global Nissan) organisational 
culture is too complex and intangible to deal with.  
 
11.2  Summary of Work and Achievements 
 
The aims and objectives of this thesis were to use knowledge management as a 
vehicle for organisational change by first, understanding the cultural interactions 
between partners on their models of learning and then to develop and trial a set of 
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tools and frameworks to raise the capability and improve the efficiency of Nissan 
Technical Centre Europe.   
 
The study has shown that efficiency, sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge 
based learning culture can be realised by organising around knowledge and that 
knowledge management and organisational learning is focused on developing a global 
mindset which allows for a variety of cultural contexts. Knowledge management 
within Nissan Technical Centre Europe is about aligning strategies and developing the 
models, tools and methodologies to improve the competitiveness of the company. 
Knowledge Management initiatives must be of use to people and must have and be 
seen to have practical applications. The study has shown that knowledge does not 
flow freely or uniformly within Nissan and efforts to produce organisational learning 
and change and the spiral up of knowledge, face persistent hurdles as there are a range 
of psychological, interpersonal and structural factors which make the organisation 
resistant to change. These barriers need to be identified and understood and strategies 
put in place to counter them. Knowledge management and learning at Nissan has been 
shaped by an organisational culture driven by individuals or groups of individuals 
which is the legacy, in part of the company having no clear founder. Knowledge 
management initiatives within Nissan need a high level sponsorship if they are to be 
successfully embedded. Nissan is built around people and not process and it allows 
managers decide how things are done.   
 
The study has provided a strategy and methodology to Organise Around Knowledge 
(OAK) to raise the capability of the company and facilitate bottom up thinking. It has 
also given the company the beginnings of a model for organisational efficiency which 
will provide management with a framework for managing across borders and people 
of different nationalities and cultures.   These methodologies are novel and have 
contributed to a better understanding within NTCE of the importance and effect of 
organisational culture on knowledge management and organisational learning. The 
author concludes that acquiring a functional understanding of organisational culture 
requires deep study and reflection and considers that he was fortunate to have had the 
enlightened sponsorship of both the Managing Director and his line manager in 
allowing him the time and resource to think, to develop his knowledge management 
strategies.    
   
  John Temple                                                                                                               315
 
11.3  Theoretical and Practical Contributions to Knowledge   
 
This research has offered a unique opportunity to apply theoretical insights into a 
significant and ongoing problem facing a global commercial enterprise. This has 
necessitated the combination of a reflective approach with the need to adapt to the 
constraints of organisational reality. It has been about finding a practical solution to a 
pressing problem and in doing so the author has had to straddle the camps of the 
academic and the practitioner and has made the following theoretical and practical 
contributions to knowledge.  
  
11.3.1  Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge 
 
The theoretical contributions have been categorised under the following headings, 
Nissan’s History, Present Day Global Nissan, Present Day Nissan Technical Centre 
Europe, Working with the Japanese, Organisational Cultures, Nissan’s Organisational 
Culture, and Knowledge Management at Nissan and Organisational Learning at 
Nissan.   
 
11.3.1.1  Nissan’s History 
 
• The author has identified that Nissan employed strategies gleaned from 
Japanese history to survive. In the past Japan has created what the author has 
called “Gaijin Bubbles”,  where they restricted access to knowledge, and 
manipulated culture both inside and outside of the “bubble” to control the 
populace.  Likewise, Nissan created its own “Gaijin Bubbles” to learn from 
the West. The company learned about automotive design and development 
through carefully arranged strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Nissan, like 
Japan has always controlled from the centre and has decided what is allowed 
in and out of the bubble. 
 
• Global Executive Trainees share characteristics with, and can reasonably be 
termed the reincarnations of, the 9th Century Japanese diplomats, the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the Samurai and the salary men. 
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• Nissan management philosophy has to be understood in a cultural-historical 
context. It was once paternalistic, highly traditional and deferential where the 
welfare of the individual is strongly linked to that of the organisation and the 
nation but this may be changing because the system of lifetime employment 
for Nissan employees and the salary men is crumbling.   
 
• Previous change initiatives at Nissan were de-railed by middle management.   
 
• Nissan’s failure in the nineties was largely due to the unbending mindsets of 
the company elite.   
 
11.3.1.2  Present Day Global Nissan 
 
• The GET model is instantly recognisable to the Japanese as an alternative to 
the University model, one which incorporates the important socialising aspects 
of Nissan’s organisational culture and by extension the socialising elements of 
Japanese national culture, and preserves the mechanism by which social 
capital is developed within the company.  
 
• The reason Nissan has been able to quickly assimilate and adapt to a 
seemingly alien western management style is because behind the rhetoric 
Nissan’s organisational culture has always been elitist and this has had a direct 
effect on knowledge management and learning within the company. 
 
• Nissan is shaped by individuals rather than by process; its knowledge is 
embedded in the social networks of Nissan Technical Centre Japan and central 
to these networks are technical and managerial experts.   
 
• Nissan Global Culture is the amalgamation of cultures from multiple 
organisations, scattered across the globe which are unified by a common 
vision and harnessed by objectives.  
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• Nissan has been built around people and not process and that for any initiative 
to succeed or even be launched within the company it needs a strong sponsor. 
 
• Global Nissan does not have a strong corporate culture. Nissan was not 
influenced by a founder’s philosophy, policy, or image. At one level this gave 
Nissan Directors the freedom to direct as they chose. It also meant that top 
management positions were open to all employees who were motivated 
enough to be interested. However, the absence of a strong philosophy or 
visible embodiment of the founder makes it difficult to unite the whole 
company, provide a clear sense of direction and keep the company moving 
forwards causing the company problems. 
 
• Ghosn has purposely been allowed to operate within a “gaijin bubble” of his 
own so that the company learns a more competitive style of management more 
suited to the twenty-first century.  
 
11.3.1.3  Present Day Nissan Technical Centre Europe  
 
• NTCE has relied on individuals to drive it forwards and is not learning 
from past mistakes.  
 
• There is a blame culture at NTCE and past change programmes have failed 
to become embedded leaving the workforce cynical about any new 
initiative resulting in resistance to change. These organisational mindsets 
have been allowed to develop over the years and are contrary to the 
efficient running of the department.   
 
• NTCE has a reactive and fire-fighting culture with people regularly pulled 
off jobs to sort problems. The Company revolves around the Directors and 
Managers, not as facilitators but as authoritarians who are the focus of 
power and where all interactions within the group move towards them.  
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• This authoritarian or autocratic style of management is the result of a 
control organisation where individuals have been judged and promoted for 
the way, and speed at which problems are resolved and control reasserted. 
There is a belief that any error is avoidable through managerial controls 
hence the reliance on Key Performance Indicators. 
 
11.3.1.4  Working with the Japanese 
 
• The Japanese have elevated people like Carlos Ghosn and Edward Deming 
into the position of Confucian elders to make it psychologically acceptable for 
them to be led by gaijins.    
 
• The Japanese approach to face saving and hone-tatamai can lead to distrust in 
a multi-cultural setting. 
 
• Japanese group dynamics may be driven by a sense of obligation rather than 
the camaraderie as suggested by the literature. 
 
• The salary man’s commitment to the company is his way of providing for his 
family and he is not, as the literature suggests, putting the company first.  
 
• Subcultures, like the gakubatsu can be very strong and can sometimes 
undermine the host culture particularly within an alliance where members 
have divided loyalties. 
 
• Although Japan’s national culture influences all Japanese companies it is 
incorrect to assume they are all the same. Nissan conducts its business 
differently to that of Toyota and Honda. 
 
• “Bottom up” management actually means hearing the voices of the selected 
few and even then, these voices are often self-censoring. 
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• The Japanese management system of consensus is a theatre for the performing 
elite and dissenting voices are quickly squashed or marginalised. Involvement 
means to concur with the direction of the company elite.   
 
11.3.1.5  Organisational Cultures 
 
• Organisational cultures can become dysfunctional.   
 
• Organisational cultural norms of making presentations and holding meetings 
cause conflict, distrust, frustration and sometimes misunderstanding in a 
global organisation.    
 
• All nationalities have preferred communication styles and rely on body 
language to manage impressions, convey messages and emphasis meanings 
but these are not always easily understood cross culturally. Culturally 
mediated styles of communication limit understanding in global organisations 
 
• Cultural change is dynamic and cannot be controlled, however by studying 
culture organisations can learn to accept, appreciate and understand the 
reasons for the differences and identify interventions which may assist in 
helping culture develop in a particular way, minimising the dysfunctional 
elements but making the most of the cultural strengths that each company 
brings to global Nissan.   
 
• The key to sustainability and implementation is in recognising and managing 
within the cultural constraints of the company 
 
• People need affirmative feelings of Recognition, Respect, Reward, Trust, 
Support, Safety and Relationships to work efficiently. Although these feelings 
are the same as needed by human beings to thrive in any circumstances it is 
important to note that this research indicates that the words labelling these 
emotions are culturally mediated and had different connotations depending not 
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only on the nationality of the people involved but also the organisations to 
which they belonged.  
 
• Individualistic cultures gain self-respect through competition, which 
ultimately demonstrates the individual’s uniqueness and separateness from 
others.  In collective cultures, employees are able to achieve self-respect 
through service within the system. They are rewarded for dedication and 
compliance.  
 
• Organisational cultures cannot be dictated but they can be shaped.  
 
• Organisational efficiency depends on being able to draw on nationalistic and 
organisational cultural strengths whilst accepting that these strengths need 
balancing to ensure they do not become self defeating.  
 
• Operationally, things may appear to be the same across borders but the 
cultural mechanisms to facilitate operations are inherently different; this 
difference needs to be understood and appreciated. 
 
• National cultures have a tremendous impact on organisational cultures.  
 
• The effect of an all encompassing global organisational culture, where 
management philosophies and systems remain rooted in the cultural model of 
the parent company, is damaging as it blinds management to the need of 
recognising the effect that national cultures have on organisations.  
 
• Knowledge of national and organisational culture is a strategic necessity for 
any organisation and needs constant debate and reflection.  
 
• Efficiency, sustainability and the beginnings of a knowledge based learning 
culture can be realised by organising around knowledge 
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11.3.1.6  Nissan’s Organisational Culture  
 
• NTC and NTCE Directors set the direction, rather than dictate the direction for 
the company. They expect others to follow but it is not mandatory and 
providing managers deliver, they can decide how things are done.  
 
• The way Nissan employees relate to each other is a key to the success of the 
company.  Knowledge is articulated in relationships, so any relationship is 
about shared knowledge. Relationships enable the making of meaningful 
connections and sustainability is pursued through the creation of the necessary 
cultural frameworks to manage those relationships - clarifying, codifying and 
mediating expected cultural mindsets. 
 
• In NTC best practices, lessons learnt and processes are “offered” to managers. 
They are not enforced and standardisation is not obligatory. Managers are 
charged with delivery but how they deliver is their responsibility. The onus is 
on the individual to deliver at all costs which leads to competition and a silo 
mentality, all of which are “delivered” within the framework of a collectivist 
culture.  
 
• In NTCE, Western Managers interpret the sense of respect and responsibility 
within an individualistic cultural framework that also leads to competition and 
silo mentalities that manifest themselves in a different way but in both 
instances it is about “self.”  
 
• For NTC Japanese managers, “self” is negotiated through their obligation-
orientated relationships with others, for NTCE Western managers, it is also 
negotiated but out of the necessity of circumstance rather than the obligation 
of relationships. It follows that negotiating self through relationships is 
supportive and leads to a long term view whereas negotiating self out of the 
necessity of circumstance is relatively short term.    
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• For the Japanese, the welfare of the group is paramount and exceeds the needs 
of individuals. Initially, the collective was a “cultural strength” of NTC with 
its consensual decision making, long hours of work, attention to detail and the 
tribal allegiances but over time these same strengths became its weakness. 
Senior management at NTC recognised these weaknesses but were unable to 
rectify them and, as with previous times in the country’s history, they were 
prepared to learn from “outsiders” and duly formed an alliance with Renault, 
which arguably kept Nissan in business.  
 
11.3.1.7   Knowledge Management at Nissan 
 
• Knowledge management at Nissan is about aligning strategies and developing 
the models, tools and methodologies to improve the competitiveness of the 
company.  
 
• Knowledge management initiatives need high level sponsorship within Nissan 
if they are to be successfully adopted by the company because people in 
positions of authority have the power to dictate what is learnt and what is 
worth knowing. 
 
•  Knowledge management initiatives must be of use to people and be seen to 
have practical applications.  
 
• There is no formal knowledge capture or transfer processes in global Nissan. 
 
• A suggested first step in managing knowledge and making the necessary 
strategies is to understand and manage the information on which to build 
knowledge. 
 
• Carlos Ghosn is only interested in the bottom line and this is key to 
understanding the dynamics of how knowledge is currently managed at Nissan.  
 
• Knowledge Management initiatives at Nissan have to be practical. 
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•  Knowledge Management is like any other function within Nissan, it is about 
deliverables and Knowledge Maps are the frameworks for developing the 
necessary cultural mindsets to deliver company objectives.   
 
11.3.1.8  Organisational Learning at Nissan 
 
• The key to organisational learning and knowledge capture within Nissan are 
the Master Schedules. These schedules are the gateways or frameworks to help 
the company mine for information. 
 
• Learning is sometimes compromised by perceptions of individual and 
organisational identities and challenging these identities can be threatening 
because often, our self perception is different to how others see us. 
 
• Japanese Managers in NTC do not see the need for processes because it is all 
captured “in the minds of the engineers.”  
 
• In the West “offered” is often a euphemism for “told” but that is not always 
the case in NTC. The word of NTC General Managers is sacrosanct. These are 
all-powerful people who are charged with delivery and how they manage their 
resource is their prerogative which leads to inefficiencies due to lack of 
standardisation. 
 
• Nissan Technical Centre Japan relies heavily on OJT (on the job training) to 
ensure quality of design and Japanese seniors and managers take the 
responsibility of training their staff upon themselves.   
 
• In NTC, there is no standard process for Design Reviews; engineers learn 
what is acceptable from their seniors and managers through on the job training. 
The social processes of holding a design review, manifest themselves 
externally first and then act as a conduit for knowledge sharing and creation 
and are internalised through a transformational process. During socialisation, 
individuals share experiences and develop common mental models. 
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• Generally, NTCE (British) engineers tend to want to be sent on training 
courses and to collect the associated certificate of attendance and learning. 
British managers and seniors also expect the company to provide the 
necessary level of tuition.   
 
• The Japanese approach to learning and more especially, the associated self-
discipline does not necessarily apply outside of NTC. 
 
• On the job training is a culture whereby engineers are expected to submit to 
authority. 
 
• Procedures and processes in Nissan are seen as “loose scripts” and it is only 
through talking and working together that people learn the tacit as well as the 
explicit knowledge. Being excluded from these networks curtails learning. 
 
• Loose scripts are a predetermined cultural control which emphasises the 
different ways power is reflected in procedures in Japan and the UK. Japanese 
procedures perpetuate a network of relationships where the power remains 
with the chief stakeholders whereas the British procedures have an 
authoritative function where the power is embodied within the issuing 
authority.  
 
• NTC job manuals are not necessarily about learning and standardization.  
They are a deliberate ploy to control the new starters and mid-career scouts.  It 
tells them who the company recognizes as the subject matter expert and 
introduces them to the subject with a basic level of knowledge and then 
expects them to learn through building a relationship with the subject matter 
experts. If they fail to perform or conform to the group norms then access to 
the knowledge they need to do their jobs and forward their careers will be 
denied. These relationships of obligation hold NTC together. It is the same 
strategy the company employed when writing the original Nissan Engineering 
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Manuals. It is history repeating itself, a cultural pattern of reinforcing 
obligations.  
 
• NTC engineers are culturally indoctrinated to think deeply, they are expected 
to understand the detail, whilst an NTCE engineer’s learning tends to be 
reactive and linear, both forms of learning are reflections of different 
organisational cultures.  
 
• Nissan work practices have been compared with those of Toyota and it has 
been shown that whereas Toyota tightly control and manage their process 
Nissan has relied on individuals or groups of individuals to deliver. Toyota’s 
knowledge seems to be in the process, Nissan’s knowledge is in its people.  
 
• Nissan Japan’s more open approach to recruitment is altering the Japanese 
approach to self promotion and self enhancement.  
 
• NTCE British engineers want a procedure in order to understand and debate 
what is expected of them and they expect to be given all the information to do 
the job and understanding why is an important part of the process of learning. 
The view of Japanese management is somewhat different, as they expect 
British employees to act within predetermined guidelines and do not 
understand why they should need to know about something that has been 
decided by the management on their behalf. The engineers should trust that the 
company (working through the senior management) have taken everything 
into account before asking the engineers to do something. 
 
• NTCE engineers react to problems, one action leads to a counter action with 
shallow, loosely linked thoughts. Problems are solved quickly but the depth of 
thought is sometimes lacking. They are prized for getting the job done. It is a 
competition to see who can do what and indicative of an individualistic culture.  
 
• NTC engineers have been culturally programmed to think more deeply. Their 
understanding is regularly challenged through the learning process. 
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11.3.2  Practical Contributions to Knowledge: Insights relating to the 
implementation of the strategy 
 
The practical contribution to knowledge is in providing practical insights for the 
research academic and a sound method and reflective insights for knowledge 
management practitioners and includes the following  
 
• It would be a useful frame of reference for researchers and practitioners to 
identify if other organisations develop their strategies and adopt practices 
taken from history. This knowledge would help them analysis change and 
plan interventions. 
 
• Compare and contrast the meaning and boundaries of employee obligations in 
a multi cultural context and its effect on organisational development. 
 
• To understand how the way in which society is organised impacts the 
organisation and organisational behaviour especially in a global context 
 
• Consider the effect of how organisational cultural norms of making 
presentations and holding meetings manifest themselves in a global 
organisation.    
 
• Understand the cultural expectations of organisational procedures and how 
they impact learning. 
 
• Understand the effects of body language in a global setting.   
 
• Understand what the word “practical” actually means in the context of their 
work and who makes the judgement as to practicality to ensure research time 
is not wasted 
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• Understand that learning is sometimes compromised by perceptions of 
individual and organisational identities and challenging these identities can 
undermine charge initiatives.  
  
• Understand the cultural expectations of training in any given organisational 
setting when making and implementing training and learning strategies 
 
• Understand the culturally mediated affirmative meanings of Recognition, 
Respect, Reward, Trust, Support, Safety and Relationships in the organisations 
in which they work 
  
• Understand how the absence of a strong philosophy or the visible embodiment 
of a founder has on corporate culture and vice versa.  
 
• Understand how “self” is negotiated in a cultural context and how that impacts 
organisational behaviour 
 
• Recognise that organisational cultures can become dysfunctional  
  
• Understand how national and organisational cultures affect learning and an 
individual’s sense of self respect.  
 
• In the years to come it would be interesting to investigate what remains of the 
Ghosn legacy, or rather how that legacy, which pitches the needs of the 
individual against the collective, has been assimilated into the organisational 
culture 
 
• Recognise that knowledge management has to encompass and improve 
business processes. These processes can be codified and articulated as 
business practices or they can be the less understood processes of how human 
beings relate to each other in organisations. These processes are conduits of 
business practice and traditions. Continually reflecting on process is the way 
we generate meaning together. The organisation must continually reconstruct 
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their nature in order to keep them alive and remain sensible in the face of rapid 
global change.   
 
11.4  Implications for Further Research 
  
The study has shown why it is necessary to introduce standards and frameworks to 
facilitate knowledge management, organisational learning and change in order to raise 
the capability of the company. The areas for future research arising from this thesis lie 
both within the company and the academic community.  In terms of the former this 
work is primarily concerned with how the company (NTCE) continually adapts the 
OAK Methodology to work within and across cultural contexts and its ability to 
develop the Model for Organisational Efficiency. Knowledge management and 
organisational learning are multi-dimensional processes that cross organisational 
boundaries and impact people. The study needs to be broadened to determine the 
relationships between learning and the exploitation or utilization of knowledge to 
understand better how knowledge management and learning not only increases 
capability but how it can be measured to demonstrate improved organisational 
performance. Early indications, of work with an Indian company, are that these 
measures should be understood in a cultural context.  In comparison to Europeans the 
Indians require more detailed knowledge maps which will be followed to the letter. 
More work also needs to be undertaken to understand the learning process and the 
cultural and cross cultural constructs that influence knowledge and its uses in different 
contexts. 
 
It would be useful to use this work as a reference point to pilot and demonstrate the 
measurable benefits of creating and maintaining an in-house team of action 
researchers within Nissan. This team would regularly interact with academia and 
supply them with case material. The academics in turn could provide them with 
theory, methods and comparative case studies (Figure **). This iterative knowledge 
cycle of learning would benefit both parties but most importantly it would show how 
industry and academia could practically work together.  The author imagines that the 
team would comprise of anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, engineers, 
information technology specialists, auditors and change managers but the study would 
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begin to determine the actual skill mix and necessary level of skill of such a team and 
how it interfaces with both the organisation and academia.  
 
NISSAN 
• Action Learning 
• Case Material 
ACADEMIA 
• Case Study Comparisons 
• Theory 
• Methods 
Knowledge 
Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1: Knowledge Cycle between Nissan and Academia 
 
This leads into the next area of further study which is to determine what makes a 
subject matter expert and suggest ways to ensure that the level of expertise is 
demonstrably maintained in a global organisational setting. This will become 
increasingly important in the age of the transient knowledge worker in ensuring the 
organisation retains the skills it needs to remain competitive. It would also be useful 
to study the impact of introducing Japanese work practices like Kaizen into western 
organisations, show how the understanding of these practices have been interpreted 
and determine if over a period of time they have been counterproductive in 
undermining national and organisational strengths. This work could also be used as a 
reference point in understanding and comparing how Toyota and Honda manage their 
design processes and more generally, for looking at the impact that organisational 
cultures have on design reviews in the automotive industry.  
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Appendix 3: Kaizen Interviews 
 
Kaizen KG241104 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I’ve got a set of questions that are quite easy to work through.  Has your attitude 
towards this activity changed since you began? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Of course - it had to do. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Right.  Good.  Excellent.  And how has your attitude changed?  How did you feel at the 
start – at the start of the kaizen activity? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Mixed really because been here, seen it before, seen things, peered into the wilderness 
and disappeared.   Positive because it seemed to come from Dave who has a level who 
could get things done so was brought in at a higher level.  So mixed feelings, but 
positive because everybody was going to be working towards the same goal, albeit at 
the time that the goal was they would improve - how we’ll get there was a bit hazy - but 
it wasn’t actually told how hazy it would be. 
   
 
Interviewer: 
 
Right.  How do you feel now about it? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Now I think the pilots and the groups have overtaken the management.  The 
management can’t keep up with us.  So what was their initiative?  If the people who’d 
been tasked with it, have fed it down, run with it, and do quite a lot of good work, 
managed to get people to put input into it, but now the management has failed us 
because the things that were said would be done don’t seem to be happening. 
 
Interviewer: 
Comment: Respect 
Comment: Support 
 
Management being who? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well the haziness of how it’s happening – the haziness kind of moves on from one level 
to another and now we’ve got 11 stakeholders, but that’s all hazy how we are going to 
do that.  So we keep running and taking it as far as we can and then it just seems to 
come to a stop.  For us we’ve got the group in Spain and the group here.  And of course 
Paul wanted it to be a shared activity but that couldn’t be until it had been rolled out in 
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Spain, which wasn’t in the control of the kaizen pilot or the kaizen pilot group, so I feel 
that we could have been supported better. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
So it’s a kind of split site problem.  Where would this support come from now you need 
it? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I suppose it should come from Knowledge Management because initially it was said 
that they would roll out to make Spain the same as us and that didn’t happen.  So now 
you have got different levels, split site, you’ve got different levels instead of it being 
carried along at the same speed.  From that being the situation – you have got a two-tier 
system - haven’t you?  It was said at the beginning, at the kick-off, that we must 
consider Spain – that they’re as important as us.  If I was in Spain and knew all this 
activity was going on and hadn’t been rolled out to me, I would feel a second-class 
citizen. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
And what kind of hands-on effect has that had with the activities? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
None, because they’ve just been here on this site.  But once it’s rolled out to them, then 
it’s going to change and maybe it would have been more acceptable to get them earlier 
on.   
 
Interviewer: 
 
So what you’ve done independently on this site is going to change when Spain gets 
involved, possibly? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Probably, but to what extent or however I don’t know. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How do you feel about that? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Let down.  Disappointed.  That’s what I mean, it was all feisty and fighting at the 
beginning – it’s just kind of petered out. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Comment: Support 
Comment: Relationships 
Comment: Trust 
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Is there anything specifically that is missing from what’s been done that would have 
solved that problem and the feeling of being disappointed and let down.  What is 
missing from the activity that gives you [indecipherable]? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
More security.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
Can you give me a concrete example? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I know it’s a pilot that goes a bit like how the wheel turns as it goes along the road. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
So, why?  Would you say you have a kind of minimal expectation of what structure you 
should have for a pilot now and it hasn’t come up to the minimum expectation? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I think that something that had been given such a high profile, the direction and the 
support would have been higher. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Question here – has this activity changed your attitude towards continuous 
improvement? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
No, because we are quite proactive on our section anyway to do continuous 
improvement.  I think the benefit was everyone getting together to do it. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Do you think that’s an important moment of it - getting everyone together? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I think it’s good for teambuilding when you’ve got new members in a team or those 
who haven’t been there so long and two are not so experienced, not necessarily in the 
role that they do, but in the Nissan me kind of speak, how it’s done at Nissan. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How did the methodology develop throughout the activity? 
Comment: Safety 
Comment: Recognition 
Comment: Relationships 
Comment: Relationships 
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Interviewee: 
 
Basically as you went along.  You are basically left to it, saying this is a knowledge map, 
make a knowledge map and know what criteria was to meet if the knowledge map was 
for somebody like a brand new baby kind of thing.  Someone who had a little 
knowledge, somebody who had in-depth knowledge, so you had decide yourself which 
level to pitch it at.  It just developed as we went along basically - what worked for us 
and what didn’t.  But nobody said that’s wrong. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Right.  Nobody on your side - nobody on our side. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Nobody in knowledge management.  That said, that’s not what we wanted, so if that’s 
not what they wanted – tough – because that’s where we’ve put all our effort into.  
Nobody has done the PDQC thing, Plan Do Check Action  - nobody has checked what 
we’ve done is correct.  The things we’ve got, the monitor and everything to see if it 
works, you know what our commitment was – the five knowledge maps - but nobody 
said make the quality of them or what’s contained in them is okay. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Why do you think that is? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I could be really sceptical here and saying nobody else would understand them. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
That’s not being sceptical.  That’s actually possibly highlighting the very point of it.  
Because how do we know - because it’s your work. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes, but nobody gave us the pitch that it had to be pitched at.  If it was a brand new 
starter that it had to be pitched at, anybody should be able to pick it up and use it.  But 
we pitched it at somebody who has knowledge of the homologation but not necessarily 
the Nissan homologation of it.  So that’s how we pitched it at. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How did you make that decision? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
We wouldn’t employ anyone who had bottled the knowledge about what we did 
because it’s specialised. 
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Interviewer: 
 
So you’ve customised that for your section? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well that would be the criteria.  Well Tony probably wouldn’t employ anyone who   
wasn’t below a level than that - like an engineer level who hasn’t imagination. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
That is probably why you’ve been allowed to develop it as you have.  Partly because it’s 
a pilot and these are new tools and so they are being developed as they are being used.  
That’s something I worked with Andy Stubbs for a while - on the installation ship map 
and then we moved into the knowledge map.  Watching him work with it and actually 
buy-in to the whole idea because he was dumped in a new section and he was learning 
the job.  He thought it was really useful and I could see so I sat down with him.  He was 
having trouble with the interrelationship map and sat down with him and I was asking 
lots of questions – maybe I should redraw this?  Then it moved into the knowledge map 
and I think it really helped him to get a handle on the scope of the work and what have 
you.   
 
So I think what you said under the veil of being sceptical – it’s not something that is 
intended for somebody from (indecipherable).  It’s a tool for you, for your section to 
carry out the continuous improvement, to know the sections work and to refine the 
processes. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
But you see that’s the first time that’s been said to me.  So that’s what I was saying 
about all this haziness – it’s not clear. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
This is also something that … 
 
Interviewee: 
 
In fairness it’s a pilot, yes, and you’ve got to run with it.  The [punches] it kind of thing 
but you’ve got to have some boundaries, especially when we were told we were the 
pilot for Design and know Design - obviously they are engineers and you have got to 
have A, B, C and if it’s so hazy, there’s no way will be into anything which hasn’t got a 
set A, B, C. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
That’s actually coming into the other question and we can deal with these questions 
together.  
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Interviewee: 
 
I didn’t say that, I didn’t say that, I can’t read upside down. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
It’s happened before with other people.  That question is how can the change in attitude 
that you’ve had – the fact that the way it’s rolled out to other people in the company, so 
Simon [Enston’s] group has asked for it.  They are a support group – quite similar to 
indirect, quite similar to PDS, but there is really a big question mark over Design, and 
what you were just saying is that you know this is a different situation to Design 
Engineers.  The haziness that you described will not go down very well at all there and 
this is one of the benefits of doing a pilot and getting this feedback.   
 
I mean what we’re doing now is just as important to the kaizen as doing Tuesday 
morning activities, doing knowledge maps or anything else, because it’s the feedback 
which is going to refine the process.  If it’s perceived as a kind of haziness or lack of 
clarity, lack of direction, part of the reason is because it’s a pilot and it’s been a shaky 
pilot I would say at times.  I’m tending to come across stuff and recognise things as it 
progresses and what I was just describing to you I’ve begun to describe to other people 
about the position of the knowledge map within the section’s work and it is a map of 
your work because it’s your section, it’s your area.  I don’t see the ownership as being 
within VY1. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
But if you have got all these stakeholders who have to buy-in to it and they get more 
different types of knowledge maps - that’s not going to look very good is it? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How do you mean - different formats? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Or pitched at different levels? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes.  Because they could have a stakeholder and another section could have the same 
stakeholder, but obviously different things.  Ao they would have two knowledge maps     
and they would think that’s different from that – I thought we were all doing a common 
activity. 
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Interviewer: 
 
Again, there is a question mark over the limits of the commonality of the tools and how 
people were taking tools and using them.  When you look if there is a standard form for 
the knowledge map and there is a standard way of laying it out and you include all of 
the stakeholders - and there’s processes and tools and everything else – what’s used?  
Now the level of detail that goes in there I would expect to be the level of detail 
necessary for the section itself to identify what happens in the process and not for 
somebody whose not in the section necessarily to understand it. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
They could make that process itself general if the stakeholders agreed to it.  Or you 
could make it so specific that the stakeholders would never ever agree to it.  So you 
could get a stakeholder buying-in for the sake of just signing but not actual buying-in. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Would that be through lack of understanding of the process, the lack of detail? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Lack of detail, also basically if there’s a problem you shouldn’t need a knowledge map 
to address it. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
No.  Can’t you think of any way in which the knowledge map would be useful in 
identifying the problems? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Only if the management pushed through. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How do you mean? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well this is a way to float the problems to the top because we’ve been fighting for a 
long time we don’t think ……….. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
The use of knowledge maps. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes. 
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Interviewer: 
 
So when you go and level with your manager. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
The manager – yes.  He has to take it on .  At the moment that’s never happened.  At the 
beginning we were told all the non-core activity would be addressed by the managers, 
by the end of August or by the end of September, and we are now into November.  So 
you say that you’ve been slogging away, you’ve being doing stuff and a lot more time 
than it was originally anticipated and it’s like you know that’s it - Oh well it’s going to 
be in the manager’s objectives next year.  So why couldn’t we say right okay we’re 
busy. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
It that what you were told?    
 
Interviewee: 
 
That’s what I’ve heard.  Yes. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
And where did you hear that from? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Oh I have my sources.  Ears to the ground.  Did you know that and also was it news to 
you? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I’m not surprised but I obviously have my ears otherwise … 
 
Interviewee: 
 
But this is allegedly, this is allegedly what’s going to happen, so if they’ve been giving 
it to print in the next year’s objectives, that means they’ve got another 12 months to sort 
it out.  Which doesn’t help us and it doesn’t impress the main reason for the kaizen 
activity being kicked off. 
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Interviewer: 
 
No.  But it’s come about because of a realisation that in order to get a stakeholder 
levelling by the managers – it’s going to take a long time because there’s no one out 
there.  Whereas at the beginning - because it’s PDS only - your looking at a fairly easily 
manageable junk which you map out and you look at the concerns.  I think that levelling 
of stakeholders and the breadth of the area that stakeholders occupy was not really 
realised, and the fact that you are going out and you are going out all over the place, to 
level with people you know Japan and Spain and everywhere else. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Call me long in the tooth, but I mean you’ve seen this happen before and it’s the same 
kind of recipe, and then it always goes so far and then halts.  Because I feel like 
responsible for ownership for the kaizen that’s happened in our group, I feel as if I have 
let the team members down because I’m their window in kaizen.  So kaizen can’t 
support the pilots in doing what it says and me telling the members you know all these 
critiques that we’ve got, the problems that I’ve got, you know, the manager will look at 
them and level them and he’ll take them through and then sort them out.  That is going 
to be totally demoralising.  How are you going to keep them motivated, to do the next 
set of knowledge maps, if they can see that nothing has happened with the other ones? 
 
It’s like you saying to your daughter – you’ve got do your homework every night – 
you’ve got to do your homework every night – you’ve got to do your homework every 
night, but you can’t see a report at the end of it or something.  You say that ‘Oh well 
done - you’ve done your homework - and this has gone towards such and such.  I can 
understand why there’s mumblings from below – people in the activity – but we’ve 
done what we were told but they’ve not keeping their side of the bargain. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Again, going back to the fact that it is a pilot and as it’s progressed I think there’s been a 
realisation, particularly timescales were unrealistic so, for example, you mentioned 
August and September. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
So why are the timescales unrealistic for the managers but not unrealistic for the kaizen 
pilot groups? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Ouch!  Because the kaizen activities are continuous improvement.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
By all people in PDS regardless of grade? 
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Interviewer: 
 
Yes. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
That’s not happened.  You can’t argue the point. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I can’t argue the point.  I can’t argue the point and from my position it’s difficult.  I 
think from VY1’s position in general it’s difficult and some people might [face] up and 
say you know [indecipherable] on everyone’s face.  In fact, me sitting here as a VY1 
person, and interfering everyone and getting feedback, personally I’m getting a fair 
amount of stick - bit by bit.  I don’t mind that because it’s very productive and it’s going 
to make it better. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well, you’re the representative of VY1, you’re not necessarily here as Matt. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Yes, but even as Matt because I’ve been involved in the activities in certain respects. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
So can I ask you the questions to find out what you are asking for them? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Perhaps you should do.  Perhaps you should do because there should be a voice from 
VY1.  We can arrange a reversal of the roles because it would be interesting.  I’m 
actually injecting a little bit of this within the interviews – it will show up in the 
transcript because I feel that I owe some explanation when certain points come up 
because it’s almost from a position as an observer – because a lot of the things I have 
been doing in kaizen have actually been support in that I’ll chip in comments at certain 
points but I’ve been watching the groups working, mostly, and making a lot of notes on 
how the activities have been progressing.   
 
My own perception of my role has been a kind of observer.  A participant observer 
because of course I also got involved and I gave direction where I felt direction was 
necessary or if people asked me to get involved.  But there are questions which are 
beginning to come up now about the organisation, the best way of rolling out the 
activities.  One of the questions is how do we role this out to the rest of the company? 
All this feedback is going towards the next pilot which will be with Simon [Enston’s] 
group and eventually to Design.  
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Now if you look at rolling out to Design, as you mentioned, there are certain aspects 
which just would not go down well in Design.  It couldn’t be rolled out into Design 
other than as a very robust initiative because you’ve got questions about the upper level 
support and the sliding timescales, the revision of the objectives, and when they are due 
to kick in. 
 
There are some parts of the process which have actually firmed up and have worked in a 
very cohesive way.  I like the way the interrelationship maps lead onto selecting core 
and non-core activity.  Then you’ve got to have a common mission statement from the 
senior on behalf of the section which identifies what they should be doing, which then 
gives you what is core and what is not core.  You’ve got the workload data analysis 
sheet, go onto the knowledge maps and if they’re used in the right way, they do serve as 
a kind of dumping ground of information about the processes and people’s ideas and 
concerns are raised. 
 
One of the things you noticed that I’ve tried to make sure is that nothing is lost.  Now 
people have made comment that maybe it shouldn’t go in.  Yes, it should go in.  You 
know you try and fill it with as much as you can.  Now that side of things in certain 
groups has worked really well.  VY5 where Zoe dragged in the two new guys and that 
was a very dense learning experience for them.  I think that’s worked really well.  Then 
you get sort of later levels - they are talking about levelling.  This has come up with 
other people as well.  How does the activity progress it was viewed as you get to this 
stage and then you move on to the next stage?  To this stage and then you go through 
the levelling and once it started to involve, if you like the higher levels, it’s started to 
break down. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
It’s like baking a cake is’t it? You bake the cake and when it comes time to put it in the 
oven and you don’t know what temperature it needs to be put in and how long for, well 
it’s pointless baking the cake and I think that’s where we are at the moment. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Right. That’s a good point because at least one other person has mentioned it and then 
it’s a problem because its certain groups which have been progressing faster than others 
are at that stage and one of the problems is that there is a difference in progress rate and 
so your group and Zoe’s group at the head of the pack and everyone’s been doing 
exactly want they needed to be doing. Work through the methods exactly as they should 
have done but because other groups are slower and they are still embroiled in the need 
to actually dragging out details of the process and it’s been quite difficult.  I think that 
all the attention been on baby sitting those groups, getting them up to this level and the 
idea that, whoops, you know we need to start levelling now hasn’t been looked into as 
much detail as actually dragging the other groups along. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
But it was known at the beginning that levelling was involved. 
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Interviewer: 
 
I don’t know what the detailed process was intended for.  I think part of the reason was 
that we weren’t involved in the levelling.  I think because the levelling is done between 
groups of management, you’ve got the situation where you should be able to take what 
you’ve got from the front end of the kaizen procedure and you sent it to the manager 
and it is levelled with the stakeholders. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Because I don’t think kaizen is an excuse because we were told that we had to have  
four hours a week for kaizen but we committed that and we stood by it. Now managers 
use the excuse that they don’t have the time I think.  It stinks because they told us that 
we had to have …. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Is that the …… 
 
Interviewee: 
 
No. No. I haven’t been told that’s the reason. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
But no is it that the impression that you got.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
But that’s the feeling yeah that’s the impression that comes across that they are too busy 
doing other things. Fair enough I am not saying that they are not busy but they  still 
expected that the staff to commit.  It’s easy for them to say yes you have to do that for 
four hours a week because I am telling you I am your manager and you have got to 
support it . But when it comes to them putting some time in, I mean how many weeks as 
it been going on for that we’ve putting four hours?  I mean the pilots are doing more 
than that a week by the time you work overtime, and look into things what have you. So 
that’s easily double for me and for the managers not to spend some time proportioned to 
what their staff have, it comes over as a very unsupportive example. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
What’s the solution to that?  I mean how can the managers get over that. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
But you see that it I’m not party to what goes on at the higher level and how the level is 
going to be doing, and what’s expected from them to do that. All I know is that we’ve 
put a lot of hard work in and people will lose interest. 
 
Interviewer: 
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Right so it’s the motivational thing. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Yes it’s a motivational thing because we’ve have been tasked to that - we’ve done that. 
Those who tasked us to do it should come some way to doing what they were tasked 
with when it was kicked off. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Yes. I understand your position, you are not the first person to mention [indecipherable]. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yeah because I mean I’ll be glad then and motivate them and told them.  In some ways 
it’s been hard going sitting here - I don’t want to be here - I ‘ve got this to do and that to 
do and the other - like tough – we’ve have been told this is what we’re doing so we 
might as well just get on with it.  You know, it’s like a dog’s backside, it’s not going to 
make any difference, you’ve still got to sit here. They know - okay you think - but they 
go in and they do put back [comments] in every - well you’ve seen them all work really 
really hard and for that not to be supported by bid time from them because they said it 
had to be done. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Do you think this attitude is shared?  If it is, who else has a similar attitude? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well it’s not for me to say what people’s personal thoughts and feelings are, but I would 
imagine anyone whose took ownership of the kaizen within their group the same way as 
me - when they come to the stage that we’re at - they should feel the same. So I think 
it’s all just waiting there to come along when everybody gets at the same stage - well 
you think well what happens next kind of thing?  So I think it’s just something that’s 
waiting to happen to everyone.  Unless the pilots are the same people who say right they 
have to deliver but that’s what happens and I ‘m not bothered by the people who are 
driving the rule every week.   But I would like to think that nobody is like that. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Me too actually, because it has been quite an intense activity in that a lot of hours have 
been put into it.  I understand and share your frustration in that there have been 
situations where there seems to have been a lack of direction at certain times. It’s more 
or less  trundled on.  Well I think the levelling element has produced a problem because 
of a realisation of how big it is. 
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Interviewee: 
 
Because basically we are stonewalled now - once you get to that point you’re 
stonewalled.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
Because you’ve done the knowledge maps, you’ve shown concerns out there. You need 
to take it on.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
I’m not dragging everybody into a role that falls on a Tuesday when we’ve done what 
we set out to do just for the sake of Oh this is kaizen Tuesday, because that’s silly.  
That’s another thing that still cheeses people off - we go along, and fair enough, for all 
the people who’ve got different responsibility afternoons, Tuesday afternoons, but 
there’s still people sitting there and it would be interesting to know how many people in 
PDS have not been involved in a kaizen meeting.  I would say more people than would 
be healthy, because if it was a PDS activity they should have all been involved.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
At some point I heard temps and contractors weren’t expected to do it. Now I can’t 
remember where I heard that but there was at some point there was a question about 
surely everyone in the section should be doing it.  I believe at the outset the intention 
was from the very top, that’s Dave Waddle, because he wants to know what goes on in 
PDS, and therefore the logical thing to do is to get everyone involved in it because then 
you do get the input of everyone.  You truly find out everywhere, everything that is 
going on, and if they used in the same way that your group is used in – this comes from 
the interrelationship map, a complete interrelationship map, the knowledge maps, 
because you do have everyone’s input. Even the sections that had a set of people who 
were identified - I think this was part of the senior’s job to identify who should be 
involved in it.  I think in the end it was decided at the senior level who would be 
involved in it.  I do believe at the very initial stages, there was an attitude that really 
everyone should be involved in it because if you want to find out what’s going on in the 
department, you really have to involve everyone - it doesn’t matter if they are a temp - 
they are actually working as hard as everyone else, or a contractor. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
They could have been here years and have the most experience. I understand that the 
decision should you know, not cart blanche if you are a temp, if you know what I mean.  
If you’re a contractor, again I think it’s probably a case by case - that’s fair enough - but 
when permanent staff that have not been involved, to take that out of the equation. 
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Interviewer: 
 
And to throw it back on you - how does that affect your attitude towards the activity?     
     
Interviewee: 
 
Well, it‘s a case of like - we’ve got these rules - this is what’s happening - but  Ah!    
       
Interviewer: 
 
But Ah!  Some people aren’t subjected to the rules.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes and you can come in with the black skirt on when it’s got to be a green skirt but 
that’s alright you can get away with it. Even though I told you that you had to wear that 
colour. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
And how do you think that particular attitude affects the activity? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Greatly I think, because there are no consequences for them who don’t participate. The 
consequences I know you are going to say when they don’t have their knowledge maps 
and they don’t have their critique.  Yes, but our section was running perfectly well 
before we had any knowledge maps and critique and we still went and did it.  I am not 
saying that the section is perfect, there is always room for improvement. But when you 
hear and you see things going on you know that other sections aren’t working like they 
should do. But there is no consequences because they don’t do the activity.  We should 
be the ones who are doing it mostly than anybody else. So what’s the balance of the 
scales on that? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
So why do you think that has happened? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Because some people are more responsible - some people want to take on what they see 
as a good tool, a good thing to do and he got everybody to buy-in to it. You know he 
was involved to say this is what we need to do, why we need to do it. Yeah okay so of 
the people who are not doing it - are they being disrespectful or what? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
What do you think? 
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Interviewee: 
 
I don’t really know. I just know that it really pisses off my guys and if it pisses them off 
- it pisses me off.  So I don’t know how that’s been addressed because there hasn’t  
seemed to be any consequences and then they don’t get involved.  So is it the good 
children?  Always doing what they are told - and they get on with it - and that’s alright 
you know that fine - but the other ones can just like play truant. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
From your experience what would you say ? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I’d say, ‘You’re not getting away with it’. So what’s the point? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Again from your experience, is there anything different with the way the kaizen activity 
has approached this and also should there be anything different? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I think it highlighted the groups who are proactive and willing to take on a new 
initiative and they want to work well as a team and they want the company to do well. 
So they say that there is no other way to do it and they don’t need help, but those teams 
and those groups who aren’t doing it - is it because they are not bothered?  Is it because 
they haven’t got the - I don’t know - the X factor.   I don’t know - is it because they 
can’t see that it’s an advantage and they are not bothered to come here and I do that, you 
know I am just happy to do that without wanting more or making their job better or how 
they work and they are not happy to work as a team. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Are there any roles or elements of the methodogy which have made a difference in the 
groups? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
You see I think I’m quite lucky because we get on well as a team and because of the job 
that we do we have to work as a team anyway. We don’t fail - we all have our 
responsibilities but we all have to come together at the end of the day. So a lot of the 
work, well the majority of the work that we do is always interactive between ourselves, 
like the knock on effect that people do.  So we are used to working as a team, so mainly 
it has to be addressed at the more grass roots level.  What do the people do on that team 
that makea them not want to interact with each other?  
 
Interviewer: 
 
I mean how can you get round that? 
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Interviewee: 
 
It’s up to the seniors - maybe its his role.  I mean I worked somewhere years and years 
ago that this girl didn’t like doing this particular job, so they never gave her that job to 
do. And that was totally unfair on other people.  It’s the same kind of thing, just because 
they don’t like doing it does it mean alright ok don’t bother doing it. I mean to get them 
to work would force them to work as team members so they are the ones who should be 
addressed more than the likes of us who go off.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
So why do you think that the groups which do work well together have been working 
well and the groups which haven’t perhaps had a different way of working how to 
progress so well in this within the wider scope. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I don’t really know because I don’t know that groups that well so I don’t know. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Why do you think that has been allowed to happen?  More to the point - it happens 
because it happens. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Maybe the pilots haven’t been strong enough within that particular group. Maybe the 
senior hasn’t backed the pilot up and told them to get off their backsides. Maybe the 
senior hasn’t set an example. Maybe the pilot is quite happy to just sit back and say well 
I can’t get them in a room.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
In that case, what’s the remedy for that situation? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Well again it was an initiative that the managers all got into, so it’s the manager held 
responsible and it should be knocked back down the line. I mean that’s what the chain 
of command is there for - isn’t it?  
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Interviewer: 
 
That can’t be denied. Certainly. Okay that’s some good feedback as well.  
 
Going back to rolling out the rest of the company, and say we’re piloting in any which 
is Simon [Enston’s] area, indirect area, very similar to doing it in PDS but also looking 
at rolling out to  ….  
 
Interviewee: 
 
So you are giving them a half-baked recipe.  I wouldn’t want anybody to buy my recipe 
if I wasn’t sure that the cake would turn out at the end.  
 
Interviewer: 
 
So no half-baked recipes? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
No. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Going back to the way your attitude has changed, the critical point within the levelling 
stage, should this [point be] let down.  Looking towards throwing it out to the rest of the 
company, again what recommendations do you have with your experience? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
I don’t.        
 
Interviewer: 
 
Is that don’t in its current form? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Don’t in its current form. Don’t until you know how the recipe comes out in the end.  I 
mean if you buy a car - you buy it with an engine that goes. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Hopefully. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
If you’ve got a warranty haven’t you, I mean you couldn’t have a car without any 
warranty because you don’t know how it’s going to turn out.  I think that needs to be 
addressed. 
 
Comment: Relationships 
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Interviewer: 
 
If you could describe that as a single recommendation or a group of recommendations, 
what would they be?  Think of bullet points.  I only have to fit this all into a 
presentation.  I’m just condensing a lot of feedback but what will come out of it are 
bullet points and probably little snippets of what people have said - and not with any 
names.  There will be little verbatims because we want to show that we’ve gone out.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
Clear direction. Clear the haze and the fog.  It’s got to be clear direction.  I mean it’s all 
right for us here because we’re all in PDS so we can come over and see all about this, 
what about that?  Have a bit more than [goals].  You know I’ll find this and that and 
what’s happened there.  That’s all right because it’s in you own family kind of thing 
isn’t it?  But once you take it here extended relatives. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Uncle Bertie. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes. 
 
Grumpy Uncle Bertie. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I mean if you can forgive your family can’t you, but you can’t forgive your cousins and 
your second cousins kind of thing.  For the integrity of knowledge management and or 
whoever and people who are selling it to them.  It should be crystal clear how to do it 
and what the benefits are. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
How do we prove the benefits of that? 
 
Interviewee: 
 
You tell me because that’s the way to find out. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I can see the benefits from getting the feedback already. 
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Interviewee: 
 
At first, we worked well as a team, all getting together and discuss the critique kind of 
thing.  I mean we know we’ve got problems in areas and a lot of the problems are 
because usually the manager’s hands are tied because they’ve got blocked by Japan.  So 
you know Paul is not at fault that he can’t take it further because it has gone to higher 
levels and bless him he has done as much as he can with regulations and this that and 
the other.  You get it from most  [indecipherable] constantly you know so I feel sorry 
for him having to [indecipherable].   So you know there are some things that are just 
facts of life that can’t be changed. 
 
So you have to accept that as well that you can’t turn back – you’re Moses and parting 
water kind of thing - partly it’s a culture thing as well – isn’t it? 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Base metal into gold. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
You have to beam me in a stick. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Well hopefully from the experiences of the pilot, we can look at things both from the 
point of being realistic, knowing what we can do.  What essentially is there as the 
methodology.  I think its fairly robust but there are all these different questions.  One of 
the biggest questions I think you know coming back to what you were saying is when 
you’re depending then on a higher level - if that direction is firm - like from the very 
beginning - it was good because it was okay.  Tuesday mornings – that’s it – it’s kaizen 
and it was kind of a like bit of a shock it was almost like [feeding through your    cost 
downs] but now it will be done.   
 
Problems exists when due to the various factors and this might be when the realism 
kicks in.  What do you do if you don’t get that higher level buy-in?  How does that 
affect the people who are doing it?  Four hours a week or more, every week, and have a 
kaizen pilot of sufficient strength that they can push people into a room and say okay 
you can get on with this, because unless the kaizen pilot is of that higher level, if the 
kaizen pilot is one of the team themselves, then their position is exactly the same as 
every other member of the team.  Like yourself, you do tend to think well you know 
I’ve spent X amount of hours on this and dragged other people into it, despite their 
complaints, I can remember sitting with people and them saying ‘No this is not just 
another initiative’. We have Dave Waddle’s assertion that this will be done and perhaps 
there were key moments when that’s necessary to reinforce. I think the beginning is 
very important, I have to sit with Mandy Lee who was very very sceptical immediately 
and I said no.  Dave Waddle said it will be done and if you have any problems with it or 
anything else you go to your manager and talk to them because they have been told by 
Dave Waddle to do this to make sure that it’s done and my understanding – and it 
undermined my position – as it slowly began to appear there wasn’t this top level buy-in 
or of the exactly the same kind. 
Comment: Support 
John Temple  409 
   
Interviewee: 
 
It was diluted in some corner. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Yes.  I was saying – no - it is from the very top. You will not be penalised for taking 
four hours of a Tuesday morning out, it’s been decreed that this will be done and 
supported by managers and if managers don’t support it they will have to answer again 
to Dave Waddle.  His position – his immovable position – is like – I’m trying to 
remember who described to this keystone.  If you pull it out the whole thing falls down 
but if it is there and strong, the thing just stays there – it’s going to work.  
 
From what you have been saying it’s not the first time I’ve heard it, you know it’s one 
of those key things because we have to be able to sit there and say I’ve listened to your 
complaints, I understand completely because you’ve had other things which have fallen 
by the way side and been disappointed before.  This time you won’t be disappointed 
because it’s coming from the top, and from the top to the manager’s firm direction.  It 
looks as if it’s going to be at this levelling stage throughout and where it slowly needs to 
be tidied up. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
People have to be realistic that it’s not a cornucopia.  It’s not going to solve all the 
problems, it’s not going to be novana and all of this but if it can help sort out some of 
the problems – it’s worth it.  But the other problems you’ve got to be realistic because 
of the culture, because of Japan, you know, that you have to be realistic. 
 
Interviewer: 
 
I think part of the process of looking at all of the problems, including the unrealistic 
ones, and identifying them, actually helps as well because you can then identify them 
and say there is not much we can do about that, but it exists and it’s actually recorded 
there somewhere.  It might be recorded as a lost cause or a hopeless case but somewhere 
or other you could actually go back and look at that and if it has a significant affect on 
productivity or whatever somewhere down the line, yes, it might come up as an issue.  
If suddenly the cosmos changed then perhaps …. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Yes.  You could readdress it in a different ways.  I think what you were saying before 
how to sell it to designers or customers – they’ve got to have examples, real examples, 
which we do not have.  It’s all theory – you see all these adverts on telly and they sell it 
to you and this, that and the other – there’s no example of what it has done for one 
subsection or section in PDS.  Because it’s hit this stone wall. 
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Interviewer: 
 
Right.  Again, that’s been brought up, other people have said that.  We need a case 
study, a success story.  Success stories sell things.  Your marathon runner wins the 
marathon and you start wearing Nike shoes.  Core blimey, I will have to get a pair of 
those because they won the marathon.  That kind of thing. 
 
Okay, I will let you go now. 
 
Interviewee: 
 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 5: Interview with Japanese NTCE seniors 
NTCE Japanese Seniors Design Review I Planning Drawing Mindset 
Meeting 
Date l Time: January 1 7th 2005, 15:00- 17:00
Location: NTCE Cranfield Phase 1, M501 
Attendees: N. Amano DKR, T. Aizawa DKS, T. Tani DKL, Y. Sewaki DKP, 
G. Sato DKT, M. Takeuchi VEE, Y. Tsuchiya VEE, M. Loader VY1. 
Objective: 
The meeting was held as a semi-structured discussion, guided with a rough set 
of questions prepared by Dave Rymell l Matt Loader: 
1. How were you first introduced to DR's 1 Planning DWG's? 
2. What are the major differences between DR's 1 PD's held in NTCE and NTC? 
Why do you think these differences exist? 
3. How do you prepare mentally before you attend a Design Review 1 Planning 
DWG. meeting? 
4. What are the most important things that you teach a new engineer about 
DR's l PD's? 
5. What is a Design Engineer's role in a Design Review? 
6. How do you judge when someone is capable of running a DR, and what 
qualities do they need (and at what level)? 
7. Can you give examples of good leaders of DR (like Takahashi-san)? What 
makes them good DR meeting leaders? 
In response to this set of questions (sent as a guide), Amano-san arranged the 
attendees and sent an introductory letter as follows: 
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
VY1 Matt Loader's group are carrying out a study into activities to improve DR's 
carried out at NTCE (improvement activities for Planning DWG too). These 
activities are included in the company objectives, and I have received a strong 
directive from Hanaoka-san to promote the activities. 
Although DR activities are being carried out for P32L at NTCE, we can't really 
say yet that we can carry out high quality DR's. 
So, I'm gathering a selection of Japanese staff who have experience of doing 
DR's to consider the questions: 'Why can't we do good DR at NTCE?' How can 
we do DR's properly from now on? I hope you can join to share your comments 
and ideas- why not come and give your opinions? 
For example: 'More time is taken in preparing materials for DR in NTC!', 'The 
reviewer's questions are trickier!', 'Divisional DR's are tougher ... .!', 'Isn't it easy- 
there is no follow-up!' etc ... 
I guess it's difficult to explain in detail in English, so the meeting will be held in 
Japanese. Matt Loader will attend at the meeting. 
Matt has helped us out a lot with translations etc. so please let's reciprocate by 
supporting this activity. 
I have been asked out of the blue to support this activity- I know everyone's 
busy, but please help out. 
Meeting Minutes (N.Amano). 
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Personal Introductions 
Design Reviews create a sense of tension / nervousness 
DR's at Toyota are extremely tough (ML: Sato gave 
a quite interesting impression of a very short, quite old SME reviewer (at SVP 
level- the point here being that the DR was considered to be so important that 
very high level reviewers were involved) who used sharp jabs with his elbows to 
emphasise his 'interrogation' of DR attendees) 
Even in Japan, differences in DR severity 
exist dependent on the parts ... . 
The airbag system DR was very 
severe. 
In a Body 
DR carried out in Japan, each engineer takes attendance very seriously. 
This is to ensure 
that your own parts have been examined to the necessary level (ML: this 
response begins to illustrate the high sense of personal responsibility felt by the 
Japanese engineer). 
This involves a lot of work to 
organise. 
However, 
unfortunately after coming to NTCE, this feeling of tension / nervousness was 
not present. 
Here, everyone 
avoided the awkward issue. Amano-san avoided taking direct notes. (ML: This 
point made everyone nervous of being seen to criticise directly, although the 
feeling was obviously shared by all). 
In Japan, the DR can be signed off and completed by a technically experienced 
Shusa level manager. 
VEE Example 
Testing is done on suitability of 
petrol engine performance. 
There are as many as 5,000 engine 
(performance) parameters. 
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The work in testing is to decide on / 
choose this data 
Are these parameters correct? Should we propose those parameters?- these 
are the issues discussed in the DR 
What are the repercussions of the data on the performance ..... the 
reviewer scrupulously interrogates the background data. 
The reviewer is Japanese Senior (Sokatsu) level. 
At the meeting for OBD, 3,000 items of data were verified one by one .... This 
took 7-8 hours ... 
B 
The checking must be done by the toughest SME available. (ML: this was a 
straightforward description of how the Engine DR was carried out- the VEE staff 
outlined the enormous data collection task and the necessity for careful 
checking. Again, the impression was very much of 'professionals' taking pride in 
doing a job thoroughly. At no stage was reference made to use of written 
procedures l standards.). 
The proposing 
side and checking side must be strictly separated. 
If this is not done, 'thief' 
and 'policeman' would become the same ... . (ML: There was an impression of 
avoidance of the implications (possible accusations) of collusion in the DR 
process- an 'us and them' attitude, together with an element of fear (present 
within NTC Japan DR's, more acute in the case of Sato's memories of Toyota 
DR's) is considered necessary for successful DR) 
Review of DR from suppliers. 
U01 
In the Engine division there is a quality monitoring group, 
and the reviews are carried out there. This is Mr Ooki's (Engineering Director) 
group 
Drawing review 
Phase review 
A review is 
requested. If the review is not passed, you cannot proceed to the next process. 
In particular, detailed checking 
is carried out on changed points / items. 
If the result is OK, 
it is necessary to explain what is needed to pass the review. 
If NG, 
from what can you understand that it is NG? Is this from an FTA carried out at 
the desk, or from test results? 
John Temple 416 
What kind of DR training did 
you receive as freshmen? 
None at all .... (unanimous response). 
The engineers are told to 
prepare materials for DR by the older engineers in their group. 
E 
While not fully understanding, they work hard to prepare the materials. After that, 
they were corrected / revised. 
By repeating this, 
eventually they feel that they have got the point of it. 
Among Toyota DR there is an 'executive DR'. The reviewer's 
name was Suzuki- an SVP, he was a little old man. 
An extremely large amount of work was done in preparation for the DR- one 
whole wall was covered in drawings and study materials. 
El 3 to 4 days were spent in 
creating the materials to cover any questions on how the design was made. 
Of course, there was a 
pre-review meeting, there was a fear of the design being considered inferior. 
There are 
cases where in Nissan the managers are not at the top level technically. 
At Toyota the Shusa level always 
carried out the questioning. 
The hierarchy was Sec. Mgr. -> Shusa -> Dept. Mgr. 
The Shusa 
was a born & bred engineer who had accumulated experience withion a 
particular specialist area of technology. 
El In Nissan this is not the case. 
The managers in NTCE 
have little technical experience. 
It has to be said 
that the disadvantage is the number of vehicles developed (in NTCE) compared 
to those in Japan. 
Reviewers are not 'pro's' 
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If the reviewers are not 
reliable, it will not be a proper DR 
'Report' culture 
l You are always 
trained to consider the standpoint of someone one step up from yourself. 
Part 
of the checking of reports is to learn bit by bit the viewpoint of your boss / 
supervisor. 
It is not necessary to study for DR's (ML 
assumption is that by doing your job well you will be prepared for DR?) 
Standpoint ('ba') of raising your own technical 
level. 
Standpoint ('ba') of being able to 
prove the reason why the design has been carried out correctly. 
The word 'DR' carries little 
weight in NTCE. 
Additional Comments (ML) 
1. Firstly, the attendees were asked to give a brief introduction, including their 
experience within the company. The attendees all had over 10 years 
experience in the company- Gen Sato was an exception: he had only been 
in the company for 3 years, but he had 10 years' experience in Toyota, a 
point that became important as the discussion on DR's developed. 
2. The ability to carry out a DR does not seem to be abstracted from the ability 
to do their regular jobs. Training is OTJ and involves being thrown in at the 
deep end when asked to prepare DR materials. Successive rewriting of the 
required materials enables the engineer to understand the requirements of 
the DR. Discussion after the meeting with Sewaki-san and Amano-san 
revealed an awareness that there is a different level of responsibility 
assumed by the NTC engineers and local staff. The NTC engineers sent to 
NTCE are all surprised at the attitudes of the local staff. After initial surprise, 
the engineers become resigned to the situation. 
3. An element of fear seems to be important in assuring the success of DR 
(perhaps similar to an old fashioned fear of financial auditors?). Amano-san 
believes that this cannot be replicated in NTCE because there is a lack of 
depth to the perception of responsibility for one's work. 
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Organisation Chart of NTCE (Nissan Technical Centre Europe: Integrated European R&D Function) 
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